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INSTRUMENTS IN ACTION 
The Semantics of Instrumental 
Action Sentences in English 
by 
Lewis Douglas Rushbrook 
This thesis investigates the meanings of English sentences referring to 
instrumental action in the physical world. It is argued that the instru-
mental notion, far from being a semantic primitive, possesses considerable 
semantic complexity. A number of recent -accounts of instrumental sentences 
from within the case grammar and generative semantics frameworks are 
examined and these are shown to have only limited capacity to represent this 
complexity. 
The thesis, however, adopts a semantic framework which permits a much 
more detailed representation of complex semantic relations. This framework 
is the 'semantic primitives' hypothesis advanced in various forms by 
Bogus±awski and Wierzbicka. Using the terms of this approach, sentences 
which have been called 'instrumental' sentences in the literature are dis-
cussed and semantic representations for them are suggested. 
In representing instrumental sentences without recourse to any formal 
semantic category of instrument, there emerge a number of notions which seem 
to play a part in instrumental action. These notions, which strike to the 
heart of action itself, include those of agency, movement, contact, and 
causation. The thesis does not claim, however, that these are semantically 
primitive notions the semantic approach adopted is sufficient guard 
against that, nor does it elevate these notions to any formal semantic 
status. Rather these notions present themselves for description when the 
meanings of instrumental s entences are examined without employing any prior 
semantic category of instrument. With this scenario of instrumental action 
as a framework, the thesis t akes up the question of the variety of ways in 
which the notion finds linguistic expression. Sentences representing 
different ways of encapsulating this notion are then discussed and 
represented. 
After an introductory chapter which contextualises instrumental action, 
Chapter 'IWo introduces and illustrates the semantic primitives approach. 
Chapters Three and Four examine descriptions of instrumental sentences from 
within case grammar, while Chapter Five discusses treatments of instrumental 
sentences from within the generative semantics proposal. Chapter Six 
presents the alternative analysis of the thesis, outlining an instrumental 
framework in terms of agency, what the agent wants, and the nature of the 
action itself. Chapters Seven and Eight respectively look at semantic 
relationships having to do with instrumental incorporation and at the 
variety of sentences expressing instrumentality. 
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Chapter One 
AN INTRODUCTION TO INSTRUMENTAL ACTION 
1.1 General 
This thesis demonstrates the writer's hypothesis that the intuitive, 
pre-theoretical notion of 'instrument', when used in linguistic descrip-
tions, refers to a notion of considerably greater semantic complexity than 
is generally assumed. This notion, expressed here as 'something which is 
used by someone because he wants something', is adopted in the thesis 
~ because of the methodological soundness of commencing the investigation 
with a reference notion which is independent of syntactic or semantic 
formulations of 'instrumental' in any particular linguistic theory. Since 
this notion, as expressed above, is not itself a formal category within 
any particular linguistic description, nor, at least in any formal sense, 
the product of any linguistic description, it has sufficient independence 
to provide a convenient datum point. 
A number of recent works have focussed attention on an instrumental 
function in English, either as a grammatical category, as a syntactic-
semantic category, or as a wholly semantic category. As far as its 
semantic content is concerned, this instrumental function has been treated 
in one of two ways in these works, detailed reviews of which follow in 
Chapters Three to Five. Some writers have assumed it to be a semantically 
unanalysable notion and have employed it as such in their descriptions, 
while other s have recognised a degree of complexity and have made proposals 
concerning the nature of this complexity. 
This thesis offers further proposals regarding the semantic complexity 
of the instrumental notion. Whatever may be the status of instrumental as 
an indivisible category in the morphological and grammatical systems of 
many languages, in the semantics of English, it is argued here, instru-
mental is not an indivisible category. Rather, like terms such as 'agent' 
and 'patient', it is an abbreviation for a complex semantic expression. 
1 
This thesis has been an attempt to reduce this abbreviation to more 
elementary semantic expressions, expressions which are not abstracted 
2 
from empirical material, but enmeshed in paraphrases (semantic represent-
ations) of sentences illustrating a variety of instrumental expressions. 
Eliminating the term instrumental from the semantic representations of 
these sentences has consisted in replacing it with simpler semantic 
expressions which, it is claimed, are needed on independent grounds in the 
semantic description. From these paraphrases or semantic representations 
there emerges a generalised view of what it means to call something an 
instrumental expression. 
Formally, the thesis counts as an exercise in descriptive linguistic 
semantics - descriptive rather than theoretical, linguistic rather than 
philosophical, for it consists in the investigation and description of the 
meanings of actual sentences in English. A firm empirical base is thus 
claimed for the study - it rests on the twin supports of two language 
levels which are subject to direct empirical inspection, viz. the levels 
at which speakers have intuitions about what their sentences mean, and 
about whether or not a sentence is syntactically acceptable(relative to a 
certain context). 
To place the thesis in a broader context for a moment, the thesis also 
makes a small, partial contribution to a general theory of action as human 
behaviour. One attempt to establish such a general theory in the social 
sciences was made some years ago by a group of psychologists, sociologists 
and anthropologists. The conceptualization of action which they jointly 
and tentatively put forward is contained in Parsons and Shils(1952). The 
thesis contributes to a general theory such as theirs in two ways: chiefly, 
in that it describes the meanings of natural language descriptions of 
action, and indirectly in that the medium of these action descriptions, 
viz., language, is itself a form of action (or 'rule-governed form of 
behaviour') as Searle points out(l969,17). 
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This chapter has the following sections. Section 1.2 outlines through 
a series of questions the type of substantive issues which come into focus 
in the semantic investigation, with Section 1.3 specifying, against this 
background, the particular aims of the thesis. Section 1.4 indicates some 
of the limitations placed on the scope of the thesis, and Section 1.5 
sketches the terms in which action is discussed, within a wider context of 
some recent philosophical and linguistic approaches to the study of action. 
The manner in which causation is represented in the thesis is outlined in 
Section 1.6. The final section details the subsequent structure and 
content of the thesis. 
1.2 Questions for Investigation 
Describing the meanings of instrumental action sentences can lead into 
oceans of interesting and complex questions. The following questions give 
some indication of the currents which have helped shape the course of this 
study. 
Agency 
What relation exists between instrumental activity and agency? Is an 
agent obligatorily present in the meaning of all instrumental sentences? 
What 'types' of agent may co-occur with instrumental expressions - merely 
human agents, animate but non-human agents, or inanimate agents as well? 
Where an agent is present or implied in an instrumental sentence, what can 
be said about what the agent wants? In what sense is instrumental action 
'purposive' rather than 'accidental'? 
Causation 
The instrumental notion is frequently linked with causation, e.g. the 
instrumental noun phrase in a sentence is referred to as a 'cause' (Fillmore 
197lb,42) and is said to contain in its meaning the element 'cause' (Nilsen 
1973,103). How does causation enter into the network of relations making 
up the meaning of an instrumental sentence? In particular, what causal 
relations exist between the agent, the object, and that which can be thought 
of as the instrument? Are there any characteristic patterns of causal 
relationships for instrumental sentences? And how can chains of causation 
be accounted for in the semantic representation of instrumental sentences? 
Time-Space World 
4 
In the time-space 'world' relevant to the meaning of the sentence 
being described are there any particular details obligatorily present, 
especially with respect to contact, time, and movement? For example, must 
contact, or something like contact, be present in the semantic represent-
ation of all instrumental action sentences? How many 'time worlds' must 
be distinguished within the one time world of the sentence itself? And is 
movement obligatorily present in these sentences - must the agent move, or 
the instrument, or perhaps both? As far as other items which might be 
present are concerned, for verbs which are said to 'incorporate' an instru-
ment in their meanings(e.g. kiss, lick, glue, hammer), what particular 
instrumental objects or object parts are essential components in the 
meanings of such verbs? 
1.3 Aims 
The thesis has the following particular aims: 
(a) To provide a semantic description of physical action sentences 
referred to as 'instrumental' in the literature; 
(b) To provide linguistic evidence challenging the assumption that 
instrumental is a semantically unanalysable notion; 
(c) To describe the semantics of instrumental incorporation; 
(d) To investigate the semantics of different surface constructions by 
which English expresses instrumentality; and 
(e) To demonstrate a particular theory of 'semantic primitives', viz., 
that suggested by Boguslawski(l970) and illustrated more comprehens-
ively by Wierzbicka(l972). The semantic representations for instru-
mental sentences in this study are specifically based on Wierzbicka's 
work: they draw upon her suggested set of semantically primitive 
elements, and their form is developed from her proposals for representing 
sentence meanings. 
1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis 
The range of linguistic data encompassed by the term 'instrumental 
sentences' has been constrained in a number of ways in the interests of a 
detailed investigation of manageable proportions. 
First, only instrumental sentences in English have been investigated. 
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While an examination of instrumental sentences in other languages would 
provide interesting comparative data and a basis for speculation about 
universal features, the demonstration of this thesis demands an intensive 
examination of instrumental expressions in one language, viz., English. 
Accordingly the thesis takes an admittedly conservative position, and makes 
claims only for the meanings of English sentences. In contra-distinction 
to mere speculation about semantic universals, serious postulation of 
semantic universals(e.g. that no natural language contains a semantically 
primitive instrumental category) should involve at the least thorough-going 
prior analy~es of the semantics of individual languages. As far as the 
semantics of instrumental expressions is concerned, the thesis attempts 
just such an analysis for English. 
Secondly, the scope of the thesis has been determined to some extent 
by the range of sentences which other writers have called 'instrumental'. 
Although one of the conclusions of this study is that some of these 
sentences cannot strictly bear the label 'instrumental', all sentences 
so-labelled by these writers have been considered essential input for this 
study and have been examined semantically. That some of the results of 
this study do not coincide with these previous studies reflects the 
different, and deeper, semantic analysis attempted here. 
Thirdly, although sentences with different illocutionary forces, to 
use Austin's term(l962,98), may express instrumental action, e.g. 
6 
statements: 
(1) John cut some cardboard with his mother's new scissors. 
questions: 
(2) Did John cut some cardboard with his mother's new scissors? 
commands: 
(3) John, cut some cardboard with your mother's new scissors. 
promises: 
(4) John promised to cut some cardboard with his mother's new 
scissors. 
to factor out unnecessary contrasts, only so-called 'declarative' sentences 
are presented in this study. These are regularly cast either in the tense 
referring to past events, or in the present or past progressive tenses, 
respectively: 
(5) a. John painted his bicycle with aerosol sprays. 
b. John is painting his bicycle with aerosol sprays. 
c. John was painting his bicycle with aerosol sprays. 
In addition to these general constraints, a number of particular 
emphases have governed the treatment of the reduced range of instrumental 
sentences nqw available for examination. Of specific note is the fact 
that the thesis has primarily concentrated its attention on instrumental 
sentences with the most literal physical action interpretation (for an 
explanation of 'physical action' in this context, see 1.53). Thus sentences 
with a direct physical interpretation such as: 
(6) a. James broke the bricks with a hammer. 
b. Doris repaired her canoe with fibreglass. 
c. The burglar cut the insect screen with a file. 
receive considerably more attention than instrumental sentences with a less 
concrete physical reference such as either: 
(7) a. Fred seduced the feminist with his smooth talking. 
b. Jane used rational argument to convince her father. 
c. Grandad livened up the dinner with his keen wit. 
or metaphorical sentences such as: 
(8) a. John ploughed his way through the crowded lobby. 
b. Marian sawed the air with her hands. 
c. The Prime Minister hammered his point home during the 
TV interview. 
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That most other writers in the area have also tended to focus on instru-
mental sentences which have a concrete, physical reference seems to indicate 
that in some way such sentences are regarded as being semantically simpler 
than the remainder. Indeed, Lambert(l969) is one writer whose semantic 
representations for metaphorical instrumental sentences are explicitly 
based on semantic representations for sentences with a simpler, more con-
crete sense. 
Notwithstanding the need to first provide an adequate semantic 
description of the 'literal' sentences, however, the thesis does provide 
some comments on less-literal instrumental sentences, notably on metaphor-
ical sentences in Chapter Seven: Instrumental Incorporation. 
1.5 Overviews of Action 
Since the thesis deals with the semantics of instrumental action 
sentences, that is, with the meanings of physical action sentences which 
refer to instruments and means, it . is important to be able to distinguish, 
at least informally, between sentences describing physical action and 
sentences describing other types of action. Accordingly, this section 
explains the particular sense in which the term 'action' is employed in 
the thesis, against a wider background of its reference in recent 
linguistic and philosophical literature. 
The sub-sections here deal with the following topics: 1.51 explains 
the sense in which action is understood in the thesis; 1.52 outlines some 
recent linguistic representations of action which focus in particular on 
the formulation of an abstract verb 'DO' as a primitive verb of agency; 
the final three parts provide an interrelated account of three areas of 
action which have received considerable attention, especially in the 
philosophical literature, in the last quarter century - viz., physical 
acts(l.53), mental acts(l.54) and speech acts(l.55). 
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It is not intended that these descriptions should provide detailed, 
exhaustive accounts of the various forms of action. Rather, their aim is 
to present an orientating sketch which will delineate certain similarities 
and differences between the so-called types of action. 
1.51 Action in the Thesis 
In this work 'action' is interpreted at a broad level in terms of 
"doing'', i.e. in terms of 'someone doing something' (or, in some circum-
stances, "something which can want something, doing something"). The terms 
'act', 'action', and 'acting' are themselves avoided as a basis for repre-
senting the meanings of sentences, on the grounds that they are semantic-
ally complex, that they are empirically rather unreliable, and that they 
-would require a counterproductive degree of definition and qualification 
before they could approach descriptive adequacy. 
On the other hand, the term "doing" is, I claim, both widely-accepted 
and well-understood. It is not, however, taken in the thesis to be a 
semantically primitive term. This is despite the fact that an abstract 
predicate DO is employed as a semantic primitive in some current linguistic 
studies(see 1.52), and despite the fact also that, as a consequence of 
Wierzbicka's hypothesis(especially 1973b) that the progressive is the 
semantically least complex aspect, "doing" is here considered less complex 
than "do". In semantic representations, therefore, "doing" will be 
represented in terms of a number of other terms which are held to be 
semantically simpler than "doing", and which are needed independently in 
semantic representations. 
In the remainder of this section I will distinguish several types of 
"doing", and then suggest how sentences containing these types can be 
represented semantically. I reserve until Chapter Six, however, a 
detailed discussion and justification of the characterisation of action 
sentences within the semantic framework of the thesis. 
Three Types of 'Doing' 
It is possible to make a distinction between action and human action. 
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For example, White(l970,2) draws attention to the fact that in ordinary 
language action is not synonymous with human action. Thus "natural or 
manufactured objects, like the heart, chemical agents, the planets or 
engines, have an action, which may be slow, complicated or beautiful; but 
they do not take action, they do not act, however much they may act on 
other things". D'Arcy(l963,6), criticising Austin for equating the terms 
'act' and 'action', claims that these terms are not synonymous, for there 
is a range of bodily movements which may not be called 'acts', but which 
can be referred to as 'actions', e.g. the beating of the heart, the 
working of the salivary glands, the functioning of the liver, etc. 
Thus while every bodily act is an action, not every bodily action is 
an act. On the basis of the above, however, the term 'human action' should 
properly embrace not only something which someone does, but also these 
things which the body is 'doing' . . It does not normally, however. 'Human 
action' is generally construed as the former only - as something which 
someone does, and the term 'action' itself is understood as having the 
same meaning in its non-taxonomic use by philosophers. 
The thesis adopts the same approach in using the term 'action' to 
refer to that sub-class of actions describable in terms of "someone doing 
something", rather than merely "doing", for the distinctions mentioned by 
D'Arcy and White can be represented using the term "doing" also. Thus 
10 
there is both an agentive "doing", representing the case where someone acts, 
or takes action, illustrated in the following sentences: 
(9) a. John was doing something with the lawnmower. 
b. What the Treasurer is doing to the economy defies description. 
c. Supporting the Labor Party is something you'll never find me 
doing. 
d. John's been doing some pretty hard thinking lately. 
and a non-agentive "doing", as when something has an action, or acts on 
something. This is illustrated by the following sentences: 
(10) a. The tap began leaking yesterday and it's still doing it today. 
b. The frost was doing enormous damage to the seedlings. 
c. What the car's been doing lately is stalling every time you 
depress the accelerator. 
In addition to the above two types of "doing", there is also, it 
seems to me, a third type of "doing". This would be characterised as non-
agentive, and non-causal, and would be represented in Australian speech at 
least in sentences such as the following. This third "doing" seems to 
mean "happening". 
(11) a. Anything doing at the club tonight? 
b. There's nothing doing at the club tonight, mate. 
There is a nice contrast possible between the first and third types, viz. 
(12) a. Doing anything tonight, Sheila? 
b. Anything doing tonight, Sheila? 
'Doing' in Terms of "Want"., "Because" and "Happening" 
The three types of "doing" presented above can be distinguished 
semantically using the terms "want", "because" and "happening". The term 
"want" is one of the suggested semantically primitive terms to be introduced 
in Chapter Two, while "happening" and "because" are considered as complex 
terms but sufficiently basic to illustrate the point in hand. In Chapter 
6.2 it will be suggested that "happening" can itself be analysed further -
primarily in terms of another putative semantic primitive, viz. "say" 
1 
Let us now examine the way in which sentences which contain these 
three types of "doing" are represented using the terms "want", "because" 
and "happening". An important difference between sentences containing 
agentive and non-agentive "doing" will be that the former but not the 
latter will contain "want" in their semantic representations. For the 
following sentences, therefore, 
(13) a. John broke the window. 
b. A stone broke the window. 
c. The window broke. 
11 
"want" will be present in (13)a ("John wanted something") but not (13)b- c. 
Sentences (13)a-b are similar, however, in that each refers to two 
causally related events. In (13)a there is a causal relation between an 
event involving movements of parts of John's body and the event of the 
window breaking. In (13)b the causal relation is between something 
happening to the stone(e.g. hitting the window) and the window breaking. 
The difference between (13)b and c is that the latter describes only one 
event and hence there is no causal relationship implied. 
Using these three terms then, and omitting certain technical descrip-
tions which would form part of a full semantic representation of these 
sentences(e.g. about something coming into contact with the window in 
(13)a-b, and about the window breaking), sentences (13)a-c would be 
represented, I suggest, as below. · 
(14) John broke the window. 
something happened to the window 
because something happened to John. 
John wanted something. 





A stone broke the window. 
something happened to the window 
because something happened to the stone. 
(Plus technical description ... ) 
The window broke. 
something happened to the window. 
(Plus technical description ... }. 
A number of comments should be made on the above representations. 
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First, the symbol '=' merely indicates that what follows is the suggested 
semantic representation for the preceding sentence. Secondly, the above 
representations contain "happened" rather than "happening". For purposes 
of clarity, I have oversimplified here, but since I am suggesting that 
"happening" itself can be further analysed(see Chapter 6.2}, this 
simplification causes no problems. A fuller representation would need to 
take into account the fact that a sentence like 
(17) Something happened to the milk bottles. 
involves a process("something was happening"} and a state. 
Thirdly, differences between the sentences with respect to causation 
and agency are clearly indicated. The presence in both (14} and (15) of 
two events(represented by the "happened" clauses) which are related 
causally(represented by "because"} accounts for causal relations 1.n these 
sentences. The presence of a "want" clause in (14}, taken with the 
clause that "something happened to John" is here hypothesised to represent 
the fact that sentence (14) but neither (15} nor (16) is about someone 
doing something. 
This is a complex point, a full discussion of which could delay the 
principal aim here interminably. At this point(see 1.53 for details}, 
suffice it to say that whil st sentence (14) could have been represented 
more 'palatably' as 
13 
(18) John broke the window. 
something happe ned to the window, 
because something happened to John 
because John wanted something. 
(Plus technical description ... ) 
where an additional "because" cements what John wants to something that 
happened to him, this is not done for the following reason. Causation, 
represented here by "because", is understood in the thesis as being a 
relation between two events(see 1.6). But John's wanting something is not 
an event(nor an action or process). Causation is thus an inappropriate 
relation fo r these two components of action, and "because" cannot for 
empirical reasons be employed, even though superficially (18) provides 
a more readable semantic representation than (14). 
I acknowledge a certain strangeness about this aspect of my semantic 
representations of action sentences, but I am loathe to 'fudge' at this 
point either by pressing "because" into service, or by selecting some 
arbitrary relation for which no convincing linguistic evidence exists. 
In Chapter Six, with the reformulation of action sentences which follows 
from d e composing the meaning of "happening", I believe there is an improve-
ment in this part of semantic representations. 
1.52 Representations of Action in Recent Linguistic Studies 
In recent years within the generative semantics framework there has 
2 
been a convergence of opinion, sti~ulated by case grammar proposals, and 
some philosophical formulations of the logical form of action sentences, 
that action should be represented using an abstract semantic predicate DO. 
3 
One account of this is given in Ross(l972). Ross proposes that 
"every verb of action is embedded in the object compleme nt of a two-place 
predicate whose subject is identical to the subject of the action verb. 
and whose phonological realisation in English is do"(70). Thus a 
sentence like: 
(19) Frogs produce croaks. 










produce frogs croaks 
Ross cites Davidson's(l967,95) suggestion that the logical form of 
action sentences should be something like: 
(21) It was intentional of x that p 
14 
(where 'x' names the agent, and 'p' is a sentence that says the agent did 
something), and then claims that "in the syntactic analysis I have argued 
for, do is the English realisation of this semantic predicate"(l05). There 
are several difficulties associated with Ross' acceptance of Davidson's 
formula and the realisation of the predicate through DO. Firstly, the 
formula is semantically inadequate as it stands. If 
(22) John hit the window. 
means 
(23) It was intentional of John that John hit the window. 
it obscures the fact that not everything one does is done intentionally. 
Davidson improves his account(and does away with the logical formula at 
the same time) in a later paper, where he says it is necessary that the 
agent be "intentionally doing s omething"(Davidson's italics), but not 
necessarily intending what actually happens(l971,6). Secondly, the 
account seems to exclude accidental action. Thus sentence (24)a should 
be contradictory if (24)b represents part of its meaning. 
(24) a. John hit the window accidentally. 
b. It was intentional of John that John hit the window 
accidentally. 
Again, sentence (25)a should be tautologous if (25)b represents part 
of its meaning. 
(25) a. John hit the window intentionally. 
b. It was intentional of John that John hit the window 
intentionally. 
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Fourthly, the term 'intentional', with its suggestions of 'thinking 
about' and 'deciding to do' seems to be too strong to characterise 
sentences in which 'someone does something'. The suggestion of the thesis 
that the term "want" should be used in this context has already been 
mentioned in the last section and it will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Six. Finally, Ross' DO itself has an enigmatic existence. If it 
is an abstract representation of intention(but not realisation), and is 
represented phonologically as do, then the doing of 
(26) John is doing something outside. 
would appear to entail only that John was intending something, a counter-
intuitive conclusion. Put differently, would sentence (26) contain one 
'intentional' DO and no other predicate, two DO's(intentional and non-
agentive), or an intentional DO and some other predicate? This last 
alternative, incidentally, reminds one that the produce of (20) is itself 
not semantically simple but would require in an adequate description further 
analysis in terms of at least "want" and "happening" components. 
Ross further notes(l0S) that Fillmore's(l968a) notion of Agent cannot 
be replaced by the notion 'possible subject of do', because there are 
sentences which contain the do of (20) above, but which have a non-agentive 
subject of do, for example; 
(27) What the rolling boulders did is crush my petunias to 
smithereens. 
Ross concludes by supposing that for at least some action sentences, 
particularly those with animate subjects, there does exist a parallelism 
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between (20) and Davidson's logical form (21), and that if the analysis 
implicit in (20) is correct, then it is one of many analyses in generative 
granunar which conform with his principle stated in (28). 
(28) The Principle of Semantic Relevance 
Where syntactic evidence supports the postulation of elements 
in underlying structure which are not phonetically manifested, 
such elements tend to be relevant semantically. 
Taking up Ross' proposal, Dowty(1972a;l972b) develops it in two ways. 
First, he analyses action sentences in terms of Vendler's four classes of 
verbs, 4 showing how the occurrence of DO characterises the activity class 
and most verbs in the accomplishment class, but does not characterise the 
achievement or state classes(l972b,62). Thus verbs in the achievement and 
state classes fail tests such as the following which have been proposed 
(e.g. by Lee 1969b,42) to distinguish sentences which contain agents from 
those which do not. 
(29) A sentence contains an agent if its verb can occur: 
(a) in the command imperative (Slice the salami.) 
(b) in the infinitival complements of persuade, remind(I per-
suaded John to slice the salami.) 
(c) with manner adverbs that require animate subjects(John 
sliced the salami enthusiastically.) 
Thus achievement and state verbs, in sentences (30) and t31) respectively, 
do not meet these tests. 
(30) a. *Hear a suspicious sound at the door! 
b. *John persuaded Frank to hear a suspicious sound at the door. 
c. *Frank carefully heard a suspicious sound at the door. 
( 31) a. *Know something that we don't! 
b. *John reminded Frank to know something that we didn't. 
c. *Frank assiduously knew something that we didn't. 
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Secondly, Dowty suggests that the verb do is a surface realisation 
of two underlying predicates, viz., DO, which signals, as Dowty says, the 
agent's volition, and/or intention, and "some notion of 'immediate 
controllability"'(l972b,67), and COME ABOUT, a non-agentive abstract 
predicate. The did in sentence (27) would thus be derived from COME ABOUT. 
The predicates DO and COME ABOUT would thus correspond respectively to the 
first and third types of "doing" mentioned in 1.51. But the inadequacy 
which I pointed out in Ross' DO applies here as well. Judging from the 
informal definitions Dowty accords to DO, this predicate is still 
essentially unrealiaed in the physical world. 
An adequate description of the "doing" in John is doing something 
outside must account for more than John's mere wanting something. There is 
also what happena(or 'comes about'). Remaining within Dowty's theoretical 
framework for the moment, this suggests that his DO could immediately be 
decomposed into something like WANT and HAPPENING(or COMING ABOUT). Such 
a move would account for the meaning of sentences containing the verb doing 
1.n an agentive context, and, through HAPPENING(or COMING ABOUT), would 
formally reveal semantic relations common to sentences containing agentive 
and non-agentive do. For further remarks relevant to this discussion, but 
within the semantic framework of the thesis, see Chapter Six. 
Finally, Shibatani(l973) has proposed an interesting account of action 
sentences in his treatment of causative sentences which draws from case 
grammar and has a theoretical framework close to the generative semantics 
model. What Shibatani seems to borrow from case grammar is the notion of 
a 'case-like' semantic entity, which he terms 'cryptotypic features'. 
Examples of these features are AGENT, PATIENT, DO, CAUSE, VOLITIONAL, 
DIRECT, COERCIVE, NON-COERCIVE, MANIPULATE, OCCUR and GOAL. Cryptotypic 
features are said to be features which "do not by themselves have any 
phonetic manifestation" (83), their role being to specify the content both 
of Shibatani's noun-like units called 'individuals' and his verb-like units 
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called 'predicates'. These features become part 0£ formalised, complex 
semantic repr~sentations which are incorporated into a generative semantics 
framework in which a set of well-formedness conditions allows only well-
formed semantic representations to be related to surface structure via 
transformations. 
Shibatani employs the feature DO to represent 'indirect causation' 
which is described as the situation where someone does something indirectly, 
as a result of which a change takes place(61). Indirect causation is said 
to involve a representation like 'AGENT DOES SOMETHING', and to be present 
in the following sentences: 
(32) a. John made the chair move. 
b. I made the TV turn on. 
c. I had Mary examined by the doctor. 
Direct causation, on the other hand, represents a causal situation in 
which the agent acts directly on the object or patient. It is said to be 
represented by the specification 'AGENT MANIPULATES PATIENT' (65), and 
involved in the meanings of the following sentences: 
(33) a. John moved the chair. 
b. John turned on the TV. 
c. The doctor examined Mary. 
While Shibatani presents an account which in an explicit formal manner 
seeks to separate and describe at the semantic representation level the 
component events of different causative sentences, his analysis is 
weakened by the fact that there is considerable semantic complexity in and 
overlap between his cryptotypic features. For example, on the account 
given in Section 1.51 of this Chapter, the specification AGENT MANIPULATES 
PATIENT would be subsumed in, not separate from AGENT DOES SOMETHING. In 
addition, the features VOLITIONAL and OCCUR would seem to be part of the 
feature DO. DO, and perhaps CAUSE, would surely be included in AGENT, 
while MANIPULATE could be decomposed in such ways as to include each of 
the above, except perhaps CAUSE. 
While Shib~ani does recognise the possible semantic overlap between 
some of his specifications(e.g. 65), he seems less concerned with the 
semantic adequacy of his features and specifications than he does with 
other aspects of his study. His features and specifications, however, 
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seem to be loosely formulated and relatively superficial. This is 
unfortunate, because the resultant semantic analysis of causative sentences 
can be no more revealing than the initial underlying features and 
specifications. 
1.53 Physical Acts 
Physical acts, sentences describing which constitute the terrain of 
the thesis, have undoubtedly received the most attention in the literature, 
probably because of the continuing fascination and enigmas arising at the 
interface between mind and body. By physical action one is to understand 
in the main action involving overt bodily movements(Ryle 1949,67), called 
'public' actions by Powe11(1967,7) and by Taylor(l966,61) "observable 
actions ... which involve or are expressed in bodily movements". The 
notion of movement in the world being part of physical action is implicit 
also in von Wright's account of action, both in his definition of 'act' 
(1968,38), viz., "to act ... is to bring about or to prevent a change in 
the world(in nature)", and in his assertion that a logic of action 
presupposes a logic of change. Examples of physical action as exemplified 
by such writers include raising an arm, shutting the window, signing a 
cheque, buttering toast with a knife, replacing a fuse, jumping from a 
window, turning on the lights, and so on. 
With some inconsistency this variety of action also admits as 
observable bodily action varieties of action without any apparent overt 
movement, such as holding a hammer, carrying a child in a papoose, holding 
one's breath for sixty seconds, or gripping a handrail. There is little 
inconsistency if one recognises, as von Wright does, some sort of dualism 
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in the nature of action. For von Wright(action is of two kinds - productive 
action(bringing about change) and preventive action(preventing change). 
If such a dualism is admitted, an action like holding 'one's breath is 
understood as doing something which involves "the absence or cessation of 
change"(Taylor 106), and holding a hammer, or clutching one's hat in a 
gale are examples of doing something to prevent the (almost) inevitable 
movement which would result from the presence of certain perceived forces 
(e.g. gravity, gale-force winds). But if there is no movement, how can 
these actions qualify as observable bodily actions? I suggest that perhaps 
what is observable - in the sense 'worthy of observation or comment' -
about many but not all of these actions is either the absence of certain 
movements which one expects as somehow normal or regular (such as the 
expansion and contraction of the chest in breathing), or the restraining 
of certain putative forces which one knows from experience cause or tend 
to cause movement. 
It should be stressed, however, that in representing the meanings of 
sentences describing physical action, one is not representing per ae any 
real or imaginary worlds. Rather, one is primarily engaged on a linguistic 
exercise, providing semantic descriptions for linguistic expressions, 
expressions which can be thought of as mediating between the mind of the 
speaker and real or imaginary worlds. Thus any delineation of a physical 
world that emerges from the semantic description can be viewed as a 
linguistic model of this physical world, arising through the medium of 
natural language. "A linguistic description of any part of the real world 
always remains a linguistic description, and should never be confused with 
what it describes" (Menzel 1970,39). 
As far as physical action i s c oncerned, one topic of continuing 
philosophical debate is that of th e nature a nd description of t h e r elation 
between the agent and his action. In particular, is there a causal relation 
here? Does sentence (34) thus mea n in part one of (35)a-c? 
(34) I moved my arm. 
(35) a. I did something that caused my arm to move. 
b. I carried out an act of will that caused my arm to move. 
c. I caused my arm to move. 
(I omit from consideration in this discussion the sense of (34) in which 
I move, say, my right arm with my left hand.) 
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In what follows I present two theories which hold that causality is 
involved, and then suggest that it is not thus involved in the linguistic 
description of action sentences. I conclude that what is needed is a 
description that does not entail any necessary causal relation between the 
agent and his action. A brief discussion is then given of the way in 
which the thesis represents semantically this part of the meaning of action 
sentences. 
According to the first view, which can be traced back at least to 
Descartes and Hume, we bring about our overt behaviour by first doing 
something else, maybe an act of willing as in (35)b or some prior physical 
act, for example, activating my muscles.
5 Thus Chisholm(l964,613) holds 
that when a man raises his arm "he makes it happen that his arm goes up". 
The principal argument against including this view in semantic representa-
tions is that the suggested paraphrases are simply not used by speakers to 
describe what someone does. Thus the following sentences are not accept-
able paraphrases for sentence (34). 
(36) a. I brought it about that my arm moved. 
b. I made it happen that my arm moved. 
Nor would the question "What did you do?" be acceptably answered by 
(36)a-b, but by (34) itself. As Davidson suggests: ''doing something that 
causes my finger to move does not cause me to move my finger, it is 
moving my finger"(l971,11). 
According to the second view, it is the agent's person which causes 
his actions. 6 There are no acts of will or preliminary episodes as in 
the first view; the agent simply causes it, but without doing anything 
else or having anything happen within him. Thus for Taylor(1966) to 
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describe an event as an action is to state that some agent has caused it. 
On this view there exists a distinctive causal relationship between the 
agent and his actions (more specifically, between the agent and an event). 
It is not equivalent to event causality, and the relationship is, Taylor 
considers, resistant to further analysis. 
Two main arguments are advanced against this second view. First, 
speakers do not seem to describe actions in this way. Thus it would be 
unusual in the least to find sentence (34), said of a situation in which 
there is no external interference and in which I do not use my spare hand 
or anything else to cause my arm to move, paraphrased as sentence (35)c. 
The same applies to sentence (37)b as a paraphrase of (37)a. 
(37) a. Mary sat down. 
b. Mary caused her body to be supported by her(its?) rump. 
The second objection is that the concept of agent causality does not 
explain anything about the relation between an agent and his actions. 
As Davidson says: "What more have we said when we say the agent caused 
the action than when we say he was the agent of the action? The concept 
of 'cause' seems to play no role."(1971,15). While ordinary, event 
causality(see 1.6) can be expanded into two events and some sort of 'law' 
between them(e.g. Wierzbicka's suggestion(l972,17) "x was the cause of y -
had x not happened, y would not ha~e happened"), there is no similar 
expansion for agent causality and no empirically accessible law. 
What can be said of the ~elationship between the agent and his actions? 
The view which I find most tenable at present, and which I have attempted 
to reflect using the terms "want" and "happening", is that expressed by 
Hampshire(l959,74) in a passage worth quoting at length. 
"An ordinary human action is a combination of intention and 
physical movement. But the combination of the two is not a 
simple additive one. The movement is guided by the intention, 
which may not be, and often is not, distinguishable as a 
separate event from the movement guided.. . [My] actions 
themselves are governed by an intention that enters into the 
action and that differentiates it from mere physical movement." 
In analysing action sentences in terms of "want" and "happening" 
(roughly representing Hampshire's 'intention' and 'physical movement', 
respectively), I have of course fractured the cardinal action verb do 
into two components, as if they were simply combined in do in the simple, 
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additive way Hampshire denies. I can only emphasise that, notwithstanding 
the seriality of semantic representation parts containing "want' and those 
containing "happening", the two parts are to be thought of as corporately 
representing what it means when someone does something. 
The question might arise: "Why bother to analyse do into "want" and 
"happening", since do seems to synthesise both elements in one term?" 
The answers here are simple. First, as mentioned in 1.51, there are at 
least three types of do and it is necessary to distinguish which one is 
being discussed. Second, an analysis into "want" and "happening" renders 
transparent certain semantic relationships between the three do's which 
would otherwise remain concealed. 
1.54 Mental Acts 
Mental acts, as introduced by Geach(l957), have to do with such 
phenomena as what people thought, how they felt, what they saw or heard, 
remembered or hoped for. According to Geach, mental acts and events are 
acts and events that happen in someone's mind. Their content is expres~ed 
by psychological verbs such as see, hope, hear and think. Thus the 
sentence 
(38) Peter heard the cock cry and remembered. 
contains a report of two mental acts, an act of hearing and one of remem-
bering. While Geach does not say as much, it follows that such acts do 
not entail any necessary corresponding physical act. It does seem, however, 
that they are always capable of some physical expression, e.g. as Taylor 
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(1966,108) illustrates, I may reproduce audibly a tune which I had success-
fully recalled. The question whether physical acts entail a corresIXJnding 
internal mental act was answered in the negative at the end of the previous 
section. That is, the thesis adopts the view that the semantic representa-
tion of a sentence such as 
(39) I moved my arm. 
cannot contain any mental act causally antecedent to the physical event of 
my arm moving. I don't do anything mental(or physical, for that matter) 
to move my arm. I simply move it. 
Mental acts, however, do not completely square with the characteris-
ation of action as 'something someone does'. One instrument for demonstrat-
ing this is Vendler's(l967) classification of verbs according to their 
temporal aspectual properties. This classification is not without its 
problems, but the broad outlines are sufficient to illustrate the fX)int in 
hand. 7 
Vendler, building on discussions by previous writers, e.g. Ryle(l949) 
and Kenny(1963), divides verbs into activity, accomplishment, achievement 















One sense in which mental acts defectively represent action is that 
only verbs from the first two classes(activities and accomplishments) 
satisfy one of the standard tests for action, viz., answering the question 
"What did someone do?' (or 'What was someone doing?'). Thus in answer to 
the question 'What did the Prime Minister do this afternoon?' one might 
find the following: 
activities 
(40) a. He thought about the current political crisis. 
b. He contemplated the role his wife had played in grooming 
him for power. 
accomplishments 
(41) a. He memorised some quotes for his campaign speech. 
b. He deliberately recalled the Opposition Leader's insults 
of the previous day. 
achievements 
25 
(42) a. *He saw an obscene placard in the grounds outside Parliament. 
b. *He heard a sound he thought was a rifle shot. 
and states 
(43) a. *He felt very satisfied with his political manoeuvring. 
b. *He hoped the Opposition would discredit itself. 
Many so-called mental acts it appears, do not qualify as actions using this 
criterion. They are simply not something one does. 
Mental acts in general appear to founder on the rocks of another 
criterion often accepted as characteristic of action, viz., that action is 
something done for which the agent can be held responsible, can be blamed 
or criticised, praised or congratulated. Thus one could be blamed or held 
responsible for having broken a window if one deliberately struck at it, 
but not if one was pushed through it from behind. 
Although there is some question · about the validity of responsibility 
9 
as a test for action in general, mental acts clearly fail to meet this 
action criterion for another reason. This is that it is not at all clear 
how anyone could be praised or blamed, held responsible or not responsible 
for any mental act which had not been expressed in some way. In this 
respect, the meaningfulness of each of the following sentences depends 
crucially on the content of the respective mental acts having been 
expressed in some way. Extra-sensory perception aside, an acceptable 
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reading for any of these sentences presupposes some expression of the 
mental act in the embedded sentence. 
(44) a. The police held me responsible for entertaining socialist 
thoughts. 
b. I congratulated my roommate for contemplating making love 
with me. 
c. The press blamed the Labor Government for feeling 
unsympathetic towards the private sector. 
The criterion of responsibility is plainly not relevant to unobservable, 
unexpressed mental acts. 
1.56 Speech Acts 
A third variety of action - the speech act - has been brought to the 
fore by the work of Austin(especially 1962) and Searle(l969). According 
to Austin, when someone utters a sentence which makes a promise or a bet, 
or when someone congratulates, censures, warns, apologises or one of many 
other situations, that person has performed a speech act. He has not 
merely said something, he has also done something. Austin continues: 
"If a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that 
he is doing something rather than merely saying something ... 
When I say 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' I do not describe 
the christening ceremony, I actually perform the christening"(Austin 
1970, 235) . 10 
A speech act is thus something which one does, and therefore it 
qualifies as action. 11 The following sentences, answering the question 
"What did you do then?", illustrate . this. 
(45) a. I promised my father I'd mow the lawn. 
b. I congratulated Fred on his new job. 
c. I warned the kids next door to stay away. 
d. I apologised to Mary for my insulting remarks. 
The question remains, however: what relationship exists between s,peech 
acts, physical action and mental action? In particular, is the speech act 
a hyponym of physical action, or a partial hyponyrn, or do these two 
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varieties of action refer to quite distinct action 'worlds'? The que stion 
is relevant to the extent that if part of the meaning of speech act 
sentences involves reference to (instrumental) phy si cal a c tion , then 
sentences encapsulating such speech acts should come under the rubric of 
this study. 
This writer is of the opinion that the linguistic evidence tends to 
suggest that, whatever else is involved in speech acts, there is no 
essential physical action component. That is, while each speech act(warning, 
promising, etc.) may be expressed through some overt physical action(e.g. 
warning someone orally, promising something to someone in writing), the 
absence of any mandatory physical action component in the meanings of 
sentences encapsulating speech acts indicates clearly that physica l action 
is not to be invariably associated with speech acts. Thus I can give 
myself orders, ask myself questions, make myself promises, argue with and 
apologise to myself; I can congratulate, warn, forbid, censure, rebuke, 
curse, thank, criticise and excuse myself - all without any necessary 
physical expression. 
A possible counter-argument might run: 'but since most speech acts 
are expressed physically, we should build a theory to account for the 
majority situation'. There are two points to make in reply. First, the 
premise is quite impossible to validate. Second, even if it could be shown 
that the majority of speech acts were physically expressed rather than 
'internal', it would still be necessary on theoretical and conceptual 
grounds to attempt to broaden the speech acts framework so that other 
varieties of speech acts were accommodated. 
The notion of 'inner' speech acts should not prove as difficult to 
accept as it might first appear. Peirce, in a passage prefiguring elements 
of the performative analysis, lays some foundations for the proposed view. 
Peirce affirms that there is a speaker and a listener present in every 
assertion(l932,191). The difficulty of identifying the listener in some 
situations, e.g. a soliloquy, can be resolved, Peirce suggests, by 
postulating the existence of a listener within the speaker. Peirce's 
suggestions, generalised to include speech acts other than assertions, 
can be interpreted as referring equally well to speech acts which are 
physically expressed and those which are not. 
While there may be philosophical problems about the, as Peirce says, 
"problematical existence" of the listener within the speaker, there is no 
semantic impediment to understanding the following speech act sentences 
which are unspecified as to the physical expression of their respective 
speech acts. 
(45) a. "Now, what shall I do next?" I asked myself. 
b. "Well done," I said to myself on winning the race. 
c. I cursed myself for ever letting Fred join the club. 
d. I promised myself that I'd take an interest in the 
children's education. 
28 
If there are some speech acts without an essential physical utterance 
or transmission, then physical action cannot be made an obligatory element 
in the description of speech acts in general. Similarly the semantic 
description of sentences illustrating speech acts will contain no standard 
obligatory physical action component. Many sentences encapsulating speech 
acts made by and addressed to oneself may be quite unspecified with respect 
to whether physical action is involved. In summary, the important point is 
that not all speech act sentences are positively specified with respect to 
physical utterance or transmission. Some may be unspecified, others have 
. . f. . 12 
a negative speci 1cat1on. 
It should be noted, however, that this view differs from the views of 
some philosophers and linguists about the nature of speech acts. Through 
weight of example and discussion, these writers demonstrate their belief 
that physical acti~n is necessarily involved in the performance of speech 
acts. The following paragraphs illustrate this point and also suggest by 
contrasting emphasis what seems to be a more tenable linguistic position. 
Both Searle and Austin discuss speech acts in terms of a generally 
unelirninable physical performance component within the context of public 
utterance, e.g. the christening, the marriage ceremony or the public 
apology. Thus Austin(l962,92-102) decomposes speech acts into three com-
ponent acts, one of which has to do with physical performance, but all of 
which are 'performed' in some sense. These three component acts are: 
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the locutionary act, which is the act of uttering sentences with a certain 
sense and reference; the illocutionary act, the act for example of 
ordering, warning or informing someone in saying something; and the 
perlocutionary act, which is the act of bringing something about by saying 
something(e.g. persuading, upsetting, annoying someone). Thus in the 
following 
(46) "Not guilty," replied the jury spokesman. 
the locutionary act is what is actually said ("Not guilty), the illocu-
tionary act is that of informing the judge and court of the jury's verdict, 
and the perlocutionary act might be that of satisfying the judge that the 
jury has discharged its responsibilities. There will of course be other 
perlocutionary effects which the jury spokesman, intentionally or not, will 
have brought about by saying what he did, e.g. relief to the accused, 
ha th . 13 per ps anger to e prosecution. 
Austin's locutionary act is itself divided into three subsidiary acts: 
a phonetic act, which is the act of uttering certain noises by physical 
movement; a phatic act, which is the act of uttering words which belong to 
a certain vocabulary and which conform to a certain grammar; and a rhetic 
act, which is the act of using such words with a certain sense and reference. 
Austin's position with respect to whether speech acts contain an 
invariant physical action component is thus unambiguous. "We may agree, 
without insisting on formulations or refinements, that to say anything is 
... always to perform the act of uttering certain noises(a 'phonetic' 
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act)"(92). In three passages Austin makes statements which, on the surface, 
could support a less rigid position. Two of these, a footnote about con-
fining attention for simplicity to spoken utterances(ll3) and a reference 
to verbal statements(l33), turn however on the contrast between the spoken 
utterance and other types of transmitted utterance(e.g. writing). In the 
third passage Austin explicitly contrasts thinking and saying: "we may 
contrast only thinking something with actually saying it(out loud)"(92). 
Although this passage could be developed in the directions of speech acts 
'in the mind', Austin does not do so. Rather it is used to imply that 
thinking, whatever else it might involve, certainly does not involve doing 
something and has little to do with either saying something or speech acts. 
To accommodate these physically unexpressed speech acts within Austin's 
framework it may merely be necessary to weaken the phonetic act component 
of the locutionary act, by removing the insistence that the 'certain noises' 
of the phonetic act be produced by physical movement. This would then seem 
to apply to speech acts which are produced in the mind without the movement 
of certain organs regularly activated in spoken language(e.g. lips, tongue, 
vocal chords, etc.), but at the same time permit these speech acts to be 
'heard' by their author as articulated language though some internal 
acoustic feedback system. 
It is not being claimed that these inner speech acts are not expressed, 
only that they are not expressed in physical action by movement. In a sense 
they are both produced, expressed and overheard, but on a different plane, 
viz., in the mind. Through some internal acoustic feedback system which 
can operate independently of the organs which produce and detect the sounds 
of speech, someone can 'hear' as articulated speech the sentences he has 
produced('spoken'). It is in this context that I suggest Peirce's 
'listener within the speaker' could be fruitfully located, after making one 
modification to the relationship between listener and speaker. In terms of 
the participants of an internal speech chain, rather than include the 
listener within the speaker, it would be more logical and consistent with 
external speech chains to rank these participants equally, e.g. by 
locating them both within the mind. 
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Searle(l969,24) distinguishes four component acts within the general 
heading of speech acts. These are: utterance acts, the uttering of words 
(morphemes, sentences); propositional acts, that is, referring and predic-
ating; illocutionary acts, such as stating, questioning, commanding, 
promising; and perlocutionary acts, which have to do with the effects of 
illocutionary acts and may involve convincing, edifying, inspiring, 
persuading, alarming, etc. It is clear from the meaning of the first com-
ponent act, and from various comments through his work associating speech 
acts with speaking, producing or issuing words and sentences, and uttering 
sounds(42), that Searle also considers speech acts as something involving 
physical movement. His paradigm is slightly more flexible than Austin's, 
however, in that since he does not specifically mention physical movement 
as a characteristic of speech acts, his paradigm could be interpreted at 
a stretch as embracing inner speech acts as well. 
Finally, Ross' (1967) featural formulation of Austin's performative 
analysis also appears to have been designed with overt utterances only in 
mind, although with some effort an inner speech interpretation could be 
effected. Ross proposes that the main verb of a speech act of declaration 
would be characterised by a cluster of _semantic features, the relevant ones 
of which are the following: +PERFORMATIVE, representing that the utterance 
is performed; +LINGUISTIC, indicating that the utterance employs language 
or some other systematic code for communication; and +cOMMUNICATION, 
denoting that the verb concerned implies communication. 
comments on Ross' proposal, see Chapter 2.22). 
(For more detailed 
As a consequence of this discussion and to prevent unnecessary c om-
plexity, I have not made any attempt to account for the semantic relations 
operating within speech act sentences which are positively specified for 
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physical expression, such as: 
(47) John opened his mouth and said "Hello". 
A suggestion as to how this might be approached is offered at the end of 
Chapter 2.22. 
1.6 Causation 
In this thesis, causation is viewed as a relation between events, such 
14 that because of one event, another event (or state) comes about. This 
view is relatively well-accepted now in some branches of recent linguistics, 
though an adequate semantic representation of the relationship has lagged 
b h . d . 15 . h ' f . e in its acceptance. In representing t e meanings o instrumental 
sentences in this work, an attempt is made to incorporate these causal 
relations directly into the semantic representations, and thus to avoid the 
causal ellipsis or over-simplification often found in semantic represent-
ations of sentences involving causation. 
This over-simplification typically arises when someone or something 
is loosely referred to as a 'cause'. For example, the italicised noun 
phrases in the following sentences might be termed 'causes'. 
(48) a. John caused the disturbance. 
b. My teZeviaion aet gave me a headache. 
c. The nuclear warship caused industrial unrest. 
The problem with this type of description, as Vendler(l967,164) indicates, 
is that the noun phrases really represent nominals, and can be filled out 
to show this. Thus (48)a would be ·represented more fully, says Vendler, 
as (49)a, and (48)b-c might be paraphrased as (49)b-c. 
(49) a. John's doing something caused the disturbance. 
b. Some event involving my television set gave me a headache. 
c. Some event involving the nuclear warship caused industrial 
unrest. 
Persons and objects, says Vendler, are to be excluded from the ranks of 
causes, and similarly, table and chairs are not such that they can be 
caused by anything. 
Davidson(l971,10) refers to this ellipsis and also to the general 
notion of causation adopted in this thesis in his comments that: 
"The notion of cause appealed to here is ordinary event-causality, 
the relation, whatever it is, that holds between two events when one 
is cause of the other. For although we say the agent caused the 
death of the victim, that is, that he killed him, this is an ellip-
tical way of saying that some act of the agent - something he did, 
such as put poison in the grapefruit - caused the death of the 
victim". 
It should be noted that reference to someone or something as a 
'cause' may be expressed either in the informal sense mentioned in the 
previous paragraph(e.g. Fillmore 1971b, Nilsen 1973) or formally as part 
of a semantic system. Examples of the latter include the assignment of 
the semantic feature +CAUSE to certain cases within case grannnar(e.g. 
Lambert 1969, Nilsen). While these features appear to be more adequate 
than the informal expression, in effect they are notationally equivalent 
to the former, and no more descriptively or explanatorily adequate. The 
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criterion of empirical adequacy in semantic description demands that 
semantic representation should account for semantic relations in sentences 
in as explicit and accurate a manner as possible. Instead of predicating 
'cause' of someone or something, it seems desirable to identify and repre-
sent that particular event within the causal relationship in which this 
someone or something is involved. 
The above remarks apply only to what has been termed 'event-event 
causality' (e.g. Thalberg(l972,36)). In Section 1.53 I examined and 
rejected proposals for 'agent-causality', under which there would be a 
causal relation between the agent and his actions. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter is followed in Chapter Two by a descriptive and exempli-
ficatory account of the semantic theory employed in subsequent parts of 
the thesis. The next three chapters constitute a critical review of recent 
literature relevant to the semantic description of instrumental sentences. 
Chapter Three focusses on some earlier case grammars, while Chapter Four 
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examines the only recent, full-length proposal for describing the meanings 
of instrumental sentences, viz. that of Nilsen's(l973). Chapter Four takes 
a look at the range of solutions suggested by linguists within a generative 
semantics framework. 
Chapter Six is the heart of the thesis. It addresses itself to 
problems encountered in the previous descriptions, and through semantic 
representations for instrumental sentences draws together what appear to be 
the essential semantic relations encapsulated in instrumental sentences. 
Chapter Seven endeavours to characterise the semantics of instrumental 
incorporation. Explications are presented for a variety of sentences con-
taining verbs said to 'incorporate' instruments, and on the basis of these 
explications, some semantic classes are suggested. 
Chapter Eight investigates the variety of syntactic means which 
English has at its disposal for expressing instrumentality, and focusses 
on semantic differences between these syntactic means. 
Chapter Nine offers a short conclusion and evaluation of the study. 
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NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE 
1
oouble quotation marks will be used to indicate that it is the 
meaning of a particular word that is being discussed rather than its form. 
2For example, proposals which concentrated attention on identifying 
semantically the role of an agent in action sentences, as in Fillmore's 
(1968a,24) definition of Agentive case as "the case of the typically 
animate perceived instigator of the action identified by the verb"(italics 
mine). 
3
other early statements of this include Lee's(l969a) attempt to show 
that do is the transitive form of an underlying verb occur, and McCawley's 
(1970c,62) incorporation of an abstract predicate DO to express "the 
relation between an agent and the action which he performs". Mccawley, it 
should be noted, uses the semantic predicate DO to represent the notion 
of "doing"(l97lb,20). There are good grounds, it seems to me, for employ-
ing what seems to be the semantically simpler term "doing" as the semantic 
predicate. The same remarks apply to the customary representation of the 
notion "becoming" by the semantic predicate BECOME. 
4
vendler(l967) groups verbs into four classes according to their 
temporal aspectual properties. Vendler's description of these four 
categories is in the following terms. 
(a) Activity category 
Verbs in this category not only possess continuous tenses and describe 
processes going on in time, but they also carry the entailment that every 
part of the process is the same as the whole. Thus if John was driving for 
10 minutes, at every successive phase within that 10 minutes John is said 
to be driving. The question frame 'For how long was someone verbing?' is 
said to elicit activity verbs. Other examples are: 
(i) a. Janie was drawing on the blackboard for at least two hours. 
b. Grandma was watering the garden for half an hour. 
(b) Accomplishment category 
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The temporal aspectual properties of verbs in this category entail an 
act or event progressing towards what Vendler terms a 'set terminal point', 
or a 'climax' (1967,100). This climax is understood to result from what the 
agent did, and it must be reached before the action can be called what it 
is. The question frame 'How long did it take to verb something?' elicits 
these verbs. Examples are: 
(ii) a. Mary and Jane beat up an old man in no time at all. 
b. Frank cleaned his teeth in 90 seconds. 
c. The five year old made her bed in just over three minutes. 
(c) Achievement category 
Unlike the first two categories, the achievement and state categories 
both lack continuous tenses. Like the accomplishment category, however, 
achievement verbs involve what can be thought of as a very narrow moment 
of time at which something happens, but the verbs carry no implication 
that what happened came about because of what the agent did. Achievement 
verbs may follow the question 'At what time did someone verb?'. Examples 
are: 
(iii) a. Fred died at 2.30 p.m. 
b. I saw the streaker the rooment I lifted my head. 
c. The assault party reached base camp at midday. 
(d) State category 
State verbs refer to a series of what Vendler terms 'time instants', 
each of which is characterised by the same state. State verbs may follow 
the question 'For how long did someone verb?' State verbs appear to 
possess temporal aspectual properties corresponding to McCawley 1 s(l9"lla,104) 
'universal present perfects', which are used to "indicate that a state of 
affairs prevailed throughout some interval stretching from the past into 
the present". Examples are: 
(iv) a. Julia has dislik ed me from the moment we first met. 
b. I've known that for years. 
c. My mother-in-law has believed in UFOs ever since I loaned 
her that book. 
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5Advocates of this fir st view include van Wright(1968,38), Melden 
(1961,37), and Chisholm(l967,113). More d e tailed arguments against this 
point of view have been put, amongst others, by Wittgenstein(1967,159-161) 
and Ryle(l949,61-66). 
6Advocates of this second view include Chisholm again and Taylor(l966). 
Hampshire(l959,74-75), Thalb erg(l972,35-47), and Davidson(1971,14-15) 
expand the two main points d eveloped in the test. 
7
vendler's classificatio n is not as clear-cut as first appears. For 
example, the same question f r ame is used as a guide in determining states 
as the one which is used for activities, viz. 'For how long did X verb?'. 
States would be more discretely marked with the question'For how long has 
X verbed?'. Second, as the n ext footnote points out, some verbs may appear 
in more than one category. Third, al-though it is said of activity verbs 
that if someone engages in an activity for a period then he is engaging in 
that activity for every part of that period, there are activities where 
this is not strictly so. Thus in the following: 
(i) John walked in the forest for an hour. 
(ii) John worked in the garden all morning. 
John may in fact do other than walk or work, respectively. In an hour's 
walk he may stop to chat to a friend, bend over to re-tie his shoe lace, 
38 
or swing from a lx>ugh or two. Similarly working in the garden can include 
lighting a cigarette, watching the neighbour's wife, or stopping for a 
coffee break. Compare the inappropriateness of the description 'Today I 
worked from 8 am till morning tea, from after morning tea till lunchtime, 
from after lunch till afternoon tea, and from after afternoon tea till 5 pm'. 
Activities such as working and walking can thus be thought of in some sense 
as 'super-activities' which may happen to include other activities not 
strictly 'working' or 'walking'. 
For some other objections to Vendler's schema see Dowty(l972b, 
Chapter Two). 
8 h' · h f th b . Tis ignores t e act at some ver s may occur in more than one 
category. Thus in addition to an accomplishment sense, the verbs recall 
and remember also have an achievement sense much like the meaning in 'it 
came to me that .. ' . . For example: 
(i) The moment the casket was lowered, I suddenly recalled 
her dying words. 
Another verb with a number of senses of different categories is~- As 
well as the achievement sense listed, there is a sense within the state 
category(as Vendler points out 1967,113): 
(ii) After the operation I'll be able to see again. 
The activity and accomplishment senses listed in (iii) and (iv) respectively 
seem to belong to another verb see, meaning something like 'meet and have 
dealings with' . 
(iii) a. For how long has Jones been seeing my wife? 
b. I'll be seeing my doctor tonight for a while. 
(iv) a. Did it take long to see Santa Claus? 
b. It took an age to see my doctor. 
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9That responsibility is not an adequate criterion for action is shown 
by Lee's comments in which he interprets agency in terms of responsibility. 
Lee says in connection with the sentence 
(i) John broke his leg. 
that "in the agentive sense, John was responsible for his leg getting 
broken; in the non-agentive sense it was something that just happened to 
John"(l969a,3). This pairing of agency with responsibility insufficiently 
identifies the agent since one can be responsible for, or take respons-




John gave permission for his nose to be reset. 
The President took responsibility for the execution of 
the dissidents. 
(iv) The coach took responsibility for any damage the team might 
cause, but there wasn't any, so he needn't have worried. 
Further, as sentence (v) reveals, non-animate phenomena may be responsible 
for something, yet without there being any necessary sense in which they 
are agents. 
(v) The tidal wave was responsible for the destruction of the 
village. 
Finally, there are things which a person may do for which it is inappropriate 
or inaccurate to say he is responsible. Thus 
(vi) 
(vii) 
Fred was rubbing his left ear. 
The negligent babysitter was fully responsible for what 
the infant had done. 
The classic statement on responsibility is by Hart(1949). Hart's 
paper has stimulated a number of different viewpoints on the relation 
between the concept of responsibility and action, e.g. by Feinberg(1965), 
Geach(l960), Baier(1970). In short summaries of the principal positions, 
both White(l970,4) and Brand(l970,18) argue against the point of view that 
human action is behaviour to which responsibility can be ascribed. 
lOThe strong inference from this quotation is that "merely saying 
something" does not entail doing something. But observe that neither 
Austin nor Searle wishes to exclude the facts that sometimes in some 
contexts(e.g. when contrasting saying something out loud as opposed to 
merely thinking it) and always in the context of one component of the 
speech act(Austin's 'locutionary' act and Searle's 'utterance' act), to 
say something is also to do something. 
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A reconciliation of these apparently contradictory passages could be 
effected through adopting some form of marked/unmarked convention towards 
what it means to 'do something' in speech acts. Under such a convention, 
for example, the appropriate unmarked response to the question "What did 
you do?", asked of someone who had raced through a burning building 
shouting "Fire!", would be "I warned the occupants to get out" rather than 
the more marked "I uttered the word 'Fire!'" 
11This is a considerable over-simplification, for, as will be shown 
later in this section, both Austin and Searle regard the speech act as a 
synthesis of a number of component acts. 
12 One consequence of the view propounded here about the nature of 
speech acts is that some aspects at ~east of what is broadly conceived of 
as 'thinking' (e.g. asserting, denying, proposing, arguing, questioning) 
may turn out to have a linguistic structure capable of analysis into 
speech acts. That is, speech acts 'in the mind' may serve as vehicles not 
only for 'talking to oneself' but also for much, but not all (there is no 
commitment here to the extreme position that all thought is language-
based) of what is known as 'thinking'. 
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While it is not possible to verify this consequence objectively, two 
independent linguistic points lend it support. First, at least in ordinary 
language, thinking is not restricted to an inner activity - one can think 
'out loud' in sentences susceptible of analysis into a speech acts framework. 
From this, it does not seem unreasonable to speculate that at least some 
inner thought would be linguistically structured in much the same way as 
thought expressed 'out loud'. Secondly, it is suggested that verbs express-
ing all types of speech acts(i.e. both inner and expressed speech acts) and 
the verb think that are related semantically in that the primitive verb 
"say" centrally underlies both sets of verbs. (This suggestion is made and 
elaborated on in Chapter 2.22). The relationship is further strengthened 
by the proposal that the primitive verb "say" be unspecified for mental or 
physical expression, allowing it freedom to occur in semantic descriptions 
of all types of speech acts. 
13As Austin notes "these three kinds of 'actions' are, simply of course 
as actions, subject to the usual troubles and reservations about attempt as 
distinct from achievement, being intentional as distinct from being 
unintentional, and . the like"(1962,109). 
141 acknowledge, however, the force of McCawley's suggestions(l974) 
that causation may relate more than events only. My point in this section 
is to argue against semantic representations in which causation is predicated 
of someone or something. 
15For example, recognition is given to this view in Fillmore(l97lb) and 
McCawley(l97lb), while more studied attempts to represent the relations are 
presented in Dowty(1972a) and Shibatani(l973). I find it difficult to 
understand what Shibatani is getting at, however, in his distinction between 
a 'causing phase' and a 'causing event•. He comments on his distinction 
as follows: 
"I use the term 'phase' rather than 'event' because the latter 
term will be used to refer to a linguistically incarnated entity. 
The terms 'causing phase' and 'caused phase' refer to abstract 
(semantic) entities, while 'causing event' and 'caused event' refer 
to what is associated with real linguistic forms. For example, in 
the sentence John's giving them poison caused the rats to die, both 
the causing and caused phase are associated with linguistic forms, 
namely John's giving them poison and the rats to die. In this case, 
we can talk about the expression in terms of the causing and the 
caused phase as well as the causing and the caused event. However, 
with respect to the sentence John killed the rats, we can only talk 
about the expression in terms of the causing and the caused event, 
since the expression does not have independent linguistic forms for 
the causing and the caused phase." 
The following difficulties with this formulation lead me to suspect 
a mistake or two in the above passage. First, while phases refer to 
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abstract semantic entities, events are said to refer to what is associated 
with real linguistic forms. Presumably these somethings to which events 
refer are themselves abstract semantic entities. But if this is the case, 
and events encode abstract semantic entities in linguistic form, where is 
the linguistic motivation for phases, which now appear to represent 
independent, abstract semantic entities which are not associated with any 
linguistic forms in a sentence? 
Second, Shibatani says that both causing and caused phases are 
associated with linguistic forms in the sentence 
(i) John's giving them poison caused the rats to die. 
But if this is the case, then by definition we should have causing and 
caused events, not phases. Third, Shibatani claims that sentence (ii) 
(ii) John killed the rats. 
only allows discussion of events, since "the expression does not have 
independent linguistic forms for the causing and the caused phase". This 
claim seems tautologous, for phases are contrasted with events in being 





A PROPOSAL FOR SEMANrIC REPRESENTATION 
The formal representation in the thesis of the meanings of instrumental 
action sentences is achieved through using the set of 'semantic primitives' 
proposed by Wierzbicka(l972). This chapter provides an account of her 
proposal, suitably modified for the purposes of the thesis. The chapter 
has the following structure: a presentation of the semantic primitives them-
selves, with some discussion(2.2); an account of the hypothesis underlying 
the semantic primitives(2.3); an illustration of the way in which sentences 
are represented using the semantic primitives(2.4); and some reasons for 
adopting this particular proposal over alternative semantic proposals(2.5). 
Section 2.6 provides a short summary. 
It is as a working hypothesis that the semantic primitives have been 
selected for use in this thesis. Some elaboration of this point seems 
desirable. Anyone concerned with the representation of sentence meanings 
is confronted these days with a wide variety of competing proposals for 
semantic representation. Some of these will be touched upon in section 
2.5. In descriptive studies in general one may either adopt one theoretical 
or methodological approach, or employ aeveral approaches in an attempt to 
chart the phenomenon under analysis from as many perspectives as prove 
fruitful. In this descriptive study, _ the former option has been chosen. 
Whichever option is chosen, however, it is mandatory in descriptive studies 
at least that the theories and approaches be employed consistently. For 
this reason, after the presentation of the semantic primitives in this 
chapter, this particular hypothesis is taken for granted in the remainder 
of the thesis. 
The primary aims of the thesis(see Chapter 1.3) have to do with pro-
viding a semantic description of instrumental sentences. With respect to 
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these aims the semantic primitives constitute an assumed, non-negotiable 
descriptive tool. A subsidiary aim of this study, however, is to demon-
strate, and simultaneously put to the test, this particular semantic 
hypothesis. This aim thus gives to the study an additional, theoretical 
dimension which will attract comments from time to time throughout the 
discussion. 
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Discussion of the set of semantic primitives has an unintended ring 
of finality about it. This is perhaps unavoidable since to speak of 
something, that something must first be introduced. But insofar as this 
particular set of semantic primitives is concerned, the members of the set 
just happen to be candidates for primitives at the present time. Nothing 
prevents further revision and modification. Indeed, in that it can never 
be proved that a putative primitive is in fact a primitive(only demonstrated 
that a particular candidate must be analysed into more elementary components 
and therefore does not qualify for primitive status), this process of 
revision and modification can be considered an essential component of a 
semantic primitives approach. 
2.2 The Semantic Primitives 
In this section the suggested semantic primitives of Wierzbicka will 
be listed(2.21) and comments offered on the interpretation of several of the 
primitives. 
2.21 Wierzbicka's Primitives 














be a part of 
become 
Not all of these are relevant to the meanings of instrumental sentences. 
Some of those that are relevant receive interpretive discussion below. 
Discussion of other primitives may be found in Wierzbicka. 
2.22 "Say" 
There are several senses of the verb~- One sense is that of 'to 
utter' or 'to pronounce' (Leibniz's(1903,490) vocem edere est dare sonum 
articulatum), exemplified by sentences such as 
( 1) a. Say "Aah". 
b. Say "Dad-dad". 
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Another sense is that of conveying thought by language or some sign system 
(Leibniz's(497) loqui est voce articulata signum dare cogitationis suae), 
illustrated by sentences such as 
(2) a. Say what you think. 
b. Say it with flowers. 
The primitive "say" underlies both of these senses, but it is not specified 
for articulation, either of sounds or speech(in Leibniz's terms). That is, 
"say" represents a mental 'saying'. It is exemplified by sentences such as 
(3) a. John said grace silently. 
b. I said to myself "What a poor film". 
c. You could never say that of Mary. 
In Chapter 1.55 I presented independent arguments that speech acts 
should not, contrary to the thrust of Austin and Searle's formulations of 
speech acts, be viewed as possessing .a mandatory physical expression 
component. But such an argument is only valid in this section if there 
exists some verb of communication which both satisfies the empirical 
criterion of not entailing physical expression and is on other grounds(see 
Section 2.3) an appropriate candidate for a semantic primitive. "Say", it 
is claimed, meets both requirements, and would therefore underlie the 
sentences below(reproduced from 1.55) which do not entail any necessary 
physical expression. 
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(4) a. "Now, what shall I do next?" I asked myself. 
b. "Well done," I said to myself on winning the race. 
c. I cursed myself for ever letting Fred join the club. 
d. I promised myself that I'd take an interest in the 
children's education. 
None of the verbs utter, pronounce, communicate, speak, talk, tell, declare 
or assert, however, substitutes acceptably for~ in all the sentences 
containing~ in (2) and (3), and therefore. none would constitute a 
challenge as a semantic primitive to "say". 
It will be obvious from the foregoing that "say" is not to be equated 
with the abstract performative verb of declaration which Ross(l970) 
introduced into linguistics from the work of Austin(l962). Ross proposed 
that the deep structure of 
(5) Prices slumped. 
should be represented as 
( 6) s 
NP VP 
I V NP NP 
I I 
+ V you s 
+ perforrnative 
+ communication NP VP 
+ linguistic 
+ declarative prices slumped 
where "the main verb of the higher sentences [like 1.n (6)] must be a verb 
1 ik e ~II ( 2 2 5 ) • 
The complex of features in (6) is thus a kind of primitive underlying 
verb, represented lexically in English ac c ording to Ross by a nwnber of 
verbs (~, assert, declare, state, tell, etc). This abstract perforrnative 
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verb differs from "say" in important respects. 
The feature +DECLARATIVE distinguishes the illocutionary force(see 
1.56) of the sentence, and marks it out from performative verbs with other 
illocutionary forces(questions, promises, commands, apologies, 
'whimperatives' (Sadock 1969), 'queclaratives' (Sadock 1971), 'impositives' 
(Green n.d.) etc.). But the primitive "say" is not restricted to declara-
tive performatives. Much as Vendler's general performative ~ can intro-
duce sentences with illocutionary forces other than declarative, so "say" 
will be present in the semantic representations of sentences with all types 
of illocutionary forces. "To perform an illocutionary act," says Vendler 
(1972,25), "is to say something in the full sense of the word." 
The feature +LINGUISTIC is employed by Ross to differentiate verbs 
which refer to communication based on language or systematic codes(e.g. 
assert, whisper, explain, write, cable, telephone, signal) from verbs which 
can denote other forms of communication(e.g. smile, shrug, wink, frown), 
for example as in 
(7) a. John winked in approval. 
b. Mary kissed John to show she was sorry. 
c. The war deserter's deliberately averted gaze said a lot 
to his conservative parents. 
As far as (7)b is concerned, in Chapter Seven I discuss a number of verbs, 
like kiss, which I claim can be characterised in terms of "saying something 
by doing something". Sentence (7)c illustrates the not unfamiliar 
situation in which the absence of some normal or expected activity or 
message can itself be for someone a message of some sort. Compared with 
the feature +LINGUISTIC, "say" is understood to be present in the semantic 
representations of all sentences denoting communication, not merely those 
based on language. 
The feature +COMMUNICATION separates verbs denoting communicatlon of 
any kind from those that do not imply communication, such as know, believe. 
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hope, doubt, etc. "Say" is certainly part of the semantic representations 
of sentences containing verbs from the first group; although not central 
to this study, there are reasons to suggest that "say" is present in the 
semantic representations of sentences containing verbs from the second group 
as well(Wierzbicka 1972,17;1974,298). 
The feature +PERFORMATIVE does not unambiguously relate to "say". 
It is said to refer to a speech act, an utterance being performed, and as 
I mentioned in Chapter 1.55 the literature strongly associates this with 
physically manifested utterances. Since "say" denotes no more than a mental 
saying, however, "say" and +PERFORMATIVE would appear to mark out different 
sentences depending on whether or not the utterance described entails any 
physical manifestation. 
As I suggested in 1.55, however, sentences describing speech acts 
needn't entail physical expression. The question remains then: do I 
'perform' or 'do' whatever is contained in these non-physical speech acts, 
i.e. can Ross' +PERFORMATIVE apply to mental speech acts with "say"? 
Conceptually, it seems plausible. I can argue or reason with myself, 
give myself orders, ask myself questions, tell myself things, etc. I can 
also conceive of a mental speech act situation in which I am both speaker 
and addressee. Linguistically the situation is less clear. Some evidence 
in favour is presented in the sentences below, all of which are possible 
answers to the question "What did you do today?" First, there are 
sentences not entailing any physical expression. 
(8) a. I said my prayers. 
b. I vowed never to flirt with that man again. 
c. I asked myself what in the world I was doing in the 
Civil Service. 
Second, there are sentences with adverbs which explicitly internalise the 
speech act. 
(9) a. I mentally promised myself I'd never leave John. 
b. I mentally vowed that I'd never touch drink again. 
Third, there are acceptable sentences which conjoin reports of physical 
acts and speech acts. 
(10) a. I washed the nappies, cooked the meals, repaired some toys, 
and mentally vowed never to have kids again. 
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b. I painted the kitchen, concreted the basement, fixed the roof, 
and promised myself I'd rent my next home. 
Having said this, I acknowledge that there are difficulties with the 
proposal, such as the two which follow, which leave me unable to resolve 
the question. One difficulty resides in deciding what it would mean 
linguistically to perform inner speech acts. A second is that in addition 
to sentences (8)a-c, the question "What are you doing?" might equally well 
be answered in the following way. 
(11) a. Nothing. I'm just saying my prayers. 
b. Nothing much. Just vowing never to flirt with that man again. 
c. Nothing really. I'm just asking myself what in the world I'm 
doing in the Civil Service. 
Finally, if "say" represents a mental "say", how would a sentence 
entailing physical expression be represented? In brief, since I, mental 
telepathy aside, cannot directly(i.e. mind to mind) tell you something, my 
message must pass through some physical intermediary. Thus there is always 
something observable about me when I communicate something to you - e.g., 
perhaps my lips move, or my head nods, or my hand causes a pen to put marks 
on something, or perhaps my fingers move in certain ways. That is, there 
is always something that can be said about me. These movements or their 
product(e.g. a letter) I intend to be interpreted by you as meaning what I 
want to say to you. To recapitulate, when I say something to you, I do 
something which I want you to understand as meaning what I want to say. 
On the strength of the above, the skeleton of a possible representation 
for the sentence I tell you: Prices slumped would be as follows 
( 12) 
= 
I tell you: Prices slumped. 
Wanting you to know something, 
I am doing this something: 
(Technical description, as general or explicit as necessary. 
Here perhaps: 
"parts of my body are moving") 
Because of that there is something 
that can be thought of as me saying: Prices slumped. 
"Can be thought of" is used rather than "is thought of" because you, the 
addressee, may misunderstand my signal. "Thought of" is employed for the 
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following reason. There are many ways in which I can say "Prices slumped", 
e.g. vocally, by letter, sign language, braille, etc. There is no one way 
that represents me saying this. Therefore this particular instance is 
.. 
just one from a set of ways that collectively can be thought of as me 
saying "Prices slumped". 
Wierzbicka(l972,123) has proposed the representation below. 
(13) Prices slumped. 
Wanting to cause you to know it, 
I say: Prices slumped. 
It seems to me that this representat i on is still in lingua menta lis, so to 
speak, despite the presence of "you". To become an uttered sentence, some 
specification that "I do someth ing" seems necessary. True, an expansion 
of "wanting to cause you" could we ll be "wanting to do something that 
would cause you", but this would s till not entail that anything is done. 
I am also unsure about the presence of "cause" in (13). The issue 
is whether an agent, in addition to wanting some particular state(e.g. the 
light to be on), can be said to want various intermediate states(such as 
moving an arm or moving the light switch). A centuries old question this 
(e.g. Plato, Georgias 467E), I take the view here that in sentenc e s to 
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which the question is relevant the agent does not want the intervening 
stages. (I say "to which the question is relevant" because the most one 
can say of many action sentences is that the agent "wants something".) 
Another perspective on this, however, is that wanting(and acting in pursuit 
of) a distant objective entails wanting whatever intermediate steps are 
necessary(e.g. Dowty 1972a,73). If this position is adopted, it is still 
necessary to justify including details of these intermediate steps in the 
"want" part of a semantic representation. For these reasons, I have 
omitted "cause" from this part of representation(l2). (For a description 
of a suggested role for "say" in characterising the meanings of "doing" 
and "happening", see Chapter 6.21.) 
2.23 "Want" 
The primitive term "want" has already been referred to briefly in 
1.51 as one of the terms into which the "doing" of John is doing something 
outside should be analysed(the other term being, for the present, 
"happening"). That is, "want" coupled with "happening" is used here as a 
semantic representation of agency. It will be present in the semantic 
representations of all sentences which meet various tests proposed for agents 
(e.g. see 1.52). Under this characterisation, agents include not only 
human beings, but all self-moving creatures about whom a speaker produces 
an agentive sentence. See 6.2 for illustrations of this point. 
There is a considerable support for considering some element of 
'volition' (interpreted loosely) as a ·basic component in the meanings of 
agentive sentences. Allowing for some variation in its actual formulation 
this element manifests itself as Ross' (1972) and Dowty's(l972b) abstract 
predicate DO(on which I corranented in 1.52), Leech's(l969,215) feature 
VOLITION, Nilsen's(1973,9O) feature INTENT, and Chafe's(l970,1O9) semantic 
unit 'potent' . 2 
In addition, Dowty(l972b,71) suggests the possibility that WANT is a 
primitive term and that INTEND should be defined in terms of it, while 
Borkin has suggested that there is syntactic evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the lexical item want is semantically less complex than 
such verbs as crave, yearn, and desire, and that these latter verbs can 
be represented semantically in terms of "a want-like predicate modified 
by intensifying adverbs"(l971,6). In 1.52 and 1.53 I also drew attention 
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to Davidson and Hampshire's formulations of action in terms of 'intention'. 
It should be pointed out, however, that "want" is not intended to be 
synonymous with terms like 'intentional' or 'deliberate'. These latter 
terms are considered to impute to the agent a degree of volitional 
involvement greater than that connnon to physical action sentences of the 
form "Xis doing something". Thus I am still an agent if I do something 
unintentionally, without deliberation, or even accidentally. While 
sentences with volitional adverbs will be discussed and represented in 6.3, 
it is suggested here that the verb intend means something like "thinking 
about ... , decide to(I decide to do X = "I say: I will do X"?) . 3 
Hampshire seems to make the distinction required here in his comments 
on intention. He says(1959,99): 
"An intention, involves, among other things, a definite and 
expressible expectation of an order of events in the future, 
and is possible only in a being who is capable of at least the 
rudiments of conceptual thought." 
This is not the notion embraced by the term "want". Rather "want" fits 
more closely his comments on a child's movements. He says(54): 
"This direct sense of (the child's] own initiated movements and 
actions is inseparable from his intention in making the movements 
or performing the actions. Intention is perhaps too rational and 
solemn a word when one is speaking of a child's experiments in 
movement." 
Is there any linguistic evidence for the distinction being made here 
between "want" as a semantically primitive term and "intend" as a 
semantically complex term which involves in part at least the notions of 
thinking about something and deciding on something? I believe there is 
and that it can be illuminated by contrasting the verbs want and intend 
in several ways: with respect to what one can want or intend, and with 
respect to thinking, to deciding, and to certain temporal aspectual 
properties of these verbs. 
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First notice that there is a difference between what one can want and 
what one can intend. This difference would appear to be a priori evidence 
that intend is more complex semantically than want. Thus I can want almost 
anything conceivable: my hair to grow, my tomatoes to sprout, my wife to 
leave me, the pound to be devalued, my dreams to come true, the heavens to 
fall, to meet my real self. But it seems that I can only intend what is 
within my power to do or bring about: e.g., to leave my wife, to devalue 
the pound(if I am Chancellor of the Exchequer), to cause the heavens to 
fall(if I am God). Using the terms 'extension' and 'intension' in the 
sense Lyons indicates(l968,454), what these observations mean is that while 
the extension of want is greater than that of intend, the intension of 
intend is greater than that of want. Ipso facto, one might argue, intend 
is semantically more complex than want, so long as both terms refer to the 
same type of entity. 
Secondly, with respect to thinking, the following contrast between 
want and intend appears 
(14) a. Without thinking about it, I wanted to smash his head in, 
which would rather have ruined my career prospects. 
b. ?Without thinking about it, I intended to smash his head in, 
which would rather have ruined my career prospects. 
( 15) a. I wanted to hit him full· in the face, but I didn't think 
about it. 
b. ?I intended to hit him full in the face, but I didn't think 
about it. 
(16) a. As soon as Mary arrived yesterday, I wanted to kiss her 
passionately, but I hadn't given it any prior thought. 
b. *As soon as Mary arrives tonight, I intend to kiss her 
passionately, but I haven't given it any prior thought. 
The 'a' sentences are acceptable, I suggest, since want neither includes 
nor excludes any element of thinking. The 'b' sentences derive their 
unacceptability I suggest from the incompatibility of asserting that one 
intends to do something and at the same time that one has not thoqght 
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about doing this. For the different form of sentences (16)a and (16)b, see 
the section below on temporal aspectual differences. The question mark 
against sentences (15)b and (16)b signals what seems to me to be the weaker 
non-acceptability of these sentences. 
Differences with respect to the concept of deciding are shown below. 
(17) a. I told the agent that I wanted to buy the house but hadn't 
decided yet. 
b. *I told the agent that I intended to buy the house but 
hadn't decided yet. 
(18) a. I want to come tonight but I haven't made up my mind. 
b. *I intend to come tonight but I haven't made up my mind. 
The unacceptability of the 'b' sentences resides in the incompatibility of 
asserting both that one intends to do something and that one has not made 
a decision to do this something. The source of the incompatibility 
derives, I suggest, from the semantic structure of the verb intend. 
Lastly, as far as their temporal aspectual properties are concerned, 
these verbs differ importantly in one respect. Want may occur in temporal 
aspectual situations entailing that the 'wanting' was spontaneously and 
almost instantaneously related to some concurrent event, whereas intend 
cannot. For example, consider the sentences below. 
(19) a. The instant my hero came through the door, I wanted to 
leap for joy. 
b. The instant my hero came through the door, I intended to 
leap for joy. 
Sentence (19)a describes a situation which has already taken place, 
in which my wanting is not temporally prior to my hero's entrance but 
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thought of as 'contemporaneous' with the 'instant' of his entrance. 
Further, sentence (19)a describes something which I want to do at that very 
moment(viz., leap for joy). Sentence (19)b, however, cannot be interpreted 
as (19)a. As a description of a past situation, it is extremely odd, for 
two reasons. First, the sentence entails that at some time in the future 
I would leap for joy, in the circumstances a strange thing to intend to do 
at any time other than at t he moment of his entrance. 
Second, in the context of this sentence intend imparts a coldly 
rational flavour to what i s presumably an essentially irrational(i.e. a 
non thought-out) activity, i.e. leaping for joy. Consider the sentences: 
(20) a. I've decided to go and leap for joy. 
b. Janet and John said they intended to do some leaping 
for joy. 
But sentence (19)a (with want) does not have this semantic tension. One 
wants something, and one leaps(almost in the wanting, so to speak). 
Contexts such as this not only underscor e the aptness of Hampshire's 
comment that "intention is perhaps too ratio nal and solemn a word when one 
is speaking of a child's experiments in movement"; they also argue for the 
extension of his comments to adult's actions also, and the canvassing of 
an alternative term(I suggest "want") to represent that minimum volitional 
involvement on the agent's part necessary to charac terise all acti on 
sentences. 
On the other hand, sentence (19)b is acceptable as an account of what 
I will do in a situation in which my intention has been decided upon at 
some time prior to the instant of the hero's entrance. In such a sentence 
what I assert will co-occur with the moment of his entrance is my leaping 
(i.e. the substance of my intention). Further, my leaping is something 
that can happen at a so-called 'point' i n time(At that moment, I leapt high 
in the air). In brief, the acceptable s e ntences differ here in that (19)a 
pairs instant with I wanted(notice that no leaping is entailed) while (19)b 
pairs instant with leap. 
The possibility of intend describing my future action accounts for 
the differences in the following. 
(21} a. *The instant my hero comes through the door, I want to 
leap for joy. 
b. The instant my hero comes through the door, I intend to 
leap for joy. 
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The unacceptability of sentence (21)a derives from the fact that the future 
time instant clause is predicated of I want, whereas I want introduces a 
present want. The instant of (2l)b is predicated of leap, however, rather 
than intend. Notice that the insertion of will in (2l}a, giving: 
(21) c. The instant my hero comes through the door, I will want 
to leap for joy. 
renders the sentence acceptable, as a prediction about my future wants and 
feelings. 
Finally, the following pairs of sentences illustrate further what 
might be termed the 'contemporaneous wanting' and the 'contemporaneous 
doing' of temporal aspectual properties of want and intend respectively. 
Sentences (22) and (24) describe past events; sentences (23) and (25) 
describe my future action. Inserting will before want in sentences (23)a 
and (25)a transforms these into acceptable predictions about my future 
feelings. 
(22) a. The moment I heard that deathly cry yesterday, I wanted 
to scream. 
b. *The moment I hear that deathly cry yesterday, I intended 
to scream. 
(23) a. 11 The moment I see your executioner appear tomorrow, I want 
to shoot him. 
b. The moment I see your executioner appear tomorrow, I ir!tend 
to shoot him. 
(24) a. Every time the Prime Minister deviated from his set speech 
last night, his adviser wanted to wring his neck. 
b. *Every time the Prime Minister deviated from his set speech 
last night, his adviser intended to wring his neck. 
(25) a. *If the Prime Minister ever deviates from his set speech 
again, I want to turn off the microphones. 
b. If the Prime Minister ever deviates from his set speech 
again, I intend to turn off the microphones. 
2.24 "Become" 
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Wierzbicka suggests that this term is semantically primitive only in 
its imperfective sense, viz. "be becoming". Note that "becoming" is not 
equivalent in meaning to the perfective sense of "become". Thus the 
sentence (26) below 
(26) John became a man 
John was becoming a man, 
after which John was a man. 
would have to be analysed roughly along the lines suggeste~ into the 
imperfective "becoming" and a subsequent state. 
Chafe(1970,139) has noted that "the meaning of become cannot be 
regarded as identical with the meaning of inchoative", because the latter 
involves constant change along a continuum where the former has to do with 
entry into a state. Interpreting inchoative in terms of "becoming", I can 
agree with this much of Chafe's account. In saying that become involves 
"simply" an entry into a state, however Chafe seems to imply that it is 
semantically simpler than inchoative. Since inchoative is not a connnon 
English verb this implication cannot be tested empirically by contrasting 
sentences with become and those with inchoative. Assuming that inchoative 
does mean "becoming", however, I would claim on the evidence of analyses 
such as (26), that "becoming"(inchoative?) is simpler than "become", not 
vice versa. 
In broad terms "becoming" is employed in semantic representations 
whenever some change(or movement) is asserted, e.g. a change of place 
("something becoming somewhere else"), a change of time("one time world 
becoming another time world"), or a change of state("John was becoming a 
man"). For further detailed discussions of the role of "becoming", and 
particularly its relation with "world" in characterising temporal change, 
see Wierzbicka(l972;1973b;l973c). 
2.25 "Think of" 
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This term should be distinguished from "think that", which is not 
postulated as a primitive term. "Think that" Wierzbicka suggests should be 
explicated in terms of the two primitives "think of" and "say"(e.g. I think 
that Xis Y = "Thinking of X, I say: it is Y"). Thus there is a contrast 
between "think of"(whose best natural language form seems to be think about) 
and "think that" in the following sentences. 
(27) a. I'm thinking about my receding hairline. 
= I am thinking of my receding hairline. 
b. I think that my hairline is receding. 
= I am thinking of my hairline: 
I say: it is receding. 
(Note that there is no contradiction in (27)b arising from the form of its 
last line. The complement of "say" is not sentence (27)b itself. Compare 
with the speech act situation, sentence (1 2 ) s ection 2.22.) 
There is a contrasting sense in think that sentences which is not 
present in thinking of sentences. This lends support to the hypothesis 
that think that is the more complex term. Consider the following sentences, 
containing what might be called a 'hesitant' and 'assertive' think that, 
respectively. 
,, 
(28) a. I think I'll take the job, I'm not sure. 
b. I think I'll take the job, thanks. 
I'm not sure how these senses should be differentiated semantically. 
Certainly "think of" does not possess any such distinction. 
/ 
(29) a. ?I'm thinking of my mother-in-law, I'm not sure. 
b. I'm thinking of my mother-in-law, thanks. 
59 
I have two reservations about the selection of "think of" as the term 
for this semantic primitive. Firstly, think about seems the most frequent 
and natural expression of the sense required and might therefore be more 
appropriate. Secondly, the verb think of(also think about) occurs with the 
"think that" sense in some sentences. For example 
(30) a. I'm thinking of coming home. 
b. I'm thinking of my homecoming. 
Sentence (30)a might be paraphrased "I think that I might come home", which 
would then be analysable in terms of "think of" and "say". The (30)b 
sentence contains the pestulated primitive sense of "think of". 
2.26 Other Terms: "World" and "Because" 
Some comments are in order on the primitive term "world", which could 
have been employed in the thesis, _but was not, and the term "because", 
which has been employed, although it is not a member of the set of primi-
tives outlined in 2.21. 
"World" 
Although I find Wierzbicka's proposal for a semantically primitive 
term "world" a most plausible one, both in the appropriateness of the term 
itself and in the representations(particularly of time) which it affords, 
I have not employed the term here because it would introduce a degree of 
complexity which would unnecessarily complicate the representations of the 
meanings of instrumental sentences. Instead, I will confine myself to the 
philosophically unexciting term "place", but without implying in any way 
that "place" is a semantic primitive. Wierzbicka(l972,95) suggests that 
perhaps the word place means something like "part of the world that 
something can be thought of as being a part of". For detailed discussion 
of this term, see Wierzbicka(l972;1973a;l973c). 
11 B ecaua e 11 
60 
As will be obvious by now, the term "cause" is not included in the set 
of semantic primitives, for reasons such as those hinted at by Fillmore 
(1972a,9) when he says: 
"It has been maintained that the relation between words like these 
[kill and die, persuade and believe] is more revealingly captured 
by the paraphrases with CAUSE ... The question is whether this 
reformulation is indeed significantly closer to the underlying 
conceptual reality to justify claims that have been made about the 
non-distinctness of semantic representations and deep structures 
of sentences. The word CAUSE itself seems to have a substructure: 
to say that John caused the cat to die is to say that John engaged 
in some activity and that activity directly resulted in the death 
of the cat." 
Causality is represented in semantic representations in the thesis by 
the term "because". This decision follows from the observation that, given 
two sentences which are paraphrases of each other, the one containing 
because and the other cause, the former renders more visible the 'sub-
structure' subsumed within the verb cause. Causal expressions of the form 
(3l)a will therefore be rendered in the putatively less complex form (3l)b. 
(31) a. X caused Y. 
b. Because x, Y. 
Sentence examples are 
(32) a. John's swallowing the apple c aused him to become sick. 
b. Because John swallowed the apple, he became sick. 
(33) a. My whistling caused an avalanche. 
b. Because I whistled, there was an avalanche. 
It is interesting to see McCawley(l974) explicitly discussing because 
and cause in these terms in his proposal for causal relations through a 
notion of 'local entailment'. Thus he writes: "If because 1.s to be 
identified with some sense of cause, s1 caus ed s 2 will have to correspond 
to 'S 2 because s 1 '" 
Further, Mccawley notes that there are several notions of causation 
playing a role in sentence meanings. He proposes that they all share an 
important characteristic, viz., 
"Each proposition of the form 'A cause B', whatever the sense 
of cause and whatever the nature of the A and B, can be associated 
in a natural way with a proposition •s1 cause s 2 • which it implies and which involves the sense of cause that is analyzable in terms 
of local entailment."(1974,11) 
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Since the proposition 'because s1 , s2 • itself underlies McCawley's local 
entailment, it follows that a semantic notion "because" would(on McCawley's 
description) be present in the meanings of all causal propositions of the 
form 'A cause B'. 
This is illustrated in McCawley's account of the semantic analysis of 
sentence (34) below. 
(34) John killed Bill. 
If this is analysed as "John did something which caused it to become the 
case that Bill is not alive", the causal proposition in the analysis would, 
Mccawley suggests, be the following, where X denotes John's action. 
(35) X caused (become (not (alive (Bill)))) 
According to Mccawley, (35) implies the sentence (36). 
(36) Because John did X, Bill ceased to be alive. 
And it is (36) which becomes the basis for the analysis in terms of local 
entailment, viz., 
(37) Bill died, and in the closest worlds in which 
Bill did not die, John did not do X. 
Whether all natural language causation reduces to "because", however, 
or whether "because" can be itself be decomposed(e.g. in terms of 
Wierzbicka's "if"(l972,17)) need not concern us further. 
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2.3 The Semantic Primitives Hypothesis 
The search for a set of unanalysable semantic components - the 
'ultimate constituents of the world', is an activity that has long occupied 
the minds and fascinations of philosophers, logicians and linguists. It is 
not my intention here to detail the various proposals that have been made 
or the objections which they have encountered. Some details concerning 
these may be found, for example, in Wierzbicka(1972) and Zwicky(l973) . 5 
Suffice it to say that the latter 20th century has witnessed a resurgence 
of interest in the possibility of achieving such a goal, stimulated by the 
work of S~rensen(1958) and anthropologists such as Bendix(l966), and 
hypotheses about the nature of semantic structure such as are found in Katz 
and Fodor(l963) and Katz and Postal(l964). 
In what follows I shall assume the essential possibility of discovering 
these primitive elements, and content myself with discussing some features 
of the particular proposal which is put forward here. This proposal differs 
from most contemporary proposals(see Zwicky 1973,474) in that, at the risk 
of falling boldly on its face, it offers primitive elements purporting to 
account for the semantic relations underlying all sentences. 
2.31 Language and Concepts 
The basic function of language is communication. "Learning a specific 
language is learning a code in which to express one's thought and to 
recover the thoughts expressed by others"(Vendler 1972,142). As far as 
thought is concerned, it is hypothesis~d that the human conceptual system 
comprises a semantic system, which is composed of a finite number of 
elementary concepts, and rules for combining these concepts into more 
complex entities(i.e. thought). Thus Bierwisch(l970,181) entertains the 
hypothesis that "all semantic structures might finally be reduced to 
components representing the basic dispositions of the cognitive and 
perceptual structure of the human organism". And Mccawley in Parret(l974, 
250), taking a highly mentalistic position with respect to language, 
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suggests that "the real phenomena to be accounted for [in language] is some 
aspect of the human mind that is reflected in linguistic behaviour. 116 
It is sometimes asserted that whether something is or is not a 
primitive term is an arbitrary matter, that there are in fact no absolute 
primitives. Thus Goodman(1951,57) says that "it is not because a term is 
indefinable that it is chosen as primitive; rather it is because a term 
has been chosen as primitive for a system that it is indefinable. In 
general, the terms adopted as primitives of a given system are readily 
definable in some other system". Robinson(l954,197) has a similar opinion 
when he says that an idea is indefinable relative to a set of primitive 
ideas only if it cannot be analysed into any function of that particular 
set; it may well be able to be defined relative to another set. It is 
within this approach to primitives that Grosu(1970,40) tentatively offers 
his set of semantic primes, commenting that "they must be primes only with 
respect to the functioning of the grammar", and adding that it is possible 
that "a prime may be further broken down into logically more elementary 
7 
concepts" ( 41) . 
By way of contrast, the semantic primitives hypothesis in the thesis 
assumes that there are non-arbitrarily determined primitive concepts, 
concepts which are independent of any particular formal hypothesis aoout 
grammatical or semantic structure. The safeguard against arbitrariness in 
determining their realisations in language is the semantic intuition of the 
native speaker. This semantic intuition provides an empirically valid link 
between natural language sentences and the meanings represented by them. 
And by representing sentence meanings in terms of this small set of primi-
tive concepts which are realised in items from the natural language, the 
semantic representations themselves become directly accessible to the 
native speaker's semantic intuition. 
It is probably advisable to avoid the term 'indefinable' in discussions 
of semantic primitives, on account of its having two senses which are not 
64 
always di s tinguished in practice. Taking one sense, to say that a concept 
is indefinable is to say that it is indivisible, that it cannot be broken 
into simpler concepts. The second sense involves asserting that a concept 
cannot be defined in any way. Interpreting 'definition' broadly, it seems 
true as Robinson observes that 'indefinable' cannot apply to word s , for 
"their meaning [i.e. the meaning of words] can always be explained to 
suitable learners on suitable occasions"(l97). Robinson believes, however, 
that indefinability can be predicated of ideas. But he cannot sure ly 
intend this second sense of 'indefinable', for what would it mean t o define, 
or not to be able to define, ideas, which are not realised in words? 
2.32 Universality 
Another feature of this hypothes is is that the concepts are h e ld to be 
universal. "According to th i s hypothes is semantic features[or conc ept,LR] 
cannot be different from language to language, but are rather part of the 
general human capacity for language, forming a universal inventory used in 
particular ways by individual languages."(Bierwisch 1970,181). Again from 
Vendler(l972,140) "it makes sense, therefore, to speak of one basic 
conceptual framework, which is the matr ix underlying the various natural 
languages." Thus while we must speak in some language or another, we do 
not think in any specific language. 
2.33 Realisation or Correspo ndence 
What is involved in language is the ' t ranslation' of these concepts 
into a code which another person can perceive. That is, concepts are 
'realised in' or 'encoded into' a certain natural language in simple terms 
which are a part of that natural language. Zwi c ky says that a weak version 
of the semantic primitives hypothesis is the following: "every semantic 
prime is realizable as a lexical unit(root, inflection, or derivational 
8 affix) in some natural language."(1973,473). Zwicky proceeds to explain 
that although some linguists Ba (e.g. Lakoff 1970b ) are reluctant to claim 
that particular lexical items realise or correspond to particular semantic 
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concepts, he can find no primes which are incapable of being realised in 
a word or affix; "in nearly every case, in fact, there is an obvious 
English lexical item corresponding to the prime."(475). 
This is not to say, however, that every language will realise the 
concepts similarly. There is no reason why a certain concept should be 
realised by a single lexical item, for example, in all languages. 
2.34 Semantic Representation is Representing Thought Through Paraphrase 
To provide a semantic representation of a sentence X(I avoid the term 
'deep structure' because of its implication of remoteness from empirically 
accessible levels) is thus to represent the thought underlying sentence X. 
One cannot represent the thought per se. What one does is to find a 
natural language sentence synonymous with sentence X but constructed only 
from the set of terms which in that language encode the primitive semantic 
9 
concepts. From this, it will be hypothesised, is obtained a sentence 
which is isomorphic to the thought itself. 'The deep structure of a 
sentence ... is a step toward the rationalistic ideal of a "perfect" 
language, a language isomorphic with the structure of thought."(Vendler 
1972,133). 
I think it is misleading, however, to refer to the unrealised 
primitive concepts as a mental language. How could this ever be verified? 
Who speaks this language, or is there a language which cannot be spoken? 
2.35 The Likely Form of Semantic Primitives 
Candidates for semantic primitives should correspond to simple, 
commonly-used and well-understood words. It is most unlikely, therefore, 
that they will be technical or highly abstract in nature, or part of a 
restricted language code(e.g. scientific jargon), or that their use will 
be conditional on the attainment of a particular educational standard. 10 
Part of the hypothesis in fact is that semantic primitives will correspond 
to words which are known to and used by children. 
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Lyons appeals in effect to the principle in the above paragraph in his 
criticism of the componential analysis approach to semantic structure. He 
says that one of its dangers is its tendency to postulate semantic com-
ponents which are neither lexically frequent nor centrally positioned in 
the vocabulary. Thus: 
"It is often suggested that brother and sister can be replaced with 
the 'synonyms' male sibling and female sibling. But this is true 
only in the context of anthropological or quasi-anthropological 
discussion. The words brother and sister are extremely common words, 
known presumably to all speakers of English, whereas sibling is a 
technical term, coined for the convenience of anthropologists; and 
most English speakers probably do not know it."(1968,479) 
Lehrer's(1974,11) comments on the need to distinguish between basic 
and peripheral words because of the role the former play in determining 
important semantic contrasts are also relevant here. Adapting Berlin and 
Kay's criteria for determining the basic colour words of a language, she 
concludes that 
"Most peripheral words will fail to meet the criteria proposed above. 
They are likely to be morphologically complex, restricted in their 
application and distribution, recent loan words, and unknc:Mn to many 
speakers of the language." 
Such "WOrds, it is hypothesised, are not likely candidates for semantic 
primitives. 
2.36 Semantic Representations Must be of Sentences 
Semantic representations must be representations of sentences, not 
merely representations of words or phrases in isolation. As has been amply 
11 pointed out, providing semantic representations of words in isolation is 
not a reliable approach to meaning: if meaning is a function of semantic 
relations contracted between lexical items(as in Lyons 1963,57), then 
isolated words provide little basis for approaching meaning. Further, 
since utterances are not composed of isolated words but of sentences(albeit 
sometimes one word sentence fragments), empirically one must seek for the 
meanings of sentences and not words. Additionally, words and phrases may 
have different meanings in different sentences, and in highly determined 
contexts, some words may have no meaning at all(Lyons 1968,414). 
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The most certain starting point is, as Boguslawski suggests(l970,145), 
to take "whole and really used utterances". There is little doubt about 
their meaningfulness: confirmation is provided not only in statements of 
the form "Peter came" means that Peter came, but also through the possi-
bility of synonymous(or near synonymous) paraphrases. 
Once semantic representations for sentences have been established, 
the meanings of parts of sentences may then be 'disengaged'(Boguslawski's 
term), by comparing parts of sentences with parts of fully-explicated 
meanings of sentences containing these sentence parts. The meanings so 
extracted will of course be relative to the contexts of the sentences 
selected. The important point is that the meanings of words, phrases or 
other sentence parts must be derived from the meanings of sentences con-
taining the sentence parts. (Compare Morgan: "By the 'meaning' of a 
lexical item I mean the specification of the elements and structures it 
contributes to the meaning of sentences in which it occurs."(1969,69)) 
I am aware of, and have some sympathy for, arguments to the effect 
that one cannot give the meaning of a s e ntence in isolation but must con-
'd th d' · h' h' h · 12 h d · 1· · d si er e iscourse wit in w ic it occurs. T e present stu y is imite 
to the degree to which I have chosen to overlook t his consideration. One 
consequence of this for the semantic des cription of instrumental sentences 
is discussed in 6.22. 
2.37 No Proofs of Primitives 
It should be pointed out that it can never be proved that a term 
represents a semantically primitive conc ept. All that one can do is to 
show that a putative primitive may be d e composed into other terms which are 
needed independently and which be t ter sa tisfy the twin criteria of maximal 
parsimony of concepts consistent with ma ximal ability to represent all 
sentence meanings. It seems that there is thus an implicit contrast here, 
as Lyons points out(1969,471), with eleme ntary mathematics where one can 
always discover whether a given number i s a prime or not. 
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Morgan approaches the problem of proof from a different angle with his 
question: 
"When we appear to have reached the limit of analyzability of the 
meaning of an item, how will we know that we have reached semantic 
primitives, rather than merely having reached a point beyond which 
we have no way to talk about what is there?"(l969,65) 
Morgan does not suggest an answer, although I think the seeds of an 
empirically satisfying one are contained in the last half of his question. 
Boguslawski, however, does offer an answer here, although it is not the 
deus ex cathedra pronouncement that some semanticists might prefer. He 
says: 
"It is also true that we cannot gain any final and absolute certainty 
as to our solutions, for one thing there are no formal indices of 
undefinable expressions, and we can never be sure that we have reached 
'the semantic bottom' of utterances, which we are instructed to reach. 
What is clear enough is merely the general perspective of investiga-
tion, the perspective of more and more explicit paraphrases that will 
be more and more convincing for more and more people."(1970,148) 
2.38 Method and Data 
In searching for the meanings of sentences the method that is followed 
is that of examining one's own thoughts and feelings about the meaning of 
the sentences, using the facts provided by one's intuition about meaning. 
Since Chomsky(e.g. 1964), it has become less necessary to justify relying 
on a method which calls for correspondence of semantic descriptions with 
. tr . . d 13 in ospective JU gement. The native speaker's intuition about what 
sentences mean has been widely accepted as one of the few empirically valid 
14 levels of language structure. 
In roodelling the meanings of sentences in terms of semantically simple 
terms, one therefore attempts to be empirically responsible in several ways: 
to represent one's semantic intuitions by accurately representing sentence 
meanings, and to do this by using only items which themselves need no 
empirical justification, being terms of natural language, and which are 
constructed according to empirically verifiable rules of sentence structure. 
Semantic representations are not adequate, however, merely because one 
feels that they model one's semantic intuition. They must be tested 
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thoroughly against one's own intuitions and against the deep intuitions of 
other investigators, and revised where necessary. 
2.39 A Developing Theory 
The theory presented in this chapt er is very much a skeleton of a 
linguistic theory. It is a long term program whose product will require 
developme nt, f l e shing out and, to stret ch the metaphor, p ossible 
transplants. What it does is to present a suggestive proposal for rela-
tions at the interface between thought and the meaning of sente nces, 
postulating a basic dictionary and a program for modelling sentence mean-
ings, using elements from this dictionary combined into simple syntactical 
patterns according to empirically sound principles of sentence construction. 
The theory has nothing to say about any phonological or transforma-
tional c omponent s , or about the restrictions on the combination of these 
primitive elements into larger complexes. Nor does the theory attempt to 
satisfy the criterion of formalisation. Answers to these enquiries must 
be built up over time. 
As far as th e role of transformations in this theory is conc e rned, 
Wierzbicka hold that: 
"Grammar - b e itEnglish, Hungarian or Chinese - is simp ly t his set 
of transformat ional rules, the ef f ect of whose application is to 
convert sentences isomorphic with thought into sentences markedly 
non-isomorphic with thought. 11 (197 2 ,25) 
One consequence of this view is that the term ' de ep structure' and 
'ahatract structure' are not particularly compatible with this theory, in 
that they imply a linguistic level which i s relatively less access ible to 
the semantic intuitions o f the investigator. On the contrary, it is 
pos t ulated that the sentences isomorphic to the thought itself are no less 
accessible to this semantic intuition t han any of their tran s f o rms ; indeed, 
through representing meaning more transparently, they could well be more 
accessible . 
Secondly, apart from their ostensible combination into larger units 
in basic sentences, the theory gives no principles for the combin~tion of 
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semantic primitives into larger complexes, or details of restrictions upon 
their combination. Some writers have suggested that such principles and 
conditions can be expected to form a part of an adequate semantic theory. 
Thus Zwicky(l973,480) says that we can expect the development in semantics 
of a "theory of valence, a set of combinatory principles for semantic 
primes", and Bierwisch(l969,181) requires that a semantic metatheory will 
have to specify "a set of general principles connecting semantic features 
to each other to form complex semantic structures". No attempt has been 
made in this theory to demonstrate explicitly the principles for combining 
semantic primitives. Implicit in the fact that semantic representations 
in the theory take the form of natural language sentences is the assumption 
that the constraints on the combination of primitives is identical to the 
constraints on the combination of ordinary lexical items. 
Finally, it will be noticed that there is very little fonnalisation in 
the theory at present. This is not meant to imply a blanket rejection of 
fonnalisation, but rather a judgement as to relative priorities in semantic 
analysis. I have suggested elsewhere(Rushbrook 1975) that the most 
important criterion in constructing and evaluating semantic representations 
is whether or not the representation adequately mirrors the meaning of the 
sentence. Brevity and clarity are important but secondary to this, and 
formalisation strikes me as at a further remove still. In section 2.4, 
however, I do suggest that some formal control should be exerted over the 
shape of semantic representations in the interests of readability. 
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2.4 Semantic Representation Using These Primitives 
2.41 Abbreviated Representations 
Despite the direction of corranents in section 2.3, I do not intend here 
to provide semantic representations in which occur only members from the 
set of semantic primitives given in section 2.2. Fully explicated sentences 
would not only be extremely long and require considerable motivating dis-
cussion; their provision would also be unnecessary for establishing the 
arguments of the thesis. Consequently sentence meanings will only be 
decomposed as far as seems necessary to satisfy these aims, and then only 
in those parts of the semantic representation which are relevant to the 
greater understanding of instrumental sentences. I realise that this 
approach rather begs the question as to what is relevant and necessary. 
I can only ask that the representations be judged for what they are. 
2.42 A Possible 'Formalisation' 
In section 2.39 I commented on the need, in the interests of read-
ability, to exert some control over the form of semantic representations 
which use these primitives. One possible approach which is not inconsonant 
with the goal of maximal faithfulness to natural language terms and patterns 
is to recognise informally several parts of a representation. These parts 
or components , which could be signalled by an extra line's space between 
parts, would correspond to different elements of the meaning of a maximally 
explicated sentence utterance. 
One component would specify the type of speech act represented by the 
sentence. Suggestions for representing speech acts using semantic primi-
tives have been made in Wierzbicka(l972 and 1974), and I have made a brief 
suggestion in section 2.22. Taking these together, a simplified version of 
this part of the semantic representation of the sentence John touched the 
window might then be represented as the following. 
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(38) John touched the window. 
Wanting you to know it, 
I say: John touched the window. 
The next component has to do with deictic properties of t he sentence. 
It would s pecify the 'world' spoken of in the sentence, the identity and 
essential relations between the people and objects present in that world, 
and the spatio-temporal relation (if known) between this world and the 
world of the speaker. All these would be specified from the egocentric 
frame of reference of the speaker. In effect this part of a representation 
says "I'm talking about this situation; it involved John and the window; 
and it took place some tim before the present". A possible rendering of 
this would be: 
(39) = Thi s something can be said about a world 
whi c h was becoming the world of whic h my saying this is a part: 
John could be thought of as a part of this world, 
the window could be thought of as a part of this world. 
(I am not s ure whether "worlds" can have "parts", hence the softening 
effect of i ncorporating "thought of". "John was in this world" might be an 
easier to a ccept alternative, but "i.n" itself must surely be explicated 
using the primitive "part of".) 
The third component would specify whether the sentence wa s about 
action, events, processes, states, etc. I have already suggested in 
Chapter 1.51 a simplified way in which this might be done with respect to 
the sentences 
(40) a. John broke the window. 
b. A stone broke the window. 
c. The window broke. 
Drawing on t hose suggestions a possible representation for John touched the 
window would be: 
(41) - Something could be said 1about the window 
because something happened to John. 
John wanted something. 
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Two comments can be made on this representation. First, as I explained 
in 1.51, I have resisted on linguistic grounds prefacing "John wanted some-
thing" with the term "because", even though the inclusion of the latter 
would appear to improve the readability of the representation. Second, I 
am uncertain as to the sequencing of the three lines here, and am aware of 
no useful linguistic evidence that might resolve the uncertainty. The order 
presented steps backwards, as it were, flrom a state of physical contact, 
through John's movement, to his mind("want"). 
Nothing hangs on this, but this sequence may provide a parallel for the 
way in which a speaker, perceiving some change in the world, might relate 
this causally with someone's movements, and if he considers these movements 
can be attributed to the person, select an expression which assigns agency 
to the person. Thus consider two p:>ssible descriptions by different speakers 
of the same event. 
(42) a. John broke the window. 
b. John's body broke the window. 
While the end state and the causal relations between the breaking and the 
movements of John's body can be the same in both sentences, the form of the 
sentences reveals whether the speaker has chosen to interpret the movements 
as "wanted" or not. 
The fourth component would specify, no more narless precisely than the 
sentence permits, the technical details involved in the action, event, 
state, etc. of the previous component. In the case under examination there 
would be a specification of part of John's body(or something that could be 
thought of as part of his body) moving and coming into contact with the 
window. 'Contact', discussed more fully in 6.4, is represented here in 
terms of "closer"(X is in contact with Y = part of X could not be thought 
of as being closer to part of Y) . Thus a suggested, stil l abbreviated, 
representation for the fourth c omponent would be: 
(43) = Part of John's body was bec oming closer to the window, 
until it could not be thought of as being closer to part 
of the window. 
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Without the part "thought of as being", the representation would not entail 
contact and could be employed for a situation i n which John tried to touch 
the window but couldn't get close enough, for example, because of a wire 
grill betwee n John and the window. 
A fuller, mor e 'basic' representat i on would replac e the term "until" 
in (43) by utilising the primitive term "wo rld" in the following still 
abbreviated way. 
(44) = The world in which part of John's body was becoming closer 
to the window 
became the world in which t his part of John's body could 
not be thought of as being closer to part of the window. 
In a more basic repres entation still, not illustrated here, the first 
"world" referred to i n (44) would b e represented as successive worlds, in 
each of which is the sa id par t of John' s b o dy c loser to the wi ndow. 
Combini ng these four componen t representations, we obtain the following 
( 45) John touched the window. 
= Wanting you to k now it, 
I say: John touched the wi ndow. 
This something can be said about a world 
which was becoming the world of which my saying t his is a part: 
John could be thought of a s a part of this world, 
the window could be thought of as a part of this world. 
Something could be said about the window 
because something happened to John; 
John wanted something. 
Part of John's body was becoming closer to the window, 
until it could not be thought of as being closer to part 
of the window. 
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Semantic repres e ntations of sentences in the thesis will omit what I have 
termed the first and second components, and concentrate instead on the 
third and fourth components, which seem to encapsulate the content, rather 
than the situation of the utterance. 15 The omissions follow in part from 
the deliberate restrictions mentioned in 1.4 and in part from the assump-
tion that any differences between sentences of the thesis with respect to 
the second component are not instrumentally significant. Chapter Seven 
contains some points not unrelated to the nature of the second component 
in its discussion of the meanings of sentences such as the following. 
(46) a. Mary hit John with a hammer. 
b. Mary hit John. 
2.5 Alternative Semantic Proposals 
It follows from what I have said in section 2.3 that many of the 
proposals currently available for representing sentence meaning will be 
incompatible with the program for semantic representation sketched in this 
chapter. In the following subsections a number of reasons for this incom-
patibility are presented and illustrated. 
Most current systems of semantic representation involve a considerable 
degree of formalisation and abstraction. While on<; must be prepared to 
consider the extent to which such formalisation is helpful or misleading, 
no plea of necessary formalisation or abstraction should be allowed to 
retrieve a model which is empirically inadequate. 
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2.51 Not Natural Language 
One reason for this incompatibility derives from the fact that many 
of the units proposed for representing the basic elements of sentence 
meanings are simply not themselves natural language terms. This raises 
immediate questions concerning their empirical validity, and it necessitates 
a 'translation' of the non-natural language symbols into some terms of 
natural language by which we may discove r what the sentence means. That is 
to say, such non-natural language symbols are not themselves directly amen-
able to our semantic intuitions. 
Unfortunately neither this translation nor the principles(Botha's 
'warrant',1970) according to which the non-natural language symbol can 
empirically represent sentence meanings are generally dealt with explicitly. 
In the face of such alternatives, one approach which does not require 
further warrant is to let the semantic representation be of the same kind 
of entity as the item to be represented, that is, to represent meanings 
using sentence paraphrases. 
One example of non-natural language symbols used in semantic represent-
ations are the symbols and formulae of symbolic logic. In the last ten 
years there has been an increasing tendency in some linguistic quarters 
to model semantic representations on the terms and formation rules of 
ymb 1 . l . 16 s o 1c ogic. While there may be many motivations for this, the 
resulting representations cannot be claimed to have any direct empirical 
validity. Semantic representations in logical language, it seems, remain 
precisely that, representations of the meaning of natural language sentences 
in terms of the propositions of an artificial language. Concerning natural 
language sentences, speakers have undisputed semantic intuitions; concerning 
the language of symbolic logic no such consensus of semantic intuition 
exists. 17 Thus while the meanings of natural language sentences can be 
realised in terms of symbolic logic, the consequential representation must 
be considered suspect as a linguistic description. 
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Zwicky t a kes up the question of logical representation in his discus-
sion as to why logically adequate systems may be linguistically inadequate. 
He remarks: 
"It has been the goal of logic to construct precise and satis fying 
accounts of a few areas of form and meaning that are of independent 
philosophical or mathematical interest. One of the cri t eria for 
satisfac t ion is systematic . elegance-parsimony in primitive symbols 
or concep ts, in sets of axioms, and so on. Logicians have been 
extremely ingenious in their parsimony. And their systems are often 
quite unnatural linguistically. Linguistic judgments of unnaturalness, 
in combination with predictions made by the Substance Theory, allow us 
to conclude that the logician's prime s cannot be linguistic primes." 
(1973,477) 18 
Aft e r s howing that ne i the r the 'Sh ff er s t roke' nor Prior's conjunction tonk 
ar e candidates for semant i c primes , Zwicky concludes that: 
"The Substance Theory c an link with observations about what sort of 
lexi cal items occur in the world's l a nguages to y i eld predictions 
about possible semanti c primes . Without the mediation of the Substance 
Theory, there is no reason for there to be a relation between the kinds 
of lexical units that occur in langua ges and the semantic primes that 
are proposed for them."(478) 
In a similar wa y the non-natur al lang uage symbols(e.g. '+', IQ I I 
etc.) whic h are employed i n semantic feature approaches to semantic repre-
sentation do not a ppear to be empiri cally valid symbols for representing 
the meanings of na~ural language s e ntences . While many descriptive and 
theoret ical problems regarding the i r use h ave bee n pointed out ,
19 few 
propone nts of this a ppro ach ex e rc i se suf f icient care in expla ining what the 
symbols mean and ho w th e y are to be emplo yed. A notable exception is 
Stockwell e t .al. (19 73,7 28). That is, to be descriptive ly adequa te, the 
s ymbol s have to be trans lated into na tural language and rules given for 
their employment; to a ppro ach empiric al adequacy one needs f urther 
motivation as to why the symbols are l inguiatically appropria te . The 
discus sions in Chapters Three and Four(notably 4.51) draw atte n t ion to 
s hortcomings in the use of these s ymbols. 
By extension, many other formal symbols employed in semantic represent-
ations must be carefully examined . Case frames, fo r instance, which can 
usefully swnmarise a verb's p o t ential for certain s yntactic-se r 1a ntic 
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relationships(e.g. Fillmore 1968a,27), have no empirical validity as such, 
yet like semantic features they are sometimes employed(e.g. Nilsen 1973) 
as if they were themselves a sufficient semantic explanation, rather than 
merely a formal representation of something. The translation of such 
symbols needs to specify the motivation for their employment in a particular 
grammar, what they represent, whether the symbols in the frames signify 
obligatory or optional elements, and the nature of the relationship between 
symbol and signified(arbitrary formalisation or intuitive reality?). 
A range of other symbols have been employed in semantic representation. 
Consider, for example, Leech's(l969,181) semantic definitions for in front 
of and behind. 
(47) a. in front of: ~PLA·~· ( 8' ·+ PRI -+ PLUS ( 8 11 • +-OBS·0) -8"' 
( 0"' · ~ FLA·¢>> " 
b. behind: -.FLA·¢' ( 8' .+ PRI f- PLUS ( 8 11 • ~OBS·0) • 8 II I 
(8 111 • ~ PLA·~)) II 
What Leech has proposed is a complex formalisation of the semantic relations 
involved in the meanings of these terms. The resultant definitions are 
themselves quite remote from the semantic intuitions of native speakers, 
and require translation into natural language expressions before anyone 
who uses these terms can determine whether the definitions are empirically 
adequate. 
Finally, even the traditional branching tree structures of generative 
grammar can be questioned as to empirical adequacy. What intuitions about 
what constitutes a meaningful natural language sentence have to be sus-
pended and what essentially arbitrary formal relationships have to be 
assumed in order for an ordinary branching tree with topmost Sand various 
non-branching terminal nodes over lexical(or semantic) items to be taken 
as the semantic representation of a sentence? 
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This view was put forcibly by Ray Catell in a lecture in Canberra in 
August 1975. Claiming that it was not particularly obvious intuitively 
that a tree structure represented the meaning of a sentence, he queried 
whether there was any point in postulating any form of semantic repre-
sentation other than the sentence itself, and suggested that the sentence 
itself should be the semantic representation. In eschewing artificial 
symbols for the representation of sentence meaning his suggestion has much 
in common with the proposal for semantic representation put forward in the 
thesis, although the operation of his abstract construal rules in explain-
ing how a sentence is the semantic representation of what it is remains 
unclear. 
2.52 The Use of Natural Language Terms 
Another reason for the incompatibility between the semantic theory 
underlying the thesis and some other contemporary approaches derives from 
the fact that where in these approaches terms from natural language are 
employed in semantic representations, the terms used are often not 
particularly suitable candidates for semantic primitives of the kind 
described in 2.3. One reason for this relates to the fact that the terms 
are usually technical and not connnonly used. I have already mentioned 
Lyon's connnents on the term sibling. Other terms which could be character-
ised in this way include inchoative, inalienable, benefactive, potent, 
amb . 20 ient. A second reason is that the terms themselves can be paraphrased 
into simpler terms. Thus an agent is. in part at least someone, or some-
thing, who does something, and an experiencer is someone, or something, 
to whom something happens. Similarly many of the suggested terms for 
semantic features can be analysed into simpler components(for some 
tentative analyses see Chapter 3.53) . 21 
The mere employment of simple natural language terms in semantic 
representations, however, will not necessarily satisfy empirical criteria. 
Artificiality may still result from combining the terms in linguistically 
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unnatural ways. Thus Vermazen criticises the semantic representation 
Katz's semantic theory would provide for the sentence John chases Jim, viz. 
(48) John chases Jim. 
((Activity) (Nature): {Physical)) of { {Named 'John') {Human))), 
{{Movement) {Rate: (Fact)) {Character: {Following))), 
(Intention of {{Named 'John') (Human)): {Trying to · catch 
{ { (Named 'Jim') (Human) )({Movement) {Rate) {Fast)))))) . 
Concerning this he says{1966,355): 
"It hardly seems to "provide a characterization of the meaning" in 
any more interesting sense; considered as a string of English words 
in parentheses, it is more or less unintelligible, and since Katz 
assures us that it is not a strong of English words, but a colloc-
ation of representatives of concepts, it is only more clearly 
unintelligible." 
A little while later in discussing differences between Katz's semantic 
theory and Carnap's artificial language, Vermazen underlines some important 
points being made in this chapter. He says(357): 
"Carnap tells us the meanings(though that is not his intention) of 
sentences in the artificial language by giving us natural-language 
sentences as renderings, so that, insofar as the rendering is 
adequate, and insofar as we understand the natural language, we 
understand the artificial-language sentences. Katz tells us the 
meanings of sentences in English by giving us unintelligible sets 
of nested expressions." 
2.6 Summary 
Jakobson has said(l961,250): 
"Attempts to construct a model of language without any relation either 
to the speaker or to the hearer and thus to hypostatize a code 
detached from actual communication threaten to make a scholastic 
fiction from language." 
In this chapter I have outlined an attempt to represent meaning in a code 
which is minimally detached from natural language sentences. The semantic 
representations are in a form(viz. natural language sentences) on which 
semantic intuitions should have no more difficulty operating than on the 
sentences to be represented. In addition, the units of the semantic 
representations(viz. simple, commonly-used natural language terms) should 
have an abstractness no greater, and perhaps considerably less so, than 
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the terms of the natural language sentences which they are representing. 
In the next three chapters descriptions of the meanings of instrwnental 
sentences in alternative representations will be presented. Frequently, as 
will be shown, the formalism and complexity of the representing mediwn and 
terms obfuscate rather than clarify the semantic relations involved in such 
sentences. From Chapter Six onwards, instrumental sentences will be 
represented in terms of the theory described in this chapter. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
1 Ross considers there is insufficient evidence in English for positing 
a particular lexical item to replace this complex of features, despite some 
evidence that other languages may have one particular lexical item in this 
position, e.g. Arabic with ?aquulu 'say'. A stronger claim for English is 
made by McCawley(l968a,157) who proposes that the performative verb for 
English declarative sentences should be represented by tell. 
2
chafe says that 'potent' specifies that a noun has, or is conceived 
to have,its own internal power. "The ability of a noun to occur as an 
agent depends on its semantic specification as a thing which has the power 
to do something, a thing which is a force of its own, which is self-
motivated .. It is largely animate beings which are conceived of as 
having their own internal motivating force."(1970,109) 
3Note that Davidson(l971,ll footnote) considers that the concept of 
intention, or of acting with an intention or of a reason in acting, can 
be analysed in part at least in terms of event causality. 
¾ier.zbicka(l973a,616) notes that the semantic element of "becoming" 
was suggested as an indefinable by A. Boguslawski at a lecture delivered 
at Warsaw University in 1970. Boguslawski employs "becoming" as a single 
notion in his paper "Preliminaries for Semantic-Syntactic Description of 
Basic Predicative Expressions"(n.d., 16). Note that Leech(l969,57) also 
employs the concept of "becoming", as one of a small set of semantic 
features having idiosyncratic logical properties('formators'). 
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5Thus Wierzbicka surveys some proposals made for basic semantic 
elements by the following: Descartes, Pascal, Arnauld, Leibniz, Locke, 
Sapir, Hjelmslev, S¢rensen, Weinreich, Katz and Fodor, Bierwisch, Apresjan, 
Zolkovskij and Mel'cuk, and Bogus!awski. Zwicky's comments relate to the 
way in which semantic primes have been presented in post-Katz-Fodor 
semantic systems: such as those of generative semanticists like Mccawley 
(1968c), Lakoff(l970b) and Posta1(1970), standard Katz-Fodor semantics, 
and various what he terms extensions of, variants of, or alternatives to 
the Katz-Fodor position, such as Gruber(l965), Weinreich(l966), Leech(l969) 
and Chafe(l970). 
6Approaching this subject from a different perspective, Carro11(1967) 
entertains the possibility that there are universal 'invariant' concepts. 
Thus "we can be sure that throughout the world people have much the same 
concepts of sun, man, day, animal, flower, walking, falling, softness, etc., 
by whatever names they may be called"(S72-3). Further, these concepts have 
their linguistic reflexes: "Many words or higher units of the linguistic 
system come to stand for, or name, the concepts that have been learned 
pre-verbally." 
7 Grosu present seven primes: CAUSE, INCHOATIVE, TRY, INTENT, BE ABLE 
TO, BE FREE TO, and HAVE TO. He notes(84) "that the semantic content of 
primes is generally defined in relation to some lexical item, which, in a 
somewhat loose sense, "corresponds" to it." His definitions of the primes 
take the form of a notional description of what the prime means, e.g. CAUSE 
means roughly bring about, TRY has roughly the meaning of try or attempt, 
together with a listing of various syntactic and semantic properties 
associate d with the lexical item which corresponds(roughly) to the prime. 
Thus INTEND, which means roughly intend,is a stative verb, it takes two 
arguments(animate subject and a complement), it does not embed itself or 
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statives, it disallows emotive adverbs in its complement, and it is 
'future-action-oriented'. 
8
zwicky suggests two stronger versions of the hypothesis: viz., 
"in any language, most semantic primes are realized as lexical units" and 
"in any language, all semantic primes are realized as lexical units". The 
theory sketched in Chapter Two affirms the strongest form of the hypothesis 
(see Wierzbicka 1972,15). 
Ba For example Lakoff(1970b,211) presents logical forms for sentences 
of the form 'x requires y to do s1 • and 'x permits y to do s1 • respectively, 
and goes on to remark: 
"These logical forms differ only in the specification of the 
predicate. 'REQUIRE' and 'PERMIT' are to be understood not as 
words of English, but as symbols for certain atomic predicates. 
The symbols we have chosen happen to be English words in capital 
letters, but they could just as well have been a box and a 
diamond, or any other arbitrary symbols." 
9 Cf.S¢rensen(l958,34): 
"How, then, do we describe the meaning of x? There appears to be 
but one possibility: the meaning of x can only be described in terms 
of synonymy, i.e. in terms of identity of meaning. The sentence in 
which the semantic description of xis formulated must therefore be 
"xis synonymous with y"." 
10 Thus s¢rensen(l958,47) considers that in searching for semantic 
primitives the linguist need not be concerned with technical terms, "for 
all technical terms are ultimately derivable from non-technical terms". 
11 For example, Lyons(l968,410-411), Wittgenstein(l967,20), Frege(l959,x): 
"Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context 
of a sentence", and Peirce(l932,167), when talking about the meaning of 
X loveth Y: "Now we are to understand that "loveth" occurs in a sentence; 
for what it may mean by itself, if it means anything, is not a question." 
12 For example Lehrer(l970,231) cites Karttunen's argument that to 
arrive at proper semantic interpretations for sentences, it is necessary 
to consider discourses, not just single sentences. 
13 Thus Chomsky talks of the need for operational tests to "meet the 
condition of correspondence to introspective judgement"(80). Other, 
spirited defences of semantic intuition may be found in Postal(l966), 
Mccawley in Parret(l974), and Chafe(l970), though I would not go so far 
as to endorse Chafe's comment(122) that "when introspection and surface 
evidence are contradictory, it is the former which is decisive." 
14Posta1(1972) claims that there are three empirical levels about 
which native speakers have linguistic intuitions: they have intuitions 
about what sentences mean, how they are pronounced, and how they are 
organised into words. 
15 
· · 1 · · . h h d . . For a simi ar position wit respect tote content an situation 
of an utterance, see Leech(l974,360). 
16Thus Bierwisch(l970,179) considers that: 
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"If appropriately refined the semantic structures arrived at in this 
way will presumably turn out to be nothing but a suitably adapted 
realization of the principles of formal logic." 
and in an important paper Lakoff(l970b, 151) suggests that: 
"It should not be too surprising to find that the logical structure 
that is necessary for natural language to be used as a tool for 
reasoning should correspond in some deep way to the grammatical 
structure of natural language." 
Other important papers reflecting the influence of formal logic include 
Bach(l968), McCawley(l968a,1972b). 
17 For similar remarks in a different context, see Vermazen(l966,357). 
18
sy the term 'Substance Theory' Zwicky intends reference to the 
hypothesis that every semantic prime can be realised as a lexical unit 
in some natural language. 
19 For example, Hall(l972), Wilson(l966) and Zwicky(l968). 
20 Chafe(l970,102) employs the term 'ambient' to specify that a verb 
"involves an all-encompassing event which is without reference to some 
particular "thing" within the environment." 
21 For some trenchant criticisms of the semantic features approach, 
see Lewis(1972,169). Lewis considers that semantic markers(or features), 
even if couched in natural language terms, still constitute part of an 
artificial language. Thus: 
"Semantic markers are aymbola: items in the vocabulary of an 
artificial language we may call Semantic Markereae. Semantic 
interpretation by means of them amounts merely to a translation 
algorithm from the object language to the auxiliary language 
Markerese. But we can know the Markerese translation of an 
English sentence without knowing the first thing about the 




INSTRUMENTAL IN CASE GRAMMAR I: 
FILLMORE, LAMBERT, STOCKWELL ET.AL. 
In this and the next two chapters a critical examination is made of a 
number of works by contemporary linguists. These works have been selected 
for review for one of two reasons: they either deal explicitly with 
instrumental sentences, or else they propose grammatical systems which 
have stimulated other papers on the syntax and semantics of instrumental 
sentences. 
Because Chomsky's 'standard theory' (1965) proves so important for an 
understanding of these works, the chapter begins by delineating relevant 
aspects of the standard theory, particularly in relation to the status of 
the category 'adverb' (3.2). Following bridging remarks on the nature of 
cases and the formal introduction of adverbs(3.3), the treatment of 
instrumental sentences within the case grammar approach is discussed, with 
an examination of papers by Fillmore(3.4), Lambert(3.5) and Stockwell et. 
al. (3.6). A summary section(3.7) concludes this chapter. Nilsen's 
treatment of instrume ntal sentenc es within case grammar is dealt with in 
Chapter Four, while Chapter Five examines generative semanticists' accounts 
of instrumental sentences. 
3.2 Instrumental in Chomsky's 'Standard Theory' 
What has become known as the standard theory of transformational 
grammar, viz., Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, played an 
important catalytic role in the development of literature which dealt 
specifically with instrumental sentences. For this reason it is desirable 
and appropriate to introduce this chapter by sketching some of the features 
of Chomsky's grammar which served as a point of departure for later writers 
on instrumental sentences. These features principally relate to the nature 
of adverbs and the way in which they are introduced into the grammar. 
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In traditional grammars(e.g. Poutsma 1904,203-4) the category of 
adverb included semantically-based types such as manner, place, time, 
causality, purpose and instrumentality. In Aspects(l06), adverbs are 
introduced categorially by the three base rules '(2) ', '(3) ', and' (5)' 
shown below. As can be seen, some of these adverbs enter the grammar as 
semantic categories(manner, time, place) while others are provided for 
through purely formal categories(e.g. prep-phrase). 
(1) 
( 2) 
s NP Predicate-Phrase 
Predicate-Phrase Aux VP (Place) (Time) 
Copula Predicate 




(4) Predicate --- ~ 
{
Adjec t ive } 
(like) Predicate-Nominal 
(5) Prep-Phras e - ---) Dire ction, Duration, Place, Frequency, etc. 
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Three groups of adverbials may thus be distinguished by virtue of their 
place of introduction in these rules: Place and Time adverbials in '(2) '; 
Manner adverbials in '(3) '; and those adverbials introduced in rule '(5) '. 
According to Chomsky, the differences in place of introduction derive from 
subcategorisation. Place and Time adverbials are said not to participate 
in verb subcategorisation. The other t~o groups do participate, but Manner 
adverbials are introduced separately to account for the determination of 
passives and pseudo-passives(l04). 
It is assumed that an instrumental adverbial, if present, would be 
included in rule '(5) ', permitting the following phrase marker for the 
sentence: 























Det N last night 
the key 
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In introducting adverbials thus, Chomsky admits in effect a 
subclassification by semantic function of the strictly grammatical category 
'Prep-Phrase'. Such a classification has led to these base rules being 
criticised, e.g. by Fillmore(1968a,16), for unintentionally confusing the 
distinction between 'pure', 'configurational' grammatical relations and 
'mediated' or 'pseudocategory' relations such as Manner, Duration, etc. 
As will be shown later, Fillmore attempts to untangle this alleged mixture 
of pure and mediated grammatical relations. 
Chomsky further assumes that the category symbols are "selected from 
a set of fixed, universal vocabulary"(66). These categories apparently 
represent primitive categories, both in belonging to the universal 
vocabulary, and in being introduced directly by the base rules. As such, 
they represent qua theory the deepest structures available for 
interpretation by the semantic component. With respect to their semantic 
terms of reference, however, the standard theory offers no formal or 
informal semantic definitions for the different adverbial category symbols. 
3.3 Case Grammar - Introducing Cases and Adverbs 
In Chapter Four of Aspects, 'Some Residual Problems' (162-3), Chomsky 
pointed out that there existed deeper, more abstract grammatical and 
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semantic functions than those found either at the surface or at the deep 
structure levels. These functions, he conceded, warranted investigation, 
but they currently lay outside the purview of any existing theories of 
language structure, including that suggested in Aspects. The case grammar 
proposed by Fillmore from 1966 onwards was one development which specific-
ally sought to investigate further these more abstract grammatical and 
semantic functions and to incorporate them into formal grammatical theory. 
Before launching into an examination of individual papers which deal with 
instrumental sentences, however, it is desirable by way of background to 
comment on the nature of cases and the manner in which adverbial cases are 
formally introduced into the grammar. 
The Natu~e of Cas es 
In a series of papers, Fillmore has proposed a form of transformational 
grammar which seeks to incorporate directly at the deepest syntactic level 
certain functional relations existing between strictly grammatical 
categories(~.g., between NP and VP, between NP and the V which immediately 
dominates it, between various adverbial elements and the categories which 
dominate them, etc.). Termed 'cases' (later also 'roles' and 'arguments'), 
these functional relations are 'primitives' in two senses. With respect to 
Fillmore's grammatical theory the cases are formal 'givens', introduced as 
unanalysable units of the base rules(l968a,2-3). The cases are also 
assumed to be primitive units in a conceptual sense. 1 
"The case notions comprise a set of universal, presumably innate, 
concepts which identify certain types of judgments human beings are 
capable of making about the events that are going on around them, 
judgments about such matters as who did it, who it happened to, 
and what got changed"(l968a,24). 
"I have assumed, too, that the role types are themselves unanalysables, 
corresponding to elementary perceptions on the part of human beings" 
(1972a,14). 
Although Fillmore does not conclude thus, it seems to follow that the 
concepts or notions will somehow be primitive elements also of the semantic 
component, to which reference must be made for the semantic interpretation 
of structures produced by the base rules of the syntactic component. 
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Fillmore does not detail the shape of his semantic component. It seems 
that he assumes a semantic component much like that outlined in Chomsky's 
standard theory. 
The FoY'l71al Introduction of Adverbial Cases 
In case grammar no formal category of adverb is present as such in the 
base rules. Rather the base rules identify certain relational cases which 
may be realised categorially as nouns, prepositional phrases, adverbs, etc. 
In attempting to incorporate as cases at the very base level the deeper 
semantic and syntactic relations Chomsky referred to, Fillmore effectively 
reverses the general, categorial:relational sequence of the standard 
theory's base rules to a relational:categorial sequence. Taking the case 
relations as primary, the categorial possibilities for their realisations 
as nouns, prepositional phrases, adverbs, etc., become of secondary and 
facilitatory importance. 
Despite that, Chomsky and Fillmore's base rules are alike in positing 
no unitary place of introduction for adverbs (or, in Fillmore's grammar, 
for cases which can be realised adverbially). As far as Fillmore is 
concerned, some cases which can be realised as adverbs are introduced as 
members of the 'Modality' constituent, and some as members of the 
'Proposition' constituent in the first base rule: 
(8) Sentence Modality + Proposition 
The Modality constituent includes such "modalities on the sentence-as-a-
whole" as negation, tense, mood, aspect and interrogative elements, and 
also those adverbials felt to be modifying the sentence rather than any of 
its subconstituents. 
Throughout the development of case grammar under Fillmore, however, 
the Modality constituent was considered to be of little consequence to the 
Proposition constituent and hence its nature and operation were never 
charted in any detail(l966,365;1968a,23). In Fillmore's more recent work, 
the Modality constituent seems to have vanished altogether. For instance 
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the 'Halloween Grammar' of 1972b treats such elements as tense as features 
of the Predicator node, which corresponds to the verb of the Proposition 
constituent. 
Lambert, one case grammarian who has modified Fillmore's proposals 
somewhat, does not distinguish at all between the two constituents. Instead, 
after detailing some semantic and syntactic criteria for identifying a few 
of the cases which Fillmore included in the Proposition constituent, Lambert 
enumerates some other possible cases: "Temporal, Manner, Measure, Extent, 
Quantity, Factitive, Abstract, Property/Quality, State, Motion, Act/Event, 
Emphasis, and perhaps Modality as well"(l969,137). Unfortunately, she does 
not further develop these cases by providing for each distinguishing 
semantic and syntactic criteria. 
But Nilsen(l973,121) does maintain a nominal distinction between what 
he terms 'Propositional' (which includes all of his instrumental cases) and 
'Adverbial(Modal)' cases. The Adverbial cases comprise: Manner, Extent, 
Reason, Locqtive, Temporal, Source, Path and Goal(which is said to include 
Benefactive}. Nilsen does not attempt to justify this division into 
Propositionql and Adverbial(Modal) cases - presumably it is a carryover 
from Fillmore's 1968a paper. 
Despite some close semantic affiliations with adverbials such as 
'Manner' and 'Causality', however, instrumental adverbials were never 
included as members of the Modality constituent in case grammer. Rather 
they were always introduced as an important separate case in the Proposition 
constituent. More recently adverbials of Location, Time, Source and Goal 
have also appeared as cases in this constituent in Fillmore, having been 
lifted out of the Modality constituent. As a general rule, those adverbial 
elements which could become subjects or objects were incorporated into the 
Proposition constituent(l966,366). 
Fillmore's twin origin for adverbs appeared to miss some generalisations, 
both formal and semantic. Formally, for example, it accorded a different 
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status to adverbs originating in the two constituents - cases in the 
Proposition constituent compared with a rather vague status as adverbial 
elements in the Modality constituent(1966,365). Semantically, it seemed 
to demand sources in different constituents for the italicised expressions 
in the following pairs of synonymous sentences, with the 'a' sentence 
expression being in the Instrumental case in the Proposition constituent, 
and the 'b' sentence expression in the Manner case, a case which seemed to 
reside within the Modality constituent. 
(9) a. Mary ground the Australian opals with a machine. 
b. Mary ground the Australian opals mechanically. 
(10) a. The French monitored their nuclear blast with an electronic 
device. 
b. The French monitored their nuclear blast electronically. 
(11) a. During the power cut, John kneaded the dough with hie handa. 
b. During the power cut, John kneaded the dough manually. 
The problem with this analysis is that one would assume a priori that if 
cases represent primitive conceptual units and in some sense capture 
abstract semantic properties at the base, then sentences with the same 
meaning should receive the same case analysis(though not necessarily the 
same sequence of cases 3), or at least be capable of 'translation' into the 
cases of the synonymous sentence. 4 Unless the Manner case maps the same 
semantic space as the Instrumental case, this assumption is not borne out 
here. 
Historically, Fillmore's adverbial proposals received little support 
from other contemporary research. Characteristic of the mid 1960s were 
attempts to reveal hitherto ignored or undetected semantic and syntactic 
relations between traditionally distinct word classes. 5 Indeed, Fillmore's 
treatment of cases itself had the effect of doing this in that it allowed 
nouns, prepositional phrases and adverbs to be subsumed on semantic-
syntactic grounds under the same case labels. But other research cut across 
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and challenged Fillmore's position. For example there were Lakoff's 
arguments, whose persuasiveness Fillmore acknowledged(1968a,23 footnote), 
that sentence adverbials such as willingly, enthusiastically, and carefully 
should be introduced not from within the sentence, as in Fillmore's Modality 
constituent, but from a predicate source in a higher sentence. At the same 
time there were arguments, also stemming largely from Lakoff's thesis(1970), 
that adverbials such as those of location and instrumentality, which 
Fillmore treated within the Proposition constituent, were also to be derived 
from a higher sentence. Finally, signalling an even more radical departure 
from the original case grammar proposals, were proposals that prepositions 
themselves, which are significantly associated with particular cases in 
Fillmore's grarranar, should be represented abstractly as predicates(Lakoff 
1970,103; Becker and Arms 1969). 
In retrospect it seems almost inevitable that Fillmore's case proposals 
should be superseded by other ongoing research. The proposals can be seen 
as an early attempt to crystallise some of the abstract semantic-syntactic 
functions mentioned by Chomsky while at the same time remaining within the 
basic grammatical framework and assumptions of the Aspects model. Other, 
later research went successively deeper and more radically into the 
semantic-syntactic deep structure and suggested semantic relations which 
cut across or passed through the gross semantic 'web' which Fillmore's six 
or so cases constituted. 
3.4 Fillmore 
Fillmore has written several papers on case grammar, with each 
representing a different stage in the development of his proposals. The 
following discussion concentrates on three important papers which deal 
inter alia with instrumental sentences. These are: "The Case for Case" 
(1968a), "Some Problems for Case Grammar"(l97lb), and "Subjects, Speakers, 
and Roles"(l972a). 
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3. 41 "The Case for Case" 
In this his principal statement of case grammar, Fillmore posits six 
main cases: Agentive, Instrumental, Dative(also called Benefactive), 
Factitive, Locative, and Objective. Fillmore's informal approximation of 
the meaning of the Instrumental case is: "the case of the inanimate force 
or object causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb" 
(24). Two problems with this definition deserve attention here: the first 
relates to agency, the second to causation. 
Agency 
In approaching instrumental sentences from the point of view of their 
meanings, the thesis takes as a fundamental and commonsense starting point 
the general, pre-theoretical notion of an instrument as "something which is 
used by someone for some purpose". Assuming this as a not unreasonable 
starting point, Fillmore's account is seen to be incomplete semantically in 
several respects. 
(a) Fillmore's definition of the concept covered by the Instrumental case 
makes no mention, explicit or otherwise, of the necessary involvement of an 
agent. It has been shown elsewhere(e.g. Lakoff 1966,9; Lee 1969b,41; 
Fillmore 1972a,10) that certain manner adverbs such as enthusiastically, 
carefully, masterfully, viciously, etc., entail the presence of an agent, 
at least in the underlying semantic structure of the sentence concerned. 
Th~t is, implicit in the meaning of these adverbs is the notion of 
'someone doing something in some way'. Similarly, it can be argued, 
instrumental adverbial expressions also entail the presence of an agent in 
the underlying semantic structure. That is, for an adverbial expression to 
be an instrwnenta.l adverbial expression, an underlying agent inter alia is 
essential. 
Put another way, the semantic structure of a sentence which is claimed 
to be an instrumental sentence should support a non-anomalous answer to the 
question 'w'hoae instrument?'. As will b e shown in detail in Chapter Six, 
however, sentences such as 
(12) a. The wind opened the door. 
b. A hammer broke the window. 
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do not, except on a metaphorical interpretation, provide for an agent in 
their semantic representations. Therefore, with the metaphorical senses 
excluded, the question 'whose instrument?' is simply inappropriate to such 
sentences. 
(b) Although Fillmore's definition of the Instrumental case does not 
mention agency, in discussion here and in an earlier paper he appeals 
implicitly to the role of agency to distinguish, for certain sentences 
containing with phrases, those which have an Instrumental case and those 
which do not. The principle which Fillmore appeals to is that "the subject 
of an active transitive sentence must be interpretable as a personal agent 
just in case the sentence contains a with phrase of instrumental import" 
(22). Thus for Fillmore's sentences 
(13) a. John broke the window with a hammer. 
b. *A hammer broke the glass with a chisel. 
c. *The car broke the window with a fender. 
d. The car broke the window with its fender. 
the principle is complied with in (13)a, violated in (13)b and (13)c 
because, given the with phrases, the subjects hammer and~ respectively 
cannot be interpreted as personal agents (unless metaphorically, in which 
cases the principle does apply and the asterisks go), and complied with 
vacuously in (13)d, because the real subject of this sentence is the 
possessed noun the car's fender and there is no independent instrumental 
with phrase. 6 
It should be said that Fillmore's statement of the principle leaves 
semantically unmotivated why the subject of an active transitive sentence 
should be interpretable as a personal agent if the sentence contains an 
instrumental with phrase. The semantic linchpin underlying this principle 
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seems to me to be the fact that the instrumental not i on itself entails 
agency; where an instrumental phrase allegedly exists, therefore, 
principles of semantic wellformedness will attempt to identify an agent, 
which may be overt or covert with respect to surface structure. In active 
transitive sentences containing instrumental with phrases, agency is 
represented overtly and is tightly constrained to subject position. 
Instrumental case sentences with covert agents are referred to in an 
earlier paper(l966,374). There Fillmore points to a role for agents in the 
meaning of instrumental sentences such as 
(14) a. The rats were killed with fire. 
b. The door was opened with this key. 
which are described respectively as having an "understood agent" and an 
"implied human agent". 
(c) Fillmore's remarks about agency(explicit or implicit) in Instrumental 
case sentences are made only in relation to sentences containing with 
phrases. Many of Fillmore's Instrumental case sentences, however, contain 
no with phrases, and thus the question whether agency plays any part in the 
meanings of such sentences as those below is not answered. 
(15) a. A hammer broke the window. 
b. The car's fender broke the window. 
c. The key opened the door. 
d. The wind opened the door. 
An obvious tension thus exists between the (implied) presence of an agent 
in the general term 'instrumental', and the lack of support for an agent, 
both in the formal definition of the Instrumental case and in the respective 
meanings of Fillmore's Instrumental case sentences themselves. 
(d) I have suggested that the relationship between instrumentality and 
agency is one of entailment. If this is so, then using the following 
formula where 'I' stands for Instrument and 'A' for Agent, viz., 
(16) a. I :::J A 
b. ,...,, A =» ,_ I 
then where no agent is implied in a sentence, no instrument is possible 
either. Such a conclusion runs contrary to Fillmore's treatment of 
sentences such as (lS)a-d, whose surface subjects he suggests represent 
Instrumental case expressions. That sentences such as these have 
frequently been claimed to be instrumental sentences can perhaps be 
attributed to two reasons. First, since surface subjects for such 
sentences are often represented by familiar domestic objects which happen 
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to be used instrumentally in real life, by association a linguistic 
instrument is strongly suggested where in fact none exists. Secondly, a 
linguistic instrument may seem to be suggested through some type of 
implicational 'spillover' from adjacent discourse. Thus whenever sentences 
such as (lS)a and (lS)c are referred to as Instrumental case sentences, it 
is almost always in contexts where they are paired with sentences which 
undeniably contain instrumental prepositional phrases, such as, respectively, 
(17) a. John broke the window with a hammer. 
b. John opened the door with the key. 
In pairing sentences such as (15)a and (17)a, (lS)c and (17)b, Fillmore 
has drawn attention to certain regular syntactic-semantic relationships. 
But in pressing a single semantic notion into service to account for the 
semantic relations between a hammer and - broke the window in (lS)a as well 
as between with a hammer and John broke the window in (17)a, Fillmore is 
forced to withdraw to a corrnnon denominator semantic notion, viz., the 
agentless definition for the Instrumental case. As will be shown in detail 
in Chapter Six, however, the semantic relations contracted respectively 
between a hammer and the rest of sentence (lS)a and with a hammer and the 
rest of sentence (17)a are neither identical nor equivalent. They cannot 
be described in terms of a single instrumental notion. 
(e) Finally, because it does not delimit the instrumental notion to agentive 
environments, Fillmore's definition of the Instrumental case is too 
inclusive, embracing more sentences than one would intuitively consider 
instrumental in nature. Thus each of the italicised noun phrases in the 
following sentences meets the criterion of 'an inanimate force or object 
causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb'. 
(18) a. The strong light hurt my eyes. 
b. The river mud stained my sneakers. 
c. Five dead leaves overbalanced my daughter's mobile. 
d. A rotting stump prevented the runaway bus from plunging 
into the river. 
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But even if these italicised items satisfy the Instrumental case criterion, 
we may well ask 'whose instrument?' respectively do they represent? It 
would be semantically gratuitous to reply 'God' or 'an animate deity', 
because one certainly wouldn't wish to be committed to the obligatory 
presence of any such beings in the semantic representations of these 
sentences. 
Rather than representing instrumental noun phrases (with an entailed 
agency specification in the sentences' semantic representations), I suggest 
that the italicised noun phrases represent objects or phenomena which happen 
to be involved, without reference to agents, in some event which is causally 
linked to the event described by the main verb. The important point to note 
about the semantic representations of these sentences is not that an agent 
is explicitly excluded(the semantic representations fail to support this 
possibility equally with explicit inclusion), but that they are unspecified 
with respect to agentivity. Detailed semantic representations for sentences 
such as these will be given in Chapter Six. 
The necessary entailment of agency within the instrumental notion 
underlay Huddleston's suggestion(l970) that an additional case 'Force' 
should be introduced to distinguish important semantic differences between 
the following sentences. 
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(19) a. John opened the door. 
b. The wind opened the door. 
c. The key opened the door. 
Huddleston argued that Fillmore's definition of the Agent and Instrumental 
case (which make John an Agent and the wind and the key both Instrumental 
case) obscured the fact that under normal interpretations (19)c but not 
(19)b presupposed an implicit agent. He proposed limiting instrumentals 
to sentences with this presupposition, and introducing a new case 'Force' 
to express the role of phenomena such as the wind(and whirlwinds, hail, 
frost, floods, droughts, etc., when used in sentences such as (19)b). 
While I have reservations, for reasons mentioned earlier and 
demonstrated in detail in Chapter Six, about classifying (19)c as an 
instrumental sentence,7 I wholly agree with Huddleston that an agentive 
context is a necessary preprequisite for an instrumental sentence. (It 
would appear to me, however, that the relation between instrumental and 
agency was one of entailment rather than of presupposition.8) 
But with respect to the new case Force, Huddleston's natural 
phenomena type examples suggest the existenc~ . 0f an uncharted middle 
ground between expressions which are clearly Instrumental case and those 
which are clearly Force case. Thus, the subjects of the sentences below 
represent neither Instrumental case nor the physical, natural force 
phenomena suggested as representative of the Force case. 
(20) a. The paperweight fractured my toe. 
b. A briefcase hit Fred on the neck. 
c. A piece of roofing iron smashed our tomato plants. 
If one wishes to retain the case grammar approach here, some 
clarification could obtain from treating as Force case all expressions 
except those which entail agency, and by reformulating and generalising 
the definition of Force case from 'phenomena not subject to anyone's 
control', which suggests a non-linguistic, real-world identification of 
natural 'forces' such as fire, wind, water, ice, etc., to something like 
'expressions denoting causal phenomena which the given sentence does not 
entail are controlled by an agent'. This proposal recognises that case 
grammar provides a linguistic rather than a real world description, 9 and 
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it also diminishes the influence of extra-linguistic connotations of case 
labels such as 'Instrument' and 'Force'. Huddleston's later comments(l971, 
111) about the Force case representing some kind of 'non-agentive force' 
or 'external causer' is in line with this proposal. 
Causation 
Fillmore's definition of the Instrumental case seems to refer too 
comprehensively to causal relations. The reference is to "the case of the 
inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state 
identified by the verb". This reference appears too inclusive, given the 
facts that, first, there are sentences with expressions satisfying the 
definition but which Fillmore chooses to call another case, and second, 
there are situations satisfying the formula but which it seems can receive 
no Instrumental case expression. 
(a) Taking up the first point, notice that although the following sentences 
contain expressions(italicised) which meet the criterion of inanimate forces 
or objects 'causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb', 
these expressions are not accorded Instrumental case membership. 
(21) a. The bridge collapsed because of the impact of the freighter. 
b. The dam burst under the weight of the flood waters. 
c. The radiator hose split from overheating. 
d. Freda broke the window by tossing a brick through it. 
e. Ethelred beheaded Damien, using an ancient battleaxe. 
Some of these at least in traditional grammars would have been called 
'causal' adverbial phrases or clauses. Fillmore, however, does not discuss 
these sentences or sentences like them, 10 perhaps because his paper deals 
primarily with syntactically simple sentences rather than complex or reduced 
complex sentences such as the above. From his comment that "complex 
sentences involve recursion through the category Sentence under the case 
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category Objective"(32), it seems obvious that the italicised expressions 
in sentences (2l)a-e will be classed as Objective rather than Instrumental 
case. This decision, ignoring the strong causal sense inherent in the 
expressions, conceals them under the Objective case label which is 
described as: 
"the semantically most neutral case, the case of anything 
representable by a noun whose role in the action or state 
identified by the verb is identified by the semantic inter-
pretation of the verb itself; conceivably the concept should 
be limited to things which are affected by the action or state 
identified by the verb''(25). 
Whatever their internal case composition, the italicised expressions in 
these sentences have anything but a neutral semantic role in the higher 
sentences in which they occur. In a later paper, Fillmore relaxes his 
position, permitting embedding under the Instrumental case. He says there 
that "when the Instrument role is occupied by a sentence, that sentence 
identifies an event which is understood as having some other event or state 
as its consequence"(197lb,42). Thus in sentence (2l)d the expression 
by tossing a brick through it would presumably identify an event having the 
event of breaking the window as its consequence. This later modification 
removes some of the strain which was placed on the Objective case by 
requiring it to simultaneously serve two inequal purposes related to 
differing category types - a wastebasket, semantic role of representing 
expressions which were most neutral semantically, and a formal surface 
structure role arising from the stipulation that the case handle all 
instances of complex sentences. Obviously there is a conflict of interests 
here: there seems no a priori reason why embedded sentences should be 
semantically neutral, and a cursory examination reveals strong counter-
examples to the proposition. 
Another example of the excessive breadth of causal aspects of 
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Fillmore's definition of the Instrumental case is illustrated in the 
following sentences. 
( 22) a. . h. th . l 11 John tore hiss 1rt on e na~. 
b. Mary drowned the silverfish in the dishhJater. 
c. Freddy burned his leg under a hot raylamp. 
In each of these sentences the noun in the prepositional phrase represents 
an inanimate force or object in some way causally involved in the action or 
state identified by the main verb. The noun thus qualifies for Instrumental 
case membership, a qualification which seems to be strengthened by the 
possibility of paraphrasing the intentional sense of sentences (22)a-c 
respectively by the sentences below. 
(23) a. John used the nail to tear his shirt on. 
b. Mary used the dishwater to drown the silverfish in. 
c. ?Freddy used a hot raylamp to burn his leg under. 
For Fillmore, however, it appears that the prepositional phrases in 
(22)a-c would be assigned to the Locative case, the case which identifies 
the location or spatial orientation of the state or action identified by the 
verb. No doubt this classification comes about through an additional 
criterion in the presence of a preposition which overtly signals a particular 
underlying case. This example, another manifestation of the tension in case 
grammar at the interface between meaning and surface structure(resolved this 
time according to a surface structure criterion), demonstrates again the 
lack of discreteness in the formulation of the Instrumental case definition. 
It also raises the following question. Where an expression meets the 
criteria for two cases, can it be non-arbitrarily assigned to one rather 
than the other, or can it simultaneously represent both cases? Lambert(l969, 
98-102) and Nilsen(l973,79-83) both provide for simultaneous representation. 
Fillmore makes no comment on the question here but in a later paper 
acknowledges it as one of the most serious difficulties facing the case 
approach(l972a,15). 
(b) Secondly, it was suggested that situations existed which, while 
satisfying the causal aspects of the Instrumental case formula, were 
incapable of expression in an Instrumental case form which Fillmore 
acknowledges. If supported(and this point is a weaker objection), it 
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argues for a theory which more closely approximates to what is linguistically 
possible. 
Thus if I use a wrench to get a key to unlock a door with a stubborn 
lock, the wrench is certainly causally involved in the unlocking of the 
locked door, yet the following sentences cannot be used to describe this 
situation. 
(24) a. The wrench unlocked the door. 
b. I unlocked the door with the wrench. 
Whether or not an object in a causal event receives Instrumental expression 
seems to be determined by the degree of causal involvement and the relation 
of the event to other events involving the agent. Further discussion of 
this matter and some exceptions to the above are found in section 3.42, in 
an analysis of Fillmore's paper "Some Problems for Case Grammar". 
Nevertheless the situation described illustrates a common situation in which 
an agent sets in train a series of events which, causally related, issue in 
some desired result. Fillmore's definition is too broad in that while these 
events all seem to meet the causal requirements of the Instrumental case 
definition, only a sub-group actually receive Instrumental expression. 
The requirement that case definitions cover all and only those 
situations actually capable of linguistic expression is admittedly an 
idealistic goal. One way of restraining Fillmore's definition in the 
direction of descriptive linguistic adequacy would be to stipulate that the 
definite article in the Instrumental case definition('the inanimate force 
or object causally involved') should refer only to the most appropriate 
phrase of instrumental import i n the given sentence. 
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Fillmore's treatment of instrumental sentences in "The Case for Case" 
1s inadequate in two respects. It fails to recognise the entailed presence 
of an agent in the semantics of instrumental sentences, and it 
insufficiently delimits the causal relations characterising instrumental 
sentences. While a causal component is obviously required, the semantics 
of instrumental sentences amounts to more than mere causal involvement by 
an inanimate object or force. 
3.42 "Some Problems for Case Grammar" 
In this paper, despite some terminological changes and an altered 
1 . f 12 · 11 . h . f d 1 . ineup o cases, Fi more retains t e notion o cases as un er ying 
semantic functions, which represent basic intuitive concepts, and which are 
selected from an irreducible set of functions defined once and for all for 
all human languages. The Instrumental case is defined as "the case of the 
immediate cause of an event, or, in the case of a psychological predicator, 
the 'stimulus', the thing reacted to"(42). Two aspects of the paper will be 
commented on below: they are, again, aspects related to agency and 
causation. 
Agenay 
(a) I have already commented in 3.41 on the need to recognise the presence 
of an agent in the meaning of ins trumental sentences. The arguments for 
this position and against Fillmore's proposal there apply equally to his 
re-definition of the Instrumental case and to his treatment of Instrumental 
case sentences here. For reasons of brevity, however, these arguments will 
not be repeated here. 
(b) I also commented in 3.41 on Huddleston's proposal to distinguish as 
Force case expressions those so-called Instrumental sentences of Fillmore's 
which did not contain an agent, explicit or otherwise, in their meanings. 
In this paper, Fillmore examines and rejects Huddleston's suggestion for a 
new case, but on what appear to me to be questionable grounds. 
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In brief, Fillmore resolves the question of whether an additional case 
is required by appealing to the principle of complementarity. 13 It seems 
unnecessary, he says, to set up a separate new case called 'Force' because 
this case "never occurs in contrast with either Agent or Instrument"(44). 
Fillmore then reviews the arguments for grouping Force with either Agent or 
Instrument case and comes down in favour of the latter, thereby continuing 
to include 'non-agentive' sentences within the Instrumental case. 
What is most at question here is not the judgement that the putative 
Force case never occurs in contrast with Agent or Instrumental, but the 
validity of employing an overtly surface structure criterion for determining 
whether or not a certain underlying semantic case exists in English. It 
seems rather odd and inconsistent, on the one hand, both to claim that there 
exist underlying semantic functions, irreducible and representing basic 
intuitive concepts, and to acknowledge English expressions representing a 
putative case of such a type(Force), and then to eliminate this case by 
what appears to be an appeal to a principle of a different order, viz., 
surface structure criterion aimed at maximal formal economy. 
If these irreducible semantic functions are claimed to exist, then they 
simply exist - incapable of being struck out by surface criteria, and the 
semantic representations of sentences in all languages will be shown as 
composed of different selections from this universal semantic 'reservoir'. 
What Fillmore does is to tacitly admit the semantic basis in English for a 
case such as Force but to regroup it with another existing case on formal, 
essentially non-semantic criteria. To be fair, what Fillmore has sought 
to do in reviewing difficulties facing this part of his case grammar is to 
propose a better 'fit' between various elements of his grammar, between in 
particular arguments and suggestions for the lineup of potential cases, and 
the formal, systemic requirements of economy and simplicity. The point to 
be wondered at is the relative weighting to be applied to these criteria 
of different orders(content and form). In a theory which explicitly 
espouses certain semantic 'basics', it is doubtful whether such semantic 
basics can justifiably be 'tampered with' by formal, surface criteria. 
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One further point can be raised in connection with the principle of 
complementarity here. This is that the principle of complementary distribu-
tion clashes with that of the irreducibility of basic semantic functions. 
The principle itself assumes the existence of two discrete entities which 
are mutually-exclusive as far as distributional factors are concerned, yet 
which have some similarities in other respects. By employing the 
principle of complementarity, Fillmore says in effect that there are two 
cases, Instrumental and Force, which are distributionally distinct but 
which on the basis of other(presumably semantic) similarities can be thought 
of, for formal purposes, as 'allocases' of the same case. But if these two 
cases share some semantic characteristics, then ipso facto the cases cannot 
represent basic, irreducible semantic functions(unless the cases are 
identical, in which case there would be no need to make out a case for 
complementarity in the first place). 
While the above discussion is really an argument for internal 
theoretical consistency, it also illustrates problems(mentioned in 2.5) with 
assuming that these cases are plausible candidates for irreducible semantic 
functions. If Instrumental and Force are sufficiently similar semantically 
to warrant analysis in terms of complementary distribution, then obviously 
they are in need of further semantic analysis. Fillmore himself hints at a 
possible approach to a deeper semantic analysis in the next paper to be 
discussed. 
Cauaation 
In this section I wish to make several comments on the reformulation 
of the definition of the Instrumental case as (in part) "the immediate 
cause of an event". 
(a) First, a general comment made previously in 1.6 about causal statements 
must be particularised here. It concerns the necessity to sometimes 
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interpolate explanatory material in semantic representations to account for 
causal ellipsis in sentences which describe causally related events. Here 
it must be stressed that an object referred to by an expression labelled 
Instrumental case cannot in itself be the immediate cause of an event; 
rather it is some event involving this object which is held to be the 
immediate cause of the other event. Thus in (25)a 
(25) a. The man broke the window with the baseball. 
b. I trimmed my beard with scissors. 
it is some event involving the baseball which is the instrumentally-
identified(irnmediate) cause of the breaking. Similarly in (25)b the 
scissors per se cannot be a cause, immediate or mediated, of anything. 
This is an important point which has been insufficiently recognised in 
descriptions of instrumental sentences. Semantic representations of 
instrumental sentences therefore must take into account the fact that the 
so-called 'instrument' noun in an instrumental sentence is just one 
constituent in an event which is causally related to the event described 
in the main verb. 
(b) Second, in what sense can something be said to be an immediate cause? 
In section 3.41 I criticised as being too loose Fillmore's characterisation 
of causal relations within instrumental sentences in terms of 'causal 
involvement in' the action or state identified by the main verb. In this 
new paper, Fillmore attempts to focus more closely on the causal relations 
within instrumental sentences by referring to the Instrument case as the 
case of the immediate cause of an event. In Fillmore's discussion of 
Davidson's(l971,17) example it is strongly suggested that immediate causation 
is to be understood in a physical sense, one capable of objective, extra-
linguistic verification. To illustrate the accordion effect resulting from 
chains of causally related events, Fillmore discusses the example of a man 
who swings a baseball bat, which hits a baseball, which moves and impinges 
on a window, causing it to break. That the Instrumental case identifies 
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the immediate, but not any intervening cause, is said to be shown by the 
fact that (26)a but not (26)b correctly describes this situation. 
(26) a. The man broke the window with the baseball. 
b. The man broke the window with the baseball bat. 
But it seems obvious that 'immediate cause' must not be understood in 
this way. For one thing, the ordinary language user, who correctly uses 
instrumental sentences, is neither a physical scientist nor privy to the 
real causes at work in physical phenomena. But more important, there are 
many instrumental expressions in quite acceptable sentences that cannot be 
understood simply as denoting immediate causation in any strictly physical 
sense. To illustrate, consider the following: 
(27) a. John cut the timber by hand. 
b. Mary killed Freda with this gun. 
c. I painted the house with a brush. 
d. I cleaned the car with a chcunois and a sponge. 
The italicised expressions would generally be identified as instrumental 
expressions, 14 but in what sense do they each represent immediate causes? 
In (27)a hand is in one sense furthest removed from the action of the verb 
d 1 t h . . 1 ( ) 15 an c~oses tote principa cause Agent. Sentence (27)b is vague with 
respect to whether the gun actually came into contact with Freda(e.g. Mary 
battered her to death with the gun) or whether Freda was shot. If the 
latter, the gun is several causal removes from the event of Freda's death 
(as Nilsen correctly suggests in his otherwise questionable paraphrase of 
John killed Bi11(1973,102) 16), and it is therefore inappropriate to term it 
an immediate cause. If the former, however, the gun could more plausibly 
refer to an object involved in an event which immediately caused Freda's 
death. But even here it is almost impossible to pinpoint causal immediacy 
in a physical, objective sense. Thus a coroner might assert that the event 
of Freda's death was caused by heart failure, a condition brought about by 
shock, presumably as a result of extensive bruising to the head, and that 
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the bruises appeared to have been inflicted with a heavy blunt instrument, 
most likely the butt of a gun found nearby. In cases like this, which are 
not inordinately far-fetched, can it be claimed that the gun is involved 
in an event which is physically and objectively an inunediate cause of 
Freda's death? 
Even in an apparently simple sentence such as (27)c, to say that 
a brush represents an object involved in an event which is the inunediate 
cause of the painting is to make a selection from a number of component 
events, including, for example, the movement of the brush, paint getting 
onto the brush, the paint on the brush corning into contact with the house, 
etc. That is, from the chain of causally related events involved in the 
meaning of this sentence, a notion of inunediate cause can be realised by 
focussing on and selecting some component events, and by rejecting others. 
Finally, where conjoined nouns appear in instrumental phrases, how 
does the notion of inunediate causation interlock with the events involving 
the two relevant instrumental objects? In (27)d, for instance, is the 
event which involves the chamois an inunediate cause equally with the event 
which involves the sponge, or is one event a more inunediate cause than the 
other, or is there perhaps a single event which the chamois and the sponge 
are thought of as belonging to jointly? 
The sentences below describe a few more of the many situations which 
involve two instrumental objects, including, in (28)d, a situation in which 
one of the instrumental objects clearly seems to participate in an event 
which is the causal antecedent of the other. 
(28) a. Frank sewed the leather with a needle and nylon thread. 
b. Jim held the vase together with araldite and rubber bands. 
c. Mary drew her mother's portrait with a pen and green ink. 
d. Jo used a hanuner and nails to attach the picture to the wall. 
Whichever answer is selected, and I incline to the latter, the simple, 
further-undifferentiated notion of immediate causation with respect to 
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instrumental sentences rests uncomfortably with situations described by 
conjoined instrumental nouns. 
(c) But if these instrumental events are not inunediate causes in the 
objective, physical-world sense usually implied, then, by Fillmore's 
definition, they shouldn't be Instrumental case expressions either. Yet 
to assert that would be to deny one's linguistic intuitions that these are 
indeed instrumental sentences. If one wishes to account for this 
instrumentality whilst retaining the element of truth involved in the term 
'immediate cause', the definition of the Instrumental case could be modified 
along the following lines. Instrumental will now be 'the case of what the 
speaker thinks of as the inunediate cause of an event', which allows for 
differences between what actually occurs (in some objective, physical sense) 
and what the speaker claims to have happened in a description of the event~ 7 
In effect the determination of immediate causation is now shunted from 
reliance on an implied physical objectivity to an evaluation and selection 
operation in the mind of the speaker. 
It is as if the speaker selects some (object-involving) event as 
critical for instrumentality, lexicalises it, and then treats as irrelevant 
any causal chains remaining between the chosen event and the event identified 
by the main verb. Thus in (27)a it is suggested that the series of 
causally related events(involving, for example, an edge of something coming 
into contact with the timber and penetrating it) necessary for the outcome 
of the main verb, but temporally subsequent to an event involving hand, 
are considered as unimportant (and only pedants will remind one of these 
18 
unselected events). From amongst several paradigmatic sets of possible 
instrumental 'causes' then, one set is selected(e.g. hands v. non-hands), 
and one member is chosen. 
What ranks as important enough for selection seems to depend on 
various non-linguistic factors: context, purposes of the utterance, socio-
cultural aspects, etc. Even Davidson's example about breaking the window 
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by hitting a ball with a bat can be expressed in ways which Fillmore 
considers unacceptable. From the situation of someone swinging a baseball 
bat, the bat hitting a baseball, the ball hitting a window and breaking it, 
Fillmore commented that English permitted mention of the 'last ' instrument 
only prior to the breaking, viz., the ball, as in the sentence 
The man broke the window with the ball (*with the bat, *by hand). 
Fillmore continues(43) "the nouns that can appear as the subject of 
the transitive verb break name either the principal cause, the Agent, or 
the immediate cause, the Instrument, but not any intervening cause". 
Thus it is possible to have The baseball broke the window, but not 
*The man's hands broke the window or *The bat broke the window. 
But by taking a 'mentalist' view of such chains of causation, it is 
possible to factor out some possible instrumental events more irmnediately 
related to the main verb's action and to select for instrumental expression 
an earlier event. Thus if I know beforehand of the man's attempt, and am 
aware that he could not decide whether to use the cricket bat or the 
baseball bat, I could ask after the event "Did he break the window with the 
cricket bat or the baseball bat?", and receive in reply the acceptable 
sentence He broke the window with the baseball bat. 19 
Or consider a situation in which a Wimbledon tennis champion is 
subjectively comparing racquets by hitting balls against a wooden practice 
screen. If a particular steel racquet consistently resulted in the screen 
breaking then sentence (29)a is acceptable. 
(29) a. He consistently broke the screen with the steel racquet. 
b. This is the racquet that broke the screen. 
The noun representing the instrument may even become subject of its own 
sentence as in (29)b. 20 There are two points to emphasise here: first, 
neither the steel racquet nor the baseball bat are irmnediate causes in the 
objective causation sense Fillmore assumes, and yet they may appear J_n 
lexical form in instrumental sentences; second, what is or is not a 
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legitimate instrumental event depends on what particular component events 
happen to be in focus in the mind of the speaker. 
Sentences of this nature, with a physically non-immediate instrumental 
event are not at all uncorranon, as the additional sentences below illustrate. 
In each of these sentences, it makes little or no sense if the italicised 
phrases are understood in an objectively verifiable sense of immediate 
causation. There is no inconsistency, however, when each is understood as 
representing an event considered by the speaker to be instrumentally 
significant to the action. 
(30) a. Mary shot John with a Smith and Weston. 
b. The marksman hit the bullseye from 800 yards with his new rifle. 
c. The Olympic shotputter equalled the world record with an 
enormous heave. 
d. The opening batsman shattered the clock glass on the 
grandstand with a mighty on-drive. 
e. The fencer pierced her opponent's vest with a sudden lunge. 
There is another interesting point exemplified by these sentences, one 
which requires special care in explication. It will be noted that the 
italicised phrases in the first two sentences refer to instrumental objects 
(Smith and Weston, new rifle) while those in the remaining sentences refer 
to instrumental events (heave, on-drive, lunge). As far as physical 
causation, and semantic descriptions of sentences involving such are 
concerned, just as objects such as revolvers and rifles cannot per se be 
involved in causal relationships, so the converse is true. Causal relation-
ships cannot exist between 'disembodied' events - 'something' or 'someone' 
is involved in the event. Hence in explicating these sentences, to account 
for causal ellipsis and to eliminate the 'magical' from the causal descrip-
tion, it will be necessary to supply in the first two sentences the event 
involving the instrumental objects, and in (30)c-e the 'something' involved 
in the instrumental event. 
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Swnmary 
Apart from the continuation of the practice of the earlier paper of 
not differentiating between Instrumental case sentences whose semantic 
representations include an agent and those which do not, the two principal 
comments on the paper concern the validity of employing the complementarity 
principle with alleged semantic primitives, and the need for further 
refinement of the "immediate cause" characterisation of the Instrumental 
case. While Fillmore is right in seeking a more precise characterisation 
than the causal involvement notion of the earlier paper, a satisfactory 
notion of immediate cause must account for the fact that an instrumental 
sentence is someone's description of a situation, not a scientific 
description of cause and effect in the physical world. Highlighting the 
speaker's role in the description thereby imparts rationality to an 
otherwise unprincipled process of selecting for lexicalisation some causal 
events as instrumentally significant, and rejecting others. 
3.43 "Subjects, Speakers, and Roles" 
With each successive paper the characterisation of the Instrumental 
case has altered somewhat, devolving away some of the characteristics of 
the definition presented in the 1968a paper, so that here the Instrumental 
case is presented in its most truncated form thus far. With the exception 
of increased specification with respect to causation, these re-definitions 
have resulted in a simpler, residual notion. Thus the reference to animacy 
in the 1968a characterisation of the Instrumental case("inanimate object or 
force") disappeared from the subsequent paper, and in this third paper 
Fillmore explicitly mentions that from the Instrumental case, which he here 
also terms the 'Stimulus' case, "the notion of 'implement' has been 
abstracted away" (12). Two points can be made under the heading of causation 
about the notion of Instrumental case that remains. 
Causation 
(a) The residual notion appears to be that of causation alone. In the 
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light of Fillmore's discussion in this paper, the case must now be 
interpreted as referring to an (immediate?) causal relation existing 
between that event which the instrumental expression itself represents and 
some subsequent event described by the main verb of the sentence. It can 
be doubted, however, whether the instrumental notion reduces to mere 
causation. Indeed, Fillmore himself seems to have recognised this point, 
for in the previous paper(197lb,42) he expressed the desire for a more 
appropriate name for the case, as if aware that the popular notion of 
instrumental was being successively eroded of its more familiar aspects. 
Perhaps 'Immediate Cause' for that paper, or merely 'Cause' here, would 
more adequately describe the case now. It may be significant in this 
respect that in the later, unpublished 'Halloween' grammar of 1972b, the 
case role Instrumental does not appear, and its place in the case hierarchy 
is filled by 'Cau' (for 'Cause'). 
(b) Notwithstanding this progressive simplification, the pared version 
still appears to be more complex causally than Fillmore suggests. In fact, 
the paper itself poses a non sequitur centering on this very point. The 
contradiction arises as follows. 
(i) ~he Instrumental case, as will be recalled, was defined as 
"the case of the immediate cause of an event". It was also 
called "Stimulus" and (later) "Cause". 
(ii) The case roles are assumed to be "themselves unanalysables, 
corresponding to elementary perceptions on the part of human 
beings". 
(iii) Yet 'cause' is not an unanalysable notion in Fillmore's view in 
this paper. Thus "the word CAUSE itself seems to have a 
substructure: to say that John caused the cat to die is to say 
that John engaged in some activity and that activity directly 
resulted in the death of the cat"(9). 
The problem, of course, resides in the conceptual difficulty of accepting 
116 
that a notion which includes (or is equivalent to) that of 'cause' could 
be regarded as conceptually unanalysable, while the word cause itself is 
thought to have a substructure. 
Swrmary 
In this paper Fillmore's notion of the Instrumental case is further 
reduced and moves further away from the popular, reference notion of 
instrumental as illustrated by instrumental sentences. My agreement with 
Fillmore's conunents regarding the complexity of the word cause entails my 
taking the position that the Instrumental case, even when simplified as 
here, still represents a complex concept. Considering that important 
semantic characteristics of instrumental sentences are absent from this 
reduced case, this position directly questions any assumption of the 
unanalysability of the Instrumental case, and its correspondence with 
elementary perceptions. Looking beyond case grammars, it also reveals 
quite clearly the impossibility of isolating, as a consequence of a study 
of the meanings of instrumental sentences, any instrumental constituent 
which is semantically primitive. 
3.5 Lambert 
In "Th~ Semantic Syntax of Metaphor: A Case Grammar Analysis", a 
dissertation devoted to the explanation and description of certain creative 
language processes such as reification, animation, personification, etc., 
Lambert adopts as her underlying theory a case grammar approach based on 
that of Fillmore 1968a but modified and expanded in various ways. The 
alterations seek both to take into account difficulties which Lambert sees 
in the earlier model, and to render the grammar a more adequate vehicle 
for describing metaphorical processes, including the incorporation of 
. 1 . . b 21 instrumenta expressions into ver s. 
Lambert's work is discussed here under the following sub-sections: 
the nature and description of the Instrumental case(3.51); the expanded 
role of semantic features(3.52); and conunents on the role of features in 
defining the Instrumental case(3.53). 
3.51 The Instrumental Case 
While Fillmore's notional definition of the Instrumental case("the 
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case of the inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or 
state identified by the verb") is taken over unchallenged by Lambert(23), 
the modified grammar does result in some differences in the nature and 
description of the Instrumental case. 22 
One major difference lies in Lambert's view that there are three 
subcategories of Instrumental case, which she names Tool, Material, and 
23 Force. These are illustrated below. 
Tool Instrumental: 
(31) a. John shut the window with a hammer. 
b. John used a hammer to shut the window. 
c. I made a castle with a plastering knife. 
Material Instrumental: 
(32) a. John filled in the window with bricks. 
b. John used bricks to fill in the window. 
c. I made a castle out of bricka. 
Force InstrUJllental: 
(33) a. Heat cracked the glass. 
b. The glass cracked from the heat. 
c. The window broke from pre~sure. 
Tool Instrumentals differ from Material Instrumentals, says Lambert 
(200), in that they cannot function as objects of the verb use up: 
(34) a. *John used up a hammer to shut the window. 
b. *I used up a plastering knife to make a castle. 
The Force(or 'Abstract Force') Instrumental was introduced to account for 
the presence of certain natural forces(e.g. heat, pressure, sun, wind) which 
functioned in the Instrumental case and which were marked by the case marker 
from(l26). These Force Instrumentals, Lambert claims, are mutually exclusive 
with both Material and Tool Instrumentals: 
(35) a. *Heat cracked the glass with a plastering knife. 
b. *I made a castle out of bricks from pressure. 
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But clearly this overlooks sentences such as the following, in which Force 
Instrumentals occur along with Material Instrumentals. 
(36) a. The wind filled my eyes with grit. 
b. The floodwaters covered my yard with debris. 
c. Excessive heat made milkshakes out of our iceblocks. 
These sentences cannot be explained on analogy with Fillmore(l968a,23), 
however, as if the Material case nouns were possessed nouns(e.g. *the 
wind's grit). 
The second major difference between Lambert and Fillmore's Instrumental 
case is the greater role played by semantic features in its definition and 
description. This change flows from Lambert's dissatisfaction with the 
variously-interpreted notional case descriptions of Fillmore's, and from 
her desire to reduce the reliance on intuition in case identification, by 
making as explicit as possible the identifying semantic features, markers 
24 and syntactic information known about each case(l30). 
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with the proviso that the actual allocation to a particular expression will 
depend on 'verb projection features' (see 3.52 below). 
Thus, whereas under Fillmore the Instrumental case was said to be 
formally and notionally an unanalysable entity, Lambert's Instrumental 
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case has neither formal nor semantic unanalysability. Formally there are 
now three subcategories, and each of these can be divided semantically into 
difference values of binary semantic features. If anything, it is 
Lambert's features that are now the primitive elements, both formally and 
semantically. The following sub-section examines briefly another motivation 
for the increasing role of semantic features in Lambert's grammar. 
3.52 The Expanded Role of Semantic Features 
The major motivation for expanding the descriptive responsibility of 
semantic features relates directly to Lambert's attempt to shape case 
grammar into a more viable instrument for describing metaphor. This 
reshaping is accomplished by her proposal for a more flexible Weinreichian-
inspired approach to the association of semantic features with lexical items 
and cases. This revised case grammar, claims Lambert, has the flexibility 
required to "actively interpret sentences which another Transformational 
Grammar would have to mark as ungrammatica1"(161). 
The role of semantic features in Fillmore's case grammar prior to 
Lambert was important but restricted. Thus in Fillmore 1968a, semantic 
features were employed to a limited extent both in the lexicon, in 
specifying the features associated with lexical items, and in obligatory 
rules which stated the features of nouns required by particular cases. 
For example, any noun in an Agent or Dative expression had to have the 
feature +ANIMATE, this being expressed by the rule: 
(37) N [+ANIMATE] ?,D [ X ------ y] 
Such a rule assumed the association with individual cases of sets of 
features compatible with or obligatory to those cases. Additionally, 
there were general rules assigning to each noun in a sentence a feature 
label designating the case relation it held with the rest of the sentence, 
e.g. a noun under Locative case would receive the feature +LOCATIVE. But 
lexical items which were not compatible with individual cases on the basis 
of shared semantic features would be marked by the feature [-CASE], 
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here [ -LOCATIVE ] . 
Semantic features were also involved indirectly in the selection of 
verbs and their insertion into sentences, the machinery for this being the 
'case frame' environment which specified the set of cases which could or 
had to occur with that verb. Semantic features were involved here in that 
case frame possibilities for particular verbs reflect semantic considera-
tions, which are represented by the semantic features associated with 
individual cases. Thus the verbs murder and terrorise, with case frame 
[_A+ D], require animate subjects and animate objects, and this animate-
ness requirement is provided for in the assignment of the feature +ANIMATE 
to the Agent and Dative cases. A case frame is thus an abbreviation for a 
cluster of semantic feature information, which makes up the semantic 
environment of a particular verb. (For some comments on the semantic 
validity of case frames and semantic features, see Chapter 2.5.) 
Under Lambert, semantic features gain a new dimension by their part 
in facilitating the description of metaphorical expressions through the 
process which Lambert terms 'case feature projection'. Case feature 
projection is the process by which any lexical item used in a particular 
case acquires the features inherent to that case, regardless of whether its 
own lexical entry contains those features or not. If the lexical item 
already possesses the features inherent in the particular case, there is no 
obvious projection of case features. But where the lexical item possesses 
features incompatible with the case features, the case features take 
dominance and are 'projected' onto the lexical item, its compatible feature 
or features being 'suspended' for that expression. 
To illustrate, Agent case projects the features +ANIMATE and +INTENT 
onto lexical items put into Agent case. An item possessing these features 
in the lexicon, e.g. housewife, functions unmarkedly in Agent case, but an 
item with features -ANIMATE (and hence -INTENT) in the lexicon, e.g. 
typewriter, acquires the features +ANIMATE and +INTENT and functions 
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markedly if used in Agent case, as in the sentence 
(38) My typewriter gave me a nice electric shock. 
Lambert adapted the notion of case feature projection from Weinreich's 
'transfer features', speaking of which Weinreich writes(1966,430): 
"An example of a transfer feature would be the feature (+Time] 
in the preposition during or the postposition ago; that is to 
say, whatever word is constructed with during and ago has the 
feature of (+Time] transferred to it." 
Lambert also employs Fillmore's(l968b,390) term 'verb feature projection' 
for the process of transferring features from a verb to a noun. Thus the 
verb sail is said to project the feature +WATER to a lexical item 
26 functioning in the Objective or Location cases. 
By incorporating these processes Lambert believes her grammar is 
considerably more capable than either the standard theory or Fillmore's 
case grammar of describing the violation of selectional restrictions, and 
therefore more adequate for the description of flexible, even intentionally 
deviant, uses of language. "Case grammar with an active model of sentence 
interpretation", she writes, "will not ignore certain creative language 
processes because they will not be marked "deviant" automatically and 
discarded rqther than given an interpretation"(l39) . 27 
Using tpe process of case feature projection, Lambert then proceeds 
to give an qCcount of ten types of creative language processes and ten types 
of metaphor. The following sentences of Lambert's show some aspects of the 
operation of the projection of case features for sentences involving 
instrumental expressions. 
(39) a. I hit him with a snake. 
b. John hammered the window shut with a rusty old nail. 
c. I broke the glass with a high C. 
d. These car windows close themselves when it starts to rain. 
e. The computer played chess with the U.S. master and won! 
Sentence 'a' illustrates the creative language process of 'instrument-
ification': "a lexical item not normally considered an Instrument or tool 
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is used in Instrumental Case and acquires features inherent to I Case 
through Case feature projection"(l64). Snake is marked +ANIMATE in the 
lexicon, but by the case projection process items in the Instrumental case 
acquire the feature -ANIMATE. The compatible feature is then selected and 
snake functions as an inanimate object. 
Sentence 'b' illustrates the creative process of what Lambert terms 
'secondary-instrumentification'(SO). The addition of a second instrumental 
expression (with a rusty old nail) is said to force the first instrumental 
expression, which has been incorporated into the verb (hammered), to lose 
its literal meaning and to become a comparative expression, analysed: 
(40) [make/ do] + (like/as] 28 + [with a hammer] 
Such a process, says Lambert, meets the condition of being a metaphor, 
since it triggers a shift from a literal to a non-literal interpretation of 
hammered(l65). (See Chapter Seven, for further comments on this sentence.) 
Sentence 'c' is said to involve feature contradiction, since break 
projects the feature -ABSTRACT onto the Instrumental case, while a high C 
is taken as +ABSTRACT. Lambert resolves _this through an appeal to 'unusual 
context' rather than by calling it metaphorical(239). But it is not 
necessary to appeal to a wastebasket category like this to account for the 
alleged feat~re contradiction, for the contradiction is entirely superficial, 
arising from an ellipsis of meaning at the surface structure. When the 
sentence is further explicated, to a level beyond that of which Lambert's 
grammar appears capable, it becomes obvious that the glass does not break 
because of a 'high C', but rather, because of what happens as a consequence 
of an event involving something which is referred to as a 'high C'. That 
is, there is a phyaioal aomething to which the term 'high C' refers. 
Whether this something is a musical object which vibrates at a certain 
• 
frequency, or an alphabetical character in a children's nursery, it is still 
a physical, non-abstract something which is involved in the event which 
causes the glass to break. 
Sentence 'd' is said to represent a slightly marked instance of 
metaphor or anomaly. Lambert analyses the sentence thus: 
Instrumental Objective 
(41) These car windows close themselves when it starts to rain. 
Its markedness is said to arise from the fact that the verb close (like 
break, open) is not a reflexive verb, and therefore disallows the case 
frame [_I+ O] in circumstances where the same lexical item fills both 
cases(241). It should be pointed out that the noun phrase these car 
windows could also function as an Agent case expression as a member of 
Lambert's special set of lexical items which can function grammatically 
as 'secondary' Agents. 
123 
Sentence 'e' illustr ates the type of feature contradiction which led 
Lambert to postulate this set of lexical items: "machines which can perform 
tasks previously performed only by humans, machines which, by being pro-
grammed by Agents, can function grammatically as "secondary Agents""(308). 
The contradiction is that the noun phrase the computer, marked -INI'ENT in 
the lexicon, appears in the Agent case, one of whose inherent features is 
+INTENT. (Fpr further comments on 'self-operating' instruments and 
inanimate a~~nts, see Chapter 6.24). 
3.53 Comment s on Lambert's Instrumental Case 
A numbe+ of comments can be made on Lambert's featural representation 
of the Instrwnental case. 
(a) First, no definitions are offered for the semantic features themselves. 
It seems that they are assumed to be the most basic components of Lambert's 
semantic apparatus and that one is t o intuitively understand what they refer 
to. It is not obvious, however, that they represent self-evident primitive 
notions. 
None of the feature names, for instance, seem semantically simple, and 
some are quite complex. Thus INTENT presumably refers to 'someone (or 
something) who wants to do something', and CAUSE to 'a relationship between 
events such that because of one event, another event occurred', as in 
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(42) a. The earthquake caused widespread destruction. 
b. The air traffic controllers' strike caused all air 
services to be cancelled. 
The meaning of the feature ANIMATE needs more careful attention. It 
cannot simply be paraphrased in terms of the popular meaning of the adjective 
animate - as 'someone (or something) who is alive', because ANIMATE would 
then include not only living things that were 'animal' (man, dog, bird, 
snake, spider, etc.) but also living things that were 'non-animal' (rose, 
gum tree, grass, etc.). The grammar of English, however, does not accept 
in toto the popular, undifferentiated meaning of animate. While it is true 
that some verbs (e.g. in (43)a below), do require merely 'living things' 
for surface subjects or objects, some other verbs(e.g. in (43)b) must have 
'animal' living things, and others again(e.g. (43)c) only human subjects of 
b . 29 o Jects. 
(43) a. John killed *the wall/the grass/the sheep/his grandchildren. 
b. John slaughtered *the wall/*the grass/the sheep/his 
grandchildren. 
c. John murdered *the wall/*the grass/*the sheep/his grandchildren. 
Similarly, it is often said that the verbs see and hear require 
animate subjects, but it is obvious from the sentences below that this 
animateness excludes 'non-animal' living things. 
(44) a. My goldfish/*my orchids saw me approaching. 
b. My dog/*my cannabis plant . heard the police squad c001ing up 
the stairs. 
Two points arise from the above discussion. First, if features are to 
be used, they must be carefully defined, else it is empty to claim that 
they 'explain' anything. 30 Second, the reference of the feature ANIMATE 
is neither intuitively obvious nor semantically simple. Judging from the 
use of the feature in Lambert's description, it could perhaps be paraphrased 
'someone (or something) who can want to do something'. This paraphrase, 
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clumsy as it is, has the effect of excluding the 'non-animal' living things, 
and also the neonate who has the potential, but the as-yet-undeveloped 
ability, for action. 
The remaining two features characterising Lambert's Instrumental case 
are also complex. The feature SOURCE, the nature of whose relationship 
with existing cases Lambert says is unclear(l27), seems to refer to a 
relationship in which there are two conceptually distinct phases, linked by 
a "becoming" process(see Chapter 2.2). This process of "becoming" may be 
realised in the context of a change of state, a change of location, or a 
change of time(although it should be pointed out that the movement of time 
is also present implicitly in the previous two situations as well). 
Fillmore's(l97lb,41) sentences illustrate these three possibilities, 
(45) a. He changed from a 96-pound weakling into a famous football hero. 
b. He went from the top of the hill to the cemetery gate. 
c. The pageant lasted from sundown until midnight. 
but note that for Fillmore the italicised phrases represent the Source 
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case, not the feature SOURCE. 
Finally, the feature ABSTRACT, explicated more fully, also seems to 
refer to a relationship, but this time between something(the 'abstract' 
thing) and sQJneone(or something), and the bridging physical perception of 
the latter. ~n 'abstract' thing would then perhaps be 'something which 
no-one can feel with part of his body'. Thus 'heat', 'cold', 'dampness', 
etc. are said to be abstract entities; · although we may touch a hot object, 
we do not thereby touch heat, but merely something which is hot. 
The above comments on Lambert's Instrumental case features suggest 
not only that the features are not themselves semantically primitive, but 
also that their meanings are not intuitively obvious. One of Lambert's 
explicit aims(l30) in moving to a featural analysis of case descriptions 
was to diminish the role of intuitive notions in characterising case 
meanings. While her resultant analysis certainly reduces the extent to 
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which case assignment relies on Fillmore's notional case descriptions, it 
has the effect of pushing the problem to a lower level, by distributing 
the appeal to intuition across a number of semantic features, which are 
themselves defined nowhere in the grammar(other than by example) and which 
ed b . . . b . 32 are assum to e intuitively o vious. This is not to say that there is 
anything amiss about a substantial appeal to intuition, for native speaker 
intuition about meaning is a cornerstone of linguistic analysis. What is 
at issue is the empirical validity of the replacing features. Lambert 
herself recognises the "possible undesirability" of using featural notation, 
but employs semantic features nevertheless because they "represent a con-
venient method of analysing cases into their component semantic parts"(498). 
The tension between the criteria of descriptive convenience and semantic 
adequacy is a familiar one in semantics. As suggested above, however, 
there are many questions about the semantic interpretation of the features 
which must be answered before they can support an empirically valid 
semantic description. 
(b) Second, the featural specification for the Instrumental case does not 
give effect to Lambert's claim that "when a lexical item occurs in I Case 
in a construction, it entails the presence of a (sic] Case(an Agent) in the 
case frame, even though A Case may not have been selected for the surface 
structure of the construction. That is, I Case~ A Case in the deep 
structure" ( 231-2) . 
Thus, despite her expansion of the -role of semantic features, Lambert's 
semantic representation through cases and features is unable to realise this 
entailment. It is necessary to be able to do this to back up claims that 
certain sentences have unspecified agents. Thus there is no way for Lambert 
to represent her claim that an Agent is present in the semantic structure of 
the following sentence. 
(46) The door was opened. 
That is, as well as being limited to the representation of surface 
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sentences only, Lambert's case grammar seems incapable of representing all 
the semantic relations present at the surface level. As will be shown in 
Chapter 4.43, Nilsen's proposal for a feature 'CONTROLLED' goes some way 
towards representing the entailment of agency inherent in instrumental 
sentences. 
(c} On a related point, Lambert's claim that the Instrumental case entails 
the Agent case explicitly narrows the semantic range of Instrumental 
sentences found in Fillmore, who only permitted unspecified agents in 
certain constructions(e.g. 1966,374), but the actual noun phrases to which 
Lambert assigns the Instrumental case range as widely as Fillmore's. Thus 
the following of her Instrumental sentences do not appear to involve any 
necessary semantic entailment of an agent. 
(47) a. The box hit the wall. 
b. Heat cracked the glass. 
c. The hammer hit the wall. 
It is not clear why Lambert chose to call the surface subjects here 
Instrumental case expressions. The same argument she advances for calling 
the door an Objective case in the sentences below 
(48) a. The door opened. 
b. The door is opening. 
seems equally applicable to the sentences (47)a-c. Her argument for the 
Objective case in (48)a-b was that "although some person or object may have 
been causing the door to open, the speaker/writer chose to ignore any 
question of Agent in his sentence" (222). Correspondingly, it would be 
consistent to argue that although in (47)a some person caused the box to 
hit the wall, the speaker chose to ignore the question of agent. But if 
there is no agent involved, then by the entailment relation Lambert 
proposes, there can be no instrument either. Consequently, in Lambert's 




Lambert explicitly builds on Fillmore's grammar with the purpose of 
fitting case grammar to describe the 'semantic syntax' of metaphorical 
sentences. Her proposal for extending the descriptive capacity of semantic 
features through case feature projection results in a grammar with 
considerable descriptive flexibility. 
With respect to the meanings of instrumental sentences, however, it 
is less than satisfactory since the constituent semantic features are 
insufficiently delineated, agency entailment is asserted in principle but 
denied in practice, and surface sentences only are capable of semantic 
representation using cases and features. 
3.6 Stockwell, Schachter and Partee 
This third case grammar approach, presented initially as a technical 
report entitled Integration of Transformational Theories on English Syntax 
and later published with revisions as The Major Syntactic Structure of 
English, represents an explicit attempt to synthesise two influential 
hypotheses about deep structure, viz., the lexicalist hypothesis of 
Chomsky(l970), and Fillmore's deep case hypothesis. 
Because of its ambitious nature, the study does not devote much 
attention to the semantics of any particular sentences. Instrumental 
sentences, therefore, where touched on, are treated largely according to 
Fillmore 1968a. There are some differences, however, as the following 
brief points indicate. 
3.61 Case Inventory and Definition 
The grammar posits only the cases Agentive, Instrumental, Neutral 
(replacing Fillmore's 'Objective' case), Dative, Locative and Essive. No 
semantic definitions are offered for the cases. The authors presumably 
adopt the meanings given in Fillmore 1968a. 33 The authors point out, 
however, that their deliberate restriction of the possible case inventory 
to these six cases resulted in various difficulties. One such difficulty 
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was that by not positing a Means or Manner case the Instrumental case has 
included in it some noun phrases "where the interpretation "instrument" 
is severely strained"(9), as in their example 
(49) The fact that he had blood on his hands proved that he 
was guilty. 
in which they claim that the subject is an instrumental. The authors 
clearly feel that this semantic inappropriateness is an undesirable 
consequence of their restricted case inventory. 
3.62 Status of Cases 
While the six cases function as formally primitive units of the base 
rules, the authors are more cautious than Fillmore with respect to the 
semantic status of cases. They thus admit to reserving judgement both as 
to "how far the cases are semantic primitives (rather than, say, complexes 
of features)"(9), and as to whether a case approach permits the clearest 
distinction between categorial and functional information in the deep 
structure. While they concede that each of the cases Dative, Agent, 
Instrument ~nd Locative are "far from intuitively simple categories"(743), 
no formal attempt, such as those made by Lambert and Nilsen(see Chapter 
Four), is made to break cases down into simpler semantic components. 
3.63 Semantic Features 
Like Fillmore, the authors do associate features with cases in 
discussing(731) the problems involved in accurately formulating redundancy 
rules that will capture such generali~ations as those that instruments are 
usually -ANIMATE and -ABSTRACT, and agents and datives usually +ANIMATE. 
Unlike Lambert, however, these features are not felt to be inherently part 
of the case notions, but rather are said to interestingly correlate with 
expressions in these cases. 
While the authors acknowledge the force of McCawley's(l968b,265) 
argument that selectional restrictions should be defined in terms of 
semantic representations and should therefore be excluded from the base 
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component, they select for themselves a more traditional stance, employing 
only a few selectional features, and stating(l8) that no semantic features 
are given in their grammar, only 'inherent' features denoting "qualities 
such as animate, human and abstract"(725). 
As far as these inherent features themselves are concerned, in a final 
section dealing with problems associated with cases, features and the lexicon, 
the authors draw attention to the "little explored nature of inherent 
features"(731), thereby suggesting the need for further investigation and 
definition. The point arises in a discussion of the formulation of 
redundancy rules that would add predictable features and thereby reduce the 
number of feature specifications needed. For instance, the authors say that 
it would be u s eful to be able to capture by way of redundancy rules the 
generalisations that instruments are usually -ANIMATE and -ABSTRACT. 
Unfortunately, as they point out with the sentences below, this is not 
always the case, since his fist is +ANIMATE and several counter-examples 
+ABSTRACT. 34 
(50) a. He hit me in the face with his fist. 
b. He destroyed my argument with several counter-examples. 
In drawing at t ention to problems caused by the "ill-defined" features, and 
in proposing alternative features(e.g. they suggest that ANIMATE could be 
replaced by t he feature AUTONOMOUS), the authors implicitly question the 
semantic primitivity of these features. 
3. 64 Summary 
The Instrumental case thus functions as a primitive category of the 
base component, representing a semantic notion largely carried over from 
Fillmore. It is not an inherently simple category, but whether it is best 
described as a complex of semantic features, themselves in need of 
examination, i s left as an open question. 
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3.7 Summary 
The examination of several case grammars in this chapter has isolated 
a number of recurring issues relating to the representation of the meanings 
of instrumental sentences. In summary these are: 
(a) the need to recognise an agency entailment as _an important, essential 
component in the meanings of instrumental sentences, and to incorporate 
this recognition in semantic representations for instrumental sentences; 
(b) the need to adequately identify and represent the causal relations 
operating within instrumental sentences; 
(c) a growing awareness that the instrumental notion involves a number 
of semantic relations, and cannot, in any normal sense of the term, be 
considered a semantic primitive; and 
(d) continuing problems of interpretation and application with respect 
to both cases and features, underlining their limited capacity to represent 
the meanings of instrumental sentences. 
In the semantic representations offered from Chapter Six onwards, I 
attempt to meet the first three of these points; the fourth is met 
vacuously, in rejecting a case and semantic feature approach to semantic 
representation. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
1But see Huddleston(1970,506-7), who draws attention to a number of 
intuitive semantic similarities between cases, thus questioning the degree 
to which cases can represent discrete non-complex symbols. 
2Mechanically, in sentence (9)b, is of course ambiguous between 'using 
a machine' and 'without thinking about it'. The former sense only is 
intended here. There is, however, no question but that the latter sense 
would also be a Manner case expression. 
3For instance the case representations for synonymous sentences such as 
Mary lent John a spanner and Mary lent a spanner to John would contain the 
same cases, but arranged differently - Agent Verb Dative Object, and Agent 
Verb Object Dative, respectively. In this case a simple movement trans-
formation in the derivation of the surface structure sentence would account 
for the alternative sequence. 
4An example of a pair of synonymous sentences, one member ot whose case 
analysis is capable of being 'translated' into that of the other is the pair 
Kiss me (Verp Dative) and Give me a kiss (Verb Dative Object). Here the 
expression give a kiss to someone can be paraphrased kiss someone. In 
general, it seems, the extent to which synonymous sentences receive identical 
case assignments will reflect the extent to which cases themselves accurately 
represent the semantic aspect of their dual role of representing remote 
semantic-syntactic elements. 
5 For example, Lakoff(l966), Lyons(l966), Ross(l967) and Bach(l968). 
133 
6Dougherty(l970,511-513) uses these sentences of Fillmore's and other 
sentences based on them to argue that Fillmore's cases do not represent an 
independent set of semantic primitives. While I accept Dougherty's con-
clusion, I cannot agree with one of his premises. Dougherty argues that 
cases are not an independent set of semantic primitives since, within 
Fillmore's grammar, a single, unambiguous surface structure sentence 
(i) Caruso broke the window with his voice. 
can be derived from two distinctly different basic structures, viz. 
(ii) break (C the window) (Ihis voice) (ACaruso) 
X 
(iii) break (C the window) (I(NP(POSSCaruso's) (Nvoice))) 
X 
I question the premise that sentence (i) is unambiguous. It seems to me 
that this sentence is capable of semantic interpretation in terms of both 
structures above, i.e. respectively, where Ca~uso does some operatic stunt 
work and deliberately breaks the window and where the window breaks because 
of Caruso's voice but there is no specification that Caruso wanted this 
consequence , 
The following sentence, which is similar to sentence (i), perhaps 
lets these two senses through more palpably. 
(iv) John knocked the vase over with his elbow. 
7 Although note that were it so classified, it would be done with 
reference to precisely the same entail~ent about agency involvement which 
characterises clear cases of instrumental sentences. 
8 See, for example, Leech's formulation of these two relations(l974,293). 
Entailment is described in the following terms. 
(i) "X entails Y means that 
If Xis true, then Y has to be true 
(but if not-Xis true, Y need not be true)." 
Presupposition is formulated: 
(ii) "X presupposes Y means that 
If Xis true, then Y is true 
and also 
If not-X 1.s true, then Y is true." 
Testing out whether an instrumental sentence entails or presupposes an 
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agent, we would obtain the following, only the first of which is appropriate. 
(iii) An instrumental sentence entails an agent means that 
If the term 'instrumental' is true of a sentence, then the term 
'agentive' has to be true 
(but if 'non-instrumental' is true, 'agentive' need not be true). 
(iv) An instrumental sentence presupposes an agent means that 
If the term 'instrumental' is true of a sentence, then the term 
'agentive' is true 
and also 
If 'non-instrumental' 1.s true, then 'agentive' 1.s true. 
Although truth and falsehood do not apply particularly well 1.n the semantics 
of natural languages, it is clear from the above that the last line of the 
presupposition formula contains an unacceptable consequence, in asserting 
agency of non-instrumental sentences. 
9These case labels, it should be remembered, are linguistic terms, 
imposing order on physical and imaginary worlds vicariously only, through 
the medium of linguistic descriptions of such worlds. 
lOFillmore does list one syntactically complex sentence in his discussion 
of Instrumental case sentences. This is the sentence: 
(i) John used the key to open the door. 
and his purpose in calling attention to it is to show by contrast with: 
(ii) John opened the door with the key. 
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(iii) The key opened the door. 
the superficiality of surface structure relations such as subject and 
object, and the non-correspondence of these with case roles. Thus, 
Fillmore says, the key is an Instrumental case expression in (i) no less 
than in (ii) and (iii). 
11 See Chapter Eight for further comments on this sentence. 
12 
For example, the 'verb' of the previous paper is called a 'predicator' 
in this, and the inventory of cases here runs Agent, Experiencer, Instrument, 
Object, Source, Goal, Location, Time, and Path, as against the previous 
inventory: Agentive, Instrumental, Dative, Factitive, Locative, Objective, 
and Time. 
13 h · · l . 11 f . t . l . Te pr~ncip e Fi more re ers to 1s not a seman &C comp ementarity 
relation such as Lyons describes in his discussion of semantic relations 
(1968,460), put rather the distribution principle most frequently found in 
phonology(e.g. Lyons,ibid 112). 
14
The qualification is added because by hand would not readily be 
assigned Instrumental case status by Fillmore. This is because the 
preposition~ is said to introduce the Instrumental case only if there is 
no Agent case present(1968a,32). This not being the situation here, it 
remains to determine to which case by hand ought to be assigned. 
One alternative is to relax the constraint on _ey_ to permit it to 
introduce Instrumental case expressions, which might seem necessary anyway 
to account for such sentences as The President arrived by car, Mary 
murdered Freda by strangling her with a yellow nylon tow rope. 
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A second alternative would be to posit additional cases of Means and 
Manner(without which cases Stockwell et.al. (1973,9) find the Instrumental 
case notion ''severely strained''). Then expressions in sentences such as 
The guests came by sea/air/bus/river boat, etc. and I did it by hand might 
qualify for inclusion in these cases. 
A third alternative is to say that, if~ introduces the Agent case, 
by hand could be thought of as part of the Agent case, along the lines 
Fillmore suggests for Instrumental expressions such as The car broke the 
window with its fender(l968a,23), where it is claimed that it's fender is 
the possessed noun part of the Instrumental case expression, the possessor 
(the car) having become the subject. Against this suggestion is the fact 
that not only may the entire possessed phrase not appear as subject 
(*My hand pumped up the tire), unlike in Fillmore's example, but also it 
would force such counter-intuitive analogous analy~es as that of claiming 
that.!_ and my finger are members of the same case(Agent} in the sentence 
I touched him with my finger. 
15It is interesting to note that in their respective discussions of the 
role of Instrumental in sentences describing chains of causation Fillmore's 
term 'immediate cause' is based on proximity to the last event in the chain, 
while Nilsen's terminology is based on proximity to the agent. Thus for 
Nilsen "the important fact to note is that the primary causer is in the 
Agent (or Force} case, and that the secondary, tertiary, quarternary 
causers are all in the Instrument case"(l973,102}. 
16Nilsen's paraphrase of John killed Bill is "John caused his finger to 
cause the trigger to cause the gun to cause the bullet to cause the wound 
that caused Bill to die". While I agree with Nilsen that there are several 
causally related events involved in the meaning of this sentence, his 
paraphrase is excessively speculative. There is nothing in the meaning of 
137 
the sentence that supports, explicitly or implicitly, any reference to 
'finger', 'trigger', 'gun', 'bullet', or 'wound'. These elements obviously 
have no part in the meaning of this sentence and therefore cannot be part 
of its semantic representation. 
17 For a similar viewpoint, cf.McCawley's comments on the status of 
indices: "indices will correspond to items in the speaker's mental picture 
of the universe rather than to real things in the universe. This approach 
to indices is necessary if a theory of semantic representation is to cover 
such things as sentences dealing with imaginary objects and sentences based 
on misconceptions about the facts. It is of no relevance to linguistics 
whether a person has correctly perceived and identified the things he talks 
about" (1968a,138). 
18 h · 1 f h . . h h W i e I am reasonably con ident about t e proposition tat t e 
speaker thinks of some event as instrumentally significant, I am not sure 
that one can go further and claim that the speaker thinks of the remaining 
causal events prior to the event described by the main verb as part of the 
main verb. This may place too heavy a burden on the main verb. 
19
rt should be pointed out, however, that the semantic representation 
for this sentence must account both for the situation described and also 
for that in which the bat actually comes into contact with the window, 
thereby causing it to break. By the same token, although there can be no 
specific mention either of the man's swinging the bat, or of the bat's 
hitting the ball in the explication of He broke the window with the baseball, 
provision must somehow be made in the semantic description for possible 
causal chains. For an attempt at this, see Chapter 6.4. 
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20But note that this sentence does not thereby become an instrumental 
sentence, because, taken alone, its semantic representation does not allow 
for any agent. Were the sentence to be given a semantic representation as 
part of a discourse which included sentence (29)a, however, semantic 
relations 'spilling over' from other semantic representations would result 
in a strong suggestion of agent involvement here, thus observing 'in the 
breach' this important criterion for an instrumental sentence. 
21Because Chapter Seven deals specifically with this topic, Lambert's 
contribution to this area will be dealt with there. 
22
rn addition to adopting Fillmore's major 1968a cases, Lambert 
mentions(l37) but does not develop characteristics for a number of other 
possible cases, e.g. Temporal, Manner, Measure, Extent, Quantity, Factitive, 
Property/Quality, State, Motion, Act/Event, Emphasis and Modality. 
23But with some vacillation, cf. 53, 126, 200. 
24
oougherty(l970,529) expresses dissatisfaction with Fillmore's case 
notions for similar reasons. He asserts that Fillmore, in presenting case 
definitions, has provided a nota t ion by which any sentence may be represente~ 
but without also providing any principles or sets of rules for assigning 
the notation. 
25 At the same time Lambert takes up and elaborates as part of her case 
definitions suggestions by Fillmore(l968a,28-9) regarding other properties 
which may characterise cases, e.g. their potential for becoming surface 
subjects or objects, the cases with which they may co-occur, the preposi-
tions which may introduce case expressions, and other special properties 
characterising cases, such as the fact that the Instrumental case does not 
139 
function intransitively as surface subject of a subject-verb construction. 
This reflects the absence of any case frame [_I] , as in the following. 
(i) *The key opened. 
(ii) *The hammer turned. 
26
rn their account of lexical insertion Friedman and Bredt(l968) propose 
a process similar to transfer features and verb feature projection. Called 
'side effects', these represent the "effects on other nodes in a tree after 
an item had been inserted"(Stockwell et.al.1973,720). Thus the insertion 
of the verb admire, which requires an animate subject, has the side effect 
of requiring that the corresponding subject noun phrase must also be 
positively specified for animacy. Stockwell et.al. provisionally adopt in 
their own sample lexicon the Friedman and Bredt proposal for side effects 
and for verbs to be inserted before nouns, a sequence argued against by 
Chomsky(l965,114-5). 
27
Lambert employs semantic features . as a basis for a functional, if 
rather arbitrary, classification of types of linguistic deviance in terms 
of anomaly, metaphor and creative language processes. 
Thus an anomalous sentence is one containing two or more different 
types of feature contradiction(156), and occurs "when a hearer/speaker 
cannot or will not interpret a sentence either literally as CLP(true or 
false), or non-literally as metaphor"(333). An example is: 
(i) Triangularity drinks a piece of asphalt. 
where the verb drink projects the feature +LIQUID onto the Objective case, 
and requires a +ANIMATE, -ABSTRACT Agent case(342). 
Metaphor arises from the resolution of feature contradiction through 
asserting the dominance of inherent case features over lexical features, 
and through shifting the interpretation from the literal to the non-
literal. It differs from anomaly not only in that feature contradiction 
is resolved, but also in that it is said to involve an underlying 
comparative structure. An example of Lambert's is: 
(ii) The table danced. 
which is said to be interpreted as "something like"(364): 
( iii) table + ( MOVE ) + like + Agent + dance 
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Lambert does not indicate how these different symbols should be read. 
Presumably the boxed item represents an abstract pro-verb(after Lakoff 1970), 
the double-lined item some type of semantic indicator of comparison, and 
'Agent' perhaps some dununy item representing an agent. 
Finally, creative language processes are what is said to result from 
the selection of compatible features. Thus if a lexical item is marked 
+ABSTRACT in the lexicon, and the particular case requires -ABSTRACT, then 
"a Construal Rule selects that feature of each pair compatible with the 
... case features"(l64). Sentences containing these creative language 
processes must be both grammatical and literal. An example of Lambert's is: 
(iv) John barks a lot. 
in which John, marked +HUMAN in the lexicon, functions as -HUMAN in the 
Agent case which, through verb projection features, requires the feature 
-HUMAN(l95). 
28 . 1 h . . . d It is not c ear here ow this structure is to be interprete, 
especially the slash symbol '/' (for disjunction?). 
29 In his comments on the place of animateness in Fillmore 1968a, 
Huddleston(1970,504) also arrives at a three-tiered breakup for the 
selectional feature ANIMATE. His feature hierarchy is +LIVING (including 
plants and animals), +ANIMATE, and +HUMAN. 
30
see Zwicky' s(l968) exposition of the alleged 'explanatory' power of 
feature notations, and also the conunents on semantic feature systems in 
Chapter 2.5. 
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31Note that the complementary feature GOAL is even more complex. Not 
only are there two distinct phases linked by a "becoming" process and with 
an orientation on the latter phase(where SOURCE emphasises the fo:nner), but 
there is also an implicit agent in the meaning of the te:nn goal. Thus 
while planets, prosperity and info:nnation may have sources, it is people 
and government, etc., who have goals, or for whom something is a goal. 
32In her analysis of different cases, Lambert relies on a number of 
semantic features, none of which are defined, to account for the meanings 
of various metaphorical and non-metaphorical sentences. These include: 
ANIMATE, INTENT, CAUSE, SOURCE, HUMAN, ABSTRACT, GOAL, POSSESSION, 
BENEFICIARY, RECIPIENT, PERCEIVER, ATTRIBUANT, DIRECTION, BENEFACTIVE, 
LOCATIVE, COUNT, MOTION TOWARDS, CONSCIOUS and WILL. The mere assignment 
of an undefined feature with a '+' or '-' value to a noun phrase, however, 
cannot be said to explain or account for the meanings of sentences in any 
empirically satisfying manner. 
33
rp his review of the earlier, technical report version of Stockwell 
et.al., Chapin(l972,651) points out that the authors fail to provide any 
explicit set of definitions for the cases they employ. He argues strongly 
that postu+ated cases must be "precisely defined so as to force correct 
descriptive decisions" and that, since cases are semantic relationships, 
"the terms of definition must be semantic ones". His remarks apply equally 
to Fillmore and Lambert and, anticipating Chapter Four, to Nilsen. 
34 . f . . . h h In trying to resolve the lack o generalisation wit respect tote 
feature ANIMATE here, the authors suggest that since "fist and face, though 
parts of an animate being, share few selectional restrictions with nouns 
such as~, horse and fruitfly"(731), they may thus be considered -ANIMATE. 
Nilsen(1973,115), it will be noted in Chapter Four, considers all body 
part nouns as -ANIMATE. 
Chapter Four 
INSTRUMENTAL IN CASE GRAMMAR II: 
NILSEN 
4.1 General 
The aim of this chapter is to examine in detail Nilsen's{l973) 
proposal for describing the meanings of instrumental sentences in terms 
of case grammar and semantic features. 1 This examination is set out as 
follows: the next section(4.2) details the main aspects of Nilsen's 
proposal; the following five sections provide critical comments on his 
treatment of instrumental sentences, focussing on methodology(4.3), 
semantic features,particular{4.4) and general cornrnents(4.5), semantic 
classes(4.6), and terms describing instrumentality(4.7). Section 4.8 
presents a short summary. 
4.2 Nilsen's Proposal 
The aim of Nilsen's book, which appears to be an expansion of his 
earlier monograph Toward a Semantic Specification of Deep Case{l972), is 
to remove ~hat he sees as a major difficulty facing the ca~e grammar model, 
viz. , the ''widespread disagreement on how cases should be defined" ( 9) . 
Nilsen continues that "unless case grammarians can agree on what tests can 
be used for distinguishing one case from another ... much of the 
discussion in the case model will later have to be revised"(9). Nilsen's 
contribution is to offer what he considers are the right tools for 
defining cases, thereby apparently reconciling existing discrepancies and 
preventing the need for later revision. 
The Instrumental case is chosen for examination because study of this 
case "seems to be the most advanced"{l3). Presumably studying a case whose 
treatment is relatively advanced will provide a more ready and convincing 
demonstration of Nilsen's proposal, and will illuminate the comparative 
definition and identification of other cases as well. 
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Nilsen claims that syntactic tests cannot adequately delimit the 
Instrumental case; semantic tests, however, can and do. Therefore 
semantic considerations should be used as 'primary tests' in setting up 
the Instrumental case. Mutatis mutandis, semantic considerations should 
be viewed as primary in determining all cases. The book is divided into 
two parts: Part I shows the failure of syntactic tests, Part II the 
adequacy of semantic tests. The following subsections discuss these two 
parts. 
4.21 Syntactic Tests 
In Part I Nilsen examines five tests which "case grammarians have 
relied on ... to define Instrumental"(l3). 
(a) The 'relative pronoun' test, which precipitates the Instrumental case 
by questioning a given sentence using how. Thus from He broke the 
window with a hammer is obtained the Instrumental case expression 
with a hammer. 
(b) The use-with test. A noun phrase is Instrumental if it can be "the 
object: of both with and use and still carry the same meaning"(19). 
(c) The 'one case per simple predication' hypothesis. 
(d) Restrictions on conjunction: only expressions from the same deep case 
may be conjoined. 
(e) The prepositions test: each case is marked by a distinguishing 
preposition. Thus in Mary was struck with a club at the concert on 
Sunday by John(l4), the prepositions are respectively: Experiencer: 
to (Mary); Instrument: with (a club); Location: at (the concert); 
Time: on (Sunday); Agent: ~ (John). 
For each of these tests Nilsen produces counter-examples which are 
said to disqualify the syntactic evidence from legitimately determining the 
Instrumental case. For example, the relative pronoun test with how reveals 
cases other than Instrumental: 
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(1) a. He flew to Miami with a corronercial pilot. (Comitative case) 
b. He is extremely sad. (Extent case) 
c. He reached Miami by hitchhiking. (Manner case) 
To refute the fifth test Nilsen presents examples showing not only that 
with marks at least five cases other than Instrumental but also that there 
are many prepositions other than with that can introduce the Instrumental 
case. 
Nilsen concludes Part I by rejecting the use of syntactic evidence 
in case assignment. The syntactic tests are not only unreliable, he says, 
resulting in vague, conflicting and counter-intuitive case groupings 
(15,31,62), but they also fail to mark a homogeneous semantic category(39). 
In addition the tests are inherently weakened in that they are affected by 
surface constraints(27) and idiosyncratic lexical items(42,81), and in that 
"because [they] are secondary, rather than primary data, they yield only an 
obscured view of the primary(semantic) facts"(81). 
4.22 Semantic Tests 
Nilsen commences Part II by lauding- the concern traditional 
grammarians expressed for semantic matters, and by praising their tentative 
efforts to couch grammars in semantic terms. This promising development 
was arrested, however, Nilsen says, by the syntax-bounded worlds of the 
structuralists and early transformationalists, and only now was it being 
re-liberated by the generative semanticists and case grammarians, with their 
re-emphasis on semantics and their contention "that universal grammar is 
most efficiently and accurately viewed as having a semantic rather than a 
syntactic base" (88) . 
By piecing together remarks made throughout the book, Nilsen's base 
component can also be seen to be semantic in nature rather than syntactic. 
It consists of 'deep cases', or 'semantic primes' (46). These cases are 
defined in terms of semantic features, or 'primary semantic data' (88), 
which are themselves claimed to be primitive units(l23,129) . 2 Given the 
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bipartite nature of the semantic level (features and cases), a semantic 
test consists in asking of a given expression whether or not a particular 
semantic feature occurs within it. For example, does the semantic feature 
INTENT appear in the expression John in the sentence John frightened the 
infant? By 'testing' in this way for the presence or absence of the set 
of semantic features, expressions (mostly noun phrases or prepositional 
phrases, but sometimes sentences) may be 'assigned' to particular cases. 
After arguing strongly for the validity of semantic features on the grounds 
of their universality, their explanatory power, and the intuitive accuracy 
and consistency of their results, Nilsen discusses the features individually, 
illustrating with English examples the manner in which the features are 
characteristically distributed with respect to the cases. 
In the course of exemplifying his features and cases, Nilsen makes the 
following interesting claims(amongst many). 
(a) Each case has a unique assignment of features, corresponding to just 
those ~any semantic differences as intuition demands. Nilsen's(l21) 
matrix of features and cases is reproduced on page 146. 
(b) There are really four deep Instrumental cases(Tool, Body Part, Force 
and Material), each with a different feature assignrnent(see matrix). 
(c) Features are arranged hierarchically. Thus ''the feature Intent is at 
the top of the hierarchy of features, each of which entails all of the 
features below it. The feature [+Intent] entails the feature [+Cause], 
and [+Intent] also entails the feature [+Animate], which entails the 
feature [+Count], which entails the feature [+concrete]"(95). 
(d) There are degrees of causation, the primary causer being in the Agent 
or Force case, and the secondary, tertiary and quaternary causers 
being in the Instrument case(l02). 
(e) Like features, cases can also be ranked hierarchically, according to 
their 'Activity Quotient' (AQ). Thus Agent, Instrument, Body Part and 
Force are the most active cases, with a high AQ, since they all have 
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SEMANTIC FEATURE ASSIGNMENT FOR NILSEN'S CASES 
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+CAUSE and therefore automatically, Nilsen says, also -+CONTROLLER, 
-+COUNT, and +cONCRETE. On the other hand, the Material, Experiencer 
and Objective cases all have the features -CONTROLLER and -+CONTROLLED; 
"this fact explains why these three cases are the most passive"(128). 
(f) The feature system 'explains' rather than merely describes various 
syntactic phenomena such as 'subject marking', 'object marking', case 
deletion and case movement, passivization, case occurrence, and the 
association of certain case frames with certain verbs. 
For example, subject and object marking are explained in the following 
way. According to the AQ the order of cases is: Agent, Force, Body Part, 
Instrument,Experiencer, Locative, Goal, Objective, Material. Cases highly 
preferred as a surface subject are the active ones with a high AQ, while 
'inert' and 'non-dynamic' cases are those marked for surface object 
position. Nilsen claims credit for first explicitly linking in one 
explanation subject and object marking. In a similar way the AQ is called 
on to acco~nt for the deletion and movement of cases. Thus the cases 
which can be moved about or deleted usually have a middle order AQ, while 
passivization is the process which detopicalizes high AQ cases and moves 
low AQ cases into subject position. 
Nilsen devotes over twenty pages to illustrating that certain 
'semantic classes' of verbs have associated with them individual 'case 
frames'. About forty classes of different types (e.g. contact, destruction, 
change of state, motion) are presented, together with some discussion, a 
suggested case frame, and a list of verbs in the class. Where applicable 
there is additional comment as to whether or not the particular instrument 
in the class can be 'incorporated' into the verb. Incorporation may be 
'transparent', where the resultant verb is homophonous with the instrumental 
noun(e.g. the verbs paint, butter, wax in the semantic class of 'covering' 
in the Material case), or 'opaque'. Thus the body part legs is said(161) 
to be incorporated opaquely in some motion verbs in the Body Part case 
(e.g. trot, walk, run). 
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4.3 Methodology 
The first problem with the book is that Nilsen's approach is method-
ologically misleading. There are three manifestations of this. 
4.31 Relation to Existing Grammars 
First, although the book assumes from the start a thorough knowledge 
of case grammar and features there is a disturbing absence of definitions 
and explanations, and discussion about the relationships between the terms 
and concepts Nilsen employs. One is thus at a loss to know where to locate 
Nilsen within existing frameworks: is Nilsen sketching a new theory or not; 
if he isn't, why not make explicit the assumptions on which the book rests? 
But Nilsen is making new claims, and in an area of constantly changing 
parameters. There are few agreed-upon axioms in case grannnar or generative 
semantics, least of all at the interface between syntax and semantics - in 
the nature, representation and determination of semantics, cases, features, 
and deep structure. The absence of theoretical discussion and definitions 
is therefore particularly surprising. Discussion of the following at least 
seems indispensable: an overview of Nilsen's grammar; the nature of 'case' 
and its place in his grammar; the relation between his syntax and semantics; 
the relations between 'case', 'feature', 'underlying base' and 'deep 
structure'; the difference between 'explanatory' and 'descriptive adequacy'; 
the difference between 'deep' and 'surface' case; the meaning of a 
'semantic primitive'; the way in which both cases and features are semantic 
primitives; and the nature of the 'metatheory' (129). Many of these terms 
are used criterially by Nilsen, yet the lack of orientating discussion 
renders his proposals rather indeterminate. 
In this indeterminate context, Nilsen's statements often create mislead-
ing impressions, strongly suggesting for inEtance that Lakoff is a case 
grammarian(29,30,77), or that Nilsen's position is representative of the 
field, an impression which frequently proves wrong. Compare for example 
Nilsen's unqualified adoption of cases and features as semantic primitives 
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with the considerable caution of a contemporary case grammar: "it is not 
yet clear how far the cases are semantic primitives (rather than, say, 
complexes of features)" (Stockwell et.al.1973,11), or the same writers' 
care in distinguishing several types of features(selectional, categorial, 
intrinsic and rule features) but their lack of commitment to semantic 
features and their subsequent avoidance of them(ibid,19) with Nilsen's 
treatment, where there is only one undifferentiated type of feature, the 
3 
semantic feature. 
4.32 The Nature of Cases 
Secondly, lacking instructions to the contrary, anyone familiar with 
case grarranar assumes that Nilsen's views are the same as his contemporary 
case grammarians, in particular, that 'case' is a theoretical construct, a 
category signalling semantically relevant syntactic relations(Fillmore 
4 1968a,S). For Nilsen, however, 'case' is somehow a fully semantic entity, 
but this viewpoint is not made explicit from the outset. Various syntactic 
tests are employed in an attempt to establish the Instrumental case(i.e. a 
semantic entity to Nilsen, but something - else to the reader), and the tests 
are then rejected for failing to provide a homogeneous semantic category(39). 
Therefore, it is claimed, semantic features will have to be used to determine 
the Instrumental case. But, Nilsen now explains, cases are semantic 
entities anyway, and must be defined semantically; applying syntactic tests 
was therefore a futile procedure and was bound to lead to anomalous results. 
Any confusion is understandable. ·By neglecting to state his position 
or procedure clearly, Nilsen leads one to accept certain assumptions and to 
believe that Nilsen too accepts and operates on the same set of assumptions. 
~ 
Suddenly, Nilsen changes the rules. The assumptions are not merely in need 
of modification, as if both author and reader accepted them heuristically 
from the beginning, but apparently they are the wrong assumptions: "a basic 
assumption of this paper is that morphological and syntactic tests are 
inappropriate for determining case membership"(85), and "it is reasonable 
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to assume that case assignment should be determined by semantic features" 
(86) . 5 But, the reader is likely to protest, it is Nilsen's tests and 
assumptions that have now turned out to be inappropriate. There are two 
associated problems. First, because Nilsen's and the reader's assumptions 
about cases differ, their criteria for evaluating the syntactic evidence 
also differ, for while Nilsen rejects evidence from the syntactic tests 
primarily on semantic grounds, the reader almost certainly does not expect 
such strong reliance on semantic homogeneity as a criterion for a valid 
syntactic test. Second, telling the reader that cases are semantic and 
determined by features is neither a discovery nor a proof. It is just a 
completely new start based on new(to the reader) assumptions. 
4.33 Assuming the Proof 
Thirdly, throughout Part II Nilsen too frequently assumes what his 
al.Ills require him to demonstrate. For instance as each feature is introduced 
he assumes its existence, its intuitive meaning, the criterion on which 
it is alloc&ted, and often, its distribution amongst the cases(e.g. 95,103, 
111,114). Before illustrating from Nilsen, consider the methodological 
errors in the following analogy. I have two apples. I hold that they are 
different. Let us call the left hand apple 'l' and the right hand apple 
'2'. Now the fact that the left hand apple is 'l' and the right hand apple 
is '2' bears out my contention that the apples are different, because they 
don't have the same numerical index. Now consider the way in which Nilsen 
distributes the feature SOURCE with respect to the Material, Tool and Force 
cases. "I feel that of these three only Material has the feature [+Source] 
The fact that Material has the feature [+Source], while Tool and 
Force have the feature [-Source] would further support my contention that 
Material is a different Case from Tool and Force, since these three Cases 
do not have the same semantic features"(l20). Series of assumptions 
successively termed facts can hardly be said to provide a convincing 
description. Nilsen must demonstrate rather than proclaim the validity of 
his system. 
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4.4 Semantic Features: Comments on Individual Features 
In Part II Nilsen attempts to demonstrate that by using semantic
 
features, results are obtained that achieve the level of explana
tory 
adequacy, are internally consistent and intuitively correct. H
is analysis, 
however, often falls short of these goals. The following subsec
tions 
examine his employment of semantic features. 
4.41 The Feature 'INTENT' 
(a) What does INTENT mean ('want', 'wish', 'will', 'purpose')? No explicit 
definitions are offered for this feature or indeed for any of th
e features, 
which has the effect of impairing their effectiveness for the r
esearcher. 
Not knowing what the features mean, how can one tell when the c
onditions for 
their applicability are met?
6 
(b) Whose is the 'intention' respectively in sentences such as the 
following? 
(2) a. They used the fraternity boys to get the building painted. 
b. Nixon used Agnew to promote his own views. 
Nilsen does provide some comments on this pair of sentences(ll0-113), but 
these are only in connection with the features CONTROLLED, CONT
ROLLER, and 
ANIMATE. He determines that both the fraternity boys and Agnew 
are 
Instrumentals, with the features +ANIMATE, +CONTROLLER and +CONT
ROLLED. 
Ironically, and Nilsen does not point this out, the only Instrum
ental case 
which these noun phrases would qualify for would, inappropriatel
y, be the 
Tool Instrument case. 
But are these noun phrases +INTENT or -INTENT, and further, do t
hey 
function as instruments, as agents, or perhaps as both? If the 
answer to 
this is +INTENT, and for consistency and accuracy this seems the
 most 
plausible assignment (since both the fraternity boys and Agnew are 
certainly doing something), then the resultant set of features would cut 
across the existing Instrumental cases, none of which can be'+'
 with 
respect to the feature INTENT. Moreover, the noun phrases woul
d also 
qualify as a type of agent, and would represent people being used to do 
something, which accords well with our intuitions but again not with 
Nilsen's formal classification of Agent case, which can never be 
+cONTROLLED. 
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Even if these noun phrases are -INTENT, however, and presumably 
Nilsen analysed them as this in calling them Instrumentals in the first 
place, they could still qualify for the Agent case as far as the feature 
INTENT is concerned. This is because Nilsen, simplistically in my opinion 
(see' (e)' below), provides for an Agent being ' 'with respect to the 
feature INTENT(91). 
These examples illustrate not only some internal inconsistencies of 
featural assignments between cases, but also a wider inability of Nilsen's 
feature-specified Agent and Instrumental cases to accommodate the meanings 
of more than a restricted range of instrumental sentences. To this extent 
Nilsen's semantic system seem self-defeating. A semantic system must 
attempt to account for the greater semantic complexity of sentences such as 
(2)a-b. It is difficult to escape the impression that INTENT is the formal 
device within Nilsen's system that, within simple sentences, separates 
Agent from the other cases. 
(c) The Experiencer case is always -INTENT, Nilsen claims. But what about 
Christ in the following? 
(3) Christ deliberately suffered for our sins. 
(d) Because of the feature hierarchy, ·Nilsen says, an expression with 
+INTENT is always +cONCRETE. Nilsen would run into difficulty explicating 
ordinary language expressions involving supernatural agents(e.g. God, Satan, 
spirits), who would necessarily be +CONCRETE by his analysis. 
(e) Nilsen's assignment of INTENT is confusing. Thus in sentence (4)a the 
Agent is marked -INTENT, but in (4)b the agent is +INTENT, he says, 
(4) a. John killed him accidentally. 
b. I punched John accidentally. 
because "the verb to punch projects the feature +INTENT onto the Agent, 
since a person cannot perform the act of punching unintentionally"(94) . 7 
Thus, in Nilsen's view, the punching was done intentionally; what was 
accidental was the particular target affected. But to eliminate 
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unnecessary contrasts, Nilsen should have compared sentences in which only 
the verbs differed, e.g. sentences (4)b and (5). 
(5) I killed John accidentally. 
In this case, what is to prevent the Agent of (5) also being +INTENT, on 
the grounds that the Agent did intend something(perhaps to hurt John) but 
not to kill hi.m7 It all depends on the 'domain' of INTENT here. If such 
an analysis is permitted, Nilsen's analysis of many sentences with respect 
to the feature INTENT collapses. The reason is that when someone 'acts' 
under normal circumstances, there is always something which is wanted. 
Hence even the agents of so-called 'accidental' sentences can be analysed 
as +INTENT with respect to this 'something', even if they must be marked 
-INTENT with ~espect to some resultant event. Such a proposal, however, 
leads one into a much deeper semantic analysis than that of which Nilsen's 
system is currently capable. 
4.42 The Feature 'CAUSE' 
(a) What is the feature CAUSE? Nilsen says(99) that it differs from the 
primitive verb cause or the higher predicate cause, both of which he rejects 
from his grammar on the grounds that "only as a feature can [Cause] be used 
to distinguish various cases from each other, and to help explain certain 
transformational processes, such as subject marking, object marking, 
passivisation, etc." (100). Notwithstanding, considering that Nilsen else-
where accepts primitive verbs in his grammar(e.g.166), the relation between 
the feature CAUSE and the primitive verb cause remains unclear. 
(b) Nilsen says that an expression with +INTENT entails +CAUSE as well, 
but there is no indication how sentences such as the following should be 
treated with respect to this question. 
(6) a. John wanted to cause a disturbance. 
b. John intended to wash the dishes. 
154 
Is CAUSE present in these sentences as, given Nilsen's system, it would be 
in the following? 
(7) a. John caused a disturbance. 
b. John washed the dishes. 
If the feature CAUSE is not present in the semantic representations of 
sentences (6)a-b, does the feature CAUSE in Nilsen's system apply only to 
causation which has been realised(in some world) and not to potential 
causation? If it did, and there is no evidence to the contrary, it would 
constitute a clear shortcoming in Nilsen's formulation of causation.
8 
(c) The relation Nilsen allows between the features CAUSE and INTENT with 
respect to the Agent turns out to be narrowly tied to surface sentences. 
To illustrate, if John intended x and caused x, under some circumstances 
this may be expressed as sentence (B)a. Using Nilsen's features the Agent 
would be mar~ed +INTENT (with respect to x) and +CAUSE (with respect to x). 
(8) a. John did x intentionally. 
b. ~ohn did y accidentally. 
If John intended x and caused y, however, this may sometimes be expressed 
as sentence (8)b, and using Nilsen's features again the Agent should be 
+INTENT (with respect to x) and +cAUSE (with respect toy), with the 
presence of the adverb accidentally here signalling a discrepancy between 
what John intended and what actually resulted. For Nilsen, however, the 
Agent in (8)b would be -INTENT here, i.e. -INTENT (with respect toy) and 
+cAUSE (with respect toy). Such an example illustrates the need for a 
semantic analysis which can reach below surface sentences, decomposing 
them into component sentences, and revealing more transparently their 
deeper semantic relations, particularly those concerned with what an agent 
wants, and any causal relations between component events. 
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4.43 The Features 'CONTROLLER' and 'CONTROLLED' 
(a) Introducing the feature CONTROL, a new feature not present in any of 
the case approaches examined so far, Nilsen says that "as a matter of fact, 
this feature must be broken down into two features: Controller and 
9 
Controlled"(l05). But what are the theoretical relationships between these 
three features? Can one primitive semantic feature itself be composed of 
two further semantic features? 
(b) Having said that, it should be mentioned that Nilsen is moving into 
new ground here, as far as the semantics of instrumental sentences are 
concerned. With the two features CONTROLLER and CONTROLLED Nilsen is 
attempting to capture a crucially important semantic relation within the 
instrumental notion. This is that, more than anything else, what makes an 
instrument an instrument is the fact that it draws its instrumentality from 
two equally necessary and interdependent relationships - on the one hand 
its relationship with the agent, and on the other its relationship with some 
subsequent event. For Nilsen these relationships are expressed in that the 
instrument is, respectively, something which is 'controlled' by someone, and 
something which 'controls' something else(cf. Leibniz' definition(l903,472), 
instrumentUil\ est, quod agit patiendo). While these two relationships can 
• 
also be expressed in terms other than 'control' (and I attempt this in 
Chapter 6 .4), Nilsen has importantly recognised this semantic duality in 
the instrumental notion. Further, by using the single stem control plus 
two derivational affixes for the names of the two features, he has also 
attempted a morphological representation of the semantic unity and duality 
inherent in the instrumental notion. 
The descriptive consequence, however, of representing these two 
relationships by semantic features, and locking these two features into a 
rigid, formal system is a failure to account for much of the empirical data. 
Five examples will illustrate this. 
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First, Nilsen claims that the Agent and Force cases are "always 
controlling something else, but are never controlled"(l0S). Sentences 
such as the following would then have to be counter-examples to these 
claims. 
(9) a. The gunman forced the teller to hand over the money. 
b. Mary helped her daughter cut her meat. 
c. God sent a mighty fire to consume the wicked city. 
Second, Nilsen claims that the Objective and Experiencer cases are 
always +CONTROLLED. If this were so, in sentences (l0)a-b cheese and vase 
respectively would be +CONTROLLED, yet any not~on of 'controlledness' here 
seems relevant only to knife and broom. 
' (10) a. John cut the cheese with a knife. 
b. Mary knocked the vase with a broom. 
In sentences (ll)a-b, where John is in the Experiencer case in both, Nilsen's 
claim would give John the feature +CONTROLLED. But in what sense can one 
say that John is 'controlled' in these two sentences? 
(11) a. John saw Mary. 
b. John heard a knock at the door. 
Third, the Agent is said to be always +CONTROLLER. But in discussing 
interesting semantic differences between sentences (12)a and b, Nilsen 
accepts Shroyer's(1969,68) assertion that in the first sentence the farmer 
is not controlling the mower, while in (12)b the farmer is in some sense 
controlling the mower. 
(12) a. The farmer cut himself on the mower. 
b. The farmer cut himself with the mower. 
It follows from this that in (12)a the farmer is -CONTROLLER and therefore 
not an Agent according to Nilsen's notation. But if not an Agent, what case 
would be appropriate? The Experiencer case is ruled out because in Nilsen's 
featural assignment Experiencer must be +CONTROLLED and -CAUSE. That the 
farmer could be simultaneously an Agent and an Experiencer, for which 
possibility Nilsen suggests precedents(93), is more acceptable, but the 
subsequent obligatory assignment of features is troublesome. Detailed 
semantic analyses of sentences such as these will be provided in Chapter 
Eight. 
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Fourth, the Material case is said to be always -CONTROLLER, but this 
seems to rule out sentences such as the following. 
(13) a. Fred sprayed the car with rust-proofing paint. 
b. Mary used self-raising flour in her Xmas cake, but 
quick-acting yeast in all her breads. 
c. Torn spread weed-killer over the path. 
d. Jane sprayed insect repellant on her face and arms. 
Fifth, Body Parts are always +CONTROLLED, Nilsen claims. Such a claim 
restricts the capacity of Nilsen's system to describe the full range of 
movements of parts of the body, in particular involuntary, 'uncontrollable' 
movements such as might be associated with sneezing, squinting, muscular 
disorders and reflex movements. 
include: 
Sentences d~scribing such movements would 
(14) a. The Prime Minister's hands trembled out of control as he 
announced his resignation. 
b. John's leg jerked involuntarily when the doctor tapped his knee. 
c. Sally's heart stopped twice during the operation. 
d. Harry's ears 'popped' as the plane descended. 
While Chapter Seven offers some semantic analyses for sentences involving 
'body part' verbs, a fascinating study remains to be made of the circum-
stances in, and the degree to, which the body parts associated with 
particular verbs (e.g. see, hear, smell, blink, hiccough, suckle, breathe) 
can be 'controlled'. 
Finally, Nilsen claims(lOS) that the Instrument(Tool) case is always 
+cONTROLLER and +cONTROLLED. While this does not seem unreasonable in an 
overtly intentional sentence such as (lS)a, interpreting what is meant by 
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this assignment of features becomes increasingly difficult when some other 
instrumental sentences are examined. Do the meanings of +CONTROLLER and 
+cONTROLLED remain constant, for instance, in an 'accidental' sentence such 
as (15)b, or in sentences describing chains of causation where the overt 
instrument may be several causal links from the direct control of the agent? 
(15) a. John carefully peeled the carrots with a knife. 
b. John accidentally nicked his chin with his razor. 
c. The man broke the window with the baseball. 
Sentence (lS)c, from Fillmore(l971,43), is one such sentence which permits 
not only an intentional or an accidental interpretation, but also a chain 
of events between the agent's initial action and the final event. 
(c) In pointing to a function of the features CONTROLLER and CONTROLLED in 
determining sentence subjects, Nilsen claims that "when an Instrument and 
an Object occur in a sentence, the Instrument must ALWAYS become the subject 
of the sentence; otherwise the sentence is ungrarnmatical"(l08). But there 
are many grammatical sentences, containing only Instrumental and Object 
noun phrases in addition to the verb, in which the Object noun phrase takes 
subject position. Examples are: 
(16) a. The cupboard opens with a key. 
b. The necklace fastened with a small clasp. 
c. The posters were stuck on with glue. 
d. The rats were killed with fire. 
e. The hubcap eventually came off with a screwdriver, (after a 
tire lever and spanner proved unsuccessful). 
f. The experimental alloy finally buckled with a massive 20 tonne 
load, (after lesser weights caused no perceptible distortion). 
It should be pointed out, however, that while the surface structures of 
these sentences contain, in Nilsen's terms, only Instrumental and Object 
noun phrases, the semantic representations of the sentences would be 
incomplete without a reference to the presence of an agent in each sentence. 
(d) Finally, many of the descriptive problems mentioned above arise 
because the features are themselves not defined closely enough. For 
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instance, if something is said to be +CONTROLLED, whose 'control' is being 
referred to? Thus in (14)b is John's leg +CONTROLLED here, as well as in 
the situation where John moves his leg intentionally? Further, does 
CONTROLLED refer only to someone's fully conscious state, or are other 
states of consciousness (e.g. during sleep) also permitted here? 
Since there are no explicit definitions or criteria provided for the 
two features, one is forced to rely on the feature names. But if one 
interprets these names according to their ordinary language senses, then 
the names seem to represent quite complex semantic relations, embracing for 
example someone(or something) wanting something and doing something, and 
because of that bringing about whatever changes he wants to someone or 
something, but with this latter someone(or something) not being able in 
return to do what he wants with the former. If these semantic relations 
are involved in the notion of control, then control is a very complex notion 
indeed, and there is no evidence that Nilsen has accounted adequately for 
its semantic complexity in these two(putatively primitive) semantic features. 
Although I don't wish here to go into the semantics of the notion of 
'control', the notion seems to be closely linked to that of agency, with the 
latter perhaps subsumed under that of control. Put crudely, under this 
interpretation, a controller would be someone(or something) who causes 
others(people or objects) to 'do' what he 'wants', but who is not himself 
10 caused by these people to do what they want. Nilsen, of course, recognises 
the semantic relationship between agency and control. Indeed, his featural 
manifestation of control is so intimately linked to that of agency that in 
some sections of his work(e.g. 108-9) the assignment -CONTROLLED is asserted 
as semantic evidence that no Agent case is present. But this seems rather 
circular however, if agency is inherent in the meaning of these features ad 
and if, to reach this initial assignment, the presence or absence of an 
agent is a determining criterion. 
160 
Can an instrumental object, then, be a 'controller'? If +cONTROLLER 
means 'someone who does what he wants with something(or someone)' then an 
inanimate instrumental object cannot be a 'controller', because it cannot 
want anything or do anything of itself. On the other hand, it is equally 
clear that animate beings, when used instrumentally, can certainly be 
'controllers' without any contradiction. But the middle ground between 
these, that including inanimate objects which 'control' (e.g. robots, 
computers, traffic lights, automatic choke) is perhaps the most interesting. 
Viewed from one perspective such objects are clearly instruments since they 
are employed by agents(although sometimes absent from a particular event) 
to perform certain tasks. Thus a computer would correspond to someone's 
instrument for making calculations, traffic lights to someone's(or some 
authority's) instrument for regulating traffic flow, and an automatic choke 
would be some manufacturer's device for aiding engine performance under 
certain circumstances. 
Vieweq from another perspective, however, it is possible to think of 
instrument~ such as these as incomplete, semi-autonomous agents, character-
ised by a oertain, programmed capacity to perform various tasks with this 
performance all the time being strictly in accordance with their in-built 
operational program. Thus they may 'act' in certain ways under certain 
circumstances, but not other than these. They are not real agents, however, 
for they cannot want anything and they cannot do anything by and of 
themselves. 
It is on the basis of this semantic similarity with agents that 
instruments such as these are easy prey to metaphorical conversion to agents. 
It is only necessary to suggest, perhaps with an adverb, the capacity for 
wanting and doing something and the nouns function as metaphorical agents, 
as in: 
(17) a. The new IBM computer cunningly beat me at chess. 
b. The traffic lights maliciously turned to red. 
4.44 The Feature 'ANIMATE' 
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(a) What is the meaning of this feature? Nilsen seems to employ ANIMATE 
in two senses: 'living', and 'living and doing something overtly'. Taking 
the former sense first, in some of the sentences which Nilsen examines the 
two values of the feature are employed to represent a contrast between 
something which is alive, and something which is alive but whose 'life' is 
not relevant to the situation described in the sentence. Thus Nilsen(112) 
suggests that while Agnew in sentence (18)a must be +ANIMATE, in (18)b 
Agnew must be -ANIMATE because it can be replaced by the phrase the body of 
Agnew. 
(18) a. Nixon used Agnew to promote his own views. 
b. Nixon used Agnew as a shield against the university students. 
In this and other examples(e.g. 110), it seems that -ANIMATE does not mean 
'not animate' or 'inanimate' but rather 'animateness is not relevant'. 
This follows from the fact that Nilsen classifies as -ANIMATE expressions 
representing objects which are in themselves animate and may even be active, 
yet whose animacy is not linguistically relevant to the sentence concerned, 
for example: 
(19) John used Mary to break the window. 
But this sense of ANIMATE highlights what seems to be a different use of 
the symbol'-', and it prompts one to query whether for previous features 
the symbol '-' was to be understood as meaning 'not a particular feature' 
(e.g. 'uncontrolled', 'not a controller', 'unintentional'), or 'such and 
such a feature is not relevant here'. The lack of explicit comment on the 
interpretation of this symbol makes it difficult to know in what sense 
Nilsen intended the various feature assignments. 
A second sense for interpreting ANIMATE seems to be connected with 
action or movement by an animate being. Here +ANIMATE would refer to overt 
action and -ANIMATE to the absence of any overt action or movement in a 
particular situation. This sense arises from Nilsen's discussion(lOl) of 
the following sentence. 
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(20) John frightened the infant. 
Nilsen says that John may be interpreted e ith er as an Instrumental or an 
Agent. As an Instrumental John would have the features +CAUSE, -INTENT 
and -ANIMATE, and this would represent the situation in which "his body 
frightened the child without any overt action on John's part". As an Agent, 
John would have the features +cAUSE, +INTENT and +ANIMATE and this would 
represent the situation in which "John intentionally frightened the child 
by thinking of and doing something fright ening (as only an animate being 
could do)". 
Since these two senses of ANIMATE are no t altog ether reconcilable, the 
conditions under which the featur e is to b e emplo yed should be made explicit. 
(b) Force and Material cases are always -ANIMATE, Nilsen says, but one does 
speak of a n imate and inanimate for c es, e.g. sentenc e (21)a, and it is not 
difficult to envisage animate objects being used as 'material', as in (2l)b. 
(21) a . Plague s of cane toads ravage d the Queensland coast. 
b . The chef used live worms to s eason the soup. 
4.45 The Feature 'CONCRETE' 
(a) Nils e n several times cont radicts himself in discussing this f eature, 
which is us ed to distinguish between a g r o up of three of his Instrumental 
ca s es (Instr ument, Body Part and Materia l), which are +CONCRETE, and the 
12 Manner and Fo rce cases, which ar -CONCRETE. During the discus s ion Nilsen 
says that the terms faith and hope ar e - CONCRETE and therefo re Ma nner 
expressions(ll6), but i n an e a rlier pass ag e( 58) Nilsen states that faith, 
lov e , naivet e , hope, c harity a re Instrumen t a ls. 
(b) Similarly, Force case expres sions are said to be always - CONCRETE(ll8), 
but Nilsen's examples show that i c e, rai n, hail, snow, sleet, v i r us , etc., 
are characterised as Force case nou ns. 
(c ) Nilse'n c laims, with examp les such as (2l)a-b, that Manner e xp re s sions 
co-oc c ur only with subjects having t he fea tur e +cONCRETE, not - CONCRETE. 
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( 22) a. The boughs of the trees swayed gracefully. 
b. *All hope disappeared gracefully. 
But this is to ignore a variety of sentences such as: 
( 23) a. Hope faded rapidly. 
b. Interest was flagging noticeably. 
c. Rumours of war spread · like lightning. 
4.46 The Feature 'COUNT' 
(a) The principal problem with Nilsen's employment of this feature lies 
in what Nilsen does not reveal about it. It is not shown for instance why 
COUNT has to be a primitive semantic feature, nor why it has to be a 
language universal feature, rather than a surface grannnatical category, 
varying widely from language to language(Lyons 1968,281-3). 
(b) Nilsen claims that expressions in the Force case are always -COUNT, 
but so-called forces may be 'counted' as the following sentences reveal. 
(24) a. Four of the mysterious forces are moving across the tarmac. 
b. God used ten separate plagues to change Pharaoh's mind. 
4.47 The Feature 'SOURCE' 
'Source' is both a feature and a case. As one would expect, the case 
Source is '+ 1 with respect to the feature SOURCE, but what this notational 
t t 1 f . b 13 au o ogy acqounts or is o scure. The feature SOURCE is used to 
distinguish between the Material, Tool and Force cases, but there is no 
indication why this is necessary(since ~hey are already distinguished by 
other features). Nor is there any indication as to what SOURCE means, or 
the criteria on which it is to be distributed amongst these cases. 
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4.5 Semantic Features: General Comments 
A number of comments have already been made in Chapter 2.5 about the 
semantic validity of feature notation in general. The following points 
draw attention to Nilsen's employment of feature notation. 
4.51 The Symbols '+' and 1 - 1 
Several objections may be brought against Nilsen's use of these 
symbols, the profile of which plays such an important role in distinguishing 
his deep cases. 
(a) First, what do the symbols mean? Does the assignment of the symbol 
'+' or 1 - 1 mean that the case concerned must have these features, or only 
that it can be assigned them? While most of Nilsen's examples support the 
former, the latter alternative interpretation for the symbols is also 
found(e.g.91). 
(b) As can be seen from Nilsen's(121) table of cases and features, repro-
duced earlier, Nilsen specifies '+' or 1 - 1 values for all features for all 
cases, even where the feature seems irrelevant to a particular case. This 
seems both iptuitively and descriptively misleading. Thus while it might 
be reasonable, accepting for a moment Nilsen's cases and features, to 
predicate +INTENT or -INTENT of John in the following: 
(25) John hit the table with a hammer. 
what does it mean for table or hammer to be -INTENT? 
Insisting on full specification using only these two values places an 
untenable demand on an already strained . semantic system, and in fact under-
lines the formal weaknesses of featural systems to adequately represent 
natural language meanings. 14 Clearly, if one does retain a system of 
semantic features, an additional value(e.g. ·~· or a blank space as 
Stockwell et.al. (1973,17) provide for) is needed here to indicate where a 
feature is irrelevant to a particular expression. (Relevancy would then be 
marked by the presence of '+' or '-' values.) Without additional notation, 
however, the feature -INTENT is subject to different interpretations when 
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assigned to John and the table, viz., 'not intentional' and 'INTENT not 
relevant here' respectively. While full specification makes for a neat 
formalised statement, it is often at the expense of clearly representing 
and revealing the meaning of the sentence involved. 
(c) An adequate semantic representation seems to require yet another 
symbol to indicate where a feature is obviously relevant but its particular 
value unknown. Thus while Nilsen says (94)that the Agent in sentence (26)a 
is +INTENT, and -INTENT in (26)b, he does not suggest what value should be 
assigned to this feature in (26)c. 
(26) a. John killed him intentionally. 
b. John killed him accidentally. 
c. John killed him. 
If '+' is understood to indicate that a particular expression 'possesses 
the property of' a certain feature, and ' ' that it does not possess that 
property, then another symbol (perhaps '?') could be introduced to represent 
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a relevant feature whose value was not known. Such a move would refine 
Nilsen's si~plistic, 'black and white' approach to assigning semantic 
features, and thereby marginally improve the capacity of his formal system 
to approximate the semantic complexity of natural language. But one of the 
problems with changing part of a system, however, is that changes result in 
other parts of the system, thereby creating or revealing other problems for 
solution. 
One example of this would be with . respect to determining whether a 
case should be Experiencer or Objective, cases which differ largely 
according to the value of the feature ANIMATE. Employing an 'unknown value' 
symbol, it would be difficult to determine whether the italicised noun 
phrase below should be assigned the feature +ANIMATE(making it an 
Experiencer case) or -ANIMATE(Objective). 
(27) The nurse shaved the old paralytic, all the time wondering 
whether he was dead or alive. 
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4.52 The Presentation of Nilsen's Features 
At a time when the role and empirical validity of features are coming 
under close review, Nilsen confidently presents and employs his features as 
if features themselves were a well-accepted axiom of semantic description. 
While this is not unreasonable, it is a criticism that Nilsen makes strong 
(new) claims for his features, yet does not provide sufficient definition 
or justification for them, other than assurances as to his intuitions. 
There is thus an impression of a descriptively adequate system, but with 
few semantic tools or criteria with which to evaluate the analysis or assign 
features to expressions. But here and there the impression gives way to 
some uncertainty, as when Nilsen says that "it is difficult to know what the 
feature Concrete actually is"(l09), and when it is admitted that it is not 
entirely clear what is meant by saying that certain adverbial cases can 
have the feature +INTENT(93). 
As far as the names of the features and cases are concerned, Nilsen's 
neat labels suggest a degree of descriptive adequacy that is greater than 
actuality warrants. Bolinger gives voice to this problem when he says: 
"giving nameq to barely explored subdivisions may create the illusion of 
controlling them, which we are far from being able to do as yet" ( 1968-'t 205). 
And Fillmore, who himself employs features to a limited extent, recognises 
the dangers of semantic description through prescribing a formal term: after 
observing that objects of the verb break must have a certain rigidity, he 
comments that "one could make these observations seem more formal, of 
course, by writing "rigidity" with an initial capital letter and postulating 
it as a semantic feature of certain nouns . . but I believe it would be 
quite misleading to do so"(l970,129). 
4.53 The Semantic Representation of Sentences 
While Nilsen provides a fully-specified matrix for features and cases, 
and supplies comments on isolated feature specifications for cases in a 
variety of sentences, at no point does he provide for any sentence a 
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fully-specified listing of the features which constitute the cases of that 
sentence. Further, he does not indicate what a semantic representation 
for a complete sentence would look like, nor whether it would differ from 
a listing of fully-specified cases and features. The closest approximation 
to a semantic representation for a sentence is the practice (used seven 
times) of superposing case abbreviations for sentences(l61-6). 
More than this is required on a number of grounds, however, for an 
adequate description of instrumental sentences. First, many of Nilsen's 
cases(e.g. Agent, Tool Instrument, Objective) permit alternative values 
for certain features. Full specification of a sentence would clearly show 
which values were selected in particular sentences. Second, taking only a 
'sub-sentence' focus does not make readily apparent semantic differences 
between different types of instrumental sentences. For example, it would 
be particularly enlightening to see explicitly the differences in meaning 
between the familiar pair of sentences containing respectively with and 
use . . to constructions, as in: 
(28) a. John cut the cake with a knife. 
b, John used a knife to cut the cake. 
Third, the present system is limited to the representation of overt, 
surface forms only. It is thus an inadequate vehicle even for the 
expression of the covert elements which Nilsen himself frequently claims 
to be present in the deep structure of sentences. For example, although 
he insists, along with Larnbert(231), tha~"the existence of Instrumental 
case entails the existence of Agent and Objective cases in the deep 
structure of the same predication"(153), and although he gives the 
following as a sentence which includes a covert Agent case in its deep 
structure: 
(29) The rats were killed with fire. 
he gives no indication as to how he would construct a semantic 
representation which included such covert elements. 
To achieve the explanatory adequacy which Nilsen is seeking for his 
semantic features, it is mandatory that the capacity of his system be 
extended to enable it to represent the deep, semantic structure of 
sentences. Without such an extension, his claim that the following 
sentences contain Instrumental cases (and therefore include Agents in 
their respective deep structures) is an empty one. 
( 30) a. Apples are harmful. 
b. The timber creaked. 
c. The sunlight faded the handout. 
d. The new gas lawnmower cuts very well. 
e. A harraner broke the window. 
f. The blotter sucked up the water. 
(For my own views on the semantics of these sentences see Chapter 6.2) 
4.54 The Adequacy of Features in Descriptive Semantics 
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Finally, there are considerable general problems with employing 
feature systems in descriptive semantics. First, it is difficult to see 
how lists of pluses and minuses and 'formal' features can ever adequately 
account for the semantics of natural language expressions. Second, most 
existing fe&tures seem to be semantically complex, with names chosen more 
for their mnemonic utility than for their semantic primitivity. Thus the 
names themselves (e.g. CONTROLLER and CONTROLLED) need 'translation' into 
simpler terms. Lastly, there is the question whether one's deep linguistic 
intuitions embrace such entities as cases and features. Nilsen certainly 
believes so, but I am inclined to the more cautious position expressed by 
Lakoff: "our intuitions about what constitutes a semantic marker are not 
clear"(1970,196), and by Postal when he says that there are only three 
unquestioned linguistic levels which are subject to direct empirical 
inspection: "speakers have direct intuitions about what their sentences 
mean, how they are pronounced, and how they are organised into words "(1972, 
164) . 
4.6 Semantic Classes 
Classification is essentially an arbitrary process. To make good 
his claim about the capacity of semantic features to "explain" various 
phenomena, including why certain classes of verbs have particular case 
frames, Nilsen must show that his classification is as principled as 
possible, that it is in fact based on his semantic features. 
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It is suggested, however, that as well as being subject to the 
already-mentioned general and particular problems associated with the 
semantic features, Nilsen's classification suffers from being heavily 
idiosyncratic, being based to a large degree on a number of disparate 
factors. Among the surface structure criteria which determine whether or 
not a particular class is to be established are the following: 
(i) differences in verb transitivity(e.g. 158-160,166). Thus there 
is a class of intransitive motion verbs having the case frame [ __ Agent 
Instrument Source Path Goal] (examples include cycle, boat, drive, !!Y_, 
skate, ski, sled), illustrated by the sentence(Nilsen 166) 
(31) John cycled from Ann Arbor to Detroit via Ann Arbor Trail 
by bicycle. 
and there is another class of transitive motion verbs having the case 
frame [ __ Agent Instrument Source Path Goal Objective] (examples are 
bus, canoe, cart, ship, truck), illustrated by 
(32) John shipped the bananas overland from Brisbane to Sydney 
by express freighter. 
(ii) surface morphology(e.g. 171). Thus one class of causative verbs 
with the case frame [ __ Agent Instrument Objective] is characterised by 
the presence of the verbal affix en(blacken, enliven, heighten, shorten, 
redden, etc.). 
(iii) the incorporability of the instrumental noun(e.g. 165-66). Thus 
one class of verbs having the case frame [ Agent Instrument Locdtion 
Object] is said to incorporate into the verb both the Instrumental 
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and Locative case expressions, as in Nilsen's(165) sentence 
(33) Mary bottled the fruit. 
Other verbs in this class include bag, box,~' fence, house, package. 
Verbs with the same case frame but which do not allow verbal incorporation 
of Instrwnental and Locative cases include fill, load, stack, pour, empty. 
Other non-surface structure factors involved as criteria for 
classification include: 
(iv) the number of places in a case frame, although the discussion 
here is so thin as to be obscure. For example, does a case frame indicate 
the absolute minimwn number of obligatory cases, as it seems in some 
one-place instrwnental classes having the case frame [ 
16 Instrwnent] 
and being respectively classes of 'sound' (163), e.g. bang, click, jingle, 
snap, and 'causation' (171), e.g. apples in the sentence 
(34) Apples are harmful. 
Or does a case frame indicate the maximwn number of possible cases, as 
seems to be the case with the nine-place predicates representative of the 
semantic class of 'exchange' (162)?17 
(v) and finally, semantic factors which stand quite outside either 
features or cases, which together constitute the only semantic 'apparatus' 
in Nilsen's system, and therefore the only explicit principled basis for 
t . 1 . f. . h 
18 h . f . . . f seman ic c assi 1cation ere. T ese semantic actors give rise in act 
to most of the major classes, yet there is almost nothing in Nilsen's 
semantic features which could serve as a principled basis for such 
semantic classes as 'motion', 'destruction', or 'attachment', let alone 
the following semantic classes of the Tool case: 'carpentry', 'sports and 
music', 'cultivation', 'clothing' , ' .hunting' and 'primping' ( 167-9) . 
Making this point even stronger is the fact that many of Nilsen's 
different semantic classes actually have the same case frame. Thus the 
verb classes of 'contact', 'body part', 'change of state', 'allowance', 
'aid', 'force' ,'encouragement' and 'expectation' all have the case frame 
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[ Agent Instrument Objective]. What this means is that insofar as 
Nilsen's explicit semantic system goes, the classes are identical in 
their semantics(and therefore should qualify as one class). But some 
extra-semantic semantic factors(e.g. 'contact', 'clothing') are arbitrarily 
chosen and elevated to class status, while other possible factors(e.g. 
'automotive', 'culinary', 'arts') are passed over. 
To account for his semantic classes, however, Nilsen could do one of 
the following: demonstrate that the postulated classes do in fact differ 
according to units of his semantic apparatus(i.e. features and cases); 
postulate additional semantic features which would, individually or 
collectively, account for different classes by seeking to get at semantic 
factors distinguishing, for example, 'cultivation' and 'hunting' classes; 
or, finally, what would have been most plausible for Nilsen, recognise 
that there were other semantic relations which were operating within the 
grammar, but which were not systemically linked to his features. Nilsen 
does not provide any foundation, however, for developing his account of 
semantic classes in any of these directions. 
4.7 Terms Describing Instrlllllentality 
Considerable lack of clarity surrounds both terms describing 
instrumentality, and the number and characterisation of the instrumental 
cases. 
First, almost total interchangeability exists between the terms used 
to refer respectively to instruments in . the real world, to the name of a 
case, and to the general term for the four cases(Body Part, Force, Tool or 
Instrument, and Material). Thus 'Instrrnnental' may refer to the set of 
four cases(95), to the 'Instrument' case alone(l64), or to the 'Body Part' 
and 'Instrument' cases together(l57). 'Instrument' may refer to the name 
of one case, also called 'Tool' or 'Tool Instrument', to objects in the 
real world(l67), to the set of four cases(91), to the three of these 
remaining after excluding Force(l03), or to Body Part alone(l62). Lastly, 
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in the case frames the capital letter 'I' seems to refer to Body Part and 
Instrument cases. This joint reference is not explained and is unexpected 
since these two cases are not linked in any special way in the accompanying 
text. 
Second, many inconsistent statements about the Instrumental cases make 
Nilsen's argumentation difficult to follow. For instance, how many 
Instrumental cases are there? Nilsen sometimes has three(l37), sometimes 
four(120), but if an early comment is taken seriously, there are potentially 
six deep Instrumental cases. In that earlier reference(58), Nilsen intro-
duces what he terms "another category or two of primary Instrumentals". 
These categories, with examples of member nouns, are: 
Semi-Human: computer, robot, wire services, answering service 
Attribute: faith, love, naivete, hope, charity 
It is a little disappointing that Nilsen did not develop these categories 
any further because a quick glance suggests that they would differ in 
interesting ways from the other Instrumental cases, e.g. with respect to 
the features INTENT, CONTROLLED, ANIMATE, COUNT and CONCRETE. 
For an9ther group of examples, the following inconsistencies are not 
uncharacteristic of a surprising lack of precision about which features 
are associated with which cases. 19 First, it is said that Tools, Natural 
Forces and Materials are "'subtypes' of Instruments"(97), and that 
Materials "have the feature -CAUSE". Yet shortly after(98) it is stated 
that "Instruments ... are +CAUSE". Second, Tools, Natural Forces and 
Materials are said to be +CONCRETE(97), but in the same paragraph it is 
claimed that "Tool and Force can be contrasted with each other in that 
Tool has the feature +CONCRETE". In another passage Material too is 
-CONCRETE(l39). Finally, it is claimed that Natural Force is a type of 
Instrument(97), yet later "I am assuming that Natural Forces ... are 
not Instruments"(l03). 
4.8 Summary 
Nilsen's book represents an ambitious attempt to account completely 
for the semantics of instrumental sentences by a formal specification of 
semantic features within a case grammar approach. 
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On the positive side, Nilsen has stimulated the examination of the 
semantics of instrumental sentences in a number of ways, in particular, 
by attempting to clarify and advance Lambert's distinction of four types 
of instrumental sentences, and, using the features CONTROLLER and 
CONTROLLED, by grappling with an essential element of that which makes 
an instrument an instrument. In focussing on a narrow, delimited area 
of English grammar, he has also done descriptive semantics a service, by 
providing an arena for testing in depth the adequacy of semantic features. 
But, overall, Nilsen's proposal for representing the meaning of 
instrumental sentences is less than successful. Most reasons for this 
are directly attributable to the feature-modified case grammar approach 
which he adopts - to its descriptive and notational inflexibility, to 
the insufficiently-defined features and the lack of adequate criteria for 
their assigmnent, and to the limited nature of data that can be investigated. 
And while Niisen could conceivably improve the notation, definitions and 
criteria, and could multiply features without limit to account for a 
plethora of semantic distinctions, ultimately it would be necessary to 
employ ordinary language to explain what his system meant, and how it 
attempted to account for the meaning of _natural language sentences. 
Throughout, Nilsen claims that, using semantic features, he can 
achieve results that are explanatorily adequate, internally consistent, 
intuitively correct and language independent. On his own evidence, 
however, these four claims do not appear to be substantiated in his 
proposals for the semantics of instrumental sentences. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1This chapter represents a substantial revision of my review(l976) 
of Nilsen's book. While Nilsen has issued an earlier monograph(l972), in 
which he first suggests the possibility of further semantic differentiation 
of cases by features, because of some significant differences between the 
works, the latter work is felt to represent Nilsen's mature opinion. 
Consequently, it is this work upon which this chapter is based. 
2Nilsen's claim that his cases are also semantic primitives is surely 
an oversight in view of his insistence on the semantic primitivity of his 
semantic features. 
3But in fact, one is offered no explicit guidance at all as to 
Nilsen's views about such frequently discussed aspects of case grammar as 
the nature, role and operation of the lexicon, base component, and trans-
formational and lexical insertion rules. Nor does the absence of formal 
tree diagrams and derivations from deep to surface structure render 
Nilsen's treatment any more familiar. For some details of the role of 
semantic features in Fillmore 1968a, see Chapter 3.52. 
4 Thus for Blake(1930,34), 'case' identifies underlying syntactic-
semantic relationships; for Robinson(l969,62), "case relations are 
syntactic primitives"; for Anderson(l971,10), cases are "grannnatical 
relations contracted by nouns"; and for Stockwell et.al., cases are 
functional primitives which dominate NPs and which define the functional 
relations between constituents of a sentence(1973,9). 
5 Nilsen's position with respect to case determination is thus a very 
strong one: unique determination is possible, and this using semantic 
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criteria. It can be argued, however, that there is a degree of inherent 
indeterminacy in case assignment, and that, given a case approach, mixed 
criteria are necessary to ensure the best array of cases. 
6
see Chapter 3.53 for some suggested paraphrases of the meanings of 
a number of these feature names. 
7But Aristotle(Nichomachean Ethics III.l) suggests another view. 
There Aristotle includes in the circumstances in which someone can act 
involuntarily the situation in which someone hits another person a sharp 
blow when meaning only to grip his hand. 
8The same comments apply to Shibatani's formulation of causation(l973, 
2). Characterising a causal situation(somewhat circularly in my opinion) 
in terms of a causing phase and a caused phase, Shibatani says that one of 
the two preconditions for the existence of a causal relation is that "the 
realization qf the latter phase is assumed by the speaker to have taken 
place". Perhaps one way of accommodating this point of view with the 
existence of sentences such as (6)a-b is by employing a notion of "world", 
drawing both on the semantic primitive "world"(see Chapter 2.2) and the 
analysis of counterfactuals in terms of possible works. On the latter, 
see McCawley's discussion and references(l974). A sentence like 
John wanted to cause a disturbance could· then be interpreted along the 
lines 'John wanted the present world to become a world in which there 
existed a disturbance because of what John did'. 
9 In fact Nilsen several times explicitly or implicitly attributes 
these features to other grammarians: for example, to Huddleston(l06), 
Langacker(l08) and Lehrer(ll3). None of these writers, however, mention 
any semantic features having to do with 'control' in the works to which 
Nilsen refers. For a discussion of other writers who have referred to 
control in the context of agency, see Chapter 6.4. 
10 Some sentences delineating aspects of the meaning of the noun 
control are presented summarily below. 
(i) a. You can't do that - I'm in control here. 
b. You must do that - I'm in control here. 
(ii) a. The referee lost control of the match and the players did 
whatever they wanted. 
b. *The referee lost control of the match and the players 
obeyed him completely. 
(iii) a. Now that I'm in control, men, you'll obey me implicitly. 
b. *Now that I'm in control, men, I'll obey you implicitly. 
(iv) a. The pilot re-gained control and the aircraft responded 
once more. 
b. *The pilot re-gained control and the aircraft failed to 
respond once more. 
11 h . 1 . f Te inc usion o ANIMATE and CONCRETE is one respect in which 
Nilsen's work differs from his earlier monograph. In that work Nilsen 
was of the opinion that "lexical features such as ANIMATE and CONCRETE 
are inappropriate for the purposes of case assignment"(1972,47). 
12 Manner is a 'Modal' case, however, and Nilsen does not sketch the 
semantic relationship between Modal and Prop::>sitional cases. It is not 
clear therefore in what respects they may be compared semantically. 
13 , , I Similarly, 'location', 'time' and 'goal are each represented 
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dually by a case and a feature. But note that while the Temp::>ral and 
Goal cases are specified '+' respectively for the features TIME and GOAL, 




with respect to the 
14Note that neither Lambert nor Stockwell et.al. are as inflexibly 
trapped within their semantic systems as Nilsen is. This is because while 
Nilsen insists on fully specifying all features for all cases, on using 
only two values and on having an almost completely inflexible assignment of 
features to cases, Lambert uses semantic features as only one means of 
specifying cases, does not attempt to specify all features for all cases, 
and through case and verb feature projection can flexibly alter assignments 
for various cases. Stockwell et.al. do not define their cases by using 
features(features are said only to "interestingly correlate with" certain 
cases), and they distinguish five possible feature values, in place of 
Nilsen's two. These five values are(l973,728): 
(i) + positive specification 
(ii) negative specification 
(iii) * obligatory specification 
(iv) +/- optional specification 
(v) absence of specification means that the feature is irrelevant. 
15
1n the feature matrices, Nilsen does employ a symbol '+', but without 
explaining its interpretation. From the adjacent text it appears that, 
rather than representing a third value and indicating a relevant feature 
with value unknown, it is to be interpreted as a disjunctive symbol indicat-
ing that one or other of its values may characterise the particular case 
concerned. One difficulty with this proposal is that it introduces 
explicitly into the deep semantic representation a disjunction which is 
not present in the sentence itself. 
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16Larnbert(l32) expressly denies that there is any one place predicate 
with the case frame [ __ I] such as Nilsen(163,171) claims. 
17There is no obvious role for case frames in Nilsen's system. Unlike 
in Fillmore's grammar, where case frames participate importantly in the 
operation of transformational rules, Nilsen's case frames seem relatively 
unmotivated, an artificial formal device which muddies rather than 
clarifies the semantic classes which Nilsen attempts to distinguish. 
Indeed, since Nilsen adopts a wholly semantic view of cases, and presents 
no picture of transformations or the syntactic component, there is a prima 
facie case for the role of case frames in Nilsen's system to be spelled 
out explicitly. 
18The additional semantic factors and Nilsen's features sometimes 
fail to correspond. Consider, for example, the relationship between the 
feature CAUSE and the semantic class of 'cause' verbs. Despite the claim 
that three of the Instrumental cases have the feature +CAUSE, only verbs 
of 'allowance', 'aid', 'force', 'encouragement', 'expectation', and those 
whose predicates are marked by an en affix are listed in the semantic 
c lass of 'cause' verbs. 
19For instance, at least eleven times the'+' and '-' values for 
certain f e atures are reproduced differently on feature matrices. 
5.1 General 
Chapter Five 
INSTRUMENTAL IN GENERATIVE SEMANTICS 
This chapter reviews several proposals by generative semanticists for 
the representation of instrumental sentences. Of the works containing these 
proposals, the most important, both theoretically and methodologically is 
that of Lakoff(l968), who uses a discussion of the deep structure represent-
ation of instrumental sentences as a vehicle for questioning some basic 
tenets of the standard classical theory of transformational grammar. With 
other papers(e.g. Lakoff and Ross 1967, Mccawley 1968a) this work has 
contributed substantially to the development of the generative semantics 
variant of the standard theory. Other proposals for instrumental sentences 
reviewed here are by Langendoen(l969) in 5.3, McCawley(l97lb) in 5.4, and 
Dowty(l972b) in 5.5. Consistent with the approach taken in previous chapter~ 
comments on instrumental incorporation by generative semanticists will be 
deferred until Chapter Seven. 
Generative semantics stands apart from the standard theory and its 
principal antithetical variant of the standard theory(viz., interpretive 
semantics) by virtue of the following major differences. First, its 
proponents claim that there is no deep structure syntactic level separate 
ooth from the level of semantic representation and the level of surface 
structure. Instead, the deep structure of a sentence is regarded(e.g. 
Postal 1971,249) as so 'deep' as to represent in itself the semantic 
structure of the sentence. Because of this, the deep(i.e. semantic) 
structure is more abstract, or "further from surface structure"(Lakoff 
1968,24), than the deep structure of the standard theory. This abstractness, 
it should be pointed out, is intensified through the tendency not only to 
identify the new semantic representations with the formal representations 




Because deep structure is now in effect the semantic structure, there 
is no need for the standard theory's projection rules to supply semantic 
interpretations for the deep structure representation of a sentence. A 
simplification in the theory here, however, is balanced by an expansion of 
the transformational component. Transformations are now permitted to range 
over derivations from semantic structure to surface structure. In addition, 
another assumption of the standard theory is rejected with proposals(e.g 
Mccawley 1968c) that some transformational rules will operate before lexical 
items have been inserted into representations, and that lexical insertion 
rules can themselves be thought of as a sub-class of transformations, 
applying whenever the configuration to which they apply arises. 
5.2 Lakoff 
In the next section relevant aspects of Lakoff's proposal for repre-
senting the deep structure of instrumental sentences are presented(S.21). 
This is followed by a discussion of: the primitivity of the granunatical 
category Instrumental(S.22), the alleged synonymy of certain types of 
instrumental sentences(S.23), and the so-called ambiguity of senses of the 
preposition with(S.24) and the verb use(S.25). 
5.21 Lakoff's Proposal 
Lakoff's aim in this paper is to call into question the empirical 
validity of the level of deep structure found in Katz and Postal's 
An Integr ated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions and Chomsky's Aspects of 
the Theor y of Syntax. Distinguishing four conditions which these works 
draw upon to characterise the level of deep structure, Lakoff concentrates 
his attention on the following two conditions: 
(I) basic grammatical relations(e.g., subject of, object of) are repre-
sented at the level of deep structure in terms of fundamental 
grammatical categories(e.g., S, NP, VP, N, V); 
(II) the correct generalisations about selectional restrictions and 
co-occurrence can be stated at this level. 
He says that the paper will examine the relationship between these two, 
especially the part the generalisations of (II) play in determining what 
are the fundamental grammatical categories and the basic grammatical 
relations. 
Lakoff mentions that his thesis(l970a) contains arguments that many 
manner adverbs are transformationally derived from more basic structures 
and that generalisations will fail to be captured if the category Manner 
Adverb is assumed to exist in deep structure. He then suggests that an 
examination of the category Instrumental Adverb will show not only that 
deep structure contains fewer grammatical relations and categories than 
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is generally believed, but also that deep structures for sentences contain-
ing instrumental adverbs will be much more 'abstract' (in the sense, further 
from surface structure) than was previously believed. 
As far as instrumental sentences themselves are concerned, Lakoff 
claims that when certain senses of with, use and to, respectively, have 
been eliminated, the following two sentences 
(1) a. Seymour sliced the salami with a knife. 
b. Seymour used a knife to slice the salami. 
are synonymous, sharing the same grammatical and selectional relations, 
despite differences of surface structure. They should therefore have 
"essentially the same deep structures" (23) ·. Although Lakoff does not pro-
pose any underlying deep structure here, it is clear from his comments 
(e.g. 24) that he considers (l)b is much closer to the common deep structure 
than (l)a. Accordingly the category of Instrumental Adverb is eliminated 
from the deep structure. 
Lakoff is not arguing for the synonymity of all sentences like (l)a 
and (l)b, or the deep structure identity of all sentences of the form (2)a 
and (2)b below. 
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(2) a. NP1 V NP2 with NP3 
b. - use to V 
He explicitly excludes certain senses of with, use and to(for details see 
5.24 and 5.25) to leave him with the "purposive instrumental" sense of 
with, the instrumental sense of use and the sense of to which "portrays the 
action in which an instrument is being used"(13). 
Lakoff's paper has had a marked influence on the development of post-
Aspects transformational grammar, on account of both its questioning of the 
empirical level of deep structure(a raison d'@tre for the standard theory) 
and the methodological innovation entailed in its arguing for the existence 
of certain deep structures yet without either saying what these deep 
structures are or formulating any transformational rules for their 
d . t' 1 eriva ion. Not being relevant to the aims of the thesis, these questions 
of deep structure and methodology will not be pursued further here. The 
focus hereafter will be towards what the paper contributes towards the 
description of the meanings of instrumental sentences. 
5.22 The Grammatical Category Instrumental 
One of the aims of the thesis has been to suggest that there is no 
aemantically primitive category of Instrumental in the structure of English. 
Since Lakoff's paper proposes in effect the elimination of an Instrumental 
category from deep structure, we must consider whether his paper supports 
this aim. To anticipate, I do not think it does. 
Lakoff's paper deals with Instrumental as a formal granunatical 
category of a hypothetical deep structure level, and his arguments have to 
do with the simplification of syntactic structure at that level, in partic-
ular with whether this Instrumental category is present at that level. 
He is not concerned with questions as to the semantic structure of the 
Instrumental category or as to whether it is semantically primitive. By 
way of contrast, Fillmore's Instrumental case, it will be remembered, was 
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explicitly set up as a syntactic and semantic primitive: syntactically it 
was a primitive relation introduced by the first base rule(l968,24) and not 
decomposable into other primitive syntactic relations, and semantically it 
was assumed by Fillmore to be unanalysable(l972a,14). 
It is therefore not Lakoff's invention to reanalyse the Instrumental 
Adverb category into less complex semantic components(cf. Nilsen) but 
rather, in the interests of reducing the number of deep structure cate-
gories, to point to a possible source for the Instrumental Adverb category 
as object of the instrumental verb use. That is, in terms of categories, 
Instrumental Adverb can be deleted because its job can be done through the 
categories V(use) and NP. The fact, however, that Instrumental Adverb does 
not reduce to V plus NP but to instrumental use plus NP suggests to me that 
Lakoff has not completely accomplished his goal. 
Given that Lakoff does not propose any underlying deep structure for 
sentences (l)a-b, one can only speculate, drawing from his other work 
(especially 1970a and 1970b), whether he would have suggested something 
like a hypothetical lexical item USE or an atomic predicate INSTRUMENTAL. 
As discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively, Langendoen(l969) and 
McCawley(l97lb) develop the deep structure representation of an Instru-
mental category along the lines of an abstract instrumental semantic 
predicate. 
5.23 Synonymy 
One of the most important questions in Lakoff's paper for our examin-
ation is the alleged synonymy of sentences (l)a and (l)b, and also of 
sentences having the respective sentence forms (2)a and (2)b. In this 
section I will present five arguments, selected from a range of sources(e.g. 
Chomsky 1969, Kooij 1971), which suggest that the sentences are not 
synonymous. In Chapter 6.3 semantic representations attempting to capture 
these differences will be proposed. 
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First, consider the following sentence pairs: 
(3) a. The pop hero used this card table to compose his latest hit. 
b. *The pop hero composed his latest hit with this card table. 
(4) a. John used a stepladder to change the light bulb. 
b. *John changed the light bulb with a stepladder. 
What follows from the lack of synonymity here is that the use NP to 
construction can pick up as object of~ a range of items which are no 
more than circumstantially involved in the activity of the complement 
sentence. Such items have no necessary causal involvement in the comple-
ment sentence's activity. 
Secondly, when items which are causally involved in the activity are 
considered, the use NP to construction again permits a wider range of com-
plement nouns than the with NP construction. Thus in a situation involving 
chains of causality the (2)b form permits mention of objects involved in 
each chain while (2)a generally permits mention only of the immediate cause 
of the event described in the main verb(see my qualification of 'immediate 
cause' in Chapter 3.42). Thus if John hits a ball with a cricket bat and 
the ball subsequently breaks a window, this being what John wants, accept-
able descriptions of this situation are as shown below. 
(5) a. John used the ball to break the window. 
b. John broke the window with the ball. 
(6) a. John used the cricket bat to break the window. 
b. *John broke the window with the cricket bat. 
(7) a. John used the cricket bat to break the window with the ball. 
b. *John broke the window with the bat with the ball. 
Another example with causally involved instruments suggests a further 
difference between the sentences. Thus Kooij(77) draws from Chomsky(l969, 
195) to point out that while sentence (8)b below 
(8) a. Rodin used a hammer to make this statue. 
b. Rodin made this statue with a hammer. 
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implies that the hammer was the instrument used in making the statue, (8)a 
is neutral with respect to this implication. That is, there could well 
have been other objects involved. Another pair of sentences revealing this 
distinction is: 
(9) a. I used methylated spirits to fill the bottle. 
b. I filled the bottle with methylated spirits. 
Here (9)b implies strongly that as a result of my activity the bottle is 
full of methylated spirits. Sentence (9)a could have this meaning, but it 
could also describe a situation where a partially filled bottle was 
'topped up'. 
Fourthly, there are differences between the sentences which are 
revealed when adverbs are added. Chomsky(l969,195) has suggested that 
there are semantic differences resulting from the presence of the adverb 
carelessly and an iterative adverbial phrase over and over again. Consider 
the following sentences: 
(10) a. John used the mallet over and over again to reduce 
the statue to rubble. 
b. *John reduced the statue to rubble with the mallet 
over and over again. 
Sentence (lO)a asserts that the mallet is used repeatedly and implies that 
the statue is reduced to rubble once only, whereas (lO)b aaaerta that it 
is so reduced repeatedly. A similar difference occurs if the adverb phrase 
once only is substituted. 
The difference between the sentences is revealed with temporal adverbs 
also. Compare the following sentences: 
(11) a. Mary used a sunlamp every Wednesday to produce a weekend tan. 
b. *Mary produced a weekend tan with the sunlamp every 
Wednesday. 
These differ in that (ll)a does not specify when the weekend tan is pro-
duced by, where (ll)b asserts it is produced on Wednesday. 
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What these sentences with adverbs emphasise is, firstly, the asymmetry 
between (2)a and (2)b with respect to their potential for adverbial 
modification. Construction (2)a is linguistically limited with respect to 
adverbial scope because there is only one surface verb. Thus there is no 
synonymous sentence (12)b for (12)a. 
(12) a. Mary used a sunlamp every Wednesday to produce a weekend 
tan on Friday. 
b. *Mary produced a weekend tan on Friday with a sunlamp every 
Wednesday. 
Sentence (12)b in fact contains a contradiction. 
The second point which these adverbial sentences emphasise is that 
more acceptable paraphrases of sentences of the form (2)a will be of the 
form (13)a below, illustrated in (13)b and (13)c. 
(13) a. NP1 - V - NP using - NP 2' 3 
b. John reduced the statue to rubble, using the mallet over 
and over again. 
c. Mary produced a weekend tan on Friday, using a sunlamp 
every Wednesday. 
For a comparative discussion of sentences of the form (13)a, see Chapter 
Eight. 
Fifthly and finally, leaving adverbs aside, notice that there are some 
sentences which, while semantically unexceptional with with phrases, have 
use NP to paraphrases which are neither synonymous nor semantically natural. 
Consider the following sentences: 
(14) a. The arctic explorer kissed his wife with blood-stained, 
frost-chafed lips. 
b. *The arctic explorer used blood-stained, frost-chafed lips 
to kiss his wife. 
(15) a. Mary tapped on the table with her slender, beautifully-
manicured fingernails. 
b. ?Mary used her slender, beautifully-manicured fingernails 
to tap on the table. 
(16) a. Fred touched his nose with his knee. 
b. ?Fred used his knee to touch his nose. 
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I think the reason for the difference between the a and b sentences 
here points to an important, subtle difference between sentences of the 
forms of (2), and the situations which they are employed to describe. The 
structure (2)a with with can be used to assert that someone did something 
(no matter how weird or trivial) and that he did it with a certain object. 
There is no implication that the object was specially chosen; the sentence 
merely states that a particular object was involved. On the other hand, 
sentences of the form (2)b assert that someone used something in order to 
do something, with the verb~ suggesting that the particular object 
chosen was one from a number of possible means. 
Consider first sentences containing kiss. Notice that the following 
sentences, which are versions of (14)a-b but without the adjectives, are 
both anomalous. 
(17) a. ?The arctic explorer kissed his wife with his lips. 
b. ?The arctic explorer used his lips to kiss his wife. 
The reason for anomaly here is simply that if the verb kiss means in part 
'do something with one's lips' then both sentences are redundantly specified, 
with (17)b further suggesting, misleadingly, that one could use other than 
lips to kiss with. 
With further, adjectival specification, however, the (17)a sentence 
becomes acceptable, viz. as (14)a. This is because further information 
which is not part of the meaning of the verb is added to the sentence, with 
lips being semantically redundant still but grarranatically necessary. 2 The 
reason why (17)b does not similarly become acceptable is that no amount of 
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adjectival modification can alter the fact that lips are uniquely what one 
kisses with. Observe that an identical situation applies with respect to 
the verb lick. 
(18) a. ?Mary licked the icecream with her tongue. 
b. ?Mary used her tongue to lick the icecream. 
(19) a. Mary licked the icecream with her sore tongue. 
b. ?Mary used her sore tongue to lick the icecream. 
Thus if the activity involved in the sentence provides no choice of 
instrumental object, it is anomalous to employ an expression which implies 
1 . b. 3 a ternative o Jects. But if kissing, for example, could take place with 
only one lip, then perhaps we might find sentences such as: 
(20) a. I used my lower lip to kiss Mary. 
b. The boxer used his uncut upper lip to kiss his wife. 
But this is not the case as far as language is concerned. However people 
may actually kiss, English neither permits alternative objects(apart from 
metaphor) nor differentiation between lips. 
Further corroboration for this explanation comes from sentences 
involving other verbs which are highly specified for instruments, yet which 
tolerate some alternatives within the species. Consider the following 
sentences: 
(21) a. ?John bit the toffee with his teeth. 
b. ?John used his teeth to bite the toffee. 
(22) a. John bit the toffee apple with his strong back teeth. 
b. John used his strong back teeth to bite the toffee. 
(23) a. ?Mary kicked the football with her foot. 
b. ?Mary used her foot to kick the football. 
(24) a. Mary kicked the football with her left foot. 
b. Mary used her left foot to kick the football. 
In these sentences teeth and feet, the specified instruments for bite and 
kick, respectively, are like lips in being unable to occur acceptably in an 
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unmodified instrumental NP. But unlike the highly constrained kiss, e.g. 
the unacceptability of (20)a-b, bite and kick permit some selection from 
within the specified range of their respective instruments. Hence, I claim, 
the fact that (22)b and (24)b are not anomalous. 
Differences between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses 
provide further grammatical support for the semantic distinction being 
argued here. Consider the following sentences: 
(25) a. The ladies who were vivacious followed me upstairs. 
b. The ladies, who were vivacious, followed me upstairs. 
c. The vivacious ladies followed me upstairs. 
Sentence (25)a, with the restrictive relative clause, asserts that it was 
a subclass of the set of ladies who went upstairs. Sentence (25)b, however, 
with the non-restrictive relative clause, carries no such assertion. 
Sentence (25)c conceals the distinction completely. 
Returning to instrumental use NP to sentences, one observes that the 
object of use in the following sentence should be ambiguous. 
(26) John used his newly-capped teeth to bite the toffee. 
The two senses would be: 
(27) a. his teeth which were newly-capped 
b. his teeth, which were newly-capped. 
Given the restriction on the possible instruments for the verb bite, 
one would predict that the non-restrictive relative clause could not occur 
as object of use in a type (2)b structure. This turns out to be the case. 
(28) a. John used his teeth which were newly-capped to bite the 
toffee. 
b. *John used his teeth, which were newly-capped, to bite 
the toffee. 
Similarly, where verbs with highly restricted instruments were employed, 
acceptable sentences were those in which the NP objects of~ were derived 
from restrictive relative clauses, e.g. (22)b and (24)b; on the other hand, 
the unacceptable sentences (14)b and (19)b have NPs derived from non-
restrictive relative clauses. 
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But what of sentences (15) and (16), in which the activities mentioned 
are not invariantly associated with particular objects used instrumentally? 
First, note that while the a sentences merely state that someone did some-
thing with something, without implying choice of instruments or asserting 
anything about the agent's purpose in acting, it is clear that the b sen-
tences cannot be paraphrases of these, for they are more specific than the 
a sentences, asserting that the agent purposely did something and that he 
used something to do it with. The first difference then is that the a and 
b sentences differ with respect to what they entail about what the agent 
intends and why he involves a certain object instrumentally. 
The second difference flows from the first. While the (2)a sentence 
structure can describe any instrumental action no matter how odd or trivial, 
the (2)b structure, is plainly inappropriate for many of these instrumental 
actions, since they are hardly the sorts of things that one intends to do 
or to use anything for. Thus while structure (2)b better describes a 
situation in which someone uses his hand to wipe or rub his nose, why 
should anyone want to use his knee to touch his nose? 
The sentences become a little more acceptable, however, if a context 
is further specified. Note that (L9)a is better rendered as (29)b. 
(29) a. Mary used her slender, beautifully-manicured fingernails 
to tap on the table and gain my attention. 
b. Mary gained my attention by tapping on the table with her 
slender, beautifully-manicured fingernails. 
(30) Let's play a game of 'Everyone touch his nose with something 
different'. 
Fred used his knee to touch his nose, Mary used her toes to 
touch her nose, .... 
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In summary, sentences of the form (2)a and (2)b are not synonymous 
across a range of contexts. The use NP to construction permits a wider 
range of objects that does with, and it asserts a different level of 
intentionality and a different relation between object and agent than the 
with construction. Conversely, the with construction, although more 
restricted as to the objects of with, is itself(contrast the verbs that 
might occur in the construction) neutral with respect to the agent's 
purpose. It can therefore be used to describe a much wider range of 
instrumental situations. 
5.24 The 'Ambiguity' of With 
The second new thrust in Lakoff's paper bears on the characterisation 
of instrumental sentences as purposive and intentional. While Fillmore 
had included use NP to sentences in his discussion of instrumental sentences, 
and had often linked instrumental sentences with agency, intentionality had 
not arisen explicitly before as a criterion for instrumental sentences. 
In my discussion of Lakoff's characterisation below, I argue that with 
is not ambiguous and that instrumental with sentences are not uniquely 
intentional in the sense in which Lakoff suggests. 
Lakoff's position concerning with is as follows. He assumes that the 
with of structure (2)a represents the with of the instrumental adverbial 
rather than any of what he terms the other occurrences of with, as found 
for example in the following sentences: 
( 31) a. Seymour sliced the salami with Sheila. 
b. Seymour sliced the salami with enthusiasm. 
C • Seymour sliced the salami with no trouble. 
Another sense of with which Lakoff says seems closely related to the 
instrumental with is found in the following sentences: 
( 32) a. I cut my finger with a knife. 
b. I broke the window with a bat. 
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Lakoff claims that these sentences are ambiguous between an instrumental 
sense, "which assumes a purposive action", paraphrased as 'I used a knife 
to cut my finger' and 'I used a bat to break the window', and an accidental 
sense, as in 'I cut my finger on a knife' or 'I broke the window while I 
. b ( • th • • ) I 4 was using a at in some o er activity . Lakoff then says that he will 
be concerned only with the purposive, instrumental sense of these sentences. 
There are two questions for examination here. First, are these 
sentences ambiguous, or merely vague? Sec ond, is the instrumental notion 
confined only to sentences which are purposive and intentional in the way 
Lakoff describes? 
To approach the first question, consider the following sentences: 
(35) a. I cut my finger. 
b. I broke the window. 
Notice that these sentences without with phrases are as susceptible as the 
sentences of (32) of having both intentional and accidental senses. This 
being so, it cannot be maintained that the ambiguity resides in with, i.e. 
that there is a purposive, intentional with and an accidental with. What-
ever ambiguities, nuances or instances of non-determination are present in 
these sentences should, it seems, be attributed to their respective verbs 
(e.g. to their aspect or meanings 5 ) rather than to with. 
But if these different senses are to be attributed to the verbs, are 
the verbs thereby ambiguous? That is, are there two verbs cut, and two 
verbs break, one intentional and one accidental? Such a conclusion seems 
counter-intuitive. These sentences seem to illustrate instances not of 
ambiguity but of vagueness or indeterminacy, which the provision of a 
linguistic or extra-linguistic context would render unproblematic. 
But even if we decide that with is not ambiguous, must instrumental 
sentences be purposive and intentional, or can they include so-called 
'accidental' senses? I argue below that while instrumental sentences 
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involve some 'volitional' (interpreted broadly) involvement on the part of 
the agent, accidental senses are not thereby automatically excluded. 
Seeking thus to release instrumental sentences from any blanket implication 
of intentionality, I would claim that sentences (32)a-b are instrumental 
whether their senses be accidental or intentional. 
My justification for this point of view rests on three matters, which 
will be discussed in the remainder of this section. These matters relate 
respectively to: the relation between accidental and agentive; the 
invalidity of appealing to any use NP to paraphrase; and a reconsideration 
of the eight contexts from which Lakoff argues that an accidental sense is 
grammatically and semantically excluded. 
The first reason is that instrumental sentences are agentive sentences 
(Lakoff at least does not propose any non-agentive instrumental sentences), 
and agentive sentences can be accidental in sense. As we have seen in 1.52, 
in agentive sentences(i.e. where someone does something) there is always 
something that the agent "wants" and in response to which "want" parts of 
his body move. Now in sentences such as those of (32) and (33) the nature 
of this "want",and whether or not the agent's action achieves what is wanted, 
is lexically concealed. The fact that many sentences of the form (2)a are 
in themselves plainly indeterminate with respect to whether they are 
accidental or purposive (or neither?) leads me to suggest that such sent-
ences are instrumental firat(because some speaker so frames them), and 
accidental or purposive later if at all(depending on the available context~. 
Lakoff, it will be noted, would reverse the sequence. 
Certain adverbs typically reveal whether what happens accords with 
what the agent intended, e.g. 
(34) a. I accidentally cut my finger with a knife. 
b. I deliberately broke the window with a bat. 
In (34)b what happened was in accord with what I wanted, whereas in (34)a 
what happened was not what I wanted, i.e. I wanted something other than to 
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cut my finger(unless knife is heavily stressed), but actually cut my finger. 
Thus sentence (34)a is both 'volitional' and accidental: volitional in that 
I wanted something and acted, and accidental in that what occurred was not 
what I wanted. 
In short, instrumental sentences are not invariably non-accidental in 
sense. Being sentences about action, in which things can 'go wrong', the 
action or activity described may vary totally from what the agent intended 
in acting initially. And although the speaker's perception may influence 
the form in which such situations are expressed(e.g. perhaps an avoidance 
of the use NP to construction, but see 5.25), the sentences are no less 
instrumental sentences. They always remain sentences about someone doing 
something with some object. 
Secondly, one objection against extending instrumental sentences to 
P..mbrace an accidental sense as well might be that the accidental interpret-
ation cannot be paraphrased using the form use NP to, which Lakoff implies 
is exclusively purposive in sense. Accidental sentences of form (2)a, it 
seems, do not paraphrase synonymously with sentences of form (2)b. Thus: 
(35) a. John accidentally snapped the tomato plant with the 
secateurs. 
b. *John used the secateurs to accidentally snap the tomato 
plant. 
(36) a. John accidentally knocked the child over with the wheelbarrow. 
b. *John used the wheelbarrow to accidentally knock the child 
over. 
But the non-occurrence of the b sentences above does not in itself establish 
that instrumental sentences exclude accidental senses; only that these 
particular a sentences have no acceptable paraphrases in structure (2)b. 
The objection is considerably weakened by two facts: first, as we have 
seen in 5.23, some of the non-accidental instrumental sentences do not 
paraphrase adequately into the use NP to form; and second, as I reveal in 
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5.25, the use NP to form does permit some accidental instrumental 
sentences. 
Finally, Lakoff presents eight grammatical contexts from which he 
claims the accidental senses of (32) are excluded. Relying on deep 
structure condition (2) he concludes that ''there are different deep 
structures underlying the accidental and purposive senses"(l0). He also 
considers that the accidental sense is unquestionably semantically imposs-
ible in these eight contexts. 
While agreeing that accidental and purposive senses will have different 
semantic representations if these senses are manifested in the sentences 
themselves, I argue below that the accidental sense is both semantically 
and grammatically(using La.koff's terminology) possible in some of these 
eight contexts. In addition, I claim that these accidental sentences a.re 
interpretable instrumentally, although 'accidental', as previously explained, 
implies not an absence of any volition, but the non-correspondence of what 
happens with what the agent wanted in acting. 
First, Lakoff claims that the accidental sense cannot occur in the 
progressive. Examples in which an accidental or non-intentional sense are 
possible are the following: 
(37) a. Temporarily distracted, the butcher was cutting the 
customer's handbag with his knife. 
b. Although I didn't know it, I was accidentally cutting 
my shirt with the scissors. 
Second, Lakoff claims that the accidental sense cannot occur with only 
modifying the object of with. The sentences below appear to invalidate 
this claim. 
(38) a. The marksman accidentally killed three people with only 
one shot. 
b. On waking in hospital, I learned that I had accidentally 
severed a limb with only a blunt pocket knife. 
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Third, Lakoff claims that the accidental sense cannot occur if without 
is substituted for with. Two comments can be made about this claim. First, 
it seems irrelevant to establishing that with has two senses. The substitu-
tion simply converts an instrumental sentence into one with no overt 
instrumental expression. Notwithstanding, such sentences can be interpreted 
as having an accidental sense, if an appropriate context is found. Thus 
Weydt(1973,572) suggests that (39)a below could occur with either sense as 
. 
an answer to a question whether I had cut my finger with a big knife or a 
small knife. 
(39) a. I cut my finger without a knife. 
b. The infant accidentally started the car without keys. 
Fourthly, Lakoff claims that the accidental sense cannot occur in the 
imperative. This claim seems impregnable. As Kooij says: "One does not 
command the involuntary result of an activity."(1971,84) Notice, however, 
that one can warn someone against the involuntary result of an activity. 
For example: 
(40) Don't cut yourself accidentally with the razor blade. 
Some sentences which appear to be imperatives allowing either sense, 
however, turn out to be elliptical if-clauses of conditional sentences. 
Examples include: 
(41) a. Break your windscreen accidentally with anything, and this 
insurance company will replace it free of charge. 
b. Puncture this tire with anything, and our magic fluid 
automatically seals the hole. 
Fifthly, Lakoff says that the accidental sense cannot occur with the 
modal can. It is not clear to me, however, that sentences such as (42)a-b 
are obviously either intentional or accidental. 
(42) a. I can cut my finger with a knife. 
b. I can break the window with a bat. 
Rather I think that they are neutral with respect to any assertion about 
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this distinction. What they do assert is that I am able to do something, 
but without specifying whether I intend to do this something. Thus an 
assertion that I am able to break one inch thick plate glass with my fist 
carries no entailment that if I actually do this, my action would have 
been intentional. Sentences (43)a-d below similarly seem neutral on this 
issue. 
(43) a. With these skates, I can go faster than anyone else. 
b. (John's the clumsiest person.) He can break anything 
with his huge hands. 
c. I can cause a lot of damage with this weapon. 
d. A mountaineer can cause an avalanche with a sneeze. 
Sixth, Lakoff claims that the accidental sense cannot occur with for 
phrases. This would seem to be undeniable; since for phrases supply the 
purpose for which the agent did something, to say that he did something 
accidentally for some purpose is to assert a semantic contradiction. The 
following sentence, however, is interesting. 
(44) I cut my finger with a knife for no reason at all. 
(It was an accident.) 
This sentence, which denies that the cutting was do~e on purpose, might 
occur as an indignant denial to someone who proposed that I had cut my 
finger deliberately for some purpose or another. In this case, the denial 
of any reason paradoxically qualifies as a reason itself. 
Next, Lakoff says that the accidental sense cannot occur with such 
adverbs as carefully, easily and successfully. Note first, as Weydt(573) 
suggests, that there is a sense in which (45) below can be interpreted as 
intentional or accidental. 
(45) I easily knocked the vase off the table with my elbow. 
More importantly, however, the line of argument followed here seems 
dubious. Thus Kooij(1971,84) considers that some adverbs will naturally 
strengthen an intentional interpretation(e.g. intentionally, deliberately, 
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on purpose), others will strengthen an accidental or unintentional inter-
pretation(e.g. accidentally, inadvertently, unintentionally) while others 
still will contribute nothing to distinguishing between the two senses(e.g. 
foolishly, undeniably, irresponsibly). What remains clear is that the 
sentences themselves continue as instrumental sentences regardless of the 
particular adverbs chosen to sway their interpretation. 
Finally, Lakoff claims that the accidental sense cannot occur in a 
sentence embedded as a complement of verbs like force, try and begin. I 
do not think the constraint is as simple as Lakoff suggests. First, con-
sider the verb force. This seems to have the effect of neutralising the 
intentional/accidental distinction in an embedded sentence. In the follow-
ing therefore: 
(46) Ethelbert forced me to cut my finger with a knife. 
it seems equally unacceptable to assert either that I cut my finger 
intentionally or that I did it accidentally. In a situation in which one 
has no choice, it makes little sense to say that one acts either intention-
ally or accidentally. One just acts. That is, the most one can say about 
my 'volition' in the lower sentence is that I wanted something and that 
part of my body moved because of that. 
A different situation holds with the verbs try and begin. Because of 
the subject identity between the matrix and embedded sentences, the verbs 
do not automatically suspend the intentional/accidental distinction in the 
lower sentence. Rather the nature of th~ agent's volitional involvement in 
the top sentence flows through to the lower sentence as well. Although I 
cannot find examples in which an accidental sense occurs, there are 
sentences describing action which is neither intended nor accidental. 
Consider the following sentences. 
(47) a. Before I knew it, I was trying to squash the deadly ant 
with my shoe. 
b. After only five minutes at the dentist's, I realised that 
I was beginning to break my skin with my fingernails. 
199 
In such sentences in which one finds oneself instinctively doing something, 
the action is neither intentional(in the sense of consciously or delib-
erately intended), nor is it accidental(in the sense of an unwanted con-
sequence of something else I was doing). Such instinctive action can be 
described as "wanted", however, in the sense in which "wanting" initiates 
and underlies all bodily action. 
5.25 The Different Senses of Use 
Having eliminated from consideration several senses of with, to build 
up his case for the synonymy of sentences (l)a-b and the structures of (2), 
Lakoff proceeds to distinguish several senses of the verb use and to dis-
card all but what he terms the instrumental sense. 
In my treatment of his discussion, I suggest that the four senses are 
not as distinct as is claimed, and the use NP to construction, far from 
being the paradigm of an instrumental (purposive) sentence, can be employed 
for the description of accidental type instrumental sentences just as can 
the with NP construction. 
Lakoff distinguishes the following four senses, which he says have 
different grammatical properties and therefore, according to deep structure 
condition (II) involve different deep structures. 6 
(a) The generic~, which has a non-animate subject, a generic interpret-
ation and never occurs indicating a specific action. Examples are: 
(48) a. Skates use ball-bearings to cut down on friction. 
b. *At 4 o'clock skates used ball-bearings to cut down on 
friction. 
(49) a. The Volkswagen uses disk brakes to provide adequate 
stopping power. 
b. *Three times this morning the Volkswagen used disk brakes 
to provide adequate stopping power. 
(b) The 'use up' sense of~' which can be paraphrased as use up but 
which cannot take duration adverbials. Lakoff's examples are: 
(SO) a. Angela used a can of clam sauce to make the lasagna. 
b. Angela used up a can of clam sauce in making the lasagna. 
c. *Angela used a pint of clam sauce for two hours to make 
the lasagna. 
(51) a. The contractor used 1000 tons of concrete to build the 
library. 
b. The contractor used up 1000 tons of concrete in building 
the library. 
c. *The contractor used 1000 tons of concrete for six months 
to build the library. 
(c) The instrumental use, which takes animate subjects, time adverbials 
indicating specific action and duration, and is not paraphrasable as 
use up. 
(52) a. At four o'clock I used a ball-bearing to break a window. 
b. The contractor used a crane for six months to build the 
library. 
c. *The contractor used up a crane to build the library. 
(d) The 'use in order to' sense of use NP to. Lakoff claims that the 
to of (53)a is ambiguous between the instrumental sense in (53)b and the 
'use in order to' sense in (53)c. 
( 53) a. The marquis used the knife to please his mother. 
b. The marquis used the knife in pleasing his mother. 
c. The marquis used the knife in order to please his mother. 
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The differences Lakoff mentions here are that (53) b but not (53)c entails 
that the marquis succeeded in pleasing his mother: 
(54) a. *The marquis used the knife in pleasing his mother, but he 
nevertheless failed to please her. 
b. The marquis used the knife in order to please his mother, 
but he nevertheless failed to please her. 
that only in the 'use in order to' sense can the infinitival phrase be 
preposed: 
(55) a. ?In pleasing his mother, the marquis used the knife. 
b. To please his mother, the marquis used the knife. 
and, lastly, that the two infinitival phrases can be used in the same 
sentence. 
(56) The marquis used the knife to butter the brioche to please 
his mother. 
201 
The following comments suggest that the senses are less distinct than 
Lakoff claims. First, the generic sense is not confined to non-animate 
subjects, as the following sentences, versions of (48)a and (50)a respect-
ively, illustrate. 
(57) Good designers use ball-bearings to cut down on friction. 
(58) European manufacturers use disk brakes to provide adequate 
stopping power. 
Next, as Weydt suggests(575) the failure of the generic sense to occur 
with 'specific actions' is a phenomenon which is "general and quite 
independent of the lexical content of use." Thus: 
(59) a. Smoking causes cancer. 
b. *Every other Thursday smoking causes cancer. 
(60) a. Washington is in the United States. 
b. *At four o'clock Washington is in the United States. 
(61) a. Elephants have trunks. 
b. *Three times this morning elephants have trunks. 
Next, some sentences with the so-called use up sense occur acceptably 
with structure (2)a. 
(62) a. John used seven trailer-loads of cement to concrete the patio. 
b. John concreted the patio with seven trailer-loads of cement. 
Finally, in excluding the 'use in order to' sense, Lakoff substan-
tially weakens his point about the purposiveness of instrumental sentences. 
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Firstly, it is frequently difficult to tell which sense is intended, 
the 'use in order to' sense or the instrumental sense, e.g. which sense or 
senses do the following represent? 
(63) a. John used my new electric toothbrush to clean his teeth 
tonight. 
b. To clean his teeth tonight, John used my new electric 
toothbrush. 
(64) a. Mary used her softest silk-net to catch the dazzling 
butterfly. 
b. To catch the dazzling butterfly, Mary used her softest 
silk-net. 
Most telling of all, is that the instrumental sense of to which Lakoff 
paraphrases as (53)b permits the accidental senses of the following 
sentences. By ruling out the 'in order to' sense Lakoff thus subtracts 
one of the principal supports for his claim for the synonymy of sentences 
of the structures of (2). If some of the sentences of structure (2)b can 
thus be accidental in sense, so can many of the (2)a sentences which Lakoff 
would say are not instrumental because they contain the accidental sense of 
with. 
(65) a. I accidentally stirred my coffee with the biro. 
b. I accidentally used the biro to stir my coffee. 
(66) a. John accidentally cleaned his teeth with my toothbrush. 
b. John accidentally used my toothbrush to clean his teeth. 
Also note that although Lakoff claims that the two infinitival phrases 
can occur in the same sentence, thereby stressing their semantic 
difference(?), it is surely not insignificant that the phrases can also be 
conjoined, which would suggest their semantic similarity. 
(67) a. The marquis used the knife to butter the brioche and 
please his mother. 
b. Mary used the tweezers to remove the splinter and stop the 
pain. 
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c. John used an enormous crowbar to raise the fallen beam 
and free his leg. 
We may even find both infinitival phrases preposed, as in: 
(68) To raise the fallen beam and (thus) free his leg, John 
used an enormous crowbar. 
5.3 Langendoen 
In two major works Langendoen has made proposals concerning the 
syntactic and semantic representation of instrumental sentences. The first 
of these(l969), which suggests a new semantic representation for instru-
mental sentences, contains a theoretical model based on Fillmore's case 
grammar but with abstract predicates after the manner of Lakoff's thesis 
(1970a). Relevant features of this work are outlined and discussed below. 
The second work(l970) eliminates these abstract predicates and is thus the 
more dependent on a case grammar framework. With less formalisation and 
more pedagogically oriented refinement, this later work tenders no new 
insights into the representation of instrumental sentences. 7 
5.31 An Abstract Instrumental Predicate 
This work is interesting historically in that the influence of three 
competing theories find representation in its grammar. Thus while a 
Chomskyan standard theory underlies the syntactic and semantic discussion 
in Chapters Three to Five, a case grammar approach replaces it in the model 
sketched in Chapter Six, with abstract predicates like those proposed in 
Lakoff's modification of the standard theory being plugged in to the deep 
structure configurations of this chapter. It is on account of its treat-
ment of abstract predicates that this work has been placed in this chapter. 
Following Lakoff's postulation of abstract causative and inchoative 
verbs, Langendoen assumes the existence, inter alia, of an abstract instru-
mental predicate. This he defines as: 
"A predicate which, like the causative, asserts that a state of 
affairs is brought about. It also contains an argument which 
specifies the instrument by which it is brought about. 11 (1969,151) 
As an example he discusses the sentence 
(69) The carpenter struck the nail with the hammer. 
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For this sentence, in which Langendoen says the verb strike is being used 
instrumentally(rather begging the question), Langendoen suggests the follow-

















by the on the nail 
carpenter 
In this representation the abstract instrumental predicate is marked by 
'Instrumental', and with the hanuner signifies what Langendoen calls the 
instrumental NP argument. As for the operation of transformations on (70), 
he says(l06): 
"After application of the subjectivalization transformation, the 
predicate strike is substituted for the abstract predicate, and 
attracts to it the locative argument on the nail. Now, since the 
preposition on follows the verb, it is deleted, whereas with is 
retained." 
The following sections discuss several features of Langendoen's proposal. 
5.32 Definition of Instrumental 
Langendoen's definition of the meaning of the abstract instrumental 
predicate is inadequate to the extent that it contains no reference to any 
entailed agent(perhaps "brought about by s omeone"?), and it tautologically 
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refers to itself in using the term 'instrument'. The former omission is 
rectified in the 1970 proposal where Langendoen suggests that 1instrument-
like1 expressions in sentences without any understood agent should be 
designated as 'Cause' case role rather than Instrument. 
Because of these inadequacies the definition tells us little about the 
meaning of this predicate: we are told that it is like the causative predi-
cate in that it asserts that a state of affairs is brought about, and it 
contains an argument which tautologously specifies the instrument (i.e., 
presumably, something realising itself). On the face of it, Langendoen's 
account seems to suggest that the instrumental predicate could be eliminat-
ed and its role carried out by his abstract causative predicate, which 
could be permitted to have an optional instrumental argument in addition 
to the agent and result arguments which Langendoen proposes for it(1969, 
105). 
5.33 Redundancy in Langendoen's Deep Structure Representation 
The instrumental function seems to be marked redundantly in the top-
most sentence of (70), once by the abstract instrumental predicate and once 
by the Instrument case role with its preposition with. While redundancy 
may characterise language as it is uaed , it is generally avoided in 
semantic representations. If the predicate simply adds an extra dimension 
of 'instrumentality' to strike it should not be necessary to signal instru-
mentality by the case role as well; on the other hand, if the Instrument 
case signifies that the hammer is being used instrumentally, one doubts 
that anything is added by cementing the abstract predicate on to the verb 
strike. 
Interpreted strictly, however, Langendoen's formulation makes two 
separate claims about instrumentality: first, that instrumentality is 
something that can be fused on to the meaning of a verb("the verb strike 
is being used instrumentally"(l06)), and that it is something that can be 
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formulated as a case role(or argument) and realised adverbially. The first 
claim does not seem wholly intelligible to me, I confess. 
Formulated thus, Langendoen's proposed deep structure invites 
questions as to the semantic relationship between the abstract predicate 
and the Instrument case role. Can one be reduced to the other, for 
example, or are they equally 'primitive'? Langendoen does not address him-
self to these questions. 
5.34 Other Instrumental Sentences 
A further problem emerges from the representation which Langendoen 
proposes for the sentence 











The transformations proposed here are: 
NP 
s 
P NP NP 
LL6 
to strike by the 
carpenter 
on the nail 
"The subjectivalization transformation, the infinitival clause and 
reflexive pronoun deletion transformation, and a transformation to 
delete with following the verb use"(l969,l06). 
There are two points at issue here. First, it seems logically incon-
sistent to attribute instrumentality to the verb strike in (70) but to 
deny it to strike in (72). If the verb strike is somehow being used 
instrumentally in (70), as Langendoen asserts, then it is surely so 
conceived in (72) also. 
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Secondly, the analysis for (72) implicitly denies any relationship 
between use and the abstract instrumental predicate. Although it has been 
widely accepted that sentences of the form of (71) are transparently 
8 instrumental in sense, Langendoen does not say whether the verb use is a 
realisation of the abstract instrumental predicate. Further, as I have 
pointed out in 5.23, there are differences in meaning between sentences 
having the forms (69) and (71) respectively. Langendoen's analysis provides 
little semantic motivation, however, either for their differences or their 
similarities. 
5.35 Relationships Between Abstract Predicates 
One view of Langendoen's abstract instrumental predicate is that it is 
an attempt to realise the deeper structure which Lakoff(l968) conjectured 
underlay instrumental sentences, and to do this in a manner analogous with 
Lakoff's(l970a) abstract causative and inchoative verbs. But while Lakoff's 
abstract predicates and others in generative semantics are described as in 
some way semantically primitive(e.g. Lakoff 1970a,105), Langendoen does not 
comment on the relative primitiveness of these three abstract verbs. Are 
there, in fact, any relationships between the semantic notions represented 
by these predicates? 
Although many formulations of instrumental sentences imply that a 
causal notion is an essential part of the meaning of an instrumental 
sentence(e.g. Fillmore 1968a, Green 1972, · Nilsen 1973), this seems too 
strong for a sentence such as the following. 
(73) Mary touched the window with a finger. 
If causation is involved here, what is it that Mary does and what is it 
that is caused by her action? 
If causation is not an obligatory s emantic notion within the cluster 
of notions making up what is called ins trumental, however, it appears that 
the inchoative notion, or better "becoming", is such an obligatory notion. 
This follows from the fact that all the instrumental sentences of the 
thesis describe some physical action, i.e. something observable which 
someone does, either moving or preventing movement(von Wright's(l968) 
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'preventive action'). Since movement has been represented in terms of the 
notion "becoming"(see 2.24), instrumental sentences of the sort discussed 
in the thesis necessarily entail this "becoming" element. 
5. 4 Mccawley 
In McCawley(l97lb) semantic structures are proposed for sentences 
containing verbs(such as hanuner, saw, nail, glue, etc.) which make refer-
ence to means and instruments. Although most of this paper's comments on 
instrumentals are relevant to Chapter Seven, McCawley's proposal for a 
semantic predicate 'BY' and a prelexical 'means-incorporation' transform-
ation warrant brief treatment here. 
5.41 The Semantic Predicate BY 
In a speculative final section to his paper Mccawley proposes the 









He hammered the dent out of the fender . 
NP NP NP 
I I ~ 








V NP NP 
I ~ ~ 
IN the dent the fender 
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Amongst the transformations which Mccawley says operate on this structure 
are those of predicate-raising, which combines CAUSE with BY, and his 
suggested new transformation 'Means-incorporation', which replaces BY-CAUSE 
with the verb HAMMER of s4 . 
In several respects McCawley's proposal is similar to that of 
Langendoen's. Both proposals _postulate a semantic predicate which is 
attached to a verb(HAMMER and strike respectively) and which does not 
appear to play any part in overt instrumental phrases. 
5.42 The Motivation for BY 
One reason why BY is not well motivated semantically resides in 
McCawley's own formulation of causal relations. In a footnote to this paper 
he claims that the notion of 'causing' which is relevant here is a relation 
between two events. In the semantic structure (75), however, the causal 
relation is between he and an event. That is, the relation is of the 
following characterisation: he CAUSE (the dent BECOME NOT IN the fender). 
If the causal relations were to be represented as the note suggests, with 
an activity and a resultant change of state, there would appear no need for 
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IN the dent the fender 
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Geis has argued tha t ~-phrase£3 should not be generated in the base 
structure but should be i ntroduced transformationally. Thus Dowty(l972b) 
presents arguments from Vendler and Geis concerning the semantic ellipsis 
of accomplishment sentences with non- sentential subjects and wi t hout 
eY-phrases. Taking Vendler's examp l e (1967,164), the semantic ally ellip-
tical (77)a below can be paraphrased in such a way as to remove this 
ellipsis, e.g. either as (77)b or (77)c. 
(77) a. John caused the distur bance. 
b. John c aused the dis tu r banc e by doing some thing. 
c. John's doing something caused the disturbance. 
Dowty suggests that if causal relations a re analysed in the subject-
complement way (as in (76) above), then (77)c would be the underlying 
structure, with (77)b derived trans forma tionally by the independently 
required rules of raising and £Y.-phrase creation. Optional del e tion of the 
.ey_-phras e would produce (77)a, in the same way as optional delet i o n r emoves 
the Agent ~ - phrase in passive sentences. 
Dowty(l972b,96) presents further arguments from Geis that if ey-
phrases are generated in the base(as McCawley's analysis proposes), ad hoc 
restrict ions will be needed. Suc h r e s t rictions would be unneces sary given 
C ~ a transformational derivation. For ex a mp le, Geis claims that e_y- phrases 
0 
~ ~ of the sort discussed are restricted i n that they never occur with non-
N 
0 





(78) a. *Jennifer seems to d i s l i k e Alice by laughing at h e r. 
b. *Jerrold believed that the earth was round by sailing 
a r ound it. 
With a base-generated :ey_-phrase, it would be additionally neces s ary to 
ensure that that £Y.-phrase did not occur where there was a sur face 
gerundive s ubject, as in: 
(79) *John's teasing Mar sha mad e her mad by kissing Jul ia. 
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Finally, Dowty asks for the semantic force of BY. Although it appears 
rather like a causative predicate, the way the semantic structure (75) is 
drawn the causing event is the formal object, while the caused event is the 
subject. 
5.43 No Overt Instruments 
None of the sentences for which Mccawley presents representations 
contains any overt surface structure instrumental phrase. It is therefore 
impossible to tell whether the predicate BY would be drawn upon in account-
ing for the semantic structure of sentences such as the following: 
(80) a. He hit the fender with the harmner. 
b. She cut the timber with a saw. 
or even whether it would have some additional semantic function in the 
following expansion of sentence (74), viz.: 
(81) He hammered the dent out of the fender with a brick. 
But it would not seem impossible to further complicate the semantic 
structure of (74) to include another semantic predicate(perhaps USE or 
WITH?) and arguments he and a brick. It remains unclear, however, whether 
an additional sentence of this nature should be inserted higher than s
2
, 
after Lakoff(1968;1970a), or below s 2 , as many have suggested(Chomsky 1969, 
194; Kooij 1971,78). Various proposals have been suggested for the meaning 
of the verb hammer(e.g. Lambert 1969,48). Whether the concept of the object 
'hammer' is itself part of the meaning of the verb hammer or not, the fact 
that some instrument is included in its meaning(e.g. 'strike repeatedly 
with something') would seem to support the latter position within any 
generative semantics structure. 
5.5 Dowty 
In two works(l972a,1972b), Dowty has presented proposals for semantic 
representations which have implications for the meanings of instrumental 
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sentences. His analyses of four different types of sentence are discussed 
below. 
5.51 Instrumental (Non-agentive) Causatives 
Dowty(l972b,112) provides a semantic structure for the following 
sentences, which he says are called 'instrumental causative' sentences. 
(82) a. The alarm clock's going off waked John up. 
b. The tree killed John by falling on him. 
c. The wind destroyed my garden by blowing the fence 
down on it. 




I I I 
CAUSE ~ 
V NP V 
I I I 
COME ABOUT ~ COME ABOUT 
X 
The derivation of sentences (82)a-c is said to occur in the following 
general way. The subject x of the stative in s
4 
is lifted into s
2 
by the 
raising transformation, then moved by the same transformation up into s
1 
in a later cycle. By a transformation of V-NP inversion, it then becomes 
the surface subject. 
While I disagree that the term 'instrumental' is an appropriate one 
for these sentences, on the grounds that the term instrumental entails 
agency while these sentences are explicitly labelled 'non-agentive', 
Dowty's formulation is fruitful. It directly encapsulates the notion of 
cause as a relation between two events, rather than leaving any causal 
ellipsis unexplicated. Allowing for differences in theory and terminology, 
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his analysis is similar in many respects to the partial representation 
which I proposed in 1.51 for the sentence A stone broke the window, viz., 
(84) = Something happened to the window 
because something happened to the stone. 
5.52 Basic Actions 
Dowty also addresses himself to the question of whether: 
"the will is the ultimate cause of all outward manifestations of 
human voluntary behaviour (Descartes' position), or whether there 
exist what some philosophers have called "basic actions" (cf. von 
Wright, 1971, p.68) for which there is no cause." (1972b,119) 
Dowty examines this question in relation to the linguistic analysis of 
sentences such as the following: 
(85) a. John opened his eyes. 
b. John raised his left hand. 
These sentences he says are clearly accomplishment sentences(see 1.52), 
being agentive and also involving a change of state. 
But what is the activity which the subject performed that caused these 
changes to come about? While Descartes claims that the causal activities 
are the invisible acts of the will, Dowty follows the view that there are 
basic actions "which are intentional yet have no causal activity"(l20). 
He suggests that one way of translating into linguistic structure sentences 
describing such basic actions is the following. 
(86) s 
V NP NP 
DO X s 
V NP 




A number of comments will be made in relation to Dowty's approach and 
structure here. First, a point of agreement and one of divergence. As 
explained in Chapter One(especially 1.51 and 1.53), the thesis adopts the 
view that in semantic representations for basic action sentences there can 
be no causal relation mediating between what an agent "wants" and the 
bodily movement that results. This is consistent with the approach Dowty 
takes and the lack of a causal predicate in structure (86). Our accounts 
diverge, however, in that I propose(see 5.53) that the semantic represent-
ation for basic action underlies all physical action sentences. This is 
not the case with Dowty's proposals(e.g. 1972b,121). 
Second, the structure itself suggests that DO is not the right word 
for the semantic predicate required here, for what (86) seems to say is 
that the agent did something: something came about. But the suggestion 
that there is some 'doing' prior to what happens is precisely what Dowty 
seeks to avoid. For what is it that the agent did, and how does it differ 
from what came about? As far as sentences (85)a-b are concerned, all that 
John does is open his eyes, and raise his left hand, respectively. 
Further, as I have pointed out already(l.52), the semantic predicate 
DO is interpreted and employed by Dowty and Ross as a verb of intention. 
But intention is too strong a concept for basic actions, for we surely do 
not intend everything 'basic' we do. Whether John intends to open his eyes 
and does so, or merely opens his eyes, he has still done something, he has 
still acted. Having developed in 2.23 some differences between the verbs 
intend and want, I simply repeat here my proposal that "want" is a more 
appropriate semantic element than one of intention for the minimum 
essential volitional component of action sentences. 
Finally, Dowty says that one objection against (86) is the sentence: 
(87) John tried to open his eyes, but he couldn't do it. 
This, he says, implies that the subject somehow did something, although 
what he did was insufficient to bring about the intended result. I think 
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that this objection is mistaken. Sentence (87) does not imply that John 
did something more basic than a basic action, but rather that in trying to 
open his eyes, John did something, in particular, something by which the 
speaker could assert the sentence itself. (cf. Davidson 1971,24: "Trying 
to do one thing may be simply doing another.") 
Such actions might be manifested for example in a screwed up face, a 
wrinkled brow, flickering eyelids -or straining neck muscles. Nor is 
'physically less' equivalent to a more basic action. Thus the sentence: 
(88) John tried to open his eyes, but he could only move his 
eyelids a fraction. 
does not constitute evidence of a more basic action, just as moving my 
finger half an inch is not a more basic action than moving it six inches. 
This follows from the fact that my moving my finger half an inch is not 
causally related to my finger's moving an additional five and a half inches. 
Note that if, when John is supposed to be trying to open his eyes, the 
speaker discerns no movement indicative of any attempt, sentence (87} would 
not be used, for contrary to the speaker's perception it commits the 
speaker to the belief that John haB tried to open his eyes. Instead the 
speaker would prefer the non- committal form: 
(89) John said that he tried to open his eyes, but he couldn't do it. 
5.53 Intentional and Non-Intentional Causation 
Finally, Dowty presents two structures which he suggests account for 
the semantic differences between sentenc es describing acts where the agent 
wilfully brought about a certain result, and acts where an agent's act 
produced a certain result regardless of whether the agent intended this 
result or not (hence the term 'non-intentional' rather than 'un-
intentional'). Sentences which Dowty uses to illustrate these two situ-
ations are: 
(90) a. John made Mary leave the party by telling dirty jokes. 
b. John's telling dirty jokes made Mary leave the party. 
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The structures which he suggests will account respectively for these 
sentences are the following. 
(91) Intentional Causation 
DO X 
V NP NP 
I 
CAUSE 
V NP NP V NP 
I I 
DO X 6 COME ABOUT A 
X y 
{92) Non-intentional Causation 
V NP NP 
I I 
CAUSE 
V NP NP V NP 
I I I 
DO X COME ABOUT 6 
X y 
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The difference between these structures is that (91) contains a second 
DO sentence above s1 , which has the effect of bringing the COME ABOUT 
sentence (s 3 ) within the scope of this higher DO. What all this is meant 
to represent is the fact that the agent in (90)a intended that his action 
(telling dirty jokes) should result in the consequence mentioned(Mary's 
leaving). But structure (92), where the COME ABOUT sentence is not within 
the scope of any DO predicate, carries no such implication. All that John 
does intentionally according to the conventions for interpreting this 
structure is to tell some dirty jokes. 
Three points can be made in relation to the adequacy of these 
structures in accounting for the meanings of instrumental sentences such 
as the following. 
(93) a. John broke the window with the hammer 
b. John intentionally broke the window with the hammer. 
c. John accidentally broke the window with the hammer. 
First, as I demonstrate in 6.3, I am in agreement with Dowty that in 
semantic representations for sentences such as (93)b-c the volitional 
involvement of the agent must be referred to twice: once in relation to 
what he actually did (e.g. moved a hand which was supporting the hammer), 
and once in relation to whether the result of this movement (e.g. the 
broken window) was what John intended when he acted as he did. 
Second, as applied to a sentenc e such as (93)b, the two DOs of 
structure (91) come to stand for diffe r ent semantic concepts. One, the 
higher DO, represents intention; the lower DO represents that minimum 
"wanting" involved in all instances of someone doing something. Having 
already distinguished between intend and want(2.23), and having presented 
reasons why I consider that DO is not an appropriate term for either of 
their semantic representations(l.52), it remains here to point out that by 
serving two concepts DO misleadingly s ugge sts that the concepts are 
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identical. As I have suggested in 2.23, I consider that 11 want 11 is 
semantically less complex than and contained in the meaning of "intend". 
Lastly, consider the relation between the basic actions structure (86) 
which Dowty proposed and structures such as (91) and (92). Should the 
basic actions structure be incorporated into these latter structures? 
Although Dowty does not propose semantic structures for actual sentences 
such as (93)a-c, there is little to suggest that he would so incorporate 
the basic actions structure into the full representation. Davidson's 
corranents(l971,23) underline the seriousness of the question. 
"We must conclude, perhaps with a shock of surprise, that our 
primitive actions, the ones we do not do by doing something else, 
mere movements of the body - these are all the actions there are. 
We never do more than move our bodies: the rest is up to nature." 
The semantic representations proposed in the next chapter attempt to take 
account of this point, by incorporating such basic actions into the heart 
of representations of instrumental action sentences. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter several generative semantics proposals affecting the 
semantic representation of instrumental sentences have been broached. 
These proposals raise for the first time questions of the relation between 
an instrumental sentence and what it is the agent 11 wants 11 , and of the 
putative synonymy of instrumental sentences having the structures (2)a and 
(2)b respectively. The proposals also reveal several attempts, consistent 
with one momentum of generative semantics, to embody the instrumental 
notion as an abstract semantic predicate, and one attempt to formulate a 
representation for 'basic action' which I consider is suggestive in its 
implications for instrumental sentences in general. 
I have argued that instrumental sentences can be accidental in sense, 
that instrumental sentences of different forms are not necessarily 
synonymous, and that the representation for basic action should be 
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incorporated in the semantic representation of all instrumental action 
sentences. While syntactically instrumental sentences cover a range of 
forms, the question of the semantic representation of the instrumental 
notion remains an unresolved problem for the generative semantics approach. 
Neither Dowty nor Green(1972), for example, attempt its resolution, 
although it seems relevant to both their studies, particularly to Green's. 
If one postulates an instrumental semantic predicate, it will clearly be 
no semantic primitive, but rather an omnibus type predicate. On the other 
hand, for generative semanticists to put to one side the further semantic 
representation of instrumental sentences is to confine to limbo an 
important and interesting group of action sentences and to admit the 
resistance of instrumental sentences to semantic analysis within the 
generative semantics theory as currently developed. 
In the following chapters semantic representations of instrumental 
sentences within the theory outlined in Chapter Two will be presented. 
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NOTES ON CHAPTER FIVE 
1
A detailed study of the methodology of Lakoff's paper has been 
carried out by Botha(1970). Terming Lakoff's methodological approach 
'grammatical argumentation', Botha examines whether grammatical argu-
mentation is a valid method for confirming a hypothesis about structural 
descriptions for sentences. He concludes (Chapter Five) that the method 
is unsatisfactory for two reasons: some of the basic methodological 
principles underlying the argumentation are obscure; and many of the 
grammatical 'warrants' (i.e. that part of the argument which authorises 
an inference from a claim to data, and vice versa) are invalid, because 
so much of the general linguistic theory which determines the form of the 
warrants is itself under attack. 
2
Thus the unacceptability of the following sentences. 
(i) *The arctic explorer kissed his wife with blood-stained, 
frost-chafed ones. 
(ii) *Mary was breastfeeding her baby with her left one. 
(iii) *John squeegeed the window with a longhandled brass one. 
3
But notice the following exception, however. 
(i) Fred's using his tongue to lick the icecream! 
Such a sentence, with heavy emphasis on using his tongue, might be 
exclaimed in a situation in which for Fred to do anything with his tongue 
would be quite remarkable, e.g. if Fred had suffered from paralysis of 
the tongue. 
4 
Lakoff uses the sentence 
(i) I cut my finger on a knife. 
as a paraphrase of the accidental sense of the sentence 
(ii) I cut my finger with a ~nife. 
Sentence (i) is not a paradigm for an accidental sentence, however. 
In Chapter Eight I discuss this example pointing out some interesting 
aspectual differences between (i) and (ii). 
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5Thus Kooij(1971,81) considers that the possibility of an accidental 
interpretation largely depends on aspectual features expressed in the verb 
phrase and on lexical features of the verbs themselves. As far as aspect 
is concerned he notes that all of Lakoff's examples are in the past tense, 
and that the accidental interpretation is more naturally connected with a 
completed activity. Further sentences such as 
(i) He broke the vase. 
(ii) He painted the vase. 
provide a contrast in that while there is an accidental and a purposive 
interpretation of (i), it is more difficult to find an accidental inter-
pretation of (ii). Kooij considers (ii) cannot be interpreted accidentally, 
but as Weydt(l973,577) points out, it is often merely a matter of finding 
a suitable context. Thus consider a situation in which someone forgets 
to cover over a vase before spraypainting a room. 
6Lakoff actually separates out the last of the four senses discussed, 
viz., the infinitival to, and deals with .it singly, but I have conflated 
the senses here under the use NP to construction. 
7Although emphases worthy of mention are: the recognition of the 
semantic similarity of the Instrument case role and what Langendoen calls 
the 'Cause' case role(see 3.43 on the tendency for Fillmore's Instrumental 
case to be assimilated towards a pure c ausal notion); and the explicit 
intention(74) to confine the Instrumen t role to the characterisation of 
certain NPs in sentences where an agent is implicitly understood, with 
the Cause case role(there is no 'Force' case role suggested) being 
employed for these NPs in sentences with no understood agent. 
8 For example, Lakoff(l968,7-13) and Lambert(l969,101). 
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Chapter Six 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO INSTRUMENTAL SENTENCES 
6.1 General 
In the last three chapters a number of recent proposals for represent-
ing the meanings of instrumental sentences were presented and examined. Two 
principal conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, there is the 
realisation that a number of constituent notions enter into the meaning of 
instrumental sentences. These included that there is someone (or something) 
who doea something; that an element of "want" is involved in this "doing"; 
that there is always some object under the agent's control, which acts on 
something else, and sometimes but not always, brings about what the agent 
wants; and that some movement of the agent is always involved(or can be 
thought to be involved). 
Second, as a consequence of the above, is the recognition that the 
instrumental notion cannot itself represent an unanalysable semantic notion, 
but must be composed of a cluster of at least these notions. 
This chapter synthesises the views on instrumental sentences which I 
propounded in commenting on alternative proposals in the preceding chapters. 
The chapter has three major sections. Taking up the proposition that instru-
mental sentences involve an agent, section 6.2 provides semantic represent-
ations for various relevant sentences. The so-called 'Force' instrumental 
(cf. Nilsen 1973) receives discussion here. Section 6.3 deals with the 
intentionality of the agent. Sentences having the form use NP to receive 
treatment here, together with instrumental sentences containing adverbs of 
intentionality. Section 6.4 tackles the notion of the agent's control: it 
examines what is done, and how, looking at movement, contact, and chains of 
·causation. The section also discusses sentences representing three other 





A major standpoint of this study has been that an agent is entailed in 
the meaning of an instrumental sentence. While few if any of the writers 
reviewed in previous chapters would take exception to this claim, none has 
followed it consistently in semantic representations, including as instru-
mental sentences many with no entailed agent. 
To give effect to this claim, the semantic representation of an 
instrumental sentence must include a specification of someone who does 
something (or, see 6.21, of something which does something). That is, if 
an instrument is claimed to be present, the specification must substantiate 
it by revealing for whom something is an instrument. Hartnack(l972,20) 
refers to an instrument as something which "presupposes a purpose". Since 
purposes do not exist independent of animate beings, it is necessary to add 
in relation to instrumental sentences that this 'purpose' belongsto someone, 
and that some specification of this someone should appear in the sentences 
theinselves. 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate the agency entailment by 
presenting seinantic representations of sentences which have been called 
instrumental sentences. Discussion will focus on the following types of 
sentences: instrumental sentences of the with NP form and containing an 
overt agent(6.21); sentences said to contain implied agents(6.22); 
sentences with physical phenomena as subjects(6.23), and sentences with 
machines or self-operating devices represented in subject position(6.24). 
6.21 Agency in Instrumental Sentences with Explicit Agents 
Let us now examine the representation of agency in instrumental sent-
ences containing explicit agents. The semantic representations obtained 
for these sentences will provide a reference point for the subsequent 
examination of other putative instrumental sentences in later sections. 
This section itself falls into two major parts. The first part develops 
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the actual presentation of the sentences, particularly in tenns of employing 
the semantic primitive 11 say 11 in place of the term "happening". The second 
part discusses the representation of instrumental sentences with animate, 
non-human agents. 
Representing Instrumental Sentences 
Consider now the representation for an instrumental sentence with an 
overt agent, viz. 
(1) John touched the window with a twig. 
The semantic representation which I suggest for this is shown in (2) below. 
The representation is in two versions, one based on the representations 
found in 1.51 and 2.42(version A) and another which attempts to represent 
the sentence meaning more fully using semantically less complex terms 
(version B) . 
(2) John touched the window with a twig. 
A. = 
B. = 
Something happened to the window 
because something happened to the twig 
because something happened to John; 
John wanted something. 
Parts of his body which were in contact with the twig 
were moving; 
because of that the twig came into contact with the window. 
One can say something about the window 
because one can say something about the twig 
because one can say something about John; 
John wanted something . 
Parts of his body which could not be thought of as being 
closer to the twig 
were becoming a part of successive parts of that place; 
because of that the twig was becoming closer to the window 
until parts of the twig could not be thought of as being 
closer to the window. 
226 
First, several comments on details of this representation. The 
expression "his body"(John's body) could be further represented as "the 
something that is thought of as John". Next, neither "place", "successive", 
"until" nor "closer" is presented as a semantically primitive term. Each is, 
however, sufficiently basic for our purposes here. 1 They could be further 
decomposed, I suggest, using for the most part the terms "part", "world" and 
"becoming". A proposal for representing "until" in terms of "world" and 
"becoming" was suggested in 2.42. 
Which brings us to the meaning of "closer". The representation of 
touch rests here on the notion of things which could not be thought of as 
being closer. Whenever two things are touching(or in contact) I claim that 
there are always some parts at least of one object which cannot be thought 
to be closer to some parts of the other. It is irrelevant here that many 
parts of each object can be thought of as becoming closer to parts of the 
other. For touching to be asserted, there must be some parts of which it 
can be said that they could not be thought of as being closer. But what is 
"closer"? My present suggestion is that it should be based on the 
comparison implicit in Xis moving closer to Y between X's position at one 
moment and that at the next moment. Its meaning would be represented in 
terms of something moving through one position to get to another. 2 
Returning to the representation of agency in sentence (2), both 
versions clearly indicate the presence of an agent. Version A represents 
the agent in action in terms of "something happened to John: he wanted 
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something, parts of his body were moving". Version B, a suggestion for the 
decomposition of "happening" itself, is in terms of "one can say something 
about John: he wanted something, parts of his body were moving(becoming a 
part of successive parts of that place)". The following remarks explain 
the motivation for this substitution, which will be employed regularly from 
this point in the thesis. 
The "one can say" expression is derived from a suggestion by 
Wierzbicka that the term "sayable" should be used in relation to the repre-
sentation of "doing". I have argued elsewhere(1975) that because of its 
awkwardness and unnaturalness, the term "sayable" should be avoided; in its 
place I suggested the expression "one can say", this being an alternative 
which contains more transparently the two semantic primitives "say" and 
"someone". 
The crux of the suggestion here that "one can say" should replace 
"happening" is based on the hypothesis that "happening" is not a semantically 
primitive term but can be reduced to something like "one can say". The 
following partial representations show how this might be done for sentences 





Something happened to Fred. 
One can say something about Fred. 
Nothing happened to Fred. 
There is nothing one can say about Fred. 
In effect, it is suggested that an event is something about which someone 
can say something. Thus is something happens to Fred, there is something 
that can be said about him, and if nothing is happening to Fred, there is 
a sense in which there is nothing (new) that someone can say about him. 
There are a number of expressions that lend support to the hypothesis 
that "happen" can be represented in part by "one can say". Consider the 
following possible replies to the question 'What happened?'. 
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(5) a. Nothing to speak of. 
b. Nothing worth mentioning. 
c. Nothing worth commenting on. 
d. Nothing to write home about. 
All of the sentences above would, I suggest, have as part of their semantic 
representations, the term "say", perhaps in the expression "nothing I can 
say something about". 
Other terms which can relate events, happenings, actions, etc., to 
"say" are the following: mentionable, notable, worthy of comment, telling, 
observable. As far as the term remarkable goes, Searle{l970,144) makes a 
not unrelated point in a passage on the possibility of asserting various 
so-called 'standard' things{e.g. that 'I remember my own name'). The slogan 
which he employs to account for the assertion of certain standard things is 
'No remark without remarkableness'. He says "The assertion - for example, 
that I remember my own name - is just pointless unless the context warrants 
it in some way." In the same way we may say that an event provides a con-
text or situation with that which warrants an assertion. Put another way, 
an event is something 'remark-able' - something that someone can say 
something about. 
Events and happenings thus provide some sort of precondition for 
descriptions about objects. If nothing happens, then there is nothing that 
can be said about the object. Hence the following. 
( 6) Fred: Anything happen at wor·k today, dear? 
Mary: No, nothing. (Silence) 
Compare this with the following. 
(7) Fred: Anything happen at work today, dear? 
Mary: Yes. (*Nothing at all.) The boss killed himself, 
the company w.ent broke, and I broke my arm signing 
for my pay. 
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The asterisked version of (7) is unacceptable because it entails a 
contradiction between the middle sentence and the last sentence, which 
asserts, by saying something about the boss, the company and the speaker 
himself, that several things had happened. A denial that anything had 
happened might be reinforced by enumerating the various relevant events that 
might have occurred but hadn't. For example: 
(8) The Prime Minister said that nothing further had happened in 
the current industrial dispute. There had been no secret 
meetings, no more confrontations, and no change in the 
positions of management and unions. 
Finally, notice that the sentence below may become acceptable if 
interpreted as irony, i.e. as an intentional breaking of the semantic rules. 
(9) Mary: Anything happen at home today, dear? 
Fred: No, nothing at all. Baby drowned in the fishpond, the 
cat strangled itself, and the roof fell in. But no, 
nothing happened. 
Using the expression "one can say" it is possible to build up a 
composite picture for situations involving an event, causally related 
events, and instrumental action. Thus paralleling the representations 





The window broke. 
One can say something about the window: 
(technical details ... see 6.22) 
A stone broke the window. 
One can say something about the window 
because one can say something about the stone: 
(technical details ... ) 
(12) John broke the window with a stone. 
One can say something about the window 
because one can say something about the stone 
because one can say something about John: 
John wanted something. 
(technical details ... ) 
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Notice that only in agentive sentences can one say this something about 
someone, that this someone wanted something, and that parts of his body 
moved. The sentence John's body broke the window would therefore be repre-
sented as sentence (11), in terms of two causally related events. (See 6.4 
for some discussion of a sentence such as John broke the window, viz. an 
agentive sentence without overt instrumental phrase and without a verb 
which incorporates an instrument.) 
In summary, then, the claim that a sentence is an instrumental sentence 
must be substantiated(or be capable of substantiation) by a semantic repre-
sentation of that sentence which reveals the agent for whom something is 
alleged to be an instrument. In the particular semantic theory employed 
here, the agent is represented as someone about whom something can be said, 
who wants something, arid whose body is moving. 
Instrwnental Sentences with Non-Hwnan, Animate Agents 
In Chapter Two I discussed some differences between the verbs want and 
intend in an attempt to provide semantic evidence as to why the semantic 
notion "want" was a more suitable term than "intend" for the representation 
of the minimal essential component of 'volition' which is present in all 
agentive sentences. Further linguistic support for this choice may be found 
in the semantic representations appropriate to agentive sentences with non-
human, animal subjects, such as the following. 
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(13) a. Fido, our prize spaniel, 'shook hands' with its paw. 
b. The elephant picked up the chair with its trunk. 
c. The frog caught the insect with its tongue. 
d. The mouse was thwnping the cage door with its tail. 
e. The squirrel was shelling the nut with its teeth. 
f. The snake attacked the dog with its fangs. 
g. The snake strangled the kid with its body. 
These sentences meet the various tests which have been proposed for 
agentive sentences, for example, occurring in the progressive, and answering 
the question 'What did X do(was doing)?' In addition, they may take manner 
adverbs requiring an animate subject: 
(14) a. The squirrel was delicately shelling the nut with its teeth. 
b. The frog skilfully caught the insect with its tongue. 
and some of them may occur in the imperative or embedded as complement of 
verbs such as order, trick, etc. 
(15) a. 'Shake hands', Fido! 
b. The trainer ordered the elephant to pick up the chair with 
its trunk. 
c. I tricked the cat into reaching for the plastic mouse with 
its paw. 
Consequently the semantic representations for sentences (13)a-g will 
also contain "want". For example, 
(16) e. The squirrel was shelling the ·nut with its teeth. 
= One can say something about the nut 
because one can say something about the squirrel; 
the squirrel wanted something. 
(technical details ... ) 
The representation is thus exactly the same with respect to agency as 
sentences with a hwnan agent, such as (2) and (12). There is something that 
one can say about the agent, that it wanted something and that parts of its 
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body were moving. 3 One point about which I am not decided is whether an 
additional line should be added to the above representation, viz. "one can 
say something about the squirrel's teeth". Although the addition would make 
the first section of this representation symmetrical with those of represent-
ations (2) and (12), it may be unnecessary on the grounds that to say some-
thing about the squirrel's teeth is necessarily to say something about the 
squirrel. I leave the point unresolved. 4 
As we have seen in Chapters Three to Five many linguists have claimed 
that a semantic notion of intention (expressed variously as a feature INTENT 
or a semantic predicate DO) is the semantic denominator of volition in 
action sentences. But such writers have not followed through the con-
sequences of this for agentive sentences with animate but non-human subjects. 
For what would it mean to assert that an animal intended to do what it 
did? Thus while a speaker could make the judgement that what happened as a 
result of an animal's actions was accidental, for example, the cat's spill-
ing my coffee when it leapt onto my lap, how could anyone assert(without 
venturing into metaphor) that it was the animal's intention to do what it 
did? Could the animal turn around and deny it, for instance, in the way 
that any human agent could? 
It is for this reason, I suggest, that the following sentences are 
semantically anomalous. 
(17) a. *The mouse was intentionally thumping the cage door with 
its tail. 
b. *The frog unintentionally c aught the insect with its tongue. 
c. *The squirrel was intentionally shelling the nut with 
its teeth. 
d. *The snake intended to attack the dog, and it did. 
Hampshire(1959,98-99) elaborates upon the distinction between animal 
and human action as follows. 
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"The difference here between a human being and an animal lies in the 
p:>ssibility of the human being expressing his intention and putting 
into words his intention to do so-and-so, for his own benefit or for 
the benefit of others. The difference is not merely that an animal 
in fact has no means of communicating, or of recording for itself, its 
intention, with the effect that no one can ever know what the intention 
was. It is a stronger difference, which is more correctly expressed as 
the senselessness of attributing intentions to an animal which has not 
the means to reflect up:>n, and to announce to itself or to others its 
own future behaviour." 
" ... It would be senseless to attribute to an animal a memory that dis-
tinguished the order of events in the past, and it would be senseless 
to attribute to it an expectation of an order of events in the future. 
It does not have the concepts of order, or any concepts at all. An 
intention involves, among other things, a definite and expressible 
expectation of an order of events in the future, and is possible only 
in a being who is capable of at least the rudiments of conceptual 
thought." 
But if the concept of intention and thus terms expressing it are not 
meaningful for agentive sentences with non-human, animate subjects, the same 
is not the case with respect to the concept of 'wan~. Sentences such as the 
following provide evidence that we can assert that animals "want", but not 
that they "intend" or "do something from intention". 
(18) a. Fido wants(*intends) to come inside. 
b. Pussy wants(*intends to have) her back stroked. 
c. Oh, what do you want(*intend), you stupid p:>och? 
d. Kitty clearly doesn't want(*intend) anything - she hasn't 
moved an inch. 
e. The lion is scratching at the door. It obviously 
wants(*intends) something. 
With respect to non-human agents, therefore, their movement can be a 
sign of "want" but not of the more intellectual notion "intention". Because 
sentences with such agents satisfy the requirements for agentive sentences, 
the claim that the notion "intention" underlies all action sentences must be 
strongly queried. On the other hand, the notion "want" naturally and 
intuitively describes the modicum of volition that can be attributed to non-
human animate agents. These considerations , I suggest, further supp:>rt the 
claim that "want" rather than "intention" should characterise all action 
sentences. 
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6.22 Sentences With No overt Agent 
An examination of the literature on instrumental sentences reveals that 
many instrumental sentences have no surface structure agent. Some sentences 
in this group are: 
(19) a. The box hit the wall. 
b. A hammer broke the window. 
c. The key opened the door. 
d. The rats were killed with fire. 
e. The door was opened with a key. 
f. The necklace fastens with a clasp. 
g. The blotter sucked up the water. 
h. The timber creaked. 
1. Apples are harmful. 
For some of these sentences e.g. (19)d, certain writers have claimed 
that an agent is present implicitly in their meaning. For other sentences, 
we may conclude that an agent is implied in the meaning as a formal con-
sequence of a writer's claims that an agent is entailed in instrumental 
sentences(e.g. Nilsen 1973). 
This section examines the semantic representations of various of these 
sentences with a view to determining whether agents are present in their 
respective semantic representations, and whether therefore the sentences 
represent instrumental sentences by this criterion. The conclusions from 
these semantic representations will then be considered against various other 
semantic and syntactic tests. 
Consider first the representation for sentence (19)a. 
(20) The box hit the wall. 
A. = Something happened to the wall 
because something happened to the box. 
The box came into contact wi th the wall under force. 
B. = One can say something about the wall 
because one can say something about the box. 
The box was becoming being closer to the wall 
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until parts of the box could not be closer to the wall; 
these parts of the box could be thought of as becoming being 
where parts of the wall were. 
Hit involves more than contact, hence the mention of 'force' in version 
A. But 'force', not a semantically primitive notion, is represented in 
version Bin terms of displacement - when something hits something, the 
former displaces(or can be thought of as displacing) the latter. This dis-
placement is represented in the last line in terms of 'moving into' the wall 
("being thought of as becoming being where parts of the wall were") . 5 It is 
more than contact, yet not penetration (for which see representations for 
verbs of cutting in Chapter Seven). 
Notice that there is no agent present in the semantic representation 
given above for sentence (20). Is there any other linguistic evidence 
external to semantic representations of this sort that would confirm or deny 
this conclusion? First, there are standard tests for agency(see 1.51). 
While these turn out negative with respect to an agent in sentence (20), e.g. 
(21) a. *Box, hit the wall. 
b. *I persuaded the box to hit the wall. 
c. *The box carefully hit the wall. 
d. *The box hit the wall yesterday and it was at it again today. 
they do not tell us whether there is an implicit agent in the sentence. 
Rather they seem to confirm what was known for a start, viz. that the NP 
the box is not an agent. 
Can other tests be found? There are two approaches which seem to me 
to be revealing. They are paraphraseability in terms of an explicit agent, 
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and entailment testing. If the sentence (19)a is an instrumental sentence 
(as Lambert 1969,233 claims) and therefore contains an implicit agent, then 
it should be paraphraseable in terms of at least one of the following. 
(22) a. Someone hit the wall with the box. 
b. The box hit the wall, because someone did something with it. 
or even, forgetting the qualifications of 5.23, in terms of: 
c. The box was used by someone to hit the wall. 
But, clearly, these sentences do not paraphrase sentence (19)a. 
A second approach is in terms of entailment. If sentence (19)a 
contains an implicit agent, then a conjoined sentence which denies the 
entailment should make the whole anomalous. Thus (23)b should, like (23)a, 
be unacceptable. 
(23) a. *The baby was carefully washed and powdered, but no-one 
washed and powdered the baby. 
b. The box hit the wall, but no-one caused the box to hit the 
wall. 
The acceptability of (23)b is further evidence, I submit, of the lack of an 
implicit agent. Another example which draws upon these entailment relations 
is the following. If (19)a contains an implied agent then (24)b should, 
like (24)a, be acceptable. 
(24) a. The baby was lovingly washed and dried, and then someone 
else gave her a feed. 
b. *The box hit the wall, and then someone else cut it up. 
To conclude this part, we have seen that sentence (19)a does not 
contain an agent in its semantic representation, and by this conclusion 
cannot be called an instrumental sentence. The representation, however, 
does not specifically exclude an agent and therefore there is no anomaly 
if this sentence occurs in an otherwise agentive context, e.g. within a 
complex sentence as in (25)a or within a discourse situation as in (25)b. 
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(25) a. John made the box hit the wall. 
b. John picked up the box and threw it. The box hit the wall. 
Let us now consider more briefly the remaining sentences of (19). 
First, consider the representation for sentence (19)b. 
(26) 
= 
The harmner broke the window. 
One can say something about the window 
because one can say something about the harrnner. 
(Because the hammer exerted a force on the window, the 
window broke). 
Parts of the hammer which were in contact with the window 
could be thought of as becoming being where parts of the 
window were; 
because of that, the window, whose parts could be thought of 
as being one something, 
became something whose parts could not be thought of as 
being this one something. 
Like the representation for sentence (19)a, the above representation 
does not contain anyone for whom the hammer is an instrument in the breaking, 
anyone who wants something and about whose movement something can be said. 
The fact that sentences such as this and (19)c are frequently called 
instrumental sentences derives I suggest from a combination of factors. 
These include: that the surface subject is frequently realised by a manu-
factured object used instrumentally(e.g. knife, key, harrnner); that the 
sentences are often about standard uses of these objects(e.g. opening a door); 
and that the sentences tend to be discussed along with instrumental sentences 
with overt agents, such as, respectively: 
(27) a. Someone broke the window with a harmner. 
b. Someone opened the door with a key. 
238 
Although I do not consider that sentence (19)b contains an agent, it is 
undeniable that such a sentence would frequently occur in agentive contexts. 
It is for this reason that I believe(see 2.36) that an adequate semantics 
will eventually need to account for discourses rather than individual 
sentences considered in isolation. 
As far as the meaning of sentence (19)b is concerned, the represent-
ation follows Wierzbicka's suggestion for decomposing break into the notions 
"part" and "think of 11 • 6 The last four lines of the representation attempt 
to express the hypothesis that when something breaks, what happens is that 
something that can be viewed as one object becomes something that cannot be 
viewed as this one object. The term "one" should not itself be taken as 
semantically primitive, but might be represented, as below, in terms of 
"part". 
(28) The window can be thought of as one something. 
= The window can be thought of as something, no part of 
which is the window. 
My comments above suggested that sentence (19)c was also a non-agentive 
sentence, and therefore non-instrumental. The semantic representation 
suggested here for this sentence is: 
(29) 
= 
The key opened the door. 
One can say something about the door 
because one can say something about the key. 
Because the key, which was in contact with the door, moved, 
the door moved until something could move through the door. 
The meaning for open that is presented here is that of providing access 
to something for someone or something(e.g. an open gate, window, grave, 
7 
church, etc.). Notice that once again no agent occurs in the first part of 
the representation. According to the 'tests' proposed earlier in this 
section, if sentence (19)c were an agentive sentence it should be 
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paraphraseable by at least one of the sentences (30)a-b below, and sentence 
(30)c should contain a contradiction. The fact that none of these is the 
case confirms the hypothesis that no agent is involved. 
(30) a. Someone opened the door with the key. 
b. The key opened the door because someone did something with it. 
c. The key opened the door but no-one caused the key to open the 
door. 
Consider now a sentence that does appear to have an agent entailed in 
its meaning. (See 6.23 for a discussion of the sentence The rats were 
killed by fire.) 
(31) 
= 
The rats were killed with fire. 
One can say something about the rats 
because one can say something about something that was burning 
(because one can say something about someone); 
this someone wanted something. 
Because parts of this someone's body which could be thought of 
as being in contact with this something that was burning moved, 
this something that was burning came into contact with the rat$ 
because of that each of the rats became something that could 
not be thought of as something that could want something. 
This suggestion assumes that dying is a process in which a self-moving 
creature(something that can want something) · becomes something that cannot 
want anything. The suggestion is limited to the extent that it cannot apply 
to the death of, for example, plants or trees, which we would assume cannot 
want anything under any non-metaphorical interpretation. 8 
It seems to me that this sentence is the passive of something like 
Someone killed the rats with fire but with the agent~ phrase deleted. The 
expressions included within the parentheses in (31) represent the agent's 
involvement. This claim seems to be confirmed in the following four tests. 
First, with respect to paraphraseability, the sentence does appear to 
sustain a paraphrase containing an agent. Thus: 
(32) a. Someone killed the rats with fire. 
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b. The rats were killed with fire because someone did something 
with the fire. 
Second, the entailment tests are more acceptable than with previous 
sentences. 
(33) a. The rats were killed with fire and then other exterminators 
plugged the snake holes with poison. 
b. ?The rats were killed with fire but no-one killed the rats 
with fire. 
Next, unlike previous agentless sentences in this section, the sentence 
may occur with adverbs entailing an agent, but without acceptability forcing 
a metaphorical reading. The following two groups of sentences, then, appear 
to be acceptable. First, sentences with volitional adverbs: 
(34) a. The rats were intentionally killed with fire. 
b. The rats were unintentionally killed with fire. 
c. The rats were accidentally killed with fire. 
While 6.3 contains a fuller account of the meanings of sentences con-
taining these adverbs, the three sentences above differ, I suggest, in that 
in the first the agent intended to kill the rats with fire and did so; in 
the second that the rats were killed with fire but that the agent did not 
intend this in doing whatever he did; and in the third that the rats were 
killed with fire but that the agent did not want this in doing whatever he 
did. 
The second group of adverbs are thos e which describe the manner in which 
an entailed agent does something. Their acceptable, non-metaphorical 
presence in the sentences below argue for an entailed agent in these 
respective sentences. 
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(35) a. The rats were ruthlessly killed with fire. 
b. The door was cunningly opened with a key. 
c. The Mona Lisa was carefully fixed to the wall with nails. 
Finally, in another type of entailment test, if sentence {19)d does 
contain an agent in its semantic representation, the presence in the with 
phrase of an adjective suggesting a non-agentive context should lead to 
semantic anomaly. In the following sets of sentences, the 'a' sentence 
contains the unmodified with phrase, the 'b' sentence reinforces the 
agentive interpretation, while the adjective in the 'c' sentence favours a 
non-agentive context. Thus: 
{36) a. The rats were killed with fire. 
b. The rats were killed with a carefully-lit fire. 
c. ?The rats were killed with a spontaneous fire. 
{37) a. John was run-over with a removal truck. 
b. John was run-over with a well-directed truck. 
c. ?John was run-over with a runaway truck. 
(38) a. Martha was permanently blinded with a chemical explosion. 
b. Martha was permanently blinded with a carefully-planned 
explosion. 
c. ?Martha was permanently blinded with a freak explosion. 
The anomaly here would seem to arise from the fact that the instrumental 
phrases in the 'c' sentences strongly suggest a non-agentive situation 
whereas the sentence form itself entails an · agentive situation. 
Next, consider sentence {19)f, with its parallels of the same form, viz., 
(39) a. The door opens with a key. 
b. This trailbike starts with a push. 
c. That airbed inflates with a pump. 
While these generic sentences do not permit adverbs which entail an agent, 
e.g. 
(40) a. *The necklace carefully fastens with a clasp. 
b. *This trailbike enthusiastically starts with a push. 
the sentences can be paraphrased so as to entail an agent(implicit or 
explicitly), and consequentially, so as to take manner adverbs: 
(41) a. The door can be opened (by someone) with a key. 
b. This trailbike can be carefully started (by someone) with 
a push. 
or, as conditionals: 
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(42) a. If someone wants to open the door, he must do so with a key. 
b. If someone wants to inflate that airbed, he must do so with a 
pump. 
With further explication therefore, sentence (19)f appears to entail an 
agent, and thus to qualify as an instrumental sentence. 
Not so sentence (19)g, one of the three remaining sentences held over 
for discussion from 4.52. Lambert's suggests, inter alia, that sentence 
(19)g should be treated metaphorically. This course of action is based on 
her assumption that the verb suck requires an agent, and on her recognition 
that the sentence itself "has no sense of an implied deleted Agent perform-
ing the action of sucking"(1969,309). While I agree with the latter point, 
the former seems questionable on two grounds. First, the verb suck can take 
inanimate subjects as in: 
(43) a. The water pump has been sucking in air for most of the day. 
b. Our new vacuum cleaner has sucked up a lot of dirt today. 
Secondly, if the sentence were interpreted metaphorically with the blotter 
as agent, one would expect agent-entailing adverbs to occur without anomaly. 
(44) a. The blotter enthusiastically sucked up the water. 
b. The blotter greedily sucked up the water yesterday and 
started into some ink today. 
c. The blotter sucked up the water skilfully. 
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In a sense this confirms what Lambert says, making the blotter a real 
agent who can be thought of as something(someone?) which can want something, 
and which can move its parts. My intuitions, however, are that sentence 
(19)g and sentences (43)a-c are understood literally, rather than metaphor-
ically. On the basis of this interpretation, the following representation 
with inanimate, non-metaphorical subjects is suggested. 9 
(45) 
= 
The blotter sucked up the water. 
One can say something about the water; 
because one can say something about the blotter. 
The water became something that could be thought of as a 
part of the blotter. 
Notice that, like the representation for sentence (20), there is no 
causal relationship asserted in the technical section of the above. I arrive 
at this conclusion with some surprise as a result of the following consider-
ations. There is no causal paraphrase "the blotter's doing something caused 
something to happen to the water". The sentence does not assert that the 
blotter came into contact with the water, hence we cannot paraphrase 
"because the blotter came into contact with the water, the water .. II 
While contact between the blotter and water is necessary, it does not appear 
that mere contact can be a cause of anything. Thus while the water could not 
become a part of the blotter without this contact, as in (20) the box could 
not hit the wall unless it were in motion, neither the contact nor the motion 
qualifies as a caus e of what follows. Being in contact and being in motion 
are more like what Bentham terms 'promotive circumstances', contributing to 
the result but not causing it. 
It is difficult to imagine how sentence (19)h could be interpreted as 
an instrumental sentence by the criterion of agency employed here. The verb 
involved, creak, is one from a class whi ch Nilsen(l973,163) says "represent 
sounds of some type that the Instrument makes ". But if the timber is an 
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instrument, where is th~ agent, and what kind of event could it be involved 
in or used for? With some imagination, one could perhaps go for something 
like the following: 
(46) a. Someone caught my attention with his creaking of the timber. 
b. Someone used his creaking of the timber to catch my attention. 
But such sentences can hardly be accepted as paraphrases of (19)h. 
Given that creaking timber can be thought of as a sign of movement, I 
suggest that all that one can say about (19)h is: 
(47) The timber creaked. 
= Because the timber moved 
there was something that someone could hear. 
For moving timber to 'creak', there is probably also some friction involved 
(perhaps representable in part as one part of the timber which was in con-
tact with another part of the timber moving along this other part). Could 
a single piece of timber creak? I leave unexplicated(hence the periods in 
the representation) this part of the meaning of the sentence. 
Finally, consider the following sentence, which has also been claimed 
to be an instrumental sentence. 
(48) Apples are harmful. 
Nilsen(l97 3 ,171) calls the NP appl es an Instrument rather than Objective 
case expression because he says the former but not the latter has a causal 
feature associated with it. Accepting that there is a causal element in the 
sentence itself, a partial expansion of the meaning might be: "Apples cause 
harm to someone" (or "something", cf. Insecticides are harmful). But for 
(48) to be an instrumental sentence, I submit that something like the 
following paraphrases would have to underlie it. 
(49) a . People cause harm to people with apples. 
b. Apples cause harm to people(someone) because people(someone) 
do something with them. 
c. Apples are used by people to cause harm to people. 
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But what are the events whic h are causally related in (48)? I suggest, 
without decomposing harm or harmful, that they are something like "something 
happening to an(any?) apple" (e.g. being eaten, falling from a tree, rotting 
in the fruit bowl, etc.) and "someone (or "something") being h armed". It 
follows from the fact that an agent need not be involved in t h e first event 
that the NP apples is not invariantly an instrumental noun. 
6.23 Physic al Phenomena as Instruments 
As we have seen in Chapters Three to Five, several linguists have 
claimed that sentences such as the following, with subjects representing 
physical phenomena, are instrumental sentences. 
(50) a. The wind opened the door. 
b. The floodwaters destroyed the city. 
c. The heat melted the butter. 
d. Fire killed the rats. 
By the c riteria which have been used in 6.21 and 6.22, these sentences 
do not appear to be instrumental sentences. Thus the subject NPs are 
neither agents: 
(51) a. *The wind opened the d oor enthusiastically. 
b. *The floodwaters destroyed the city yesterday and they 
were at it again today. 
c . *I reminded the heat to me lt the butter. 
d. *Fire, kill the rats. 
nor objects involved instrumentally, as s hown by the fact that the following 
sentences a re not paraphrases of sentenc es (SO)a-d respectively. 
(52) a. The wind opened the door b ecause someone did something 
with t h e wind. 
b . Someone destroyed the city with the floodwaters. 
c . Heat was us ed by someo ne to me lt the butter. 
d. Someo ne killed the rats with fi re . 
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Let us consider the semantic representations for the first two of 
these sentences. As far as the first is concerned, I suggest the following 
as a possible representation. 
(53) The wind opened the door. 
= One can say something about the door 
because one can say something about the wind. 
Because air which was in contact with the door moved, 
the door moved until something could move through the door. 
In this representation, the wind, thought of as the perceptible effect of 
moving air(e.g. perceived through sound, sight or touch) is presented as 
. h d 10 causing t e oar to move. But there is no agent, no person here for whom 
the wind can be thought of as an instrument in bringing about some effect. 
Similarly, there is no agent for whom fire can be thought of as an 
instrument in sentence (S0)d, a suggested representation for which is below. 
(54) Fire killed the rats. 
= One can say something about the rats 
because one can say something about something that was burning. 
This something that was burning came into contact with the 
rats; 
because of that each of the rats became something 
that could not be thought of ·as something that could 
want something. 
This representation, which is the same as (31) less the agency components of 
the latter, would also form the semantic representation for another so-called 
instrumental sentence, i.e., the passive of (S0)d, viz., The rats were killed 
by fire. It should be said that the formal resemblance between this passive 
and sentence (19)d tends to conceal the non-instrumental nature of iLs 
active form, viz. (50)d. 
Notwithstanding, physical phenomena may occur acceptably in instru-
mental sentences as the following sentences reveal. 
(55) a. God destroyed the people of Noah's time with a flood. 
b. Zeus frightened the people of Rome with lightn i ng bolts. 
c. Neptune capsized the vessel with a tidal wave. 
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d. The enemy command used firestorms to ravage the countryside. 
e. The Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind. 
These sentences satisfy the agency criterion for instrumental sentences(e.g. 
their semantic representations containing someone who wants something doing 
something) and they also meet the paraphrase and entailment criteria 
advanced earlier in support of identifying instrumental sentences. For a 
sample representation, consider: 
(56) 
= 
God killed the rats with fire. 
One can say something about the rats 
because one can say something about something that was burning, 
because one can say something about God; 
God wanted this something: 
He wanted this something that was burning to come into 
contact with the rats; 
He wanted each of the rats, because of that, to become 
something that could not be thought of as something 
that could want something. 
( technical description . .·) 
The principal difference between this and (31) is that an enumeration 
of what the agent wants has been provided here. The representation assumes 
that God wants everything he does, and it therefore lists out as 'wanted' the 
various events which are causally involved. I am not sure whether hwnan 
agents can be said to want(or to intend) each event in a sequence of causally 
related events. My intuition is that perhaps one intends a certain effect, 
and wants the intervening events which bring it about. For two conflicting 
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opinions on this point, see Austin(l970,285)and Dowty(l972a,73). 
A second difference arises in relation to specifying the technical 
details of the meaning of the sentence. How is one t o 'link' the agent{God) 
and the something that is burning? Given that God and Satan, spirits, etc., 
are generally thought of as incorporeal beings, the expression "parts of 
God's body were in contact with this something that was burning" is quite 
inappropriate. Nor am I entirely happy with the expression "God could be 
thought of as being in contact with this something that was burning" for 
this also seems to imply corporeal substance. For the present, therefore, 
what I suggest is an expression, neutral with respect to contact, along the 
lines that God is someone who can move things (merely) because he wants to. 
Applying this suggestion, the technical section of (56) might then commence: 
"Because God wanted it, this something that was burning came into contact 
with the rats". 
In 5.5 I discussed two sentences which Dowty labelled 'instrumental 
(non-agentive) sentences'. Reproduced below, these sentences are sufficient-
ly similar to (55)e to warrant distinguishing comments. 
(57) a. The tree killed John by falling on him. 
b. The wind destroyed my garden by blowing the fence down on it. 
It seems to me that these sentences each describe two causally related 
events; in (57)a the tree falling on John causes him to die and in (57)b 
the wind blowing down my fence causes my garden to be destroyed. In both 
sentences the ~-phrase merely specifies in greater detail the causing event. 
That neithe r the tree nor the wind are in s trumental objects follows from the 
lack of any agent in these sentences for whom these objects are being used 
instrumentally. That neither tree nor wind are themselves non-metaphorical 
agents follows from the unacceptability, for instance, of adverbs of manner 
or volition: 
(58) a. *The tree thoughtlessly killed John by falling on him. 
b. *The wind intentionally destroyed my garden by , blowing the 
fence down on it. 
Writing of Shroyer's work, Nilsen(1973,57) notes that; 
"Shroyer indicates that in order for these Forces to qualify as 
Instrumentals, it must be understood that someone is carrying out 
the action. 11 
While insurance companies charitably designate as 'acts of God' the con-
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sequences of physical phenomena such as we have been considering, the 
general cosmic view of Western peoples at least is that such phenomena are 
not invariably linked with any agent. Thus while the sentences (SO)a-d do 
not specifically exclude an agent, and may therefore occur in agentive con-
texts, taken individually, the sentences do not entail any agent. The noun 
phrases representing the physical phenomena cannot therefore be understood as 
instruments, nor the sentences themselves as instrumental sentences. 
6.24 Self-Operating Instruments 
Discussions of instrumental sentences frequently include sentences with 
subjects representing 'self-operating' objects such as computers, robots, 
automatic doors, etc. The debate in such discussions tends to turn on 
whether these objects can be thought of as agents, as instruments, or as just 
one object causally involved in some event. In 4.43 I suggested that from 
one perspective these objects could be thought of as instruments, being manu-
factured by someone to perform certain tasks, and that from another perspect-
ive they could be thought of as a kind of limited agent, having a restricted 
repertoire of repeatable movements. 
This section considers briefly and in an exploratory way semantic 
representations for the following sentences. 
(59) a. The door opened by itself. 
b. The door opened itself. 
c. The door opened automatically. 
Bearing in mind previous discussion (6.22 and 6.23) of sentences with the 
verb open, the non-instrumental(i.e. non-agentive) sentence underlying the 
above, viz. The door opened, would receive a semantic representation along 
the following lines. 
,..-.-
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( 60) The door opened. 
= One can say something about the door. 
The door moved until something could move through the door. 
This representation makes the claim that, unlike sentences (19)c, (19)e, 
(SO)a and the sentence The door was opened, sentence (60) has no causal 
paraphrase such that The door opened= "something caused the door to open". 
With this representation as a basis, I suggest that sentences (59)a-c 







The door opened by itself. 
One can say something about the door. 
This something that one can say about the door was not 
caused by something not thought of as part of the door. 
The door moved until something could move through the door. 
The door opened itself. 
One can say something about the door, 
because one can say something about part of the door. 
Because this part of the door moved, 
the door moved until something could move through the door. 
The door opened automatically. 
One can say something about the door 
because one can say something about parts of the door which 
someone made wanting their movements to cause the door to move. 
Becaus e these parts of the door moved, 
the door moved until something could move through the door. 
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In brief, the differences which these representations have attempted 
to capture are the following. Representation (61) tries to r epresent that 
sentence (59)a asserts that the door opened and, without ass e rting that the 
door opened itself, denies that anything else opened the door . Represent-
ation (62) expresses the assertion that the door caus ed itself to be open, 
i.e. that something happening to some part(s) of the door caused the door 
to move open. The third representation makes the claim that the particular 
event described results from the activation of a device for opening the 
door. Let us now consider these sentences more closely. 
First, the failure of the sentences to pass the agency tests means that 
none of the surface subjects(interpreted literally) can be considered an 
agent, i.e. as someone or something who wants something and does something. 
Thus: 
(64) a. *The door enthusiastically opened by itself. 
b. *I ordered the door to open itself. 
c. *Door, open automatically! 
Even automatic devices, which can to some extent be thought of as 'agents' 
with a restricted capacity for doing something, are not agents who want 
something, nor could they do anything intentionally or accidentally. 
Nor can the sentences be paraphrased in such a way as to reveal that 
the surface subjects are some entailed agent's instrument. Thus the follow-
ing sentence s are not synonymous with sentences (59)a-c respectively. 
(65) a. *The door opened by itself because someone did something 
with the door. 
b. *Someone used the door to open itself. 
c. **Someone opened the door automatically with the door. 
But if, as r epresentation (63) suggests, sentence (59)c entails someone 
who made some part of the door which causes it to open, why can't this part 
be thought of as that someone's instrument? I suggest that it cannot because 
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that someone does not thereby open the door in the instance described(or for 
that matter in any instance), in the way that one can as s ert, for example, 
of the following example: 
(66) John opened the door with a key. 
both (67)a and (67)b: 
(67) a. John opened the door. 
b. The key opened the door because John did something to the 
door with the key. 
It is not possible to assert of sentence (59)c, however, either of the 
following. 
(68) a. Someone(who had made part of the door wanting its movements 
to cause the door to open) opened the door. 
b. This part of the door(which someone had made ... ) opened 
the door because this someone did something to the door with 
this part of the door. 
Second, with respect to causal relations, while sentences (59)b-c do 
entail that something caused the door to open(see the representations for 
what this something is), sentence (59)a is like (60) in not itself supporting 
a semantic representation in terms of "something caused the door to open". 
Representation (61) thus makes the claim that the sentence means the same as 
(60) plus a denial that what happened was caused by something or someone 
other than the door. The by itself phrase seems to be employed as a marked 
expression to indicate that the situation being described is somehow not 
standard or not what was to be expected. Other examples are: 
(69) a. The train left by itself(without its driver). 
b. Baby is walking by herself now. 
c. With her new calculator, Mary can solve problems by herself. 
The unmarked situation would be zero marked, I think, resulting either in no 
E.l. phrase , or no sentence at all since there would be nothing 'remarkable' 
(in Searle' s sense). 
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One small piece of evidence which seems to support this interpretation 
of the use of by itself concerns the employment of unstressed just as 
a modifier in descriptions of someone's amazement or incredulity at some-
thing(e.g. I just can't believe it, I just don't know how you man age ten 
kids, etc.). Since a speaker may, mystified at being unable to positively 
determine causality, invoke the by itself (herself, etc.) expres s ion as a 
way of retreating to a minimal, negative statement about causality, sentences 
with by itself are relevant to this use of just. Thus, with unstressed just 
and a rise-fall intonation on itself: 
(70) a. The door just opened by itself. 
b. The train just left by itself. 
I am uncertain, however, of the extent to which this use of just dis-
tinguishes between sentences (59)a-c. My tentative suggestions, therefore, 
for the senses of the following sentences, in which just is unstressed in 
both and there is a rise-fall intonation respectively on itself and 
automatically, are given below. 
(71) a. The door just opened itself. (It usually opens something elseJ 
b. The door just opened automatically. 
that.) 
(It doesn't usually do 
Third, the (59)b sentenc e represents a straightforward sentence that 
something caused some thing to open. Representation (62) accounts for the 
two events which are caus ally related in terms of the movements of some part 
of the door(without specifying whether the part is a device for using the 
door to open) causing the door to move until it is open. The unacceptability 
of 
(72) *The door opened itself by itself. 
would thus derive from the fact that a clear assertion that the door opened 
the door is followed by an expression(by itself) invoked when the causing 
object is not known(cf. Lambert 1969,223: 11 by itself ... can be used by 
speakers who wish to emphasize the notion that an event or act is inexplic-
able, without Agent or Cause"). 
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Finally, wi1;-h respect to sentence (59)c, notice that it entails (59)b, 
as the following sentences and the representation (63) reflect. 
(73) The door opened automatically. It therefore follows that 
the door opened itself. 
Sentence (59)b, however, does not entail (59)c. 
(74) *The door opened itself. It therefore follows that the door 
opened itself automatically. 
Secondly, while the sentence describes only one instance of an opening, in 
asserting automaticity of this instance, it introduces to the meaning a 
context of a capacity, realised or unrealised, for many 'openings'. 
Automatically thus suggests a manufactured object whose movements 
(mechanical, electrical, etc.) would cause the door to move open. I suggest 
'manufactured' on the assumption that in the natural world things occur 
naturally or instinctively rather than automatically (*automatic childbirth, 
*automatic growth, *The eggs hatched automatically). The term 'manufactured 
object' sketches the context in further detail, for it entails an agent 
(someone who made the object) and a purpose for which it was made. With 
respect to (59)c being an instrumental sentence, however, even if automatic-
ally entails an agent, this agent is strictly someone who makes the automatic 
part rather than opens any doors, and he is sufficiently remote to prevent 
the automatic part of the door being something with which the agent be 
th f . d . 11 ought o as opening the oor on each occasion. 
6.3 Instrumental Sentences: The Nature of What the Agent Wants 
Throughout the thesis I have suggested that the term "want" is suffi-
cient to represent the volitional component of agency. I have taken up the 
suggestion that instrumental sentences entail an agent, and suggested that 
this agent can be represented minimally in terms of someone about whom some-
thing can be said, that this someone wanted something, and that parts of this 
someone's body were moving(or could be thought of as moving). Having in 2.23 
255 
tentatively distinguished between the verbs want and intend, I have shown 
in relation to various sentences, for example those which seem to be vague 
rather than ambiguous with respect to what the agent wanted, as: 
(75) a. I broke a plate with a stone. 
b. John hit Mary with a book. 
and those with adverbs which deny that the agent acted intentionally, as: 
{76) a. I unintentionally broke a plate with a stone. 
b. John unintentionally hit Mary with a book. 
that instrumental sentences need not be intentional, but that, being 
agentive sentences they must contain someone (or something) who wants 
something. 
This section examines instrumental sentences from the point of view of 
what the agent wants or,where appropriate, intends. There are two sections, 
dealing firstly with instrumental sentences containing with NP phrases, and 
secondly{6.32) with sentences of the form use NP to. Semantic representa-
tions are presented for sentences having these forms, both without adverbial 
modification and those with the following volitional adverbs: intentionally, 
unintentionally, accidentally. 
6.31 Instrumental with NP Sentences 
Consider now the question of what the agent wants in the following 
sentences. 
(77) a. Mary moved the bric k with the trowel. 
b. Mary intentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
c. Mary unintentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
d. Mary accidentally moved the brick with the trowel. 
Sentence {77)a seews vague or indeterminate as to whether Mary intended to 
move the brick with the trowel. Thus the acceptability of the following 
sentences indicates that (77)a does not entail that Mary intended what 
occurred. 
(78) a. Mary moved the brick with the trowel but she didn't 
intend to. 
b. Mary unintentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
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The semantic representation which I suggest for (77)a is shown below. 
Consistent with the indeterminacy mentioned above, the representation does 
not indicate any matching of what Mary wanted with what happened. 
( 79) Mary moved the brick with the trowel. 
One can say something aoout the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
Parts of her body which were in contact with the trowel 
became a part of successive parts of that place; 
because of that parts of the trowel which were in contact 
with the brick could be thought of as becoming being where 
parts of the brick were; 
because of that the brick became being a part of successive 
parts of that place. 
The representation makes the following claims about the physical 
details of the meaning of (77)a. First, there is contact between both Mary 
and the trowel, and the trowel and the brick, but the trowel is not asserted 
as moving into contact with the brick. Second, the trowel exerts some force 
on the brick, thereby causing it to move (cf. sentence (19)a with hit, in 
which the oox has an effect on the wall, but the wall is not asserted to 
move). Third, the sentence does not enable one to express the movement of 
the brick in terms of the relation of the brick to the trowel, unlike the 
movement of the box in relation to the wall in sentence (19)a. I suggest, 
therefore, that the brick's movement merely be expressed in terms of 
"becoming a part of successive parts of that place". 
257 
Consider now sentence (77)b. If the sentence Mary intentionally did X 
means something like "Mary intended to do X and Mary did X", then one 
suggestion for the semantic representation of (77)b would be that given for 
(77)a but with an added sentence specifying that what Mary did was what she 
intended to do. This would result in: 
(80) 
= 
Mary intentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
One can say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
This something that can be said about Mary was something that 
Mary intended. 
(technical details as for (79) above) 
The 'something that can be said about Mary' here is that she moved the 
brick with the trowel. But what is the meaning of "intend"? In 2.23 I 
postulated, tentatively, that it be represented in terms of "thinking about 
... decide to", where perhaps I decide to do X can be paraphrased as "I 
say: I will do X". While thi~ representation was only offered as a working 
suggestion there (and here), let us consider briefly how it might be 
incorporated into a simple example. Thus, omitting technical details: 
( 81) 
= 
Mary intended to move the br.ick with the trowel. 
Thinking about moving the brick with the trowel, 
Mary said: I will move the brick with the trowel. 
Note that the representation is as indeterminate as the sentence itself as 
to the time when Mary intends to do this; it specifies that future time 
only in terms of "I will", where "will" is not held to be a semantically 
. . . 12 pr imi ti ve term. 
.... 
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With some qualification, this suggestion comes close to being an 
expanded sentential version of the abbreviated representation which Dowty 
(1972b,103) proposes for what he calls 'intentional agentive accomplish-
ments'. The qualification has to do with the similarity applying only in 
respect of the topmost predicate DO in Dowty's representation, and with DO 
being interpreted strictly as Ross and Dowty claun it should, viz. as a 
verb of intention rather than of fulfilled intention. As I have mentioned 
elsewhere(l.52 and 5.5), the verb DO strongly suggests more than mere 
intention. 
Sentence (77)c seems to involve merely the denial that Mary acted 
intentionally. There is no entailment that Mary did intend something, hence 
the representation avoids saying that what happened was not what Mary 
intended. 
(82) Mary unintentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
One can say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
This something that can be said about Mary was not 
something that Mary intended. 
(technical details as before) 
Finally, consider sentence (77)d, represented below. 
(83) Mary accidentally moved the brick with the trowel. 
One can say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
This something that can be said about Mary was not 
what Mary wanted. 
(technical details as above) · 
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Notice that this representation does not mention anything about 
"intend". This is because, unlike sentence (77)b and c which respectively 
assert intention and lack of intention, the effect of the adverb in this 
sentence does not seem to be getting to the agent's intention. Rather, it 
indicates what we might call a 'low-level' mis-match between agent and 
event, one representable in terms of "want" rather than 'higher' order 
volitions such as "intend". 
One line of support for this suggestion relates to the fact that while 
both accidentally and intentionally(and unintentionally) may be predicated 
of situations where intentional action is conceivable, only accidentally is 
found predicated of some situations where intentional action is not conceiv-
able but where acting from "want" is entailed. The example concerns 
agentive sentences having non-human animate subjects(see 6.21), where if 
intention is predicated of the agent, one is somehow saying more than can 
sensibly be verified. Thus: 
(84) a. ?The mouse was intentionally thumping the cage door with 
its tail. 
b. ?The snake intended to attack the kid, and it did. 
But agentive sentences with such subjects may take the adverb 
accidentally. Thus: 
(85) a. The elephant accidentally broke a chair with its trunk. 
b. The neighbour's dog accidentally knocked over oGr milk 
bottles with its tail. 
The effect of the adverb on the meanings of these sentences is to stipulate 
that the speaker dissociates the referred-to event from what the speaker con-
siders the animal wanted in its movements. The fact that there is no incon-
sistency in the adverb accidentally(but not, say, unintentionall1) occurring 
in this agentive environment which excludes intention thus seems further 
support for limiting the reference of accidentally to that of the term "want". 
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6.32 Instrumental Use NP To Sentences 
In 5.23 I presented a range of examples showing the non-synonymy of 
instrumental with NP and use NP to sentences. In this section I suggest how 
use NP to sentences might be represented so as to capture what these 
sentences assert concerning what the agent wants or intends. The represent-
ations offered here should be regarded as working suggestions for the mean-
ings of use NP to sentences with normal stress and intonation. At the 
expense of a complete description, I have ignored discussions of less 
central use NP to sentences, e.g. those with contrastive stress. An examin-
ation of their meanings must wait upon the clarification of the meanings of 
the more central sentences. 
First of all, notice a major asymmetry between with NP and use NP to 
sentences. Although manner adverbs, including those entailing an agent, may 
modify the complement sentence of a use NP to sentence: 
(86) a. Mary used the trowel to slowly move the brick. 
b. Mary used the trowel to carefully move the brick. 
c. Mary used the wooden spoon to vigorously stir the Xmas 
cake mixture. 
the complement cannot be modified by any of the three adverbs which were 
employed in 6.31. 
(87) a. *Mary used the trowel to intentionally move the brick. 
b. *Mary used the trowel to unintentionally move the brick. 
c. *Mary used the trowel to accidentally move the brick. 
By way of contrast, however, in sentences containing with NP phrases, these 
adverbs may occur modifying the VP referring to the same activity. For 
example: 
(88) a. Mary intentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
b. Mary unintentionally moved the brick with the trowel. 
c. Mary accidentally moved the brick with the trowel. 
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From this I suggest that the complement sentence projects an environ-
ment which is already positively specified for intention, such that any 
additional modification leads, as we have seen, either to unacceptable 
redundancy or anomaly. Some support for this interpretation comes from 
entailment relations. Thus: 
(89) a. *Mary used the electric beater to mix the eggs but she 
didn't intend to mix the eggs. 
b. *John used a handmower to cut his lawn, but he didn't 
intend to cut his lawn. 
It is within the context of these remarks that I think that use NP to 
sentences can be thought of as being 'intentional' and 'purposeful'. 
Incorporating these points, the representation which I suggest for the 
sentence Mary used the trowel to move the brick is as follows. 
(90) 
= 
Mary used the trowel to move the brick. 
One can say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
This something that one c an say about the brick was what 
Mary intended (i.e. Mary intended to move the brick). 
Parts of h er body which were in contact with the trowel 
became a part of succ e ssive parts of that place; 
because of that something (which could be thought of as a 
part of the trowel) which was in contact with the brick could 
be thought of as b ecoming b e ing where parts of the brick were; 
because of that the brick became being a part of successive 
parts of that place. 
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Two points should be mentioned about representation (90), the paren-
theses in which are purely to aid in clarity. First, it accords a different 
volitional standing to the two component sentences, Mary used the trowel and 
Mary moved the brick. While the representation asserts that Mary intended 
the latter, it allows that she just happened to use the trowel, rather than 
intending to use it. The sentence Mary used the trowel is not volitionally 
unmotivated, however, for the expression "Mary wanted something"(coupled 
with the expression "parts of her body moved .") provide the minimal 
volitional framework for the whole sentence. It is the intentional 
expression("this something that one can say about the brick was what Mary 
intended") which has been layered, so to speak, onto this framework. 
Secondly, consistent with what was discussed in 5.23 concerning the NP 
following use having the capacity to refer to objects which do not 
immediately cause the following event (e.g. John used the cricket bat to 
break the window), the technical section does not assert that parts of the 
trowel are in contact with the brick. Instead it says that something that 
could be thought of as a part of the trowel is in contact with the brick 
(e.g. if the trowel supports a bag which is holding the brick). For more 
on causal chains, see 6.46. 
Since the three adverbs being employed here cannot occur modifying the 
complement sentence, let us now examine their occurrence within the use 
sentence. Now since use NP to sentences, more than with NP sentences, carry 
an implication that the whole sentence describes intentional behaviour(! 
suggest that this is because of the influence of the intentional nature of 
the complement sentence, which imparts its intentionality to the rest of the 
sentence), one cannot acceptably modify just any use NP to sentence. 
(91) a. ?I accidentally used a spoon to stir my coffee. 
b. ?John accidentally used his toothbrush to clean his teeth. 
c. ?Mary accidentally used a piece of string to tie the Lean 
stalks. 
d. ?John unintentionally u sed the chamois to wash the car. 
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Nevertheless, suitable contexts having been constructed, there are 
sentences describing such which can take these adverbs. The principle 'no 
remark without remarkableness' is relevant here, for one suspects that in 
context there would be little call to assert the following sentences if they 
were done using a 'standard' object. 
(92) a. I accidentally used a biro to stir my coffee. 
b. John accidentally used my toothbrush to clean his teeth. 
c. Mary accidentally used a live wire to tie the bean stalks. 
d. John unintentionally used his best business shirt to wash 
the car. 
Consider now how such sentences might be represented, but for conven-
ience of reference using the example with Mary moving the brick. An 
appropriate situation here might be where Mary had been instructed to move 
the brick, but not, for some reason, to use the trowel to do so. The 
sentences are: 
(93) a. Mary accidentally used the trowel to move the brick. 
b. Mary intentionally used the trowel to move the brick,. 
c. Mary unintentionally used the trowel to move the brick. 
To enable what is proposed in these representations to be seen most clearly, 
I have not decomposed here, as was done in {90), that part of the represent-
ation that represents what Mary wanted and/or intended. 
(94) 
= 
Mary accidentally used the trowel to move the brick. 
One can say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
Mary intended to move the bric k. 
Mary did not want to use the trowel. 





Mary intentionally used the trowel to move the brick. 
One cay say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
Mary intended to move the brick. 
Mary intended to use the trowel. 
(technical details as before) 
Mary unintentionally used the trowel to move the brick. 
One can say something about the brick 
because one can say something about the trowel 
because one can say something about Mary; 
Mary wanted something. 
Mary intended to move the brick. 
Mary did not intend to use the trowel. 
(technical details as before) 
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These representations follow those given in 6.31 in that accidentally 
is represented in terms of "someone not wanting something", intentionally in 
terms of "someone intending something" and ·unintentionally in terms of 
"someone not intending something". It might be thought that the fifth and 
sixth lines of (95) could be simplified into one statement that "Mary 
intended to use the trowel to move the brick", on the grounds that the 
adverb intentionally has the effect of making the entire sentence 
'intentional'. It would be misleading to do this, however, both because the 
aim is to separate out the semantic relations involved, and because it would 
suggest that sentence (93)c could be partially represented in terms of "Mary 
did not intend to use the trowel to move the brick". Contrary to the 
meaning of (93)c, this partial representation does not entail that Mary 
intended to move the brick. 
6.4 Aspects of Instrumental Action 
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This section proposes what it means for something to be an instru-
mental sentence. This it does by exploring in terms of notions such as 
movement, contact, and causation, the relationships between the agent and 
the instrumental object and between this instrumental object and the object 
which can be thought of as being affected by it. 
This section provides a discussion of the following topics. After pre-
senting a proposal for the instrumental notion itself, there is a discussion 
of action sentences which can take no instruments(6.42) and of the range of 
action sentences with which instrumental expressions may occur(6.43). Then 
follows an examination of the meanings of instrumental action sentences 
from the point of view of what they entail concerning contact(6.44), 
movement(6.45), chains of causation(6.46) and the notion of contro1(6.47). 
The section relates in particular to the second aim of the thesis, viz., 
that concerned with challenging the alleged semantic primitivity of the 
instrumental notion. There were two components involved in substantiating 
this aim. The first were the arguments in Chapters Three to Five that the 
instrumental categories that had been variously proposed fell short of 
semantic primitivity. This section, building on sections 6.2 and 6.3, pro-
vides the second component, viz., through an examination of instrumental 
action sentences in terms of various semantic notions (none of which are 
themselves semantically primitive), a decomposition in effect of the 
semantic notion 'instrument'. 
r 
6.41 The Instrumental Notion 
What does it mean to say that something is an instrw-nental action 
13 
sentence? I suggest that an instrumental action sentence describes a 
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situation in which someone, wanting some effect in the world, does something 
which has an effect on some part of the world which is not directly under 
the influence of his own will. The instrumental object in this context is 
that which mediates between the agent's will and those other parts of the 
world not subject to the agent's will. In this regard, the agent's body is 
both that object in the world which is directly subject to what the agent 
wants, and also an instrumental object with which the agent can change the 
world. Through the movement of the mediating object, the agent thus manip-
ulates the world in accordance with what he wants, although as we have seen 
the agent does not always bring about with this object the effect which he 
wants. 
6.42 Basic Actions 
In 1.53 and 5.52 I drew attention to the semantic description of so-
called 'basic action' sentences in which someone does something(e.g. move an 
arm) without first doing anything else, rejecting along with Dowty accounts 
which postulate a causal relationship between the agent's will and his 
bodily movement. These notes illuminate basic action sentences from the 
point of view of the instrumental proposal at 6.41. 
This pro_p:)sal provides an explanation· for the unacceptability of the 
following sentences. 
(97) a. *Mary lay down with her back. 
b. *Fred flexed his arms with his muscles. 
c. *John yawned with his mouth. 
d. *Mary smiled using her face. 
e. *John stood up with his legs. 
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If one's body is what one can immediately influence(i.e. move) as one wants, 
there is no place for any instrumental object mediating between what one 
14 wants and the consequent movement of part of one's body. Hence the 
unacceptability of the above sentences. Were they acceptable, they would 
entail inter alia a causal relation between something happening, for example 
in (97)c, to John's mouth and his yawning. This proposal also explains why 
sentences of (97) but without their instrumental adverbs cannot occur with 
the adverb accidentally. Thus: 
(98) a. *Mary accidentally lay down. 
b. *Fred accidentally flexed his arm. 
The reason is that there is no intervening stage between will and movement 
where a 'slip' could occur, and further, what would it mean to say that my 
basic actions were accidental? 
But such a causal relation exists even less in the sentences above 
taken without the instrumental adverbs (witness the unacceptability of 
Fred's doing something caused his arms to flex as a paraphrase of Fred 
flexed his arms). It was because there was no causal paraphrase for 
sentences describing basic actions that in 1.51 and 1.53 I rejected a 
semantic representation which related causal ly what the agent wanted and 
what was happening to the agent's body(i.e. moving). A sentence such as 
John caused his left hand to move is not a description of a directly influ-
enced movement of the agent's body, but rather of an instrumentally caused 
movement, as shown by the possibility of adding, for example, the expression 
by pushing it with a ruler. The instrumentally caused movement is signalled 
rather more transparently in the sentence John moved his left hand with his 
right hand. 
6.43 The Extent of Instrumental Action 
Basic action situations apart, it follows from this proposal that all 
physical action situations where the agent manipulates the external world 
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assume something that can be thought of as an instrument. Sentences des-
cribing physical action support this through providing either an explicit 
instrumental phrase or a syntactic position where an instrumental adverb 
could be added. 
In this respect, consider the following sentences where there are no 
overt instrumental adverbs. 
(99) a. John bent the spoon. 
b. Mary hit the cricket ball. 
c. Fred was touching the wet paint. 
Now whereas, for example in (99)a, John can move parts of his body merely 
by wanting it(e.g. thereby smiling, frowning, raising an arm, etc.), he 
cannot bring about the desired change to the spoon merely by wanting it. 
Thus: 
(100) a. *John bent the spoon with his will. 
b. *John's will bent the spoon. 
There must be something which John's body(moved by his will) brings into 
contact with the spoon, and whose movements cause the bending of the spoon. 
That something is required(it could be part of John's body or an external 
object such as pliers) is supported by entailment evidence such as the 
following. 
(101) a. *John bent the spoon but he didn't bend it with anything. 
b. *John bent the spoon but he didn't do anything to the 
spoon with anything. 
Similarly, the remaining sentences of (99) would all entail some object 
providing a bridge between the agent's will and the effect sought. 
6.44 Contact 
Another consequence of the proposal outlined in 6.41 is that in instru-
mental action there is always contact between the agent and the instrument, 
and between the instrument h b . t 15 and t e o Jee . As far as agent and 
instrument are concerned, this contact may be of one of two kinds: the 
agent's body may be in contact with the instrumental object, as in: 
(102) a. John cut the apple with a knife. 
b. Mary strangled the tomcat with some old wire. 
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or the agent's will may be thought of as being in contact with part of the 
agent's body. Infelicitous as this sounds, since it scarcely needs asser-
tion, it seems necessary to account for sentences such as the following, 
where part of the agent's body becomes his instrument. 
(103) a. John nudged Mary with his elbow. 
b. Fred pulled the plug out with his toes. 
It is worth noting that even in sentences (102)a-b there would still be 
some body part of the agent involved, even though an instrumental phrase 
already exists. This body part instrument could be expressed explicitly, 
e.g., 
(104) a. John cut the apple with a knife with his bandaged right hand. 
b. John used his damaged right hand to cut the apple with a knife. 
and it would certainly be expressed in a semantic representation for the 
sentence. Thus the technical section of the semantic representation for 
sentence (102)a would refer to part of John's body which was in contact with 
the knife moving, and part of the knife which was in contact with the apple 
moving into the apple because of that, etc. (see Chapter Seven for detailed 
representations for verbs of cutting). To generalise, whenever an object 
external to the agent's body is used instru..~entally, part of the agent's 
body is also involved. It is because of these dependencies that some 
linguists(e.g. Nilsen 1973) have referred to body part instruments as 
primary instruments and to instrumental objects external to the agent's body 
as secondary instruments. 
With respect to the instrumental object (be it body part or other) and 
the object affected, there must again be contact between them for instru-
mental action to occur. 
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(105) a. *John cut the apple with a knife, but the knife didn't come 
into contact with the apple. 
b. *Mary strangled the tomcat with some old wire, and 10 minutes 
later the wire touched the tomcat for the first time. 
c. *Fred shot his mother-in-law with a Smith and Weston, but 
nothing that could be thought of as a part of the Smith and 
Weston came into contact with his mother-in-law. 
Observe that sentence (l0S)c with shot at instead of shot would be accept-
able, since shoot at does not entail any contact. 
But if contact is necessary, what about psychokinesis, the production 
of physical motion in some object external to the body merely by willing it? 
While I suggested a representation along these lines in 6.23 for the 
sentence God killed the rats with fire, psychokinetic action goes against 
that part of the proposal for non-paranormal instrumental action which says 
that some part of the agent's body must be involved in instrumental action. 
But sentences describing events such as Geller's bending a spoon without 
touching it are consistent with other instrumental sentences to the degree 
that they entail that aomething(electromagnetic forces? 16 ) comes into 
contact with the spoon. 
Since a with NP sentence generallyentails that the instrumental object 
itself comes into contact(or can be thought of as coming into contact) with 
the affected object, one can predict the unacceptability of sentence (106)a 
below. One just cannot think of a person's will acting directly on anything 
external to his body, and it is surely too much to ask that we think of a 
person's will as a part of his body. Sentence (106)b, however, is accept-
able, for what acts on the spoon here are the so-called 'forces', and it is 
these which are activated by the agent's will. 17 
(106) a. *Geller bent the spoon with his will. 
b. Geller bent the spoon with electromagnetic forces activated 
by his will. 
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Other sentences, acceptable to the extent that they don't exclude an 
instrumental object intermediate between the agent's will and the spoon, 
describing 'spoon-bending' are the following. 
(107) a. Geller used his will to bend the spoon. 
b. Geller bent the spoon by willing it to bend. 
c. Geller caused the spoon to bend. 
Notice that (107)a is more acceptable than (106)a. This follows from the 
fact that, as shown in 5.23, the NP object slot after use can be filled by 
objects which do not directly come into contact with the affected object, 
unlike the situation in with NP sentences where the NP following with is 
represented b y objec t s which can be though t of, at least, as coming into 
contact with that a f f ec ted object. 
Finally, note that will and willpower are not identical in meaning, 
the latter(a force which manifests someone's will?) suggesting a force 
which may indeed transcend the agent's body. Because the term willpower 
has this quasi-physical sense which the term will lacks, its substitution 
for will in the above sentences may improve their acceptability for some 
speakers. 
6.45 Movement in Instrumental Action 
What can be said about the participants in an instrumental action 
situation with respect to movement? The situation described in 6.41 
suggests that the movement of the non-instrumental object is not a 
necessary feature of instrumental action. This seems to be the case, for 
while the object may move(sentences (108)a-c below), the fact that it does 
not in the remaining sentences eliminates object movement as a character-
istic part of instrumental action. 
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(108) a. John pushed the table against the wall with his feet. 
b. Fred stirred the mixture with a wooden spoon. 
c. Mary tightened the fitting with a screwdriver. 
d. John carved the meat with a rusty sabre. 
e. Fred hit the wall with his cricket bat. 
f. Mary touched her diamond with the fountain pen. 
With respect to movement and the agent, it will be recalled that the 
discussion of physical action in 1.53 provided that in 'doing something 
somewhere' there is always some movement of the agent. While this seems 
unassailable in the majority of cases, and accords with the proposal for 
instrumental action where the agent wants some effect and moves his own body 
to achieve this effect either directly, or indirectly through the movements 
of another object, what about where the agent does not appear to move but is 
obviously doing something? The following sentences describe such a 
situation. 
(109) a. John was supporting the plank with his right hand. 
b. Mary used a string bag to hold her textbooks. 
Verbs occurring in sentences describing such situations include 
support, hold, restrain, etc. I suggest that they can be represented in the 
following way in terms of the agent's "being thought of as moving". Granted 
that the notion of gravitational force underlies the meaning of support, 
Xis supporting Y could be represented in brief as "because of what Xis 
doing, Y is not becoming closer to the earth 11 • And what is X doing? I 
propose that Xis exerting a force on Y and because of that Y is not becom-
ing closer to the earth. The following representation expresses this, with 
'force' being rewritten as before in terms of parts of something being 
thought of as becoming where something else is. Thus, omitting unnecessary 
detail: 
(110) John was supporting the plank with his right hand. 
John wanted something. 
Parts of John's right hand which were in contact with the 
plank could be thought of as becoming being where parts of 
the plank were; 
because of that, the plank was not becoming closer to the 
earth. 
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This suggested representation does not preempt the possible spatial 
positions of X and Yin relation to the earth. Thus X may be above Y 
(support by suspension), below Y, or to the side of Y(cantilevered support). 
Notice that these are the same relative positions with respect to which one 
can say that something is heavy, heavy being another word whose meaning 
assumes the notion of gravity. The heart of this suggestion is that because 
a force is exerted on Y by X, Y does not move closer to the earth. Nothing 
is said, however, about Y's movement in any other direction. 
In this regard, I suggest there is a contrast with the verb hold, as in 
sentence (109)b. Whereas support refers to a one-dimensional restraint on 
an object's potential movement(a bed supports one's body, and one supports 
growing plants to prevent them from falling and breaking), hold seems to 
refer to omnidirectional spatial restraint. The held object remains 
spatially contiguous with that which holds. Thus one has not failed to 
support an injured bird if it flies away from one's hand, but one has failed 
to hold a cat, for instance, if it jumps out of one's arms. My tentative 
suggestion for hold is therefore: 
(111) 
= 
Xis holding Y. 
Parts of X which were in contact with Y 
could be thought of as becoming being where parts of Y were; 
because of that, Y was not (in brief) moving away from X. 
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Finally, consider movement and the instrumental object. Must the 
latter always move? Where the instrumental object is part of the agent's 
body, the answer of the previous paragraphs applies. Where this is not the 
case, the answer is more complex. Movement of the instrumental object is 
entailed in instrumental sentences containing with NP, as a consequence of 
the fact that the agent is doing something with the instrumental object. 
That this is so may be seen from the readings which this construction 
places on sentences which contain an object not normally thought of 
instrumentally. Thus: 
(112) a. Mary broke the window with the clothesline. 
b. Fred knocked my feet with the grand piano. 
c. John cut himself with the garage. 
d. Johnny scratched his arm with the tractor. 
To make these sentence acceptable, one has to assume that the instrumental 
objects are of such a nature, e.g. perhaps toys in (112)c-d, that the agent 
can do something with them. 
The use NP to sentence, as we have seen in 5.23, can express a wider 
range of situations than the with NP sentence. While it can express a 
moving instrumental object(Johnny used the tractor to scratch his arm), 
movement is not automatically entailed. Thus: 
(113) a. Mary used a sharp tree stump to perforate the polythene. 
b. Fred used the garage roof to dry out the tarpaulin. 
An important point to note, however, is that where the instrumental object 
does not move, there is always some movement of the affected object. Thus 
in (113)a the polythene is moving relative to the stump, and in (113)b some 
liquid which can be thought of as being part of the tarpaulin is moving out 
of the tarpaulin(becoming being a part of something else). 
This discussion of the movement of object and instrumental object would 
be incomplete without a mention of the preposition on. Compared with the 
preposition with, on significantly restructures the relative movement of 
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object and instrumental object. For details, see Chapter Eight. 
6.46 Chains of Causation 
In various parts of this work(3.42 and 5.23) attention has been drawn 
to the so-called chains of causation, which provide a causal, 'accordion' 
effect between what the agent does and what happens to the object. Examples 
include Davidson's(1971,17) oft-quoted example of a man who swings a bat 
which hits a ball which breaks a window, and Nilsen's(l973,103) sentence: 
(114) John caused his finger to cause the trigger to cause the gun 
to cause the bullet to cause the wound that caused Bill to die. 
Fillmore has suggested(see discussion 3.42) that as far as descriptions 
of causal chains are concerned, the grammar of simple sentences containing 
with NP phrases permits mention only of the most immediate instrumental 
cause. Hence (115) is unacceptable as a description of the situation 
Davidson mentions. 
( 115) *The man broke the window with the baseball bat. 
In 5.23 I complemented this observation by showing that the object of use in 
a use NP to sentence may select any object instrumentally involved in the 
causal chain. Thus: 
(116) The man used the baseball bat to break the window. 
Notice now a distinct polarisation of instruments in sentences which 
explicitly identify two instruments. The occurrence of these two instru-
ments is highly restricted according to their relative causal proximity to 
agent and object. Consider the following sentences. 
(117) a. The man used the baseball bat to break the window with the ball. 
b. *The man used the ball to break the window with the baseball 
bat. · 
(118) a. The man broke the window with the baseball bat, using the ball. 
b. *The man broke the window with the baseball bat, using the balL 
(119) a. The man broke the window with the ball with the baseball bat. 
b. *The man broke the window with the baseball bat with the ball. 
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These sentences reveal that in descriptions of causal chain situations the 
with NP phrase within the sentence describing what happens to the object 
again selects that instrument whose movements come closest to causing the 
event involving the object, while the verb use, or the second with NP 
phrase, selects that instrument closest to the agent. 18 A sentence like 
(117)a thus provides a more transparent representation than a simple 
sentence containing with NP of the instrumental action situation, tracing 
a path from the agent, at one end, through the instrument more immediate 
to the agent to the object and the instrument closest to the object. A 
perfect linear representation would need to follow the sequence: agent-
instrument-instrument-object. The sentence nearest to this seems to be 
(120)a below. 
(120) a. The man used a bat and a ball to break the window. 
b. ?The man used a ball and a bat to break the window. 
A special case of causal chains involves sentences such as the follow-
ing which describe so-called 'material' instruments, where someone does 
something with something thought of as a substance, e.g. puts substance X 
on Y(sugar on cereal, water on the garden, lacquer on hair}, or puts 
b · (' k . 1 ' ) 19 tl th 1 su stance X in Yin in a pen, petro in car. Exac y e same se ec-
tional restrictions as were mentioned above apply here. 
(121} a. John used a spade to fill the bucket with sand. 
b. *John used sand to fill the bucket with a spade. 
(122} a. John filled the bucket with sand with the spade. 
b. *John filled the bucket with the spade with sand. 
This account provides an explanation for the acceptability of the two 
sentences below, despite the unacceptability of sentence (117)b and (12l)b, 
respectively, above. 
(123} a. The man used the ball to break the window. 
b. John used sand to fill the bucket. 
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Where only one instrument is expressed, the verb~ may select an instru-
mental object from across the causal chain(hence sentences (123)a-b above). 
But when two instrumental objects are chosen, they must be sequenced, 
rearranged if necessary, to reflect the restrictions mentioned above(hence 
the unacceptability of sentences (117)b and (12l)b, respectively. 
As far as semantic representation is concerned, sentences must be 
examined individually to determine whether any causal chains are represented 
and how any such causal chains should be expressed semantically. Because 
causal relations in physical action have to do with one object influencing 
another object with which it is(or can be thought of as being) in contact, 
discussion of the representation of causal chains often reduces to a deter-
mination of which objects are in contact with which. In this regard, there 
is one link in the causal chain which, as we have already noted in 6.43 and 
6.44, is not always made explicit. This involves the necessary(psycho-
kinesis apart) movement of parts of the agent's body, this movement through 
contact causing the movement of something else. Thus in representing the 
meanings of the sentences of (102) and (103) it is necessary to refer to the 
movements of part of the respective agent's body, even though the surface 
structure conceals their causal involvement. 
I have already mentioned in this chapter two sentences which involve 
causal ellipsis between the instrumental object and the affected object. 
To represent their respective meanings I proposed using the expression "be 
thought of as a part of". Hence in senten·ce (90) it is something that can 
be thought of as a part of the trowel(e.g. anything which is supported by 
the trowel and which holds the brick) that is in contact with the brick. 
Similarly in (105)a the object which hits the mother-in-law can be thought 
of as a part of the Smith and Weston. 
I do not propose, however, that all possible causal chains should be 
fully explicated. Thus in (l0S)a again, although the movement of the 
trigger causes numerous causally related movements of internal parts of the 
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gun, culminating in the discharge of the bullet, I suggest that this complex 
chain within the gun between trigger movement and bullet movement should be 
encapsulated in terms of the trigger being thought of as being in contact 
. 
with something that ~sin contact with the bullet. The moving trigger thus 
causes movements of this other part of the gun, whose movements cause the 
bullet to move (I mention without elaboration the possibility of further 
causal chains operating within the bullet between the gun part's movement 
and that of the bullet). 
Drawing these comments together, sentence (lOS)a might be represented 
as follows, omitting unnecessary details and leaving undecomposed the term 




Fred shot his mother-in-law with a Smith and Weston. 
Fred wanted something. 
Parts of his body which were in contact with the trigger 
of the Smith and Weston moved; 
because of that the trigger, which could be thought of as 
being in contact with something that was in contact with 
the bullet, moved; 
because of that this something that was in contact with 
the bullet rroved, 
because of that the bullet moved until it penetrated his 
20 
mother-in- law's body. 
The notion of control frequently enters descriptions of action sent-
ences. For example, Thalberg(l972), without defining the notion of control, 
uses what he calls 'control' terms('deliberately', 'intentionally') and 
'loss of control' terms(e.g. 'unwillingly', 'unintentionally') as a 
criterion for action verbs. Dowty(l972b,17) partially glosses his semantic 
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predicate for agency, viz. DO, in terms of "immediate controllability", 
and Shibatani(l975,65) uses the notion of control as a contrasting term to 
'ballistic', to characterise causal action in which the causing object 
remains in control of an object throughout the period of causation. 
('Ballistic' causation refers to causal action where the causing object 
provides only an initial causal impulse.) In his case grammar treatment of 
the semantics of instrumental sentences, Nilsen makes extensive use of the 
notion of control, bifurcating it into two semantic features CONTROLLER and 
CONTROLLED. As shown in page 146, Nilsen's Tool Instrumental case has the 
features +cONTROLLER and +CONTROLLED, representing that nouns in this case 
refer to objects which both control something, and are controlled by 
someone or something. 
I have already commented in some detail in 4.43 on Nilsen's proposal, 
suggesting tentatively that 'control' might be represented along the follow-
ing lines: Xis controlling Y ="Xis doing with Y what X wants to do". 
In this section therefore I briefly point out three reasons why I have not 
incorporated this notion into my description of instrumental sentences. 
First, the notion of control seems to me to be inseparably linked 
with that of agency, involving what someone wants or intends, someone doing 
something, and causally related events. While Thalberg and Dowty recognise 
a strong relationship between agency and control, neither Nilsen nor 
. . 21 Shibatani reflect this relationship in their respective accounts. Any 
attempt to incorporate the notion of control into instrumental sentence 
representations must not, therefore, be made a separate exercise from 
representing agency. 
Secondly, if a notion of control were asserted to exist between agent 
and instrument, or between instrument and object, it would result in 
unacceptable interpretations for instrumental sentences such as the 
following. 
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(125) a. John cut his finger with a knife. 
b. John accidentally cut his finger with a knife. 
But if control can be represented as I suggested earlier, it is clearly 
inappropriate to assert this in the semantic representations of sentences 
such as (125)a, which are vague as to whether the agent wanted what 
happened, or (125)b, which assert that the agent did not want what 
happened(i.e. the agent wanted something, but could not be said to have 
controlled what happened). Hence the unacceptability of the following. 
(126) *John accidentally cut his finger with a knife. It therefore 
follows that John was doing what he wanted with the knife. 
Since, in my opinion, any notion of control is an entailment, flowing 
out of the meaning of the whole sentence rather than being something one 
can predicate of individual participants in the situation, I prefer to 
work with the notions of contact, movement, causation and someone wanting 
something, although the term 'control' (or its representation) might provide 
a generalised semantic description for an otherwise difficult to describe 
sentence. For example, while the representation of X pushed Y requires 
only contact between X and Y for X's movement to cause Y's movement, 
X pulled Y requires more than mere contact(e.g. a coupling, lock, magnetic 
or other force). Now the term 'control' could globally cover what the 
situation needed, but it does not at all clarify any of the details 
involved. With respect to X pulled YI presently favour a representation 
in terms of X exerting a force on Y, along the lines suggested in the 
representation for sentence (111). The following representations show the 
semantic asymmetry of the sentences Xis pushing Y and Xis pulling Y. 
(127) 
= 
Xis pushing Y. 
Y is moving because X, which is in contact with Y, is 




Xis pulling Y. 
Because X, parts of which can be thought of as becoming being 
where parts of Y are, is moving, 
Y is becoming a part of parts of that place where X was. 
Rather than assert control between any of the participants in an 
instrumental sentence, therefore, I choose to refer to what happens in 
terms of such notions as contact, movement, causation and what the agent 
wants, etc., and to let the rather unhelpful notion of control flow, if it 
will, out of the meaning of the sentence as a whole. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has attempted to provide an integrated approach to the 
semantic representation of instrumental sentences. Drawing on remarks made 
in earlier chapters concerning other accounts of instrumental sentences, it 
has proposed an alternative description in terms of the semantic theory 
outlined in Chapter Two. Subsequent chapters will assume rather than 
develop the basic framework of this chapter in their investigations of more 
specific instrumental expressions. 
In three major sections the c hapter has sought, respectively, to give 
effect(through semantic representations) to the claim that instrumental 
sentences entail an agent, to examine the nature of what the agent can be 
said to want or to intend in relation to various instrumental sentences, 
and to identify some of the semantic notions involved in the instrumental 
action itself. 
Taking these three together, it appears that instrumental sentences 
make reference at least to someone who wants something, to movement, to 
contact, and to causation. Without claiming that these few elements com-
pletely define the instrumental notion (they are, after all, not all 
semantically primitive, and there may well be other semantic elements which 
the present analysis has failed to detect), the semantic representations of 
11111.-
282 
instrumental sentences in terms of these semantic elements do show the 
essential decomposability of the semantically complex instrumental notion. 
283 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 
111 Successive" rather than "different", I suggest, because the latter 
carries some implication of multi-directional dispersal in the context of 
"becoming a part of different parts of a place". While "successive" could 
be employed with this 'ripples in the pond' interpretation, its linear 
interpretation seems sufficiently well-accepted for selection over 
"different". If the notion of different parts is also required, the term 
"successive" would seem doubly suitable, for 'successive parts' entails 
parts which are not the same, whereas 'different parts' does not entail 
parts which are successive. Of course, "successive" is not claimed to be a 
semantic primitive. 
2
consider first the static situation represented in the sentence 
A is c loser to Y than B, for which situation the following are diagrammatic 
representations. 
y 
B A y A y 
B 
(i) A is closer to Y than B. 
A. = The distance from A to Y is less than from B to~ 
B 
B. = The places which someone would move through moving from A to Y 
can be thought of as a part of the places which someone would 
move through moving from B t o Y. 
C. The places which someone who was a part of A would become a 
part of, wanting to become a part of Y, can be thought of as a 
part of the places which someone who was a part of B would 
become a part of, wanting to become a part of Y. 
The expression "places", it should be remembered, is not a primitive, 
but could be represented further using the term "world". Another simplifica-
tion in the above which should be mentioned is that the expression "someone 
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who was a part of A" should be represented as "someone who could be thought 
of as being a part of A". Thus a fly in the milk is not a part of the milk, 
but can certainly be thought of as a part of the milk. Similarly, John 
walking through the supermarket can be thought of as being a part of the 
supermarket without exactly being part of it. 
This representation would form the basis for the representation of the 
sentence Xis moving closer to Y, where at one moment Xis closer to Y than 
at the immediately preceding moment. Notice, however, that the sentence 
describes only one path traced towards Y; the situation is thus that repre-
sented in the lefthand diagram above, where X can be thought of as moving 
from B to A. Thus: 
(ii) Xis moving closer to Y. 
A. = 
B. = 
X, who is a part of some place(B), is becoming a part of 
another place{A) which is closer to Y than the first place {B). 
X, who is a part of some place{B), is becoming a part of 
another place(A) which someone who is a part of the first place 
(B) would become a part of, wanting to become a part of Y. 
There are two, non-identical versions here. I am not sure which is prefer-
able. Version A simply 'plugs in' at the right spot the representation for 
A is closer to Y than B. Version B describes the special case in which the 
two reference positions for the term "closer" are both passed through by X. 
3A representation of the technical specification here might run along 
the following lines, assuming that shell means something like 'remove the 
outer part from something'. Thus: 
A. Because the squirrel's teeth, which were in contact with 
the nut, were exerting force on the nut, 
the outer part of the nut was becoming separate from the nut. 
!i 
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B. = Because the squirrel's teeth, which were in contact with the 
nut, 
could be thought of as becoming being where parts of the nut 
were, 
the outer part of the nut was becoming something 
that could not be thought of as the nut. 
Several conunents are in order on this representation. First, it assumes 
that the squirrel exerts some force in separating shell from nut proper. 
Version A indicates this force as "force", while version B attempts to decom-
pose this notion in terms of displacement (viz., in terms of something that 
can be thought of as becoming being where something else is). Section 6.22 
discusses this notion in more detail. Secondly, the thrust of the last line 
of Bis that the shell is something that can be detached from the nut itself, 
and, so-detached, cannot be thought of as being the nut. The shell can 
certainly be thought of as being a part of the whole nut(i.e. shell and nut 
proper). 
4
one piece of evidence that might aid a decision here is that, whereas 
one can say something about the instruments in sentences (2) and (12) 
respectively, viz., the following: 
(i) a. The twig touched the window. 
b. The stone broke the window. 
one cannot use this type of expression for the body part instruments in e.g. 
sentences (13)e and f. 
(ii) a. ?The squirrel's teeth were shelling the nut. 
b. *The snake's fangs attacked the dog. 
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5Notice, however, that the sentence does not assert that the wall (or 
part of it) moves as a result of the impact. (Contrast this with sentences 
containing move in 6.3). What is asserted is that the box comes into 
contact with the wall and has some effect on it; it is the box's movement 
which is focussed on, not any consequential movement of the wall. The 
semantic representation attempts to capture this by its reference to parts 
of the box becoming being where parts of the wall were; it does not assert 
that parts of the wall are becoming being anywhere. 
6For some discussion of the meaning of sentences containing break see 
Fillmore 1970 and Wierzbicka 1973b. The latter's tentative suggestion for 
the sentence The tree broke is the following. 
( i) 
= 
The tree broke . 
. Some parts of the tree, after having been becoming 
thinkable of as not being parts of one tree, 
were thinkable of as not being parts of one tree. 
The meaning of break involves more than mere changes in surface appearances 
(Fillmore 1970). Thus if the skin on my finger gets broken, my finger is 
not thereby broken, but only the s kin(i.e., something that can be thought of 
as one entity). A scratched plate, similarly, is not a broken plate. 
Conversely, something may be broken without any externally visible signs(e.g. 
my leg). 
Notice that, unlike sentence (19)a, sentence (19)b carries no assertion 
that the hammer moved into contact with the window. The representation thus 
commences with the causal event which results in the window breaking, viz., 
that in which the hammer can be thought of as displacing the window. 
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7The following comments should assist in interpreting representation 
(29). First, the terms "contact" and "move" will not be further decomposed 
unless critical to the semantic representation concerned. Next, the last 
line is shown as "the door moved" not as "parts of the door" because we say 
The door opened not Parts of the door opened. Third, the door's moving 
does not cause the door to be open - it is opening the door. Fourthly, the 
expression "move through the door" is obviously inadequate, both in that 
one moves through or between a doorway("place where the door has been"?) 
not through or between a door, and also because the meanings of "through" 
and "between" are quite complex in ways that need not delay us here. Nor 
does open involve someone being able to go inside something, as the 
incongruity of opening, say, the front door and going outside should reveal. 
Finally, the last line does not continue with a specification of what some 
agent might want(cf. the representations for sentences with closer), perhaps 
in terms of "wanting to become a part of places on the other side of the 
door". The reason for the omission is simply that many non-agentive things 
(e.g. water, steam, grain) may pass through passages that are said to be 
open. 
8
wierzbicka(1973b) suggests that the sentence Bill was dying might be 
represented as below. 
( i) 
= 
Bill was dying. 
... The something that could be thought of as Bill was 
becoming something that could not be thought of as Bill. 
This version, which draws on the fact that a person's body is often referred 
to as the person himself, is also limited, it seems, with respect to repre-
senting the death of lower animals such as plants. Such objects cannot be 
thought of as something else, in the way, for example, that John's body can 
be thought of as John. 
911 Blotter 11 is of course a complex term. If it means something like 
'paper made for drying something' (i.e. 'causing there to be no liquid on 
something'), then a possible representation for Xis a blotter might be: 
"X is paper which, coming into contact with liquid, the liquid can be 
thought of as becoming a part of". 
10Note, firstly, that although the wind may open a door either by 
pushing or by 'sucking' it open, such detail is beyond the generality of 
sentence (SO)a. Secondly, notice an interesting difference between the 
following sentences. 
(i) a. The wind opened the door. 
b. The door was opened with a key. 
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While (i)a means that the wind caused the door to move open, the second 
sentence(which I claim is an instrumental sentence for the same reasons as 
sentence (19)d) seems to imply that the door was first unlocked and then 
moved open. Because I have doubts about the generality of this interpreta-
tion of (i)b, however, my present view is that the semantic representation 
for this sentence would not contain any element having to do with 'unlocking'. 
I think the implication of unlocking arises from a combination of the factors 
mentioned in discussion of sentence (19)b. 
11Notice the levelling effect which results from predicating 
automatically of human agents and inanimate objects. Thus: 
(i) a. Mary made her bed automatically. 
b. The knife cut the bread automatically. 
Human activity ends up being somehow less than fully human(perhaps the agent 
can be thought of as not wanting anything when parts of his body move), 
whereas the inanimate objects appear to become more than merely inanimate 




Might the "will" of intend (viz. 11 thinking about X, I say I will do X") 
be represented in something like the following manner. 
(i) 
= 
I will make love to you tonight. 
The world of tonight, which the world of which I am a part 
can be thought of as becoming(can be thought of as?), is a 
world a part of which am I making love to you. 
This representation captures the assertiveness of sentence (i) by providing 
for a future time-world which is asserted to contain the said activity. 
13
The views expressed in this section are unexceptional philosophically. 
For similar viewpoints see Hampshire(l959), and Wierzbicka(l967). 
14 h . . 11 h . T ere is an interesting para el ere between on the one hand basic 
actions and instrumental action, and on the other hand saying something to 
oneself and saying something to someone else. In 2.22 it was claimed that 
the verb~ represented a semantic primitive "say", a verb of mental 
saying. Consider now the following sentences. 
(i) a. I moved my arm. 
b. *I moved my arm with my muscles(*will). 
(ii) a. I moved Fred's arm. 
b. I moved Fred's arm with my hand. 
(iii) a. I said something to myself. · 
b. *I used the phone (*a letter) to say something to myself. 
(iv) a. I said something to Fred. 
b. I used the phone (a letter) to say something to Fred. 
Such examples tend to confirm the postulation of a mental verb "say". Just 
as in basic physical action I do not use anything to cause my body to move, 
so in 'basic' speech act situations I do not require any mediating instrument 




"Touch, and not sight, is primitively the most authoritative of the 
senses, the natural criterion of physical reality, just because acting 
upon objects necessarily involves touching, the contact of my body 
with the resisting body that is not my own." 
16 h . 1 · d . . T us in an Austra ian Broa casting Corporation Radio 2 program(24 
September 1975) devoted to discussing Uri Geller's feats a Dr David Ellyard 
reported that he was trying to measure the strong, electromagnetic forces 
("emissions") which operated on the objects Geller worked with. Cf. also the 
the terms used to describe Geller' s actions in "Uri Geller: The Mind Bender ,11 
Woman's Day, Feb.4,1974,4-7: "He could bend spoons just by concentrating on 
them." "People can really bend metal by mind power." "He learnt that watch 
hands moved when he wished them to move." 
17
rn cases of psychokinesis, does the agent's will cause the forces to 
move, or do they move, so to speak, merely in his wanting it? The dilennna 
is not quite the same as the normal basic actions paradigm. 
18 It seems to me that this account explains more adequately than Nilsen's 
'appropriateness' criterion the relative acceptability markings for his two 
sentences (1973,111): 
(i) a. *He painted his house with a spray gun and red paint. 
b. He used a squirt gun and acid to blind the bank teller. 
19Notice the following differences between the so-called material instru-
ments and other instrumental objects. First, they are not in semantic 
contrast, since one can always add to a material instrument sentence another 
instrumental expression. 
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(i) a. *He filled the bucket with sand with dirt. 
b. *He filled the bucket with a spade with a shovel. 
c. He filled the bucket with sand with a spade. 
Second, unlike other instrumental sentences we have seen, an instrumental 
sentence containing a material with NP phrase can be passivised in two ways. 
(i) a. Mary loaded the Kornbi with grog. 
b. The Kornbi was loaded with grog. 
c. Grog was loaded into the Kornbi. 
(ii) a. Mary cleaned the Kornbi with a chamois. 
b. The Kornbi was cleaned with a chamois. 
c. *A chamois was cleaned onto(?) the Kornbi. 
Third, material instrumental nouns are primarily mass nouns, although there 
may be instances of 'secondary recategorisation' (Lyons 1969,282) in some 
contexts. For example, 
(i) a. John sprinkled the salad with oil. 
b. John sprinkled the salad with two different oils. 
Finally, there is a productive paraphrase relationship for most material 
instrumental sentences, arising perhaps because most sentences can be para-
phrased in terms of one of 'put X on Y', 'put X into Y', or 'put X around Y'. 
Thus: 
(i) a. John rubbed Mary's leg with liniment. 
b. John rubbed liniment on Mary's leg. 
(ii) a. Mary packed the caravan with supplies. 
b. Mary packed supplies into the caravan. 
(iii) a. Fred screened his house with fences. 
b. Fred put fences around his house. 
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20Note that the representation for the sentence Fred shot at his 
mother-in-law with a Smith and Weston would differ in that there would be an 
elaboration of what John wanted ("the bullet to penetrate his mother-in-law's 
body"?), and the technical details would not assert that the bullet did 
penetrate her body, but perhaps only that it could be thought of as coming 
near her. 
21Thus, in addition to the features CONTROLLER and CONTROLLED, Nilsen 
employs two other features having to do with the characterisation of agency, 
viz. INTENT and CAUSE. Shibatani, in addition to his cryptotypic features 
BALLISTIC and CONTROLLED (related in that OC. BALLISTIC ___,. - "" CONTROLLED) , 
employs the following additional features, most of which would appear to 
overlap in the characterisation of agency: MANIPULATIVE, referring to 
causation in which the 'causer' physically manipulates something; DIRECT, 
referring to causation in which the causer directly causes something: DO, 
referring to indirect causation; VOLITIONAL, for where someone does some-
thing 'volitionally'; and the predicate feature CAUSE. Independent of any 
of the above, there are two noun-like units: AGENT and PATIENT. 
.. -• 
Chapter Seven 
I NSTRUMENTAL INCORPORATION 
7.1 General 
The aim of this ch pter is to investigate the semantics of a particular 
type of instrumental sentence, viz., that in which the instrument is said to 
be 'incorporated' in t he meaning of the sentence verb. For example, the 
verbs in the following sentences 'incorporate' respectively in their 
meanings the items shown in parentheses. 
(1) a. Mary kissed John. (lips) 
b. Fred winked at the barmaid. (eye) 
c. Tom rowed across the stream. (oars) 
d. Jane saddled her pony. (saddle) 
e. Bill ph otographed the aging president. (camera) 
f. Florence watered her primulas. (water) 
This section provides some general remarks on the nature of incorpora-
tion and t he range of incorporated instruments. Later sections will examine 
in detail sentences r epresenting different types of instrumental incorpora-
tion. 
Al t hough instrume ntal incorporation has attracted considerable dis-
cussion other varieties of incorporation have also been noted, particularly 
within case grammar s tudies.
1 
Thus Lambert instances the following kinds of 
verb incorporation, with the 'a' sen tence in each pair representing the 
post-incorporation s e ntence and the 1 b 1 s entence her suggested pre-
incorporation s e n t ence . 
. 1 . t· 2 Materia incorpora ion: 
(2 ) a. I buttered the bread with a k nife. 
b. I spread the butter o n the bread with a knife. 
Locative incorporation: 
(3) a. She boxed flowers for a living. 




(4) a. He upped the price of tobacco after the budget. 
b. He put the price of tobacco up after the budget. 
Temporal incorporation: 
(5) a. Jane surranered in Italy. 
b. Jane spent the summer in Italy. 
Manner incorporation: 
(6) a. John limped into the room. 
b. John came into the room with a limp. 
and Object or 'Patient' incorporation: 
(7) Margaret was still eating when we arrived. 
where eat incorporates the notion of food. 
This last-mentioned type of incorporation has been discussed 
extensively by Gruber(l965;1967). 
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'Instrumental incorporation' should be understood in this chapter as 
referring to the presence in the meaning of the sentence verb of a meaning 
component referring to an instrument, or to a property of an instrument, for 
which the sentence has no lexicalized NP expression. For example, in (l)a 
the meaning of kissed includes a reference to the meaning component 'lips', 
while slapped in: 
(8) Mary slapped John's face. 
is an example of a verb whose meaning includes a reference to an instrument 
having a particular property: that part of the instrument which comes into 
contact with the object must be flat, or thought of as flat. 3 Note that 
this working definition carries no implication that the instrumental element 
has been moved into and adjoined to the meaning of some more basic verb. 
There are a number of ways, not necessarily mutually exclusive, of 
describing the semantic relationship between the instrument and the sentence 
verb. Lyons for instance uses the notion of 'syntagmatic interdependence 
or presupposition' to account for the semantic sense-relations holding 
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between bite and teet h, kick and foot(l968,422,428,440). Lambert and Nilsen, 
whose semantic systems find expression within the constraints of case 
grammar, conceive of instrumental incorporation as that "of a whole case 
being incorporated into a verb, or a pro-verb, with semantic as well as 
syntactic effects"(Lambert 1969,48). For example in discussing the 
sentences: 
(9) a. John shut the window with a hammer. 
b. John hammered the window shut. 
Lambert says that the Instrumental case expression with a hammer in (9)a 
appears as the verb in (9)b and functions as an Instrumental-case verb. The 
former verb shut is said to appear as a Directional adverb. 
Other, theoretically less-dependent means of referring to the relation 
between an incorporated instrument and the verb include saying that certain 
verbs "are associated with" particular instruments(Langendoen 1970,80), e.g. 
with embrace, arms, with smoke, any form of burning tobacco, with punch, the 
fist; that certain verbs(e.g. hammer, nail) "make reference to" means and 
instruments(McCawley 197lb,26); that the instrument may be 'part of' the 
meaning of the verb(e.g. Fillmore 1971,379-80), as "tongue" can be said to 
be part of the meaning of the verb lick; and finally, that some objects 
"may be somehow characterized by the verb" e.g. the lips of the agent are 
characterized by the verb kiss, and cutting "presupposes" the presence of 
an object external with respect to the agent(Bogus¼awski n.d.,25). 
Verbs of instrumental incorporation, s ·ome often called simply 'instru-
mental' verbs, may be grouped according to different criteria. Three group-
ings resulting from criteria which have been explicitly or implicitly 
employed are shown below, together with member verbs. 
One classification relies on a notional, intuitive division of instru-
mental verbs into different types of 'real world' instruments, syntactic and 
semantic arguments normally being adduced in favour of the classification. 
Verbs are arranged according to whe ther their meanings include references to 
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members of the following types of instruments. 
Body Part Instruments: e.g. nod, blink, kiss, taste, lick, swallow, punch, 
crawl, kick, finger, breastfeed. 
Tool Instruments (Nilsen sub-divides this group into many classes): 
e.g. nail, button, screw, bottle, saw, shovel,~, 
chop, bulldoze, saddle, scalp, mop, vacuum, slice. 
Material Instruments (Bogus¼awski's instrumentum materiae): 
Force Instruments: 
e.g. salt, sugar, asphalt, butter,~, concrete, 
varnish, screen, glass, brick, veneer, timber. 
e.g. freeze,~, cremate, flood, light, electrocute, 
heat, cook, pressurize. 
Instruments of Motion: e.g. drive, pedal, cycle, sail, gallop,~' walk, 
paddle, ship, !_!z, bus. 
4 Object Instruments (Bogus¼awski's instrumentum obiecti): e.g. shoot, load. 
Another possible classification hinges on the degree of specificity 
with which verbs refer to an instrument in their meanings. The result of 
such a classification is a cline, one end point of which contain s verbs 
which completely specify their instrument, the other end of whic h contains 
verbs wh ich make the least specific mention of an instrument. 
Verbs with instruments completely specified: kiss, lick, look, listen, 
walk, salt, ~cle, gallop. 
Verbs with instruments partially specified: cut, write, drive, shoot, 
mop, slap. 
Verbs least specific (possibly merely 'something'): touch, hit, push, 
feed, move. 
A third possible classification of these verbs rests on the dual defin-
ing criteria of homophoneity between noun and verb and the productivity of 
certain morphological processes. For example as Mccawley has mentioned 
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(197lb,28) there appears to be a productive relat j_on between nouns denoting 
instruments that can hold things in a 'fixed co•.1figuration' (e.g. belt, nail, 
paste, glue, rivet, screw, cellotape) homopho11ous transitive verbs, and 
adjectives which are homophonous but for the addition of the past participle 
morpheme, e.g. 
(10) a. The laminates are glued together. 
b. The handrail is screwed onto the concrete. 
c. The poster is cellotaped to the roof. 
The range of verbs identified by these criteria is obviously a subgroup-
ing of all instrument-incorporating verbs, but the examination of lexical 
items in this class has attracted considerable attention, because it leads 
easily into a discussion of derivational processes(grammatical or semantic) 
that would relate identical forms. 5 In recent years the advent of trans-
formations coupled with the development of the goal of a minimal syntactic-
semantic base component have seen some semanticists(e.g. Mccawley 1971b) 
seeking for a unitary base for both homophonous forms. Attention has been 
focussed on the question whether certain lexical items are 'basically' nouns 
or verbs, with the other form transformationally derived from the first. 
Leech(l974,214), however, argues that derivational('conversion') rules 
should be formulated as bi-directional rather than uni-directional, with 
historical factors determining the particular derivational direction 
between individual parts. 
Subsequent sections of this chapter explore the meanings of several sets 
of instrument incorporating verbs. These have been selected because they 
illuminate different semantic aspects of instrumental incorporation. 
Section 7.2 concentrates on some verbs of cutting, 7.3 on the verb kiss, 
7.4 on the verbs hammer and nail, 7.5 on some verbs of material incorpora-
tion, and 7.6 on a number of verbs which incorporate body parts. 
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7.2 Verbs of Cutting 
This section investigates the meanings of some verbs of cutting (cut, 
~, shave) showing their semantic relationships and mutual dependence on 
the two less complex(but not semantically primitive) notions of 'penetration' 
and 'edge'. With respect to incorporation, the investigation suggests that 
rather than entailing a fulJY-determined instrument such as a knife, saw, or 
razor, respectively, the verbs refer instead to "something parts of which 
form an edge", with differences between the verbs relating to d i fferences in 
the nature of the action involved. 
7.21 Cut 
Let us first consider the meaning of the following sentence, in 
particular from the point of view of what instrument is involved. 
(11) John cut the cheese. 
First note that, consistent with what we have seen in 6.44, there must be 
something in contact with the cheese. 
(12) *John cut the cheese but nothing came into contact with 
the cheese. 
But do we need a knife? I suggest not, because if cut specified "knife" 
uniquely, all of the following sentences should be disallowed. 
(13) a. John cut the cheese with a knife. 
b. John cut the cheese but he didn't do it with a knife. 
c. John cut the cheese with a razor blade(toy bulldozer blade, 
grandfather's sword). 
This would follow because the a sentence would be redundantly mentioning 
a uniquely specified object (cf.*Mary licked the icecream with her tongue), 
the b sentence would be contradicting an entailment of cut (cf.*Fred kissed 
Granny but he didn't use his lips), and the c sentence would be asserting 
some object other than that specified in the meaning of cut (cf.*John 
kicked his dog with his elbow). 
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Is a 'blade' then involved? The following sentences do not seem to 
support this either. 
(14) a. John cut the cheese with a piece of wire (some glass, a ruler, 
his fingernail, a piece of grass). 
b. The laser knife, whose cutting beam has a one third millimetre 
cutting beam, cuts by vaporising flesh. 6 
What I want to claim is that an edge of something is involved, or some 
part of something that can be thought of as an edge(cheese wire, laser beam). 
This edge need not be sharp because one can cut objects with blunt knives 
and edges. The following sentences support this by showing the unaccept-
ability of asserting no edge, and asserting something which is not an edge, 
respectively. 
(15) a. *John cut the cheese without any edge of anything penetrating 
the cheese. 
b. *John cut the cheese by pushing his fist(a squash ball, a flat 
object) through it. 
Leaving for the moment details as to the meaning of 'edge', I suggest 
the following for the semantic representation of John cut the cheese. 
(16) John cut the cheese. 
John wanted something. 
Parts of his body which were in contact with something parts 
of which formed an edge moved, 
because of that these parts which formed an edge became being 
in contact with parts of the cheese which were not surface 
parts. 
Let us now consider some details of this representation, commencing with 
the notion of penetration. In ear l ier semantic representations we have seen 
sentences which asser t that objec ts are in contact w·th each other 
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(represented in terms of "parts of X could not be thought of as being closer 
to parts of Y"), and that one object exerts a force on another object("parts 
of X which were in contact with Y can be thought of as becoming being where 
parts of Y are") . 
Now while both 'contact' and 'force' have in effect been explicated up 
to now in terms of surface parts acting on each other, the verb cut intro-
duces the further notion of 'penetration'. This demands that we make 
explicit the hitherto unexplicated notion of 'surface'. I am suggesting 
that in physical action sentences, verbs of penetration are 'marked' with 
respect to the notion of surface, whereas this notion does not require 
explicit mention in all those physical action descriptions involving only 
contact, or movement(including verbs such as break and melt, as well as 
touch, hit, move, etc.). 





This is a surface part of X. 
This part of Xis a part which is in contact with s omething 
that is not X. 
That is a non-surface part of X. 
That is a part of X which is not in contact with something 
that is not X. 
To assert of anything that it is a surface part, therefore, is to say that 
it is in contact with something other than itself(e.g. air). It is insuffi-
cient to say that it could be in contact with something else because so 
could most internal parts. On the other hand, non-surface parts of some-
thing are not in contact with anything that is not a part of this something 
(or, to cover objects with internal cavities, such as certain sorts of cheese, 
anything that is not thought of as a part of this something) . 7 
Returning now to the sentence John cut the cheese, it might be objected 
that there is no mention of 'separating into parts' in (16), which is surely 
part of the meaning of the sentence. My answer to this is that any notion 
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of separation flows out of what (16) asserts about penetration. That is, 
(16) says that an edge of something comes into contact with parts that are 
not surface parts(i.e. not in contact with anything that is not cheese). 
But in this very event these parts of the cheese become surface parts. Put 
another way, cutting creates new surfaces, which I suggest entails separa-
tion into parts("causing something which can be thought of as one something 
to become something which can be thought of as several somethings"?). Note 
that sentence (16) does not entail that John cut off a piece of cheese. 
Accordingly the representation asserts neither this nor that he didn't cut 
a piece off. 
Let us now take up the notion of 'edge'. Observe that in (16) I have 
avoided the infelicity of asserting that "part of something -is an edge". 
Edges, like points and surfaces, are not parts of an object, although parts 
of objects may be characterised as surface parts, or as forming an edge or 
a point. For the meaning of edge I propose: 
(19) This is an edge of x. 
= This part of X can be thought of as a part where two surfaces 
of X are . t 8 in con act. 
Notice in (16) that the edge of this something is not an instrument of 
cutting, which would lead to circularity in the meaning of cut, but rather 
something which creates surface parts of hitherto non-surface parts(i.e., 





This i s a blade. 
This is something made for cutting. 
This is something, p arts of which form an edge, made for 
separating something into parts. 
302 
(21) This is a knife. 
= This is something, part of which is a handle, part of which 
is a blade, made for separating something into parts. 
The representations suggest increasing complexity, with blade adding to edge 
the notion of its having been made for some purpose, and knife adding to 
blade that of having a handle. 9 It also follows from these representations 
that both blade and knife are semantically more complex than the verb cut. 
Before moving on to the verbs saw and shave, observe that there is a 
semantic analogy between cut and pierce which can be expressed by saying 
that edge stands in the same relation to cut as point does to pierce. The 





X cut Y. 
X penetrated Y with an edge of something. 
X pierced Y. 
X penetrated Y with a point of something. 
Verbs which refer to penetration with a point of something (I suggest point 
be represented as "that part of something that can be thought of as a part 
where more than two surfaces meet1110 ) include spear, spike, nail, puncture, 
prick, knife, shoot, and perhaps torpedo and inject. 
Some support for thus linking cutting and piercing comes from facts 
about the term sharp. The nature of things that can be sharp includes both 
those with edges(e.g. knives, blades, scissors, etc.) and those with points 
(e.g. pins, nails, needles, skewers). Bec ause of this, and the fact that 
some sharp objects c an be described as penetrating both with an edge, and 
with a point, e.g. 
(24) a. Mary cut Fr ed with a knife. 
b. Mary stabbed Fred with a knife. 
the term sharp should be explicated not in terms of cutting or piercing but 
penetrating. Hence, I suggest: 
(25) 
= 
This X feels sharp. 
Touching X with part of my body, 
I can imagine this X easily penetrating 
something (perhaps "this part of my body"?). 
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Sharp is thus represented in terms of {relative) 'ease of penetratiorr . 11 
The term blunt, which applies to all the objects that can be sharp, would be 
represented as the more complex term "not sharp", and the verb sharpen in 
terms of someone's doing something to X that would make X something one 
12 
could imagine more easily penetrating something. 
7.22 Shave 
If cut means to separate into parts with an edge of something, what 
can be said about the verb shave? Does it, in particular, refer to 
separating into parts with a razor? I suggest that "razor" is no part of 
the meaning of the verb shave, for the following reasons. First, if it were, 
sentence (26)a below should be unacceptable. 
(26) a. Fred s haved Harry without using a razor. 
b. Fred s haved Harry with a piece of broken glass(a chisel 
blade, a sharp axe). 
c. Fred s haved the X with a spokeshave(a sharp knife). 
Second, although people might frequently shave with a razor{electric or hand 
model), other objects may also be used, as the b sentence shows. "Razor" 
cannot therefore become an obligatory eleµient of the meaning of shave. 
Thirdly, as sentence c suggests, there are many things which one can shave 
(e.g. timber, a hide), for which one would not use a razor. 
I propose therefore that the sentence Fred shaved Harry's face be 
represented as follows, in terms of Fred's cutting off to the base hair on 
Harry's face by moving an edge of something over the surface of Harry's 
face(NB. snipping individual hairs off does not qualify). Thus 
(27) 
= 
Fred shaved Harry's face. 
Fred wanted something. 
Parts of Fred's body which were in contact with something 
parts of which formed an edge moved, 
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because of that these parts which formed an edge became being 
in contact with non-surface parts of the hair on Harry's face 
where the hair can be thought of as being in contact with the 
face, 
until these parts which formed an edge became being not in 
contact with non-surface parts of that part of the hair. 
Two comments should be made on (27). First, the notion of base or 
surface in shave has been, somewhat clumsily, expressed in terms of the 
location where "the hair can be thought of as being in contact with the 
face". Secondly, this sentence, unlike (16), entails that the hair is cut 
off. I have attempted to capture this in the final section of the represent-
ation, by specifying that the edged part continues moving through the hair 
until it ceases to be in contact with any non-surface parts of the hair. 
This of course entails that that particular piece of hair is now completely 
separated from that hair from which it was being severed. 
Finally, I would suggest that the term razor is semantically more 




This is a razor. 
This is something made for shaving hair from skin. 
This is something, parts of which form an edge, 
made for separating hair into parts, 
by moving these edged parts over the surface of someone's skin 
until these edged parts separate at this surface 
part of the hair which can be thought of as being 
in contact with the surface of the skin. 
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7.23 Saw 
Just as the important part of the meaning of shave concerned the nature 
of the action involved(moving over a surface, cutting off something at the 
base), so the method of action distinguishes the verb saw from other verbs 
of cutting. Once again the instrumental noun does not appear to be present 
in the meaning of the verb, as the acceptability of the following sentences 
suggest. 
(29) a. Mary sawed the magician in half without using a saw. 
b. Mary sawed the magician in half with a scalpel(razor blade, 
sword). 
What then distinguishes sawing from other forms of cutting? One might 
suppose that it has something to do with the fact that saws have teeth, but 
one can also saw with knives and toothless saws(e.g. a stonesaw, which cuts 
by friction with sand and water). What I propose distinguishes this verb is 
the following. In sawing what caus es the object to be separated into parts 
is the movement of the edged part in relation to that part of the object's 
surface with which it is in contact. That is, the edged part moves in 
relation to an imaginary fixed point(marked by an 'X' below) on the surface 
of the object. 
Notice that there are two directions of movement that can be disting-
uished in the above examples. One direction is that taken by the edged part 
as it progressively moves into what it is thereby separating into parts 
(hence the arrows within the boxes on the diagrams). The other(shown by the 
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arrows within the edged instrument) is that in which the edged part is 
moving where it comes into contact with the object. The angle at which 
these directions meet, whether the cutting is by reciprocating or rotatory 
motion, seems always to be about 90 degrees. 
The identification of these directions of movement suggests possibil-
ities for describing other forms of cutting. For example, in separating by 
chopping, chiselling or guillotining, the force of the edged part is 
directed such that it coincides with the direction in which the object is 
cut. In cutting by scoring, or some forms of slicing, the directions seem 
similar to those for sawing, but here one can imagine a fixed point on the 
edged part(cf. the object, for sawing) which moves along the surface of the 
object being cut. And cutting with scissors involves a doubling of the 
situation found, for example, in chopping, with the two forces directed 
towards each other. 
I suggest therefore the following representation for the sentence 
Mary was sawing the log. 
( 30) 
= 
Mary was sawing the log. 
Mary wanted something. 
Parts of her body which were in contact with something parts 
of which formed an edge were moving; 
because of that these edged parts which were in contact with 
the log weremoving in contact with this part of the surface 
of the log; 
because of that these edged parts were becoming being in 
contact with non-surface parts of the log. 
And for the noun saw, which is semantically more complex than its homophonous 





This is a saw. 
This is something made for sawing something. 
This is something, parts of which form an edge, 
made for separating something into parts, 
by moving these edged parts in contact with a part of the 
surface of this something; 
until these edged parts become being in contact with 
non-surface parts of this something. 
7.3 The Verb Kiss 
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The verb kiss, together with lick and kick, is generally one of the 
first to be mentioned in any discussion of verbs whose meaning refers to an 
instrument. There are two parts to the meaning of kiss, as the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary brings out in its definition: "to press or touch 
with the lips, in token of affection, greeting or reverence". These two 
parts, which we may term a 'physical' and an 'expressive' component, signal 
a division of body part verbs into those which refer only to movement(e.g. 
lick, kick, punch, elbow, finger, breastfeed, etc.), and those which entail 
that the agent wants the movement to express something(e.g. kis s, wave, nod, 
wink, gesticulate, clap, spank, shrug, embrace, hug, etc.) . 13 This distinc-
tion is rarely brought out in semantic classifications of body part verbs. 
One must take care, however, to discriminate between the second group, 
where the agent wants his activity to say or show something(see later for a 
discussion of these alternatives), and verbs(especially intransitive verbs 
such as~' laugh, frown, cough) which, while expressing something about 
the agent, do not entail that the agent wants this movement to express 
anything. 
This section therefore discusses the meaning of the verb kiss as one 
verb from this second grouping of body part verbs mentioned above. No 
attempt has been made to impose any comprehensive classification on all body 
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part verbs. Another semantic grouping of such verbs, for example, is 
presented in 7.6. 
7.31 The Physical Component 
Let us now examine, in terms of these two components, the meaning of 
the sentence John kissed Mary on the cheek. With respect to the physical 
component, we have already discussed in 5.23 the fact that the agent's lips 
are uniquely specified as the instrumentally involved object in kissing. 
The agent's lips must also come into contact with Mary's cheek, but unlike 
the movement of the lips in the meaning of the verb suck, no more than lip 
contact is asserted in kiss. The unacceptability of the sentences below 
follows from a violation of each of the abovementioned entailments. 
(32) a. *John kissed Mary on the cheek without using his lips at all. 
b. *John kissed Mary on the cheek without touching her. 
c. *John tried to kiss Mary, but he only managed to touch her 
with his lips. 
The Maori (and Eskimo) custom of greeting by rubbing noses is trans-
lated into English as 'kissing', but the difference in the physical component 
is always marked linguistically with the restrictive adjective Maori, and the 
b . . 11 . . th. h 
14 h . f th t ver kiss is usua y written wi in apostrop es. Te meaning o e sen -
ence John kissed Mary the Maori way might, I suggest, be represented as a 
comparative statement, in which the expressive component of kiss is held 
constant and the physical component is replaced. Thus, in abbreviated terms: 
( 33) 
= 
John kissed Mary the Maori way. 
John can be thought of as saying about Mary what someone says 
about someone when he touches them with his lips, 
by doing what someone who is a Maori does when he wants to 
say this something about someone. 
The expression 'to blow someone a kiss' might be represented in terms of 
forming one's lips as one does when one kisses someone, and then pretending 
to blow that shape to someone. 
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As f ar as the first par t of the meaniny of kiss is concerned, I suggest 
that the sentence under examina tion would b e r epresented as below. 
(34) 
= 
John kissed Mary on the cheek. 
John wanted something . 
John's lips moved until they c ame into contact with 
Mary's cheek. 
But kissi ng is more than mere contact with t he lips, as the lack of synonymy 
between the following illustrates. 
(35) a. Mary touched the milo with h er lips to see how hot it was. 
b. *Mary kissed the milo with h er lips to see how hot it was. 
7.32 The Expressive Component 
With respect to the expressive component of the meaning of kiss, the 
dictionary entry mentioned earlier referred to the verb as meaning in part 
"a token of affection, greeting or reverenc e ". Is there any overt evidence 
that the verb kiss does function as a 'token' to express something? I 
suggest tha t the following sentences provide some confirmation of this. They 
are presented with rough explications serving only to illustrate that "say" 
can be thought of a s part of the meaning of kiss. 
(36) a. John kissed Mary goodnight. 
= John said 'goodnight' to Mary by touching her with his lips. 
b. Give me a kiss if you real ly love me. 
= If you really love me, 
say 'I love you' by touching me with your lips. 
c . Show y our respec t to Grandpa. Give him a kiss. 
= Say 'I respect you, Grandpa ' b y touching him with your lips. 
d. 11 Thi.s is to say 'happy birthday ' , " Mary said as she kissed me. 
= This something I am doing(going to do) can be thought of as 




Although the range o f things that can b e 'expressed' in this way, e s pecially 
in the sentence fo rm (36)a, is fa i r l y r esLric ted(*John kissed me congratula-
tions, *Ma ry kis sed Freda thanks f o r the wedding present), the transparency 
of these e xpres s ions does provide some il l umination of the semantic 
15 
structure. 
Without going into unnecessary detail, there are four things that can 
be said about the expressive component in the meaning of kiss. The first 
three r e late r espective ly to symbol ic ac t i vity, to what is said, and to 
audience. . . . yrnb 1 · . . 16 Kissing is as o 1c activity. That is, I suggest, in doing 
this activi t y(touching with the lips), o ne c an be thought of as saying 
. 
something (cf. the spee ch ac t situation where in aay~ng something, I can be 
thought of as doing(something). As with a ll symbol, in kissing the relation 
between what is done (the sign) and what i s said(the designatum) is 
conventionalised and cannot be arbitrar i l y altered. Thus I cannot kiss 
today by touching with the lips and tomorrow with the nose. 
How can we express this symbolic nature of kissing? Leaving aside for 
the present the question of what is said, I suggest the following represent-
ation as a possible a pproach. 
(37) 
= 
John k i ssed Mary o n t he cheek. 
John wanted to do this something that is thought of(that men 
17 
think of?) as someone's saying something about s omeone. 
John' s l i p s mov e d until they c ame into contact with Mary's 
cheek. 
Wi th respec t to what touching wi th the lips can be thought of as saying, 
I sugges t that it b e represented along t he lines of 'someone' s s aying 
something good about some one'. For a sta r t, this would explai n why the 
activi t y is consistent with the e xpr es s io n o f assertions, wishes and prayers, 
but not o f questions , commands or r e quests , as the following s e ntence sets 
revea l. 
---
(38) a. "This 1.s to say 'Peace' , 11 she said as she kissed him. 
b. "This is to wish you 'many happy returns', 11 Frank said 
kissing his mother. 
c. "This i s to say 'God bless'," she said kissing him. 
(39) a. *John kissed a li~tle old lady to ask the way to the 
Post Of f ice. 
b. *Mary kissed her boyfriend to order him to keep his eyes 
off the blonde. 
c. *Fred kissed her lazy husband to request him to take out 
the garbage. 
The term "good" has been chosen here because it seems a plausible 
common semantic element in the various sentences containing the verb kiss 
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which have been listed(e.g. kissiny as a mark of greeting, respect, love or 
affection) . 18 Without going into the meaning of "good", the representation 
for sentence (37) can now be updated as follows: 
( 40) John kissed Mary on the cheek. 
= John wanted to do this something to Mary that is thought 
of as someone's saying something good about someone. 
John's lips moved until they came into contact with Mary's 
cheek. 
It is important to realise that (40) do e s not assert that John wants 
to say s omething good about Mary, but only that he wants to do something. 
There are two reasons for avoiding this assertion. First, if John wants to 
say something good, why not merely say it? Second, it is of the nature of 
symbolic activities such as kissing, saluting, curtsying, shaking hands, 
etc. to treat as irrelevant what the agent's real feelings are. Someone 
may thus engage in such activities because it's the 'thing to do', but 
without meaning anything by it. 
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The third point about the expressive component of the meaning of kiss 
relates to the question of audience. Who interprets what the symbolic 
activity expresses? Peirce claims that every assertion(a type of symbol) 
contains both a speaker and a listener(l932,191). Elsewhere he a s serts that 
symbolic signs requires interpreters for them to be signs, while Morris adds 
a fourth aspect of a sign, viz., the effect it has on the interpre ter(l938, 
25). Who then is the interpreter in the meaning of kiss sentences ? 
I suggest that the agent is always an interpreter as well as initiator 
of the physical activity(recall Peirce's 'problematical listener within the 
speaker'), and that whenever an animate object is present as 'pat i ent', that 
that being can also be an interpreter of the sign. Taking them in turn, the 
postulation of the agent-interpreter helps to account for sentences such as 
the following where there is no other animate audience and it would be 
gratuitous to assume any 'spiritual' interpreter. 
(41) a. I kissed the still warm barrel of my gun without a soul 
in sight. 
b. Mary was alone when she kissed the Blarney stone. 
c. John kissed the body as it lay in the deserted room. 
With respect to animate objects, notice the syntactic differ e nces 
between animate and non-animate objects in the following sentences. 
(42) a. John ki s sed Mary on the cheek(brow, nose, lips). 
b. *John kissed the camera on the lens(strap, filter). 
(Similar restrictions apply for this construction with other surface contact 
verbs, e.g. hit, touch, slap). Wierzbicka(l967), developing an instrumental 
chain schema such as I have presented in 6.41, suggests that the semantic 
differences to be accounted for in sentences such as these can be representm 
as follows. In the a sentence, John causes a sensation for Mary( the person) 
by touching part of her body with his lips; in the b sentence, ho wever, 
. 19 John causes no sensation for the obJect. 
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Now while we may modify accordingly the representation for the sentence 
John kissed Mary on the cheek(see below), it is not clear to me that Mary 
thereby becomes an interpreter of the sign(a 'listener' in Peirce's terms, 
or someone to whom John can be thought of as saying whatever it is that 
touching with the lips is thought to express), rather than merely someone 
who feels some sensation as she would, in relation to non-symbolic physical 
contact, every time she was touched, hit, bumped, etc. For this reason, I 
have not included in (43) below anything asserting that Mary is the 
interpreter of the symbol. 
( 43) 
= 
John kissed Mary on the cheek. 
John wanted to do this something to Mary that is thought of 
as someone's saying something good about someone. 
John's lips moved until they came into contact with Mary's 
cheek. 
Because of that, Mary felt something. 
Fourthly, I merely raise the po s sibility that in touching with the 
lips, one does not want to do something, but to show something ( e~g. 
perhaps that he has good thoughts about the object which he is touching). 
In some instances at least kissing 'shows' something about the agent. Thus: 
(44) a. Show me that you love me with a kiss. 
b. Show your Grandpa some respect. Give him a kiss. 
I am not convinced, however, that the two proposals differ substantially, 
for it seems to me that show might itself be represented in terms of "doing 
something which says something"(or enabl e s s omeone to say something). 
I leave the question open. 
In conclusion, we note that the verb kiss is one which uniquely 
specifies a body part and that this body part can be thought of as an instru-
ment, not of kissing, but of doing something that 1s thought of as someone's 
saying something good about someone. 
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7.4 The Verbs Hammer and Nail 
Let us now investigate briefly some aspects of the meanings of sentences 
with the verbs hammer and nail, whose semantics have intrigued several 
writers in recent years. 20 The question for our purposes is whether 
historical evidence for morphological derivation notwithstanding, one member 
of the homophonous pair is semantically more complex than the other, and if 
so, which one. 
7.41 Hammer 
Consider first the sentence: 
(45) John was hammering the metal. 
From our previous discussion in Chapter Six we know that there must be 
"something" (be it part of John's body or something external to his l:x>dy) 
which mediates between John and t he metal. Hammering is generally under-
stood as meaning something like 'to strike repeatedly'. I suggest that the 
striking be represented as an instance of 'contact under force', which we 
have already incorporated in some representations in Chapter Six. The term 
'repeatedly' is related to what the agent wants(e.g. the metal to be flat, 
the door to be opened, the nail to be in the wall). Consequently, if one 
blow is sufficient to insert a nail, the agent has still hammered it in. 
For sentence (45), therefore, I suggest the following: 
(46) John was hammering the metal. 
John wanted something. 
Parts of his body which could be thought of as being in 
contact with something were moving; 
because of that this something was becoming being closer 
to the metal 
until parts of this something could be thought of as becoming 
being where many parts of the metal were. 
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The above representation is quite simi lar to that given for sentence 
(20) of Chapter Six(The box hit the wall). As with that sentence, sentence 
(45) does not assert that the object(the metal) moves. Hence there is no 
causal relation expressed in the representation between the movement of this 
something into contact with the metal and anything happening to the metal. 
The principal difference between the two representations lies in the attempt 
to express the notion of greater force implied in the verb hammer. On the 
grounds that a greater force will have a larger effect on an object in its 
path, I have represented this by the expression "becoming being where many 
parts of the metal were". Note that this effect is still a surface effect 
though. These parts of the something are only thought of as having this 
effect - there is no actual penetration. 
Representation (46) does not refer to a "hammer". This is because, 
disregarding historical evidence for the antecedence of the noun form, I 
take the verb hammer to refer to a particular type of activity, for which 
any of hundreds of objects might be instrumentally employed, rather than to 
an activity that specifies a particular instrument, as e.g. might be the 
case if the verb hammer meant "strike repeatedly (as) with a hammer". The 
b h b h . 
21 
· 11 1 1 th 't ver ammer ecomes, on tis account, semantica y ess comp ex an is 
cognate noun, paralleling what was suggested for the homophonous verb and 
noun saw and for the verb shave and the noun razor. The noun hammer might 
be shown as the following: 
(47) This is a hammer. 
This is something made for hammering. 
= This is something, part of which is a handle, part of which is 
somet hing with a hard surface , 
made for moving thi s hard part into contact with s omething 
until parts of this hard part can be thought of as becoming 
being where parts of that something are. 
.IL-
316 
As with the representations for the nouns knife and razor, (47) does not 
assert that the hammer ia us din this way, only that it is something made 
for this purpose. Hammers, knives and razors may of course be used in 
countless ways unrelated to their manufactured function. The term "hard 
surface" in the above means something like 'a surface whose shape is not 
22 
easy to alter' . 
But if the meaning of the verb hammer does not refer to its cognate 
noun, how shall we explain the dubious acceptability of the following? 
(48) *John hammered the metal with a hammer. 
In my opinion, a satisfactory account runs along these lines. Sentence (45) 
does not assert that there is a hammer as instrument; rather it asserts a 
u particular activity and we und e r s tand some instrumental object. Sentence 
(48) adds the information that for this activity John uses a hammer, that is, 
he uses the culture-bound standard object for hammering. But what could be 
more unremarkable? If there is something to say, however, for example if 
with hammer stressed the sentence is a denial that John used a shoe, the 
sentence is fine, hence (49)a below. 23 Merely making the article definite 
increases the acceptability, for the hammer becomes more specific hammer, 
and sentence (49)b below then is about some particular hammer. Similarly 
sentence (49)c, unlike (48), identifies and says something about a 
particular hammer. 
/ (49) a. John hammered the metal with a hammer. 
b. John hammered the metal with the hammer. 
c. John hammered the metal with a hammer he'd found suspended 
from a spider's web in the garage. 
7.42 Nail 
I propose that the verb and noun nail should be represented in a similar 
fashion, with the verb referring without specifying a particular instrument 
to a certain activity, and its cognate noun referring to an object made for 
• 
use in this activity. The activity which is entailed in the verb nail is 
probably more complex than any we have previously discussed. To commence 
with Green's(l972,87) suggestion, she proposes that the first sentence 
below be represented approximately as the second. 
(50) a. Max nailed the sign to the door. 
b. Max caused the sign. to be on the door. by driving 
i J 
something through it. into it .. 
i J 
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In terms of the notions we have encountered so far in representing 
physical action sentences, sentence (50)a involves various combinations of 
the following: movement, contact, force, penetration, and 'holding' (see 
6.45). Without attempting, for reasons of sheer length, to reproduce these 
notions in ful~ sentence (51) below might be represented as follows. 
(51) 
= 
Max nailed the sign to the door with a stone. 
Max wanted the sign to be on the door. 
Max struck something with a stone. 
Because of that parts of this something which could be 
thought of as forming a point penetrated the sign until 
they penetrated the door. 
Max did this something until the sign was held onto the door. 
The double penetration would be accounted for more fully in terms of the 
pointed part coming into contact with non-surf-ace parts of the sign until it 
came into contact with non-surface parts of the door. This of course 
entails that it went through the sign, but not the door, which is what (51) 
means. The discussion in 6.45 about supporting and holding indicates that 
the term "on" would be represented more fully in terms of the latter, since, 
while it is so nailed, anywhere the door moves, the sign moves also. 





This 1.s a nail. 
This is something made for nailing. 
This 1.s something, parts of which form a point, 
made for holding an object to something, 
by being struck so that this pointed part 
moves through the object into this something. 
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In conclusion, I have suggested with semantic representations that the 
verbs hammer and nail are less complex semantically than their respective 
cognate nouns, and that they refer to an activity, but without nominating 
a particular object. On the other hand, the nouns hammer and nail have 
been presented as semantically more complex, since they are objects 
specially made for use in the activities described by their homophonous 
verbs. 
7.5 Material Incorporation 
Apart from the body part verbs mentioned in 7.2, I have suggested that 
the other verbs discussed thus far are semantically less complex than the 
nouns referring to instruments designed for use in the activities denoted 
by the verbs. One group of verbs, however, which do seem more complex than 
their cognate nouns are 'material incorporation' verbs such as water, salt, 
sugar, carpet, concrete, etc. 
Reference has already been made to these verbs in several parts of the 
thesis, for example, in relation to 6.46 ·where it was pointed out that 
sentences containing many so-called material incorporation verbs can be 
paraphrased in terms of 'put X on Y' and 'put X in Y'. We should add here 
that for each of these two groups there is another group in converse 
relationship, viz. 'take X off Y' (e.g. skin, dust, shell, defrost, peel) 
and 'take X out of Y' (e.g. stone(a cherry), weed, milk, bone, disembowel). 
This section suggests briefly how sentences from three of these four 
groups might be represented, and then discusses an apparent exception to 
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the proposal that these verbs specify uniquely the nature of their 'instru-
1 , . l . 24 menta materia obJect. The sentences to be represented are: 
(53) a. Mary watered her primulas. 
b. Frank salted the soup. 
c . John weeded the garden. 
The first sentence, the 'put X on Y' type, might be represented as 
below. 
(54) Mary watered her primulas. 
Mary wanted some water to be in contact with her primulas. 
Parts of her body which could be thought of as being in 
contact with something in which was some water were moving, 
because of that some water was moving until it came into 
contact with the primulas. 
This representation supports what I am claiming about material verbs 
referring to particular substances by expressing explicitly that the sub-
stance 'water' is involved. Other comments on (54) include, firstly, that 
the representation tries to be as indeterminate as the sentence as far as 
the object with which Mary watered her primulas(e.g. bucket, hose, hand) 
and the location of the primulas(e.g. garden, vase) are concerned, and 
secondly, that the last line might alternatively read "until it could be 
thought of as being in contact with the primulas". This modification might 
better account for situations where one waters X by putting water on the 
earth in which Xis growing. 
Sentence (53)b, representing the 'put X in Y' group, receives the 




Frank salted the soup. 
Frank wanted some salt to be something that could be thought 
of as part of the soup. 
Parts of his body which could be thought of as being in 
contact with something in which was some salt were moving; 
because of that some salt was moving until, becoming being 
in contact with the soup, it became something that could be 
thought of a s part of the soup. 
In (55) also, the verb is represented as more complex than its cognate noun, 
which(like water) would itself be represented as a non-decomposable 'species 
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name'. On a technical note, observe that the salt's being in contact with 
the soup is not a cause of the salt's becoming part of the soup(cf. sentence 
(45), in 6.22). 
Finally, consider the following representation. 
( 56) 
= 
John weeded the garden. 
John wanted some weeds which could be thought of as part 
of the garden 
to become something that could not be thought of as part 
of the garden. 
Because of what John did, the weeds became something that 
could not be thought of as part of the garden. 
I have not given the technical section in detail here for reasons of length. 
Any full representation would need to include that something which is in 
contact with and exerting a force on some weeds is moving away from the 
garden, causing these weeds to be removed from the garden. As with the -verbs 
water and salt, weed refers to a particular object in its meaning. Unlike 
those two, the cognate noun can be further decomposed, e.g. perhaps as 
"a plant which is growing where someone does not want it to grow". 
In 7.41 an explanation was suggested for the unacceptability of the 
sentence John harmnered the metal with a hammer. Material incorporation 
sentences are also unacceptable in this form(e.g. those below) but for a 
different reason, I suggest. 
( 57) a. *Mary watered her primulas with water. 
b. *Frank salted the soup with salt. 
c. *John weeded the garden of weeds. 
In view of the semantic difference that I am advancing between the 
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verbs here and those in 7.4, it is possible to predict that sentences (57)a-c 
will be unacceptable on grounds of redundancy, the prepositional phrases 
simply repeating information present in the verb. Should further specifica-
tion of the material instrument be required, however, the noun referring to 
the incorporated object may occur independently, but always with modifiers 
derived from a restrictive relative clause (cf.the discussion of kiss in 
these terms in 5.23). Thus: 
(58) a. Frank salted the soup with some of that salt in the 
new container. 
b. *Frank salted the soup with some salt, which he'd nearly 
run out of. 
Finally, if the verbs which we have mentioned in this section do 
identify a particular substance in their meanings, how should the following 
sentences be interpreted? 
(59) a. The pre-schoolers were painting the blackboard with water. 
b. Tony was buttering his bread with margarine. 
c. Mary dusted the tomato plants with talcum powder. 
Two possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that the material 
incorporation verbs refer to a generic noun, such that the particular sub-
stances employed are, or can be "thought of" as, a type of this substance 
(e.g. talcum powder is or can be thought of as 'dust'). The second is to 
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treat these sentences as explicit comparatives, such that in (59)b, for 
example, 'Tony is doing to the bread with margarine what one does to bread 
with butter'. One disadvantage with this suggestion is its appeal to a 
'standard' activity(e.g. spreading bread with butter, putting dust on tomato 
plants), which, as sentence (59)a illustrates, does not underlie all such 
sentences. 
The material incorporation verbs we have examined thus illustrate one 
group of verbs in which the verb is of greater semantic complexity than its 
(usually) homophonous noun. The verb refers not only to a particular 
material substance (which might be understood generically) but also to an 
activity which involves this substance, and which instrumentally brings 
about what the agent wants. 
7.6 Body Part Verbs 
Another group of incorporation verbs which are semantically more com-
plex than their associated nouns are verbs which refer to parts of the human 
body. These verbs, whether homophonous with the cognate noun(e.g. elbow, 
knee, finger, shoulder, thumb, toe) or not(e.g. kick, walk, bite, lick, 
26 punch, chew ) , can generally be represented in terms of someone's doing 
something with part of hi3 body, bringing about(or attempting to bring about) 
what he wants, but cannot achieve directly, through the instrumental inter-
vention of part of his body. 
In 7.2 I discussed some body part verbs(e.g. kiss, wink, wave) which 
described symbolic activity, and in 5.23 I mentioned that the use NP to 
construction was inappropriate for the description of action in which no 
choice of instrument was possible. That is, sentence (60)a was acceptable 
but not (60)b. 
(60)a a. Mary licked the icecrearn with her sore tongue. 
b. ?Mary used her sore tongue to lick the icecrear:1. 
I 
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In this section I distinguish between verbs which identify a body part 
which can be used instrumentally and those identifying body parts which 
cannot be used as instrum nts . The first group includes most of the body 
part verbs. Thus in the verb bite the teeth are something that can be used 
for (minimally) exerting a force on something, in kiss the lips can be used 
in an activity that is thought of as saying something good about someone, 
and in walk the legs can be thought of as someone's instrument for getting 
J 27 him(his body?) somewhere. 
The second group of verbs includes the following: sit(down), stand(up), 
and lie (down) . Syntactically they are all intransitives or pseudo-transitive 
(He sat himself down) when they refer to the agent's own movement. 
Semantically, however, they are transitives, for they each refer to 
activities in which the agent's will moves his body. In this respect, 
sentences containing these verbs parallel the semantically more transparent, 
transitive sentences such as John raised his arm. 
The difference between these verbs and other body part verbs such as 
kiss, walk, bite and kick is that sentences containing these verbs are 
incapable of any paraphrases that would identify an instrument. Thus: 
(61) a. *John sat down with his legs. 
b. *John stood up with his legs. 
c. *John lay down with his body. 
Nor, if sit means something like "cause one's body to become supported by 
one's buttocks" and lie "cause one's body to become supported by one's back", 
are the body parts named(buttocks and back, respectively) able to be referred 
to as instruments. These body pa.rts are merely positions at which support 
is said to occur. 
(62) a. *John used his buttocks to cause his body to become supported. 




The reason for the difference between these groups is not just that the 
second group refer only to the direct movement of the agent's body, but also 
that verbs in the second group incorporate the whole body, making any refer-
ence to its use as an instrument out of the question. As we saw in 5.23 the 
use NP to construction is inappropriate where there is no choice of instru-
ment. What would it mean therefore to say that I used my body to sit down 
or to lie down? Could I have used something else? 28 
The sentence John sat down might then be represented as below. 
(63) 
= 
John sat down. 
John wanted his body(which was supported by his legs?) to 
be supported by his buttocks. 
Parts of John's body moved until his buttocks, 
becoming being in contact with the top of something, 
became supported by this something. 
This representation entails that if John's buttocks ,are supported by some-
thing, then John is thereby supported. The specification of "top" is 
necessary because, as mentioned in 6.45, support may be by various means(e.g. 
suspension, cantilevering, gravity). The term "top of something" could be 
represented more fully in terms of "a surface part of something that is 
furthest from the earth". 
To conclude, verbs referring to the human body may be grouped in various 
ways according to different criteria. The distinction noted here is between 
verbs referring to action in which something external to the agent is 
affected by the movement of part of the agent's body and verbs referring to 
the direct movement of the agent's whole body but without the body thereby 
being an instrument. 
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7.7 Sununary 
In the instrumental incorporation process we see reflected the economy 
and productivity of language, both in processes leading to the formal 
identity of many nouns and verbs and in the semantic interrelationships 
between verb and instrumental noun. This chapter has discussed a range of 
incorporation verbs, pointing out in particular several groups of verbs 
which refer to a noun of greater semantic complexity than their respective 
verb and several groups in which the noun referred to is semantically less 
complex than its corresponding verb. I have not attempted to provide a 
comprehensive picture, but rather to focus in sufficient detail on a number 





NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
1 
See, for example, Larnbert(l969), Langendoen(l97O), McCawley(l97lb), 
Green(l971,1972), Borkin(l972), Nilsen(1973), and Lehrer(l974). 
2 
· rnb' 1 h . . . Lambert is a iva ent over as to whet er Material is a different case 
from Instrumental or merely another kind of Instrumental case. As I mention 
later in this section, however, both 'Material' and 'Locative' incorporation 
can be thought of as a type of instrumental incorporation. 
3 
Thus (8) could be expanded as follows: 
(with a frying pan. 
( 
(with a wet flounder. 
( 
(i) Mary slapped John's face (with a copy of Playboy. 
( 
(with his starched dicky. 
( 
(with a palm frond. 
but hardly as: 
(with a spoonful of icecrearn. 
( 
(with the point of a needle. 
(ii) Mary slapped John's face ( 
(with a tennis ball. 
( 
(with some cotton wool. 
As McCawley(l97Ob,167) and Lehrer(l974,18O-1) have noted, there is more to 
the meaning of slap(punch, kick, etc.) than merely striking with an 
instrument having the appropriate properties. 
4 For example as in: 
(i) a. William Tell shot the apple with an arrow. 
b. William Tell shot an arrow into the apple. 
(ii) a. The terrorists loaded the helicopter with arms. 




An early account is provided by Jespersen(Vol.VI,84), who uses the 
term 'noiseless machinery' to describe the formation of identical words from 
different word classes. Avoiding the term 'conversion' on the grounds that 
it suggests that English no longer distinguishes between noun and verb, he 
proposes that the relation should be described in terms of one form being 
made from the other without change. He then proceeds to list several 
classes of verbs formed from substantives and a number of substantives 
formed from verbs. 
6
see The Australian, 18 May 1976. The sentence is a synthesis of parts 
of the newspaper description of the use of the laser knife . 
.., 
1
The change from "this" to "that" in (18) is occasioned because of the 
deictic difficulties of using the term "this" to refer to an internal part 
of something, that is, a part which by definition cannot be touched, yet 
touching which would make it a surface part. 
8
cf. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: "the line in which two 
surfaces meet". 
9
cf. Katz(l966,3OO), where knife is given the following semantic 
representation: "(Some contextually definite), (Physical Object), 
{Nonliving), (With Blade), (With Handle)". 
1O
rn its present form, this explication for point does not account for 
references to what seems to be a two-dimensional 'point', e.g. as in Can you 
see this point on the map? I am unable at present to find a single 
representation for these two usages of point. 
328 
11
r reject the analysis "penetrates well" on the basis of the following. 
(i) a. ?This knife is sharp but it doesn't cut well. 
b. This knife is s harp but it doesn't cut easily. 
12 A semantic representation for John sharpened the pencils would 
probably require an additional specification as to what he wanted. For 
example, "he wanted the pencil to be sharp because he wanted to poke the boy 
in the next seat", or "he wanted the pencil to be sharp because he wanted to 
draw some fine lines". 
13 h' d . 1 d h h h . 1 . Tis secon group does not inc u e cases were t e p ysica action is 
involved in uttering something, e.g. the verb speak. In such a case my 
physical movement is not thought of as me saying something, it is me saying 
something. 
14
rt is significant that the pakeha(non-Maori) speaker refers to this 
activity of the Maoris as a 'kiss ', ~ather than as 'rubbing no£es', because 
it suggests that what he sees as i mportant in the meaning of the verb kiss 
is the fact that it expresses something, with the actual physical activity 
and body parts used being mere aids in expressiJn. In calling what happens 
a 'kiss', the pakeha speaker thus focusses on the covert expressive function 
of the verb rather than on the more overtly remarkable, but culture-specific, 
physical activity. 
Besides the contrasts mentioned between lips and noses, touching and 
rubbing, the Maori 'kiss ' also differs in that (a) it requires a living 
human object(no 'kissing' sacred objects, spears, etc.); (b) it requires 
that the object reciprocate the greeting; and (c) it possesses a more 
restricted message. On these three characteristics, the Maori 'kiss' is 
paralleled by English shake hands. But in translating this activity into 
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English, there is obviously less semantic and referential anomaly in 
referring to the Maori greeting by a word whose form conceals the body part 
involved than by shake hands, which doesn't. Notice that there is no 
unmarked verb in English for greeting by physical contact{greet and salute 
don't entail contact, and shake hands and kiss are too specific). 
15
rn this regard consider the following sentences with other verbs from 
the group which includes kiss. 
(i) a. John waved goodbye(hello). 
b. Mary nodded her assent. 
c. Fred shrugged his indifference. 
d. Jane winked to show her agreement. 
e. ?The huge audience clapped their acclaim for 15 minutes. 
Compare for clap, its euphemistic paraphrase 'express appreciation in the 
usual way'. 
16
Peirce(l932,143) and Morris(l938,37) distinguish three types of signs: 
indices, icons and symbols. An index is related to its object by being 
actually(physically) affected by it(e.g. a cry of pain, appendix scar, 
passport photo, yawn, heartbeat, sneeze, bread and wine in R.C. Eucharist 
etc.). An icon is related to its object by bearing some resemblance to it 
(e.g. model train, mimicry, architectural drawings, pilot study, etc.). A 
symbol is related to its object by a mental connection "by virtue of a law 
(usually an association of general ideas), which makes the symbol be inter-
preted as referring to the object', Peirce says. Examples include common 
nouns(such as house, paperweight), a newspaper, certificate and diplomas, 
the bread and wine in a Protestant Eucharist, etc. It is obvious that 
kissing, shaking hands, saluting, etc. are symbolic activities, the physical 
component of which is related to the expressive component by a 'law' making 
the symbol be understood as referring to that expression. 
L 
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17 One difficulty in (37) lies concealed in the expression "that is 
I 
thought of". Who is it that thinks of this activity in this way? Is 
touching with the lips a universal symbol of something, or is this only the 
case for some peoples? In my present uncertainty about the appropriate 
subject for the verb "think of", I leave this problem concealed in the 
expression "is thought of". 
18




x1 is good. 
x1 is a good x. 
One can say about x1 what we could want to be able to say 
about any X. 
19
wierzbicka considers that the sentence John kissed Mary should be 
anomalous because John cannot kiss Mary, but only part of her body. But if 
Mary is represented as "part of Mary's body", then anomaly results in repre-
senting the sentences JQhn kissed Mary on the cheek(*John kissed a part of 
Mary's body on the cheek), and John kissed Mary goodnight(*John kissed part 
of the body of Mary goodnight). She suggests that Mary in the first 
sentence above is a surface remnant of a complex sentence ln which Mary is 
subject and there is a complex unspecified predicate of awareness of 
sensation. 
Some confirmation of this seems to be provided in sentences about 
touching different parts of the body. Not all body parts are equally 
sensible to physical contact. Anderson(l974,2) provides the examples here, 
with the explanation that "cheek and arm are more intimate inalienable parts 
than are hair and ear, so that affecting the part more directly affects the 
whole". 
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(i) a. The barber cut me on the cheek. 
b. The barber cut me on my cheek. 
(ii) a. *The barber cut me in the hair. 
b. *The barber cut me in my hair. 
Instead of saying that affecting the part more directly affects the whole, 
however, I would prefer to say that affecting the body part more directly 
affects the person. 
To the above I would add that if substituting kiss results in the same 
acceptability judgements as for (i) and (ii), then one reason would be that 
hair and perhaps fingernails(?Mary kissed me on the fingernail) aren't looked 
upon semantically as body parts as sensitive as other body parts, i.e. 
touching someone's hair or fingernails does not cause such sensations for 
the person as touching someone's skin, for instance. Physiologically this 
appears sound also, since hair and nails are looked upon as 'dead tissue'. 
Hence cutting one's hair and nails causes no harm to the physical body and 
creates in itself no sensations for the person. 
20 For example, Lambert(1969), Green(l971;1972) and McCawley(l97lb). 
21This account is similar to that given in Green(l972,87), which focusses 
on the standard activity entailed by the verbs rather than specific instru-
ments. "A hammer is thus 'the standard object for striking repeatedly' and 
a nail is 'the standard object for attaching by hammering' (i.e. ' ... by 
driving by striking repeatedly') .... The difference between generic and 
specific uses of instrument nouns would correspond to whether they were 'an 
object for . ' or 'the standard object for ... '." 
Compare this with Larnbert(l969,50) who considers that a sentence such as 
(45) "implies" that a hammer is used, and that sentences referring to any 
instrumental object other than a hammer are comparatives. Thus (i)a is 
paraphrased by Lambert as (i)b. 
(i) a. John hammered the window shut with his fists. 
b. John used his fists like a hannner to shut the window. 
22 Perhaps, X has a hard surface= "Touching the surface of X with 
something, one can imagine that this something cannot become being where 
parts of X are". 
23Notice that Watt(1973) appeals to facts of contrastive stress in 
discussing the verb nail. Presenting the following sentence: 
/ (i) Dognog wanted to nail the boards together, but Gripsnake made 
/ 
him do it with tape. 
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he claims that the antecedent of do it is something like 'fasten together', 
and that sentence (ii), which shows this overtly, is synonymous with (i). 
/ 
(ii) Dognog wanted to fasten the boards together with nails, but 
/ 
Gripsnake made him do it with tape . 
I agree with his postulated antecedent 'fasten together', but not with his 
paraphrase in terms of the ins trumental noun nails. The contrast I suggest 
is not between nails and tape but b e tween t he activity ·entailed in nailing 
(e.g. striking something so that it goes through one object into another, 
holding the former to the latter(se e 7.42 for details), and that entailed 
in fastening with tape. The latter activity, for example, entails neither 
striking nor penetration. 
24 For a semantic representation for a sente nce ::: rom the 'take X off Y' 
group, see the suggestion in Footnote 3, Chapter Six, for the sentence 




wierzbicka(l972,21) suggests that 'species names' (e.g. cat, apple, 
rose) are a type of indefinable expression and might be represented along 
lines appropriate for proper names. Cat, for instance, might be represented 
as "an animal thinking of which one would say "cat"". 
26
one verb which Nilsen(l973,160) would include here is the verb stub, 
which he claims incorporates the body part toe as instrument and occurs thus 
as a transitive verb. But if this is the case the acceptable sentence 
John stubbed his toe should be anomalous("John did something to his toe with 
his toe"). In addition it is not clear why toe should be an instrument 
rather than an object here, as Langendoen suggests(l970,81) unless John has 
masochistic tendencies and is given to inflicting pain on himself by striking 
his toes against objects. Similar remarks apply in relation to Nilsen's 
suggestion that the verb purse incorporates as instrument the object 'lips'. 
27Anderson's(l968,369) suggested underlying structure for walk is 
"travel on foot". Notice that this structure, with its implied contrast 
between travelling by other means(e.g. on horseback, or by sea, rail or air) 
conceals the fact that in walking the agent moves the instrumental object 
(legs) directly without using anything else. Leaving aside similar 
activities such as running, swimming, crawling, etc., in all other forms of 
travel(horseback, road, rail, etc.) the instrumental object cannot be moved 
directly by the agent's will. Wierzbicka's proposal is more appreciative of 
this point. She suggests(l972,106): 
(i) A is walking along X. 
= A causes his body to be becoming supported by further 
parts of X, 
by causing movements of his legs which cause his legs to be 
becoming s upported, first one, then the other(another), by 




"There is a common path of reasoning that starts from the fact that 
I may speak of my arm or of my leg, or of any part of my body, as 
an external instrument and that concludes that I may therefore 
speak of my body, taken as a whole, as an external instrument. This 
inference from parts to whole, which is more often implicit than 
explicit, is invalid. I may use my arms rather than my legs, my 
head rather than my shoulders, to bring about a certain effect or 
in performing a certain action. I may lose control, for one reason 
or another, of my arms and legs, and of my head and shoulders. They 
may then be thought of as instruments which I, distinguished from 
these instruments, suddenly find that I cannot use. But there is no 
equivalent sense in which I can be said to use my body, taken as a 
whole, in bringing about a certain effect or in performing a certain 
action; for there is scarcely a conceivable opposition between using 
my body, taken as a whole, and using something else, my mind." 
Chapter Eight 
THE VARIETY OF INSTRUMENTAL SENTENCES 
8.1 General 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the variety of syntactic 
means by which English may manifest instrumental action, together with some 
comments on semantic differences between these. In this respect some 
different constructions which have already been considered in previous 
chapters include with NP and use NP to instrumental sentences, and sentences 
containing instrumental incorporation verbs. These types of instrumental 
expression will therefore receive little attention in subsequent sections. 
The chapter follows a pattern of increasing superficial syntactic 
complexity, looking broadly at 'covert' instrumental expressions (8.2), 
instrumental incorporation verbs (8.3), prepositions (8.4) and adverbs (8.5), 
verb-object expressions (8.6), and complex sentences (8.7). 
8.2 Covert Instrumentality 
As we saw in 6.43, in all physical action sentences except those des-
cribing basic actions there is a syntactic position available for the 
expression of an instrument. This follows from the impossibility of an agent 
having a direct effect on anything external to his body without some inter-
mediate instrumental event. Whether this instrumental position is filled in 
a particular surface sentence or not, the semantic representation must take 
into account that the agent brings about some effect on part of the world 
through an event involving something that can be thought of as an instrument. 
In this respect, consider the following sentences: 
(1) a. Mary lifted her arm. 
b. Mary lifted Fred's arm. 
c. Mary lifted Fred's arm with her hand. 
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The first sentence describes a 'basic action' for which no instrumental 
expression is possible (see 6.42). The second sentence provides covertly 
for an instrumental expression, for Mary must lift Fred's arm with something 
(*Mary lifted Fred's arm but she didn't lift it with anything), and sentence 
(l)c represents overtly one possible instrumental phrase for the previous 
sentence. 
This survey of instrumental expressions thus commences with those 
sentences in which the instrumental subject receives 'zero' surface expres-
sion but must be expressed semantically. Such sentences can be thought of 
as providing a 'discontinuous' representation of the instrumental action 
chain suggested in 6.41, for they identify the end participants in the chain 
but conceal the bridging instrumental object and its activity. 
8.3 Instrumental Incorporation 
Examples of this form of instrumental expression have been discussed in 
Chapter Seven. From that examination we may note here that some incorpora-
tion verbs uniquely specify a particular object(e.g. kiss, bite, lick, walk, 
breastfeed, water, salt). Others entail any object with a particular 
property(e.g. cut, saw, slap, nail), while others again(e.g. hammer) are 
inappropriately labelled 'incorporation' verbs, for they refer to an 
instrument with no greater specificity than verbs such as hit and touch. 
8.4 Prepositional Expression 
While with is regarded as the unmarked instrumental preposition, there 
are a number of prepositions which may be found in instrumental sentences. 
Often, it is the use NP to construction which imparts to sentences with these 
prepositions an instrumental sense absent from the simple sentence without 
the use NP to form. For example: 
(2) a. John sliced the bread on the breadboard. 
b. John used the breadboard to slice the bread on. 




In 5.2 and 6.4 some differences were pointed out between with NP, the 
unmarked instrumental preposition, and use NP to, which might be thought of 
as the unmarked sentential construction expressing instrumentality. Those 
remarks will not be repeated here. Notice, however, that the expressions 
with the help of, with the assistance of, etc., may also express 
instrumentality. 
As their terms suggest, these expressions may be used to describe an 
activity which instrumentally supplements an existing activity. It is for 
this reason that they cannot substitute for basic action with phrases: 
(3) a. John hit me with his fist. 
b. *John hit me with the help of his fist. 
(4) a. Mary slapped me with her hand. 
b. *Mary slapped me with the help of her hand. 
They may, however, describe causal activity elsewhere within the instru-
mental chain: 
(5) a. Mary removed the hubcap with the help of a sledgehammer. 
b. John baled the lion up in the corner with the aid of a 
powerful arc light. 
8.42 On, In, Through, etc. 
Whilst these prepositions carry a predominantly locative meaning, such 
that an instrumental sense is usually derived only by contextual implication, 
e.g. note the strong ins trumental imp l i ca t i o n i n the third sente nc e . 
( 6) a. Mary cooked her dinner on the bed. 
b. Mary cooked her dinner on the kitchen bench. 
C. Mary cooked her dinner on the stove. 
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the spatial properties of some objects and the way they are used can result 
in or favour an instrumental expression using the locative preposition 
rather than with. Thus: 
(7) a. Tom grated the cheese on a carrot grater. 
b. Mary spooned out the soup in a ladle. 
c. Julie drank her tea through a straw. 
The instrumental sense of these sentences is strengthened when the use NP to 
construction occurs with them. 
(8) a. Tom used a carrot grater to grate the cheese on. 
b. Mary used a ladle to spoon the soup out in. 
c. Julie used a straw to drink her tea through. 
But even without a use NP to frame and without any instrumental object 
with properties suited to expression with the locative prepositions, 
sentences with these prepositions may occur instrumentally. Consider, as 
one example, the sentences: 
(9) a. John cut his finger on a knife. 
b. John cut his finger with a knife. 
Sentences of the form (9)a have been claimed to be non-instrumental 
(Nilsen 1973) and accidental in sense(Lakoff 1968), but this is not a 
necessary interpretation. Observe, that it conflicts with the following 
instrumental sentence: 
(10) John used a knife to cut his finger on. 
There are three contrasts between sentences (9)a-b. The first suggests 
why (9)a is frequently used to express accidental action, but the remaining 
two delineate semantic relations which point to ways in which sentence (9)a 
might sometimes describe non-accidental behaviour. The first difference is 
that only the sentence (9)b can be paraphrased in terms of John's doing 
something with the knife. Prior to the event then, (9)a entails no contact 
between John and the knife. The step from John's not doing anything with 
the knife in (9)a and the subsequent event being accidental is a short one. 
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The second difference is that in (9)a the knife is thought of as 
stationary while in (9)b it is thought of as moving. To see that this is so 
in (9)b, consider the interpretations of relative motion which arise from 
sentences with unusually large objects. 
(11) a. John cut his finger with the grand piano. 
b. John tore his shirt with the Eiffel Tower. 
c. John scratched himself with a church steeple. 
The operation of making these sentences acceptable entails finding contexts 
in which John could do ,these things with these objects. Suitable contexts 
might include where John is a giant, or where the objects are toys, but such 
always that John can move them to bring about some effect. 
The third difference follows from the second, and concerns the relative 
movement of an edge of the knife and John's finger. In (9)b it is the knife 
edge that moves into his finger, whereas in (9)a the semantic representation 
would need to show that it is John's finger that moves onto the knife edge. 
The semantic representation for these sentences could then be partially 





John cut himself on the knife. 
... Non-surface parts of John's finger became being in contact 
with an edged part of the knife. 
John cut his finger with the knife. 
... An edged part of the knife became being in contact with 
non-surface parts of John's finger. 
With this picture of the converse relation between edge and finger in 
'cutting on' and 'cutting with', there is no difficulty accepting that one 
could quite intentionally cut oneself on something. 
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8.43 ~ 
A number of different classes of~ relevant to this chapter have been 
identified by various authors. One, the passive QY_, identifies the agent 
who is involved in any instrumental action. Another, the 'method'~, 
(present in John cleaned the car by rubbing it with a wet chamois) is 
discussed in 8.7. Three others, the 'instrumental'~, the 'means' :ey_ and 
the 'vehicle' .ey, are discussed below. 
Fillmore(l968a,32) suggests that the instrumental notion is marked by 
the preposition~, rather than with, if there is no agent present. I have 
already responded to this suggestion in 6.2 by arguing that if there is no 
agent entailed then no instrument can be assumed either and by showing that 
sentences of the form Fillmore describe$ e.g. He was killed by a knife) can 
be expressed semantically merely in terms of two causally related events. 
There are some other~ expressions, however, which seem to identify 
an instrumental-means component within the instrumental chain. One group, 
the 'means'~, defines a small set of nouns(e.g. hand, willpower, mechanical 
means, computer) referring to motive forces, while another set identifies a 
range of methods of travel(e.g. car, train, plane, taxi, bus, etc.). Both 
groups are capable of paraphrase in terms of use NP to, e.g. 
(14) a. John solved his problem by computer. 
b. John used a computer to solve his problem. 
(15) a. Fred came to Sydney by train. 
b. Fred used a train to get himself to Sydney. 
and they both map on to the instrumental schema details of the activity by 
which the agent brings about the final event. 
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8.5 Adverbs 
Only a handful of adverbs give expression to any details of the instru-
mental situation. These adverbs include manually, mechanically, electronic-
ally, and electrically. In this .:l:Y_ form they constitute a very small 
closed semantic set(*nuclearly, *solarly), such that the assertion of any 
one term has the effect of denying the other members (cf. the term by itself 
in 6.24). As far as the instrumental chain is concerned these adverbs 
identify the energy source involved · in the instrument activity. The set is 
a suppletive one for it seems to be continued in the preposition ~(e.g. 
by nuclear(steam., solar, thermal) power(or energy). 
8.6 Verb-Object Expressions 
This section concerns the simple V-NP sequence where the verb itself 
expresses instrumentality and the grammatical object names that physical 
object which is used instrumentally. The primary example are the verbs use 
and employ, although utilise may be acceptable to some speakers. 
(16) a. John used a rotary hoe (?a farm labourer). 
b. Mary employed a farm labourer (?a rotary hoe). 
c. Jane utilise,d her time (?the scraps of fabric) well. 
These sentences focus statically on the agent 'end' of the instrumental 
chain, concealing both the activity in which the object is involved(e.g. in 
(16)a, perhaps being pushed through a paddock while its blades are turning), 
and the purpose for which it is being so used(e.g. to break up the soil). 
With respect to the instrumental chain and the way it is encoded into 
surface structure, notice that passivised with NP instrumental sentences 
from which the agent has been deleted(e.g. The soil was broken up with a 
rotary hoe) are the converse of sentences (16)a-c, since they focus on the 
object 'end' of the instrumental chain. 
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Notice in (16)a-b the complementary distribution of use and employ with 
respect to animate and inanimate objects. The questioned phrase in each 
becomes acceptable only when the rest of the instrumental chain is 
mentioned. Thus: 
(17) a. John used a farm laoourer to operate his rotary hoe. 
b. Mary employed a rotary hoe to break up the dried out paddock. 
8.7 Complex Sentences 
As the complexity of the surface syntax increases, so the need for 
elliptical representation of the instrumental chain decreases. From a 
variety of different forms, the one to be selected depends on the particular 
perspective of the instrumental chain that is required. In this regard, 
consider the following possibilities. 
(18) a. John used a knife to kill the monster. , 
b. John killed the monster, using a knife. 
c. Because John did something(to the monster) with the knife, 
the monster died. 
d. John killed the monster, by doing something to it with the 
knife. 
The first sentence represents the use NP to construction, which I have 
called the unmarked sentential instrumental expression. This construction 
provides a linear representation of the instrumental chain; it focusses on 
the instrument which links the agent and the consequent event, and it entails 
that the agent intended to do what he did. 
Sentence (18)b is also intentional, but it emphasises summarily the 
total action(John killed the monster). It differs semantically from a simple 
with NP sentence, however, in that the substitution of using for with renders 
the killing intentional. 
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Sentences (18)c-d differ from the previous two in that they do not 
entail that the agent acted intentionally. Both have emphases of their own, 
(18)c highlighting the causal relationship between what John did and the 
consequent event, and (18)d, the 'method' ey, elaborating u:p::>n the agent's 
activity. 
For a final example, consider the expression instrumental in. This 
expression, which takes only animate subjects (*The washing machine was 
instrumental in cleaning the clothes) and introduces only embedded sentences 
or derived nominals (*Mary was instrumental in the kitchen), seems to pin-
point an animate instrument within the chain - someone who brings about for 
X what X wants. Not unnaturally given its animate subject, it favours 
contexts such as business and administration where people typically act on 
behalf of other people. Thus: 
(19) a. John was instrumental in getting me a bank loan. 
b. Mary was instrumental in arranging an interview for you. 
8.8 Summary 
We have seen that there are numerous surface structures by which the 
instrumental notion may be manifested. With various degrees of detail, they 
enable selective illumination of different combinations of participants, 
activities and relationships within the instrumental chain. 
1 
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NOTE TO CHAPTER EIGHT 
1The pre_IX)sition from is often discussed as one with an instrumental 
force in some contexts. Thus Nilsen(l973,84) suggests that from introduces 
an instrumental case in the following. 
(i) He died from an overdose of sleeping pills. 
Sentences like this and The door opened from pressure seem to me to encapsu-
late a pure causal relationship. There is no suggestion of a paraphrase in 
terms of the agent using the overdose to kill himself, for instance(someone 
else may have administered the pills). 
Chapter Nine 
CONCLUSION 
This study has investigated the meanings of a variety of instrumental 
action sentences. Basic action sentences to one side, instrumental action 
sentences turn out to possess amazing generality, embracing all situations 
where someone who wants something modifies some part of the world through the 
action of part of his body. As a consequence, the instrumental notion comes 
to be indivisible from action and associated notions involved in action. 
In reviewing earlier accounts of instrumental sentences, I have 
suggested that by virtue of semantic limitations, particularly of theory and 
formalism, which were placed on their studies, important aspects of the 
instrumental notion were neglected. In my own treatment of instrumental 
sentences, therefore, I attempted to delineate the notions involved in 
instrumental action and to incorporate them consistently in semantic repre-
sentations. These notions turned out to comprise: agency, movement, 
contact and causation. While their employment in semantic representations is 
tantamount to a decomposition of the instrumental notion, none of these 
notions is considered to be semantically primitive. 
In relation to the aims of the thesis, I have described in some detail, 
especially in Chapters Three to Six, action sentences which have been 
referred to as instrumental sentences in the literature. Presenting semantic 
representations in terms of the notions mentioned above, I have argued that 
the criterion of agency disqualifies many of these from being linguistic 
descriptions of the instrumental notion. As well, against several contem-
porary proposals, I have proposed that the term "want" rather than "intend" 
should become the basic volitional component in instrumental action. 
The assumption that the instrumental notion is semantically undecompos-
able is one that the thesis has challenged most seriously in an oblique 
fashion, through the semantic representations of many instrumental sentences 
which, in containing no reference to any semantic category of instrument, 
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are their own argument against the primitivity of the notion. 
Some representative networks of semantic relationships have been 
focussed on in examining verbs of instrumental incorporation and,consistent 
with what one might expect of a notion which deals centrally with human 
action in the world, the instrumental notion is discovered to be susceptible 
of expression in a wide variety of surface structure forms, enabling 
attention to be focussed on different aspects of instrumental action. 
It is the semantic theory sketched in Chapter Two which has suggested 
a language capable of talking about the semantic complexities of instrumental 
action. The theory has not constructed a language, however, for the terms 
of this language are, paradoxically, merely simple terms of language itself. 
This theory has also discouraged tendencies to postulate any artificial, 
formal semantic units, and conspired to produce semantic representations 
which, one would hope, need little further empirical validation beyond 
themselves. While the theory is not without its shortcomings, its empirical 
soundness and its applicability to any area of semantic analysis, make it an 
attractive approach for further development. 
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